Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly

Bakó, Barna and Kálecz-Simon, András (2013) Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly. Society and Economy, 35 (4). pp. 531-538. DOI 10.1556/SocEc.2013.0004

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Official URL: http://akademiai.com/content/k42166101h69h557/

Abstract

The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help collusion.

Item Type:

Article

Uncontrolled Keywords:

strategic delegation, managerial incentives

JEL classification:

D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Divisions:

Faculty of Economics > Department of Macroeconomics
Faculty of Economics > Department of Microeconomics

Subjects:

Mathematics, Econometrics

Funders:

Lendület Fiatal Kutatói Program / Momentum Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences