Corvinus
Corvinus

Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly

Bakó, Barna and Kálecz-Simon, András (2013) Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly. Society and Economy, 35 (4). pp. 531-538. DOI 10.1556/SocEc.2013.0004

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Official URL: http://akademiai.com/content/k42166101h69h557/


Abstract

The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help collusion.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:strategic delegation, managerial incentives
JEL classification:D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Funders:Lendület Fiatal Kutatói Program / Momentum Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
DOI:10.1556/SocEc.2013.0004
ID Code:1158
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:08 Apr 2013 10:14
Last Modified:13 Oct 2014 15:05

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