Puppe, Clemens and Tasnádi, Attila (2014) Axiomatic districting. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.
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The final version appeared in Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 44, no. 1, p. 31-50. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0824-9
Abstract
In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the "optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP |
| Series Number / Identification Number: | 2014/01 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | districting, gerrymandering |
| JEL classification: | D72 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics |
| Subjects: | Mathematics, Econometrics |
| References: | |
| ID Code: | 1464 |
| Deposited By: | Ádám Hoffmann |
| Deposited On: | 27 Feb 2014 14:01 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Mar 2015 07:34 |
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