Bakó, Barna and Tasnádi, Attila (2014) The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.
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Abstract
In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP |
| Series Number / Identification Number: | 2014/11 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Mixed duopoly, Cournot, Bertrand-Edgeworth |
| JEL classification: | D43 - Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L32 - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics Faculty of Economics > Department of Microeconomics |
| Subjects: | Mathematics, Econometrics |
| Projects: | TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/ 2-11/1-2012-0001, MTA-BCE "Lendület" Strategic Interactions Research Group, OTKA K-101224 |
| References: | |
| ID Code: | 1655 |
| Deposited By: | Ádám Hoffmann |
| Deposited On: | 17 Jul 2014 14:37 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Jul 2014 11:31 |
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