Corvinus
Corvinus

The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies

Bakó, Barna and Tasnádi, Attila (2014) The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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Abstract

In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2014/11
Uncontrolled Keywords:Mixed duopoly, Cournot, Bertrand-Edgeworth
JEL classification:D43 - Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L32 - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Projects:TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/ 2-11/1-2012-0001, MTA-BCE "Lendület" Strategic Interactions Research Group, OTKA K-101224
ID Code:1655
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:17 Jul 2014 14:37
Last Modified:25 Jul 2014 11:31

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