A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game

Attila Tasnádi

Department of Mathematics, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration, Fővám tér 8, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary


Abstract

We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the firms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the firms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with different reservation wages and that a worker’s productivity is independent of his type. We show that equilibrium unemployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the efficient allocation of workers would result in full employment.

Keywords: Unemployment; Bertrand-Edgeworth; wage-setting games

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1 Introduction

In the literature we can find various micro-theoretic models of explaining unemployment in the market, see for example, Weiss (1980), Shapiro and Stiglitz 1

Email address: attila.tasnadi@bkae.hu (Attila Tasnádi).
URL: www.bkae.hu/~tasnadi (Attila Tasnádi).
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(1984), Ma and Weiss (1993), Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) among many others. These works have the common feature that they neglect the strategic interaction between wage-setting firms competing for workers. In recent papers Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (2000), Thissse and Zenou (2000) and Wauthy and Zenou (2002) showed that unemployment may arise as an equilibrium of an oligopsonistic wage-setting game. Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (2000) and Thissse and Zenou (2000) based their analysis on Salop’s (1979) circular city. Wauthy and Zenou (2002) considered a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the labour force is heterogeneous with respect to education cost and in which to work for the high-technology firm requires more education. In this paper we present another type of wage-setting game to explain unemployment. Our model may be regarded as an adaptation of Bertrand-Edgeworth’s competition to the labour market.

To keep our model as simple as possible we distinguish only between two types of workers, which differ in their reservation wages. However, both types of workers have the same productivity. Moreover, there is a fixed finite number of workers of each type. We assume that the two firms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity, but homogeneous with respect to the workers’ types. In addition, the firms have a limited number of workplaces. In this market we will establish that under certain conditions equilibrium unemployment emerges.

Though reservation wages are exogenously given in our model one might think about how the difference in reservation wages between two types of workers, whom we assumed to be equally productive, may emerge in real markets. One example would be to consider male and female workers as the two different types of workers. Supposing they have the same level of education, they can be regarded as equally productive. However, female workers may have smaller reservation wages because of possible discrimination or different opportunity cost of time. Another example would be to distinguish between native and ethnic minority workers. Again even if these two types of workers are equally productive, workers belonging to ethnic minorities may have lower reservation wages due to possible discrimination.

There is some relation between the Harris and Todaro (1970) model, which also gives us a third example satisfying our assumption of equally productive workers with different reservation wages, and the model presented in this paper. The two types of workers can be interpreted as rural and urban workers. The low-productivity firm operates in the rural area while the high-productivity firm operates in the urban area. Rural and urban workers both satisfy equally the requirements of the firms. However, urban workers have higher reservation wages, which may be caused by higher unemployment benefits or by higher costs of living. Thus, the emerging equilibrium unemployment results from
the inflow of workers from the rural area into the urban area. The main
difference between the present model and that of Harris and Todaro (1970)
lies in the wage determination process since we have endowed the firms with
strategic wage-setting power.

The equilibrium of the wage-setting game predicts to us how many workers
of each type will be assigned to a particular firm. In this respect our model
can be regarded as an assignment model which has the following interesting
feature: Unemployment in the market may exist though the workers have the
same productivity (skills) and the total number of jobs is equal to the total
number of workers. For an overview of assignment models in the job market
we refer to Sattinger (1993).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
formal description of our model. Section 3 analyzes the capacity-constrained
wage-setting duopsonistic game and identifies those conditions under which
unemployment exists in the market. Section 4 concludes our paper. The more
technical part on the mixed-strategy equilibrium is contained in the Appendix.

2 The framework

Our labour market will be very simple. There are two different types of workers
denoted by \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). We assume that workers belonging to the same type have
all equal reservation wages. Let us denote these values by \( r_\alpha \) and \( r_\beta \). We shall
assume that \( r_\alpha < r_\beta \). Suppose that the market contains \( m_\alpha \) and \( m_\beta \) workers
of type \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) respectively. For simplicity we assume that there are only two
firms denoted by \( A \) and \( B \). We assume that, independently of the worker’s
type, a worker employed by firm \( A \) generates \( \rho_A \) and a worker employed by
firm \( B \) generates \( \rho_B \) revenue. This assumption means that the firms do not
care which type of worker they employ. We assume that firm \( B \) has a higher
productivity, that is, \( \rho_B > \rho_A \). In addition, we assume that \( r_\alpha \leq \rho_A \) and
\( r_\beta \leq \rho_B \), which implies that both types of workers can generate a surplus at
a certain firm. Suppose that the firms have a limited number of workplaces
denoted by \( n_A \) and \( n_B \). The wages set by the firms are \( w_A \) and \( w_B \). We say
that there is unemployment in the market, if there are workers who have
reservation wages less or equal to the higher wage offer, and did not get a
job in the market specified in the remainder of this section. Since we do not
want to consider ‘structural’ unemployment, we assume that \( m_\alpha = n_A \) and
\( m_\beta = n_B \). Under these circumstances an efficient allocation of workers would
be if all \( \alpha \)-type workers were assigned to firm \( A \) at wage \( r_\alpha \) and all \( \beta \)-type

\footnote{In order to maintain the differences in reservation wages in a dynamic context,
one might think of rural workers employed in the urban area as commuters.}
workers were assigned to firm B at wage $r_\beta$.

We will consider the following wage-setting game: First, the firms make a wage offer. Next, the workers are trying to get a job with the firm making the higher wage offer if the offer exceeds or equals their reservation wages. If there are no more vacancies at the high-wage firm, the workers turn to the firm with the lower wage offer. We have to specify the strategic game describing the situation in the market. Let the firms’ strategy sets be $W_A := [0, \infty)$ and $W_B := [0, \infty)$ respectively. Clearly, nobody will apply at a firm setting a wage lower than $r_\alpha$. It is also obvious that a firm setting a wage greater or equal to $r_\beta$ can fill all its workplaces since even if its opponent is setting a higher wage, the workers not obtaining a job with the high-wage firm will apply to the low-wage firm.

If at least one firm picks a wage from the interval $[r_\alpha, r_\beta)$ and the other firm from the interval $[0, r_\beta)$, then only $\alpha$-type workers will apply. Moreover, if they set the same wage, we assume that the two firms share in expected value the $\alpha$-type workers in proportion to the size of their workplaces. If firm A sets the higher wage, then it will employ all the $\alpha$-type workers, while if firm B sets the higher wage, it will employ $\min\{m_\alpha, m_\beta\}$ workers.

Suppose that firm B sets a wage greater or equal to $r_\beta$ and that firm A sets a wage in $[r_\alpha, r_\beta)$. We assume that the number of $\alpha$-type workers employed by firm B is determined through a random sample of size $m_\beta$, where the sampling is done without replacement from an urn containing $m_\alpha + m_\beta$ workers. Then $Y$ has also a hypergeometric distribution.

In a similar way as in the previous paragraph we can determine the expected profits of the firms for the case when firm A sets a wage greater or equal to $r_\beta$ and firm B sets a wage in $[r_\alpha, r_\beta)$. We assume that the number of $\alpha$-type workers employed by firm A, denoted by $Y$, is determined through a random sample of size $m_\alpha$, where the sampling is done without replacement from an urn containing $m_\alpha + m_\beta$ workers. Then $Y$ has also a hypergeometric distribution.
distribution, i.e., the probability of hiring \( k \in \{0, 1, \ldots, m_\alpha\} \) \( \alpha \)-type workers by firm \( A \) equals

\[
Pr(Y = k) = \binom{m_\alpha}{k} \binom{m_\beta}{m_\alpha - k}.
\]

Now we have unemployment in the market with the exception of the low probability event that \( m_\alpha - Y = m_\beta \), because \( \beta \)-type workers will not apply for a job with firm \( B \). Note that \( Pr(m_\alpha - Y > m_\beta) = 0 \) and expected unemployment equals \( m_\beta - (m_\alpha - E Y) = m_\beta \frac{m_\beta}{m_\alpha + m_\beta} \).

Summarizing the cases described in the preceding paragraphs, firm \( A \) has an expected profit function \( E\pi_A(w_A, w_B) := \)

\[
\begin{cases}
(r_A - w_A) m_\alpha, & \text{if } w_A \geq r_\beta; \\
(r_A - w_A) m_\alpha \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\alpha + m_\beta}, & \text{if } w_A \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_B \geq r_\beta; \\
(r_A - w_A) \max\{m_\alpha - m_\beta, 0\}, & \text{if } w_A, w_B \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_A < w_B; \\
(r_A - w_A) m_\alpha \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\alpha + m_\beta}, & \text{if } w_A, w_B \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_A = w_B; \\
(r_A - w_A) m_\alpha, & \text{if } w_A \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_A > w_B; \\
0, & \text{if } w_A < r_\alpha.
\end{cases}
\]

and firm \( B \) has expected profit function \( E\pi_B(w_A, w_B) := \)

\[
\begin{cases}
(r_B - w_B) m_\beta, & \text{if } w_B \geq r_\beta; \\
(r_B - w_B) m_\alpha \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\alpha + m_\beta}, & \text{if } w_B \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_A \geq r_\beta; \\
0, & \text{if } w_A, w_B \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_A > w_B; \\
(r_B - w_B) m_\alpha \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\alpha + m_\beta}, & \text{if } w_A, w_B \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_A = w_B; \\
(r_B - w_B) \min\{m_\alpha, m_\beta\}, & \text{if } w_B \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \text{ and } w_A < w_B; \\
0, & \text{if } w_B < r_\alpha.
\end{cases}
\]

Assuming that the firms are risk neutral, they will play game

\[
\Gamma := \langle \{A, B\}, (W_A, W_B), (E\pi_A, E\pi_B) \rangle.
\]

Notice that we have not included the workers themselves as strategic players, but we have included their behaviour in the specification of \( (E\pi_A, E\pi_B) \).
3 The equilibrium of the wage-setting game

Our aim is to determine the equilibrium of game $\Gamma$ and those conditions in the market under which unemployment exists. First, we investigate the case in which firm $A$’s productivity allows firm $A$ to make profits even through hiring $\beta$-type workers, that is, in the following we shall assume $\rho_A > r_\beta$. Supposing that firm $B$ sets wage $r_\beta$ we shall denote by $w^*_A$ the wage at which firm $A$ is indifferent to whether it sets wage $r_\beta$ or $w^*_A \in (-\infty, r_\beta)$, that is, $w^*_A$ is the solution of equation

$$(\rho_A - r_\beta) m_\alpha = (\rho_A - w^*_A) m_\alpha \cdot m_\alpha + m_\beta.$$ 

By solving this equation we obtain that $w^*_A = \frac{1}{m_\alpha}(r_\beta (m_\alpha + m_\beta) - \rho_A m_\beta)$. Clearly, $w^*_A$ may be even less than $r_\alpha$, but we allow this to simplify our analysis. In an analogous way we define the value $w^*_B \in (-\infty, r_\beta)$ as the solution of equation

$$(\rho_B - r_\beta) m_\beta = (\rho_B - w^*_B) m_\alpha \cdot m_\alpha + m_\beta,$$ 

which results in $w^*_B = \frac{1}{m_\alpha}(r_\beta (m_\alpha + m_\beta) - \rho_B m_\beta)$. Observe that we have $r_\beta > w^*_A > w^*_B$ because of $\rho_B > \rho_A > r_\beta$.

The following proposition describes the outcome of game $\Gamma$ in case of $\rho_A > r_\beta$.

Proposition 1 Suppose that $\rho_A > r_\beta$. Then in game $\Gamma$ we have the following cases:

1. If $w^*_A < r_\alpha$, then the unique equilibrium equals $(w_A, w_B) = (r_\beta, r_\beta)$ and there is no unemployment.
2. If $w^*_A > r_\alpha$ and $w^*_B \leq r_\alpha$, then the unique equilibrium equals $(w_A, w_B) = (r_\alpha, r_\beta)$ and expected unemployment equals $m_\beta \cdot m_\alpha + m_\beta$.
3. If $w^*_A = r_\alpha$, then $(w_A, w_B) = (r_\alpha, r_\beta)$ and $(w_A, w_B) = (r_\beta, r_\beta)$ are both equilibria.
4. If $w^*_B > r_\alpha$, then an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.

Proof. First, observe that neither of the two firms will set a wage above $r_\beta$. In addition, any wage below $r_\alpha$ is dominated by wage $r_\beta$. A strategy profile $(w_A, w_B) \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta] \times [r_\alpha, r_\beta]$ cannot be an equilibrium profile because; if $w_A = w_B$, then both firms have the incentive to unilaterally increase their wages slightly, and if $w_A \neq w_B$, then the firm setting the higher wage can increase its profit by reducing its wage slightly. Hence, in an equilibrium at least one firm has to set wage $r_\beta$.  

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Case (1): Suppose that \( w_A^* < r_\alpha \). We already know that at least one firm, say firm \( A \), sets wage \( r_\beta \). Then from \( w_B^* < r_\alpha \) it follows that every wage \( w_B \in [r_\alpha, r_\beta) \) is dominated by wage \( r_\beta \). The same argument can be repeated if we assume that firm \( B \) sets wage \( r_\beta \).

Cases (2) and (3): We will split our analysis into two subcases: (i) \( w_B^* < r_\alpha \) and (ii) \( w_B^* = r_\alpha \). We start with (i). Suppose that \( w_A^* \geq r_\alpha \) and \( w_B^* < r_\alpha \). We know that in a possible equilibrium at least one firm sets wage \( r_\beta \). If \( w_A = r_\beta \), then \( w_B = r_\beta \) follows since firm \( B \) realizes less profit by setting a wage below \( r_\beta \) than by setting wage \( r_\beta \). However, if \( w_B = r_\beta \), then wage \( r_\alpha \) is a best reply for firm \( A \) because \( E\pi_A(r_\alpha, r_\beta) \geq E\pi_A(w_A^*, r_\beta) = E\pi_A(r_\beta, r_\beta) \). In addition, \( E\pi_B(r_\alpha, r_\beta) = E\pi_B(r_\beta, r_\beta) > E\pi_B(r_\beta, r_\alpha) = E\pi_B(r_\alpha, r_\alpha) \). Thus, \((w_A, w_B) = (r_\alpha, r_\beta)\) is an equilibrium. Observe that \((w_A, w_B) = (r_\beta, r_\beta)\) is another equilibrium if \( w_A^* = r_\alpha \). Now we turn to subcase (ii). Suppose that \( w_B = r_\beta \). But then firm \( A \) sets wage \( r_\alpha \) since \( E\pi_A(r_\alpha, r_\beta) = E\pi_A(w_A^*, r_\beta) < E\pi_A(r_\alpha, r_\beta) \) because \( w_B^* = r_\alpha \) implies \( w_A^* > r_\alpha \). We obtain that \((r_\alpha, r_\beta)\) is an equilibrium strategy profile since \( E\pi_B(r_\alpha, r_\beta) = E\pi_B(r_\beta, r_\beta) = E\pi_B(r_\beta, r_\alpha) = E\pi_B(r_\alpha, r_\alpha) \). Now suppose that \( w_A = r_\beta \). But then firm \( B \) has two best replies: \( w_B = r_\beta \) and \( w_B = r_\alpha \), where in the first case \((r_\beta, r_\beta)\) cannot be an equilibrium strategy profile since firm \( A \) would deviate to wage \( r_\alpha \). Consider the second possibility of \( w_B = r_\alpha \). However, this is in contradiction with \( w_A = r_\beta \) being an equilibrium strategy of firm \( A \) since \( E\pi_A(r_\beta, r_\alpha) = E\pi_A(r_\beta, r_\beta) = E\pi_A(w_A^*, r_\beta) < E\pi_A(w_A^*, r_\alpha) \). Thus, we conclude that \((r_\alpha, r_\beta)\) is the unique equilibrium strategy profile in subcase (ii).

Case (4): Suppose that \( w_B^* > r_\alpha \). As was shown in the first paragraph of this proof, in an eventual pure-strategy equilibrium at least one firm has to set wage \( r_\beta \). Suppose that \( w_A = r_\beta \). But then firm \( B \) sets wage \( r_\alpha \) since \( E\pi_B(r_\beta, r_\beta) = E\pi_B(r_\beta, w_B^*) < E\pi_B(r_\beta, r_\alpha) \). However, this is in contradiction with \( w_A = r_\beta \) being an equilibrium strategy of firm \( A \) since \( E\pi_A(r_\beta, r_\alpha) = E\pi_A(r_\beta, r_\beta) = E\pi_A(w_A^*, r_\beta) < E\pi_A(w_A^*, r_\alpha) \). The same argumentation can be repeated if we assume that \( w_B = r_\beta \). Hence, we conclude that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. □

In case (1) of Proposition [1] wage \( r_\alpha \) is high enough to prevent the firms from setting low wages. Therefore, we have full employment in the market. Let us remark that in the full employment case \( \alpha \)-type workers may be employed by firm \( B \) and \( \beta \)-type workers may be employed by firm \( A \).

Case (2) of Proposition [1] occurs if only firm \( B \) does not strictly prefer setting wage \( r_\alpha \) to \( r_\beta \) whenever its opponent sets wage \( r_\beta \). In this case firm \( B \) has no vacancies but firm \( A \) cannot find enough workers since \( \beta \)-type workers will not apply to firm \( A \) and only those \( \alpha \)-type workers will apply to firm \( A \) who could not obtain a job with firm \( B \). Hence, all \( \alpha \)-type workers get employed and there
are \(\beta\)-type workers seeking for a job with firm \(B\). In particular, we can expect that \(m_\beta \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\alpha + m_\beta}\) \(\beta\)-type workers will not get a job. Thus, unemployment exists in the market, which arises because of the inefficient allocation of workers to firm \(B\). All workers apply first to the high-wage firm \(B\) and workers are hired through a first-come, first-employed mechanism, where each order of arrival is assumed to be equally probable.\(^3\) Unemployment is caused by a mismatching between firms and workers. However, there is a serious reason why we have to worry about matching workers with firms; in particular, the high-wage firm cannot employ all the workers who want to be employed with the high-wage firm, since the firm has only a limited number of workplaces. Hence, competition is relaxed by the introduction of capacity constraints, as is usually the case in Bertrand-Edgeworth type games. Among other reasons this makes our model behave differently from Waughty and Zenou (2002).

Unemployment could also be explained by a lack of coordination between firms. However, to avoid the emerging unemployment firm \(B\) has to introduce a different selection procedure. Clearly, firm \(B\) has no incentive to employ a different kind of selection procedure, since this might imply additional costs. Hence, one cannot expect that this type of unemployment disappears if the game is repeated infinitely.

Now turning to case (3) we can observe that either case (1) or case (2) emerges. Finally, case (4) of Proposition 1 occurs if both firms set wage \(r_\alpha\) whenever they believe that their opponent sets wage \(r_\beta\). Unfortunately, in this case an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. However, in a mixed-strategy equilibrium a non-efficient assignment will arise with positive probability, that is, either there will be unemployed \(\beta\)-type workers or \(\beta\)-type workers will not apply for a job at all, since \((r_\beta, r_\beta)\) cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies and \((r_\beta, r_\beta)\) is the only undominated outcome leading to an efficient assignment of workers. The mixed-strategy equilibrium can be found in the Appendix.

We still have to investigate the case of \(\rho_A \leq r_\beta\). Clearly, if even \(\rho_A < r_\beta\), the workers will not be assigned to the firms efficiently, since even if firm \(B\) sets wage \(r_\beta\), \(\alpha\)-type workers will be employed by firm \(B\) with the exception of the low-probability event of \(X = 0\).

The following proposition determines the Nash equilibrium of the capacity-constrained wage-setting game \(\Gamma\) for the case of \(\rho_A \leq r_\beta\).

**Proposition 2** Suppose that \(\rho_A \leq r_\beta\). Then in game \(\Gamma\) we have the following cases:

1. If \(E\pi_B (r_\alpha, r_\beta) \geq E\pi_B (0, r_\alpha)\), then the unique equilibrium is \((r_\alpha, r_\beta)\) and

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\(^3\) This results in the expected assignment of \(\alpha\)-type workers to firm \(B\) described in Section 2.
expected unemployment equals $m_β \frac{m_α}{m_α + m_β}$.

(2) If $Eπ_B (r_α, r_β) < Eπ_B (0, r_α)$, then an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.

Proof. Clearly, firm $A$ will never set its wage above $ρ_A$ while firm $B$ will never set its wage above $r_β$. In addition, any wage below $r_α$ is dominated by wage $r_β$ for firm $B$ and at least weakly dominated by wage $r_α$ for firm $A$.

First, suppose that $ρ_A < r_β$. Then a strategy profile $(w_A, w_B) \in [r_α, ρ_A] \times [r_α, ρ_A]$ cannot be an equilibrium profile because; if $w_A = w_B$, then at least firm $B$ has the incentive to unilaterally increase its wage slightly, and if $w_A ≠ w_B$, then the firm setting the higher wage can increase its profit by reducing its wage. Hence, in a possible pure-strategy equilibrium firm $B$ has to set wage $ρ_A$. However, a strategy $w_B \in (ρ_A, r_β)$ cannot be an equilibrium strategy of firm $B$ since $Eπ_B (w_A, w_B)$ is strictly decreasing on $(ρ_A, r_β)$ in $w_B$ for any fixed $w_A \in [0, ρ_A]$. Thus, in a possible pure-strategy equilibrium firm $B$ has to set wage $r_β$. This implies that firm $A$ has to set wage $r_α$.

Second, in case of $ρ_A = r_β$ strategy profile $(r_β, r_β)$ cannot be an equilibrium profile since then $Eπ_A (r_β, r_β) = 0$, while $Eπ_A (r_α, r_β) > 0$. Through repeating the argumentation of the previous paragraph one can show that a strategy profile $(w_A, w_B) \in [r_α, ρ_A] \times [r_α, ρ_A]$ cannot be an equilibrium profile. Hence, we obtain that profile $(r_α, r_β)$ is the only one which can still be a pure-strategy equilibrium.

Finally, we have to determine the condition under which $(r_α, r_β)$ is a Nash equilibrium. First, it can be easily checked that $Eπ_A (r_α, r_β) ≥ Eπ_A (w_A, r_β)$ for all $w_A \in W_A$. Second, we need $Eπ_B (r_α, r_β) ≥ Eπ_B (r_α, w_B)$ for all $w_B \in W_B$. Taking into consideration that $Eπ_B (r_α, w_B)$ is strictly decreasing on $(r_α, r_β)$ in $w_B$ we obtain that

$$Eπ_B (r_α, r_β) ≥ \lim_{w_B \searrow r_α} Eπ_B (r_α, w_B) = Eπ_B (0, r_α)$$

is a sufficient condition for $(r_α, r_β)$ being a Nash equilibrium. In addition, if $Eπ_B (r_α, r_β) < Eπ_B (0, r_α)$, there exists a sufficiently small $ε > 0$ such that $Eπ_B (r_α, r_β) < Eπ_B (r_α, r_α + ε)$. We conclude that $Eπ_B (r_α, r_β) ≥ Eπ_B (0, r_α)$ is a necessary and sufficient condition for $(r_α, r_β)$ being a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. □

Condition $Eπ_B (r_α, r_β) ≥ Eπ_B (0, r_α)$ is equivalent to

$$m_β (ρ_B - r_β) ≥ \min \{m_α, m_β\} (ρ_B - r_α).$$
Thus, clearly $m_\beta > m_\alpha$ is a necessary condition for $E\pi_B (r_\alpha, r_\beta) \geq E\pi_B (0, r_\alpha)$. Moreover, if $m_\beta$ is increased sufficiently while $m_\alpha, r_\alpha, r_\beta, \rho_A$ and $\rho_B$ are kept fixed, then $(r_\alpha, r_\beta)$ will become a pure-strategy equilibrium.

Although in case (2) of Proposition 2 we did not determine the outcome of game $\Gamma$ we know that an efficient outcome with full employment is not possible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, since firm $A$ will never set a wage above $\rho_A$. Thus, if $\rho_A < r_\beta$, we have either unemployment with vacancies at firm $A$ and unemployed $\beta$-type workers, or a total of $m_\beta$ vacancies and $\beta$-type workers will not apply for a job.

4 Concluding remarks

In this paper we considered a wage-setting duopsonistic game in which the firms differ in their productivity and the workers in their reservation wages. To simplify the analysis we assumed that there are only two firms and two possible levels of reservation wages. It would be interesting to determine the outcome of a more general setting with $n$ firms in the market and $m$ different levels of reservation wages. However, the number of cases to be investigated increases rapidly as $m$ or $n$ increases and therefore, this generalization would take much space.

Under certain conditions we pointed out the existence of unemployment (Propositions 1 and 2). In particular, unemployment emerges because $\alpha$-type workers may occupy better paid jobs, which would be acceptable even for $\beta$-type workers. Thus, we explain unemployment through a non-efficient assignment of workers to firms. An interesting feature of the model is that unemployment may emerge although the workers have the same productivity (skills). In addition, in case of unemployment there are also unfilled vacancies at the firm setting the lower wage. The coexistence of unemployment and unfilled vacancies has been demonstrated, for example, by Gottfries and McCormick (1995) in a different setting.

To demonstrate the existence of unemployment in our job market we have applied random rationing of $\alpha$-type workers. This resulted in the application of the input market equivalent of the so-called random rationing rule (at least in expected value), which is well-known in the literature of price-setting games in output markets. We refer to Vives (1999) for a description of rationing rules in product markets.

An appealing way to resolve the assumption of equally productive workers would be to consider a model like Wauthy and Zenous (2002). In particular, consider the $\alpha$-type workers as low-skilled workers and the $\beta$-type workers as
high-skilled workers. Now suppose that $\alpha$-type workers face education costs $E_A^\alpha$ and $E_B^\alpha$ if they want to work for firms $A$ and $B$ respectively. Define $E_A^\beta$ and $E_B^\beta$ in an analogous way. Given that the $\alpha$-type workers are the low-skilled ones and firm $A$ is the low-productivity firm it would be natural to assume that $E_A^\alpha > E_B^\alpha$, $E_A^\beta > E_B^\beta$, $E_A^\alpha < E_B^\beta$ and $E_A^\beta < E_B^\beta$. Now even if we maintain our assumptions imposed on the number of workers and workplaces (that is, $m_\alpha = n_A$ and $m_\beta = n_B$), it can be verified that there is a range of parameter values such that we have full employment and the firms set different wages in contrast to Proposition 1. A more complete analysis of this modified model deserves attention in future research.
In the Appendix we consider case (4) of Proposition 1 in detail. We know that in this case an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist and we start with pointing out that we cannot apply the existence theorems on games with discontinuous payoffs established by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Simon (1987) and Reny (1999) for all parameter values. To verify this latter statement we can restrict ourselves to Reny’s (1999) Corollary 5.2, since the other existence theorems on discontinuous games all follow from Reny’s corollary. In particular, for the case of \(m_a \leq m_B\) we will check that the mixed extension of \(\Gamma' := \langle \{A, B\}, [0, \rho_B]^2, (E\pi_A, E\pi_B) \rangle\) is not better-reply secure at \((r_B, r_B)\). It can be easily verified that game \(\Gamma'\) itself is not better-reply secure at \((r_B, r_B)\), since firm \(i \in \{A, B\}\) could only increase its profit by setting a wage below \(w^*_i\). Now if firm \(i\)'s opponent reduces its wage slightly, then firm \(i\) makes zero profit. Hence, firm \(i\) cannot secure payoffs higher than \(E\pi_i(r_B, r_B)\). However, we have to show that the mixed extension of \(\Gamma'\) is not better-reply secure at the profile in which both firms are setting wage \(r_B\) with probability one. Suppose that firm \(i\) deviates by playing a mixed strategy resulting in higher payoffs than \(E\pi_i(r_B, r_B)\). Now if its opponent sets wage \(r_B - \varepsilon\) with probability one, where \(\varepsilon\) is sufficiently small, then firm \(i\) makes less profit than \(E\pi_i(r_B, r_B)\), since it could only have slightly higher profit with a very low probability while it makes zero profit with a very large probability.

In the following a mixed strategy is a probability measure defined on the \(\sigma\)-algebra of Borel measurable sets on \([0, r_B]\). A mixed-strategy equilibrium \((\mu_A, \mu_B)\) is determined by the following two conditions:

\[
E\pi_A(w_A, \mu_B) \leq \pi^*_A, \quad E\pi_B(\mu_A, w_B) \leq \pi^*_B
\]

(1)

holds true for all \(w_A, w_B \in [0, r_B]\), and

\[
E\pi_A(w_A, \mu_B) = \pi^*_A, \quad E\pi_B(\mu_A, w_B) = \pi^*_B
\]

(2)

holds true \(\mu_A\)-almost everywhere and \(\mu_B\)-almost everywhere, where \(\pi^*_A, \pi^*_B\) stand for the equilibrium profits corresponding to \((\mu_A, \mu_B)\). We shall denote the distribution functions associated with \(\mu_A\) and \(\mu_B\) by \(F_A\) and \(F_B\), respectively.\(^5\)

Propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide the complete mixed-strategy solution for

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\(^4\) Game \(\Gamma'\) is better-reply secure if whenever \((w^*, E\pi^*)\) is in the closure of the graph of its vector payoff function and \(w^*\) is not an equilibrium profile, then there exist an \(\varepsilon > 0\), a player \(i \in \{A, B\}\) and a strategy \(w_i \in [0, \rho_B]\) such that \(E\pi_i(w_i, w'_i) \geq E\pi^*_i + \varepsilon\) for all \(w'_i \in N(w^*_i)\) for some open neighborhood \(N(w^*_i)\) of \(w^*_i\).

\(^5\) We follow the convention that the distribution functions are left-continuous. Hence, \(F_A(w) = \mu_A([0, w])\) and \(F_B(w) = \mu_B([0, w])\) for all \(w \in [0, r_B]\).
case (4) of Proposition 1. One can check that the solutions given by Propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6 satisfy equations (1) and (2). However, in what follows we just provide the mixed-strategy equilibrium and omit the very tedious calculations checking (1) and (2).

For the case of $m_\alpha \leq m_\beta$ we can have two different types of equilibria. The first one is described by the following Proposition.

**Proposition 3** If $\rho_A > r_\beta$, $w^*_B > r_\alpha$, $m_\alpha \leq m_\beta$ and

$$\frac{(\rho_B - r_\beta) m_\beta}{(\rho_B - \rho_A + \frac{(\rho_A - r_\alpha) (\rho_A - r_\beta) m_\alpha}{(\rho_A - r_\alpha) m_\alpha - (\rho_A - r_\beta) m_\beta}) m_\alpha} < 1,$$

then $(\mu_A, \mu_B)$ given by

$$\mu_B (\{r_\beta\}) = \frac{\rho_A - r_\beta}{\rho_A - r_\alpha} m_\alpha + m_\beta, \quad \mu_A (\{r_\alpha\}) = \frac{\rho_B - r_\beta}{\rho_B - r_\alpha} m_\alpha + m_\beta, \quad \mu_A (\{r_\beta\}) = \frac{\mu_A (\{r_\alpha\})}{\frac{\rho_B - r_\beta}{\rho_B - r_\alpha} m_\alpha + m_\beta},$$

is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the corresponding equilibrium profits equal $\pi^*_A = (\rho_A - r_\beta) m_\alpha$ and $\pi^*_B = (\rho_B - r_\beta) m_\beta$.

The following Proposition considers the other possible equilibrium that might arise in case of $m_\alpha \leq m_\beta$.

**Proposition 4** Suppose that $\rho_A > r_\beta$, $w^*_B > r_\alpha$, $m_\alpha \leq m_\beta$ and

$$\frac{(\rho_B - r_\beta) m_\beta}{(\rho_B - \rho_A + \frac{(\rho_A - r_\alpha) (\rho_A - r_\beta) m_\alpha}{(\rho_A - r_\alpha) m_\alpha - (\rho_A - r_\beta) m_\beta}) m_\alpha} \geq 1.$$  \hspace{2cm} (4)

Then $(\mu_A, \mu_B)$ given by

$$\mu_B (\{r_\beta\}) = \frac{\rho_A - r_\beta}{\rho_A - r_\alpha} m_\alpha + m_\beta, \quad \mu_A (\{r_\alpha\}) = \frac{\rho_B - r_\beta}{\rho_B - r_\alpha} m_\alpha + m_\beta, \quad \mu_A (\{r_\beta\}) = \frac{\mu_A (\{r_\alpha\})}{\frac{\rho_B - r_\beta}{\rho_B - r_\alpha} m_\alpha + m_\beta},$$

is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the corresponding equilibrium profits equal $\pi^*_A = (\rho_A - r_\beta) m_\alpha$ and $\pi^*_B = (\rho_B - r_\beta) m_\beta$.

These calculations can be found in a working paper version of this paper (Tasnádi, 2003).
where $\pi(\cdot) = (\pi, \mu)$ then a mixed-strategy equilibrium.

Proposition 5 If $\rho_B > r_\beta$, $w_B^* > r_\alpha$, $m_\alpha > m_\beta$ and
\[(\rho_A - r_\alpha) m_\beta > (r_\beta - r_\alpha) m_\alpha,\] (5)
then a mixed-strategy equilibrium $(\mu_A, \mu_B)$ is given by

\[\mu_A(\{r_\alpha\}) = \frac{\rho_B - r_\beta}{\rho_B - r_\alpha} \frac{m_\alpha + m_\beta}{m_\alpha} - \frac{m_\alpha^2}{m_\beta^2} + 1,\]
\[\mu_B(\{r_\beta\}) = \frac{\rho_A - r_\alpha}{\rho_B - r_\alpha} \frac{m_\alpha + m_\beta}{m_\beta},\]
\[\mu_B([\bar{w}, r_\beta]) = 0, \quad \mu_A([\bar{w}, r_\beta]) = 0,\]
\[\mu_A(\{r_\alpha\}) = \frac{m_\alpha + m_\beta}{m_\beta} \left(1 - \frac{\rho_B - r_\beta}{\rho_B - \bar{w}}\right), \quad \mu_A([\bar{w}, r_\beta]) = 0,\]
\[F_A(w) = \frac{\rho_B - r_\delta}{\rho_B - \bar{w}} \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\alpha + m_\beta} \mu_A(\{r_\beta\}) \text{ for all } w \in (r_\alpha, \bar{w}], \text{ and}\]
\[F_B(w) = \frac{\rho_A - r_\beta}{\rho_A - w} \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\alpha + m_\beta} \mu_B(\{r_\beta\}) \text{ for all } w \in (r_\alpha, \bar{w}],\]

where $\pi^*_A = (\rho_A - r_\alpha) m_\alpha$ and $\pi^*_B = (\rho_B - r_\beta) m_\beta$.

Finally, we have to consider the other possible equilibrium that might arise in case of $m_\alpha > m_\beta$.

Proposition 6 Assume that $\rho_A > r_\beta$, $w_B^* > r_\alpha$, $m_\alpha > m_\beta$ and
\[(\rho_A - r_\alpha) m_\beta \leq (r_\beta - r_\alpha) m_\alpha.\] (6)
Then \((\mu_A, \mu_B)\) given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu_B (\{r_\alpha\}) &= 0, \quad \overline{w} = \frac{1}{m_\alpha} (\rho_A m_\beta + r_\alpha m_\alpha - r_\alpha m_\beta), \\
\mu_A ([\overline{w}, r_\beta]) &= 0, \quad \mu_B ([\overline{w}, r_\beta]) = 0, \quad \mu_A (\{r_\alpha\}) = \frac{\rho_B - \overline{w}}{\rho_B - r_\alpha},
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
F_A(w) &= \frac{\rho_B - \overline{w}}{\rho_B - w} \quad \text{for all } w \in (r_\alpha, \overline{w}], \quad \text{and} \\
F_B(w) &= \frac{\rho_A - \overline{w} m_\alpha}{\rho_A - w m_\beta} - \frac{m_\alpha}{m_\beta} + 1 \quad \text{for all } w \in (r_\alpha, \overline{w}]
\end{align*}
\]

is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the equilibrium profits equal

\[
\pi^*_A = (\rho_A - \overline{w}) m_\alpha \quad \text{and} \quad \pi^*_B = (\rho_B - \overline{w}) m_\beta.
\]
References


