Corvinus
Corvinus

The prisoners' dilemma, congestion games and correlation

Forgó, Ferenc (2016) The prisoners' dilemma, congestion games and correlation. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics.

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Abstract

Social dilemmas, in particular the prisoners' dilemma, are represented as congestion games, and within this framework soft correlated equilibria as introduced by Forgó F. (2010, A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol. Mathematical Social Sciences 60:186-190) is used to improve inferior Nash payoffs that are characteristic of social dilemmas. These games can be extended to several players in different ways preserving some important characteristics of the original 2-person game. In one of the most frequently studied models of the n-person prisoners' dilemma game we measure the performance of the soft correlated equilibrium by the mediation and enforcement values. For general prisoners' dilemma games the mediation value is ∞, the enforcement value is 2. This also holds for the class of separable prisoners’ dilemma games.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2016/07
Uncontrolled Keywords:prisoners' dilemma, congestion games, soft correlated equilibrium, mediation value, enforcement value
JEL classification:C72 - Noncooperative Games
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Projects:OTKA 101224
ID Code:2187
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:06 Jan 2016 08:05
Last Modified:02 Feb 2016 08:19

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