Corvinus
Corvinus

Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

Tasnádi, Attila (2010) Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm. Journal of Economics, 99 (3). pp. 251-266.

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Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/j12773848532u4nt/


Abstract

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

Item Type:Article
Series Number / Identification Number:10.1007/s00712-010-0108-5
Uncontrolled Keywords:Forchheimer, dominant firm, price leadership
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Management, business policy, business strategy
ID Code:234
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:08 Feb 2011 16:03
Last Modified:03 Jul 2012 00:24

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