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**Type of actors, objects of exchange, type of original transactions in the coverage of
corruption**

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1. Introduction


In the following analysis we deal with only specific corruption cases within our seven-country sample for content analysis (France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and the UK). Only 5,212 relevant articles dealt with such cases within the total sample (12,742). We focus here on providing a descriptive comparative analysis of the actors, types of transactions and country specifics. The second part of the analysis describes the actors involved in the corrupt transactions, while in the third section we deal with the object of exchange in corrupt transactions. The fourth section focuses on the type of transaction which is linked to the corruption. Finally, a summary of the results of our preliminary findings is provided.

2. Representation of specific corruption cases

The following section discusses the variables related to the representation of specific corruption cases in the seven examined countries. A corruption case occurs between one or more agents and clients. Such a transaction can be characterized by the nature of agents, the clients, the exchanged goods, and/or also whether the transaction was repeated or was a one-off event. An article was categorized as a representation of a specific corruption case when it specified the actors who had engaged in a named act of corruption.

Figure 1 contains the main topic of the articles by country in the case that the article did not treat corruption as a marginal topic. The number of articles by country is included in parenthesis. As can be seen, there were huge differences between the total numbers of articles. The lower the number of examined articles (for example, in the case of Romania), the lower the level of validity. As a result some caution is necessary in understanding the comparative analysis. Amongst the examined countries, articles published in Romania (87,1%) and Hungary (84,5%) were most likely to mention specific corruption cases when they mentioned one of the corruption keywords. In almost every examined country the proportion of specific corruption cases from the total was higher than 70 percent. Articles from the UK and from France dealt more with corruption as a general phenomenon (17,7% and 17,3%) because of their international focus. A quarter of the Latvian articles reported on anticorruption activities carried out by authorities. The next section only includes an analysis of those articles in which a specific corruption case was mentioned.

Figure 1: Main topic of articles by country (%)



3. Actors involved in corruption cases

The following section only discusses actors involved in specific corruption cases. The actors typically involved in a specific corruption case are the agent and the client. An agent is someone who works for a public institution and provides an advantage to a client of the organization.

Figure 2: Agent/Client focus by country (%)





Figure 2 demonstrates whether the examined articles focused on the client or on the agent. In most cases (more than 66 percent), news outlets focused on the agent – this is probably the result of agents typically being politicians and thus being interesting subjects to write about. Meanwhile, any mention of clients was relegated to the background. French news outlets had an agent focus 73,6 percent of the time, and Hungarian news outlets 76,1 percent. The greatest focus on clients was found in British (23,7%), Latvian (20,5%) and French (17,4) news outlets. The client appeared to be least significant to Slovakian (6,4%), Hungarian (7,3%) and Italian (9,2%) news outlets. Slovakia represented both clients and agents most equally (21,5%).

3.1 Type of actors in articles by country


Figure 3: Type of agent involved in corruption cases by country (%)



In the presented corruption cases most of the participating agents and clients were single actors, although each country has its own specificities (see Figure 3 and 4). Articles from Hungary and UK included similar types of corruption-related agents (41,8 and 38,1% of single actors, respectively) and a significant number of groups of actors (26,7 and 37,4%) as agents. As clients, British news outlets included 21,7% single, 10,5% group and 16,9% institutional actors, while Hungarian papers provided details about 15,9% single, 9,8% group and 9,9% institutional actors. Although the proportions are similar, British news outlets mostly described international cases, while their Hungarian counterparts

focused on domestic and local ones. The number of group actors (31,3% agents and 19,4% clients) is significant in the case of Italy. In comparison with other European countries, Italy's criminal organizations are often more institutionalized and are thus embedded in certain economic sectors, societal groups and territorial areas (Sberna et al., 2015). In Romania, both agents (55,6%) and clients (39,5%) were dominantly single actors. Institutions as clients appeared in significant proportions in the case of the UK (16,9%), France (16,2%) and Slovakia (18,9%).

Figure 4: Type of client involved in corruption cases by country (%)



3.2 Type of actors in articles by main event arena

At an international level, as demonstrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6, there is less focus on single actor agents (35,5%) and single actor clients (18,9%). Institutions as clients appeared mostly at the international level (26,5%). Single actors as agents were less likely to be mentioned at the international level (35,5%), suggesting that international corruption does not involve named actors. These phenomena might occur because news outlets do not have much interest in political instrumentalization at an international level. The other reason could be simply because the readership of the publications would not be aware of many international politicians' names so media found it irrelevant to mention them. Single agents were significant at the national (49,8%) and local (52,2%) level, but also in foreign countries (54,5%), presumably because of the frequent mentioning of foreign heads of state. Single actors as clients were more likely to be named at national and local levels. The more local the event arena, the more likely actors are to be named as single agents and clients. However, at the local level

there are a significant number of group agents (33%) and group clients (14,8%). Groups of agents are also present at an international level (32%). The reason single agents are more likely to be named at a local level might be that news outlets politically instrumentalize corruption cases that involve opposition politicians.

Figure 5: Type of agents involved in corruption cases by main event area (%)




Figure 6: Type of clients involved in corruption cases by main event area (%)





Figure 6, in comparison with Figure 5, demonstrates that agents were much more likely to be mentioned in the articles than clients. In 10-20 percent of all cases the type of agent, and in around fifty percent the type of clients were not identified. Reporting on corruption usually involves a focus on the agent because agents are more likely to be connected to public institutions, while in many cases it is hard to identify who the client is. In this case, it seems that the analyzed news outlets are putting even more emphasis on agents. This may firstly be that the audience is more interested in the activities of politicians than businessmen. Such types of articles have a much greater effect on politics and politicians than businessmen. Moral outrage may be created when corruption concerns politicians because they are supposed to represent the public good and public interests.

3.3 Type of actors in articles by corruption type


Figure 7: Type of agents involved in corruption cases by main type of corruption (%)



Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the type of actors by the type of corruption. The most widespread type of corruption is bribery (2334 cases). Many of the types of corruption are reported in such low numbers that no conclusions can be drawn about them. In the case of bribery, solicitation and embezzlement the agents are unavoidably the actors. Clients were more likely to be named in cases of bribery and solicitation (around sixty percent). Half of the agents that were involved in bribery were single actors, and 27,3% were groups of actors. On the client side, 30,1% were single actors and 15,4% were group

actors. In the case of solicitation, single agents (66,9%) and single clients (40,4%) were more prevalent than in the case of bribery. In our sample, embezzlement is defined as a transaction in which agents are even more indispensable: more than ninety percent of the agents were identified in such cases, and only fifteen percent of clients.

Figure 8: Type of clients involved in corruption cases by main type of corruption (%)



3.4 Position of actors in articles by country

The position of actors by country is illustrated in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. In Table 1, the first four categories (government or state high representatives, public officials, politicians and mayors) are all state representatives. This is why in Table 2 and Table 3 these categories are aggregated: to visually better represent the role of state representatives in the corruption cases under analysis¹. The representation of local administrators and mayors is prominent in the case of Latvia (20,8%) and Italy (22,7%). In British news outlets, government or state representatives as agents appear in relatively low proportions (less than 30 percent), but there is a relatively strong focus on sports-related agents. Agents in France are also less likely to be government or state representatives (51,3%), just as in Romania (40,8%) although the latter may be due to the small number of analyzed cases. In the rest of the

¹ In the next table the following positions were aggregated into the category of government or state representatives: Government or state high representative, Public official, manager, consultant, Politician and Mayor, local administrator.

countries agents are more likely to be government and state representatives (in around sixty percent of cases). The amount of sports-related actor agents is highest in the UK (13%) and Slovakia (10,3%).

Table 1: Position of agent by country (%)

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania |
|---|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Government or state high representative | 16,9 | 22,0 | 27,6 | 22,9 | 33,0 | 15,7 | 18,8 |
| Public official, manager, consultant | 13,3 | 7,9 | 7,7 | 13,8 | 10,8 | 18,6 | 12,6 |
| Politician | 8,8 | 4,4 | 12,1 | 9,6 | 2,8 | 11,0 | 1,8 |
| Mayor, local administrator | 22,7 | 1,1 | 3,9 | 9,5 | 12,0 | 20,8 | 7,2 |
| Businessman | 7,8 | 12,7 | 15,0 | 5,3 | 11,4 | 3,0 | 2,2 |
| Judge, Prosecutor, Inspector, Detective | 2,0 | 0,9 | 2,7 | 6,7 | 2,0 | 3,5 | 4,9 |
| Policeman | 4,9 | 6,2 | 4,1 | 3,8 | 3,2 | 4,6 | 5,8 |
| Medical doctor, nurse | 3,9 | 1,3 | 0,7 | 3,4 | 0,7 | 0,6 | 1,8 |
| Sport actor | 1,8 | 13,0 | 3,6 | 10,3 | 1,5 | 0,3 | 4,9 |
| Other | 11,2 | 9,4 | 8,5 | 5,9 | 10,8 | 4,8 | 8,1 |
| Not applicable | 6,5 | 21,0 | 14 | 8,8 | 11,8 | 17,1 | 31,8 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>100,0</i> (1369) | <i>100,0</i> (746) | <i>100,0</i> (413) | <i>100,0</i> (624) | <i>100,0</i> (1207) | <i>100,0</i> (630) | <i>100,0</i> (223) |

Table 2: Position of agent according to country (aggregated categories) (%)

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania |
|---|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Government or state representative | 62,5 | 35,7 | 51,3 | 55,9 | 59,3 | 66,2 | 40,8 |
| Public official, manager, consultant | 7,8 | 12,7 | 15,0 | 5,3 | 11,4 | 3,0 | 2,2 |
| Judge, Prosecutor, Inspector, Detective | 2,0 | 0,9 | 2,7 | 6,7 | 2,0 | 3,5 | 4,9 |
| Policeman | 4,9 | 6,2 | 4,1 | 3,8 | 3,2 | 4,6 | 5,8 |
| Medical doctor, nurse | 3,9 | 1,3 | 0,7 | 3,4 | 0,7 | 0,6 | 1,8 |
| Sport actor | 1,8 | 13 | 3,6 | 10,3 | 1,5 | 0,3 | 4,9 |
| Other | 10,5 | 9,1 | 8,5 | 5,8 | 10,0 | 4,6 | 7,6 |
| Not applicable | 6,5 | 21,0 | 14,0 | 8,8 | 11,8 | 17,1 | 31,8 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>100</i> (1369) | <i>100</i> (746) | <i>100</i> (413) | <i>100</i> (624) | <i>100</i> (1207) | <i>100</i> (630) | <i>100</i> (223) |

As demonstrated before, clients remain in the background and in most cases remain unknown or unmentioned (Table 3). But the focus is not only on the agents; in most cases news outlets do not even identify who clients are. One possible explanation for this is the earlier mentioned reason that news outlets tend to name agents because they are most likely to be politicians. The other potential

explanation is the lack of journalistic investigation by news outlets. While agents are typically well known personalities, the identity of clients is harder to discover. In our sample grand corruption is overrepresented. Only ten percent of petty corruption was committed by businessmen and almost forty percent by citizens. In a typical (grand) corruption case, for example, bribery (the most frequent type of corruption represented in our sample) businessman are the initiators of the corruption transactions, bribing government or state representatives. Bribery cases typically happen when the public sector and business sector meet.

Businessmen are the most well represented clients, especially in Italy (28,7%) and Slovakia (28,2%). In France, government representatives as clients are mentioned in significant numbers (9,9%).

Table 3: Position of client according to country (aggregated categories) (%)

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Government or state representative | 6,7 | 5,5 | 9,9 | 2,1 | 4,1 | 1,4 | 4,9 |
| Businessman | 28,7 | 23,6 | 14,3 | 28,2 | 18,1 | 20,2 | 23,3 |
| Citizen | 5,3 | 2,8 | 1,0 | 1,9 | 3,9 | 1,6 | 3,6 |
| Other | 13,7 | 16,5 | 8,7 | 18,9 | 8,6 | 17,5 | 12,6 |
| Not applicable | 45,6 | 51,6 | 66,1 | 48,9 | 65,3 | 59,4 | 55,6 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>100</i> (1369) | <i>100</i> (746) | <i>100</i> (413) | <i>100</i> (624) | <i>100</i> (1207) | <i>100</i> (630) | <i>100</i> (223) |

4. Object of exchange

4.1 Object of exchange by country

In response to the questions: “What does the agent give to the client?”, and “What kind of goods does the embezzler appropriate?” the model indicates that news outlets from most of the countries reported that non-material goods were given by the agent to the client (see Figure 9). The agent usually provides clients with positions, licenses, and so on, but a significant amount of material goods are also provided. In the case of Hungary, agents provided more material goods (41,8%) than non-material ones. On the other hand, Slovakia and Latvia media reported that an extremely low amount of material goods were transferred by agents (5,1% and 5,6%).

Figure 9: ‘What does the agent give to the client?’ Object of exchange by country (%)





Figure 10: ‘What does the client give to the agent?’ Object of exchange by country (%)



While agents usually give non-material goods, clients give material goods in exchange (Figure 10). What the client gives to the agent was reported in less than half of all transactions. The exchanged good was most identifiable in Slovakia (55,9%) and the least identifiable in Hungary (19,3%). French and Italian media included details about the non-material goods given by the client in the greatest proportions (12,6% and 12,5%, respectively).

4.2 Object of exchange by type of transaction

Figure 11: ‘What does the agent give to the client?’ Object of exchange by corruption type (%)





Figure 12: ‘What does the client give to the agent?’ Object of exchange by corruption type (%)




As demonstrated in Figure 11, media reports that the agent mostly gives non-material goods to clients. The highest amount of non-material goods are transferred in the case of bribes (47,4%), solicitation (50%) and clientelism (52,3%). In the case of embezzlement and fraud, the opposite happens. The agent gives (in 56,9% and in 26,4% of cases) non-material goods to the client.

Typical transactions that require material goods from the client (see Figure 12) are bribery (58,4%), extortion (41,3%) and illegal party financing (53,5%).

4.3 Type of original transaction by country


Figure 13: Type of transaction affected by corruption by country (%)



Original transactions were more likely to be repeated than one-off (see Figure 13). In the UK-based media a significant amount of repeated transactions are included in the media (46,4%) because of the focus on reporting on international cases, involving corporations that used to bribe officials in different foreign countries for a long period of time. At the same time in Hungary (44,9%) the figure is due to national and local cases. Considering the amount of one-off transactions, the two new European Union member countries' papers reported many more of them: 35,7% of the Slovakian, 30,1% of the Hungarian, 24,9% of the Latvian and 31,4% of the Romanian-specific cases were one-off transactions, while this proportion is only 6,3% in the UK, 12,1% in France and 16,5% in Italy. This distinction might be due to the amount of international cases that are reported on by old European Union members that tend to be repeated transactions. When a corruption case gets international attention, then it has probably been going on for a while. Our hypotheses concerning the representation of one-off transactions is that new EU members report more one-off transactions at the local and national level. Taking a look at the amount of one-off transactions versus repeated transactions (Figure 14) we gain a more sophisticated picture. In France and Italy there are more one-off transactions reported in the media

(44,3% and 44,1%), which may indicate institutionalized and widespread corruption. However, new EU members still have a higher amount of one-off transactions represented in their media.

Figure 14: Type of transaction affected by corruption by country (national and local level) (%)




One possible explanation for this is that in old EU members' news outlets there is a stronger tradition of journalism and harsher competition between media products. While new EU members' media outlets still consider a one-off transaction to be important news, media reports in France Italy and the UK focus more on “huge” and “important” cases that generate higher attention and make media products more marketable.

4.4 Type of original transaction by main event arena

As illustrated in Figure 15, specific corruption cases were more likely to be presented as “repeated” at the international level (41,2%), probably because of the more general description of corruption. When the event arena was international or a foreign country, the amount of one-off transactions was very low (11,8% and 16,7%). On the local level, the tendency is the reverse. The amount of reported one off transactions is the highest (26%), while the amount of repeated transactions is 33%. Another observable tendency is that the more the event arena is local, the more the amount of non-applicable cases decreases (47% at an international level and 41% on a local level).

Figure 15: Type of transaction affected by corruption by main event arena (%)



4.5 Type of original transaction by corruption type

Figure 16: Type of transaction affected by corruption by main type of corruption (%)




Figure 16 demonstrates the type of original transaction by type of corruption. As a general remark, the more specific a type of corruption is, the less frequently the original transaction can be categorised as non-applicable. For example, in the case of embezzlement, the original type of transaction was not applicable in only 33% of cases. Embezzlement (45%), fraud (44%) and illegal party financing (40,6%)

were most likely to be repeated transactions. In the case of collusion, the type of transaction was not applicable in 51% of cases and the lowest amount of one-off transactions were recorded (12,3%), next to fraud with 10,8% percent. Most of the types of corruption were reported as one-off events (more than twenty percent of cases).

5. Type of interactions

At the following section describes, a CHAID (Chi Square Automatic Interaction Detection) classification method was applied to the specific cases. The model examined the specific interactions between the agent and the client by country. The outcome (dependent) variable in the analysis was the examined countries. The independent variables were initially all the variables that affect and characterize the transactions between an agent and a client, and the context, but the analysis proved only four of them to significantly affect the outcome country.

The CHAID analysis is a classification tree method that calculates how variables best combine to explain the outcome defined by the dependent variable. CHAID is based on chi square calculations and is appropriate for classifying categorized variables (rather than continuous variables). The method executes several steps in defining the outcome categories. In the first step, the whole sample is divided into subsamples based on the less independent variable after its statistically independent categories have been merged. In the following steps, this algorithm is repeated for the previously separated subsets (IBM, 2012).

After identifying the significant variables for the analysis, in order to simplify the process we recoded those variables so as to reduce the number of values.

- One important variable was the **event arena**, or where the corruption case happened. We recoded the variable to have two values: international/foreign or national/local event arena.
- The second important variable was the **type of agent**. After recoding, the agent was determined to be one of two variables: single agent or non-single agent (the latter category contains both group actors and institutional actors).
- The third variable considered was the **type of transaction**: this could be either one-off or repeated.

- The fourth variable was the **position of the agent**: this we recoded into government or state representative, or other type of agent².

Using the aforementioned independent variables and the countries as a dependent variable, the CHAID method created 15 outcome categories. Table 4 illustrates the steps by which the algorithm separated the sample in order to generate the outcome categories, and indicates the defining characteristics of the outcome category, as well as the percentages of observed cases. For example, for the first outcome category (10.2%) the method first considered only local and national level cases (the variability of the other independent variables was lowest after this separation), then the cases in which the type of actor was unknown, and then the cases which only happened once (one-off transactions). The number of such cases is 532. Accordingly, each outcome category represents one type of interaction.

Table 4: Type of interaction for each outcome category and most and least characteristic countries in each outcome category

| # | Variables which determine the outcome category in order of application | % |
|-----|---|-------|
| 1. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by single actor, one-off transaction. | 10.2 |
| 2. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by single actor, repeated transaction. | 8.5 |
| 3. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by single actor, type of transaction unidentifiable. | 15.8 |
| 4. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by non-single actor, one-off transaction. | 5.4 |
| 5. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by non-single actor, repeated transaction. | 10.8 |
| 6. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by non-single actor, type of transaction unidentifiable. | 8.3 |
| 7. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by not identified actor, one-off transaction. | 7.2 |
| 8. | Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by unidentified actor, repeated transaction. | 1.5 |
| 9. | Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction is one-off, committed by government or state representative as agent. | 3.3 |
| 10. | Event arena is international/foreign, transaction is one-off, committed by non-governmental agent. | 1.7 |
| 11. | Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction is repeated, committed by government or state representative as agent. | 5.8 |
| 12. | Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction is repeated, agent was non-governmental representative or missing. | 6.2 |
| 13. | Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction unidentifiable, committed by government or state representative as agent. | 7.8 |
| 14. | Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction unidentifiable, committed by non-government or state representative as agent. | 4.7 |
| 15. | Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction unidentifiable, position of agent was missing. | 2.8 |
| | Total percentage | 100.0 |
| | Total number of analysed articles | 5,212 |

² Categories that were aggregated as government or state representatives: Government or state high representative, Public official, manager, consultant, Politician and Mayor, local administrator. The second category contains everything that is not included by these positions (businessmen, citizens, sports-related actors, etc.).

Table 5 illustrates the 15 outcome categories by country. For example, in the first outcome category 158 cases (29,7%) are Italian. So the most characteristic outcome country for the first outcome category is Italy, but the outcome category also includes Hungarian cases (n=123, 23,1%).

Table 5: Outcome categories by country

| Outcome category # | Italy | | UK | | France | | Slovakia | | Hungary | | Latvia | | Romania | | Total | |
|--------------------|-------|------|-----|------|--------|------|----------|------|---------|------|--------|------|---------|------|-------|-------|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| 1 | 158 | 29.7 | 16 | 3.0 | 12 | 2.3 | 96 | 18.0 | 123 | 23.1 | 79 | 14.8 | 48 | 9.0 | 532 | 100.0 |
| 2 | 189 | 42.8 | 26 | 5.9 | 16 | 3.6 | 43 | 9.7 | 102 | 23.1 | 39 | 8.8 | 27 | 6.1 | 442 | 100.0 |
| 3 | 401 | 48.8 | 29 | 3.5 | 40 | 4.9 | 94 | 11.4 | 77 | 9.4 | 143 | 17.4 | 38 | 4.6 | 822 | 100.0 |
| 4 | 38 | 13.6 | 5 | 1.8 | 4 | 1.4 | 58 | 20.7 | 134 | 47.9 | 38 | 13.6 | 3 | 1.1 | 280 | 100.0 |
| 5 | 159 | 28.2 | 38 | 6.7 | 10 | 1.8 | 33 | 5.9 | 263 | 46.6 | 56 | 9.9 | 5 | 0.9 | 564 | 100.0 |
| 6 | 207 | 47.7 | 15 | 3.5 | 16 | 3.7 | 48 | 11.1 | 91 | 21.0 | 50 | 11.5 | 7 | 1.6 | 434 | 100.0 |
| 7 | 68 | 18.2 | 32 | 8.6 | 12 | 3.2 | 43 | 11.5 | 58 | 15.5 | 101 | 27.0 | 60 | 16.0 | 374 | 100.0 |
| 8 | 14 | 17.5 | 21 | 26.3 | 2 | 2.5 | 1 | 1.3 | 27 | 33.8 | 9 | 11.3 | 6 | 7.5 | 80 | 100.0 |
| 9 | 12 | 6.9 | 8 | 4.6 | 22 | 12.6 | 35 | 20.1 | 72 | 41.4 | 17 | 9.8 | 8 | 4.6 | 174 | 100.0 |
| 10 | 8 | 9.3 | 17 | 19.8 | 11 | 12.8 | 23 | 26.7 | 24 | 27.9 | 2 | 2.3 | 1 | 1.2 | 86 | 100.0 |
| 11 | 19 | 6.3 | 117 | 38.9 | 37 | 12.3 | 19 | 6.3 | 86 | 28.6 | 22 | 7.3 | 1 | 0.3 | 301 | 100.0 |
| 12 | 10 | 3.1 | 144 | 44.7 | 67 | 20.8 | 26 | 8.1 | 64 | 19.9 | 10 | 3.1 | 1 | 0.3 | 322 | 100.0 |
| 13 | 56 | 13.7 | 109 | 26.7 | 94 | 23.0 | 61 | 15.0 | 45 | 11.0 | 40 | 9.8 | 3 | 0.7 | 408 | 100.0 |
| 14 | 24 | 9.8 | 97 | 39.4 | 49 | 19.9 | 38 | 15.4 | 24 | 9.8 | 11 | 4.5 | 3 | 1.2 | 246 | 100.0 |
| 15 | 6 | 4.1 | 72 | 49.7 | 21 | 14.5 | 6 | 4.1 | 17 | 11.7 | 13 | 9.0 | 10 | 6.9 | 145 | 100.0 |

Table 6 describes the most and the least representative countries within the outcome categories.

Table 6: Type of interaction in the case of each outcome category and most and least characteristic countries

| # | Most characteristic countries | Least characteristic countries |
|-----|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. | Italy / Hungary | France / UK |
| 2. | Italy / Hungary | France / UK |
| 3. | Italy / Latvia | UK / Romania |
| 4. | Hungary / Slovakia | Romania / France |
| 5. | Hungary / Italy | Romania / France |
| 6. | Italy / Hungary | Romania / France |
| 7. | Latvia / Italy | France / UK |
| 8. | Hungary / UK | France / Romania |
| 9. | Hungary / Slovakia | UK / Romania |
| 10. | Hungary / Slovakia | Romania / Latvia |
| 11. | UK / Hungary | Romania Italy / Slovakia |
| 12. | UK / France | Romania Latvia / Italy |
| 13. | UK / France | Romania / Latvia |
| 14. | UK / France | Romania / Latvia |
| 15. | UK / France | Slovakia / Italy |

As can be seen, Italy is the most characteristic country in the case that the event arena is local or national, and the case is committed by single actors, no matter if the transaction is one-off, repeated or unidentifiable. Italy is also characteristic in the case that the event arena is local/national or missing, the case is committed by a non-single actor, and where the type of transaction is unidentifiable. Moreover, Italian news outlets are not likely to include foreign and international cases that involved repeated transactions, or cases where both the transaction and type of agent was missing.

Hungary is the country most characteristic in the case of five outcome categories, including when the event arena is local or national and the case is committed by non-single (group or institution) or unidentifiable actors, regardless of whether the transaction is repeated or not. Hungary is the most characteristic country in the case of the international or foreign event arena when the type of transaction is one-off, regardless of whether the agent is a governmental representative or non-governmental actor. Slovakia also matches this second pattern, being the second most characteristic country in these outcome categories.

Slovakia is the least characteristic country in the case of foreign and international cases that have repeated transactions, and cases where both the transaction and type of agent were missing.

Latvia is the most characteristic country in one outcome category where the event arena is local/national or missing, the case was committed by an unidentified actor, and it involved a one-off transaction.

Latvia is the least characteristic country when the event area is international or foreign and the case was committed by a non-governmental actor as agent. It is also the least characteristic country in the case of the foreign or international event area when the type of transaction was unidentifiable.

UK is the most representative country in five of the outcome categories. These outcome categories include cases when the event arena is international or foreign and the type of transaction was either repeated or not possible to identify, regardless of whether the agent was a governmental or non-governmental actor. France is the second most characteristic country in four of these five outcome categories, with very similar corruption transactions.

UK is the least characteristic country when the event area is local or national, and the act was committed by single actor, regardless of the transaction type. UK also is the least characteristic country when the event arena was international/foreign, where the type of transaction was one-off and the case was committed by the government or a state representative as the agent, or the agent is missing.

France is among the least characteristic countries in almost every case when the event area is local or national. Due to its low number of cases, Romania remains an insignificant country in this regard in almost all of the outcome categories.

Table 7 demonstrates how the country-specific cases are divided between the outcome categories.

Table 7: Countries and cases divided between each outcome category

| No. of outcome category | Italy | | UK | | France | | Slovakia | | Hungary | | Latvia | | Romania | |
|-------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| 1 | 158 | 11.54 | 16 | 2.14 | 12 | 2.14 | 96 | 15.38 | 123 | 10.19 | 79 | 12.54 | 48 | 21.72 |
| 2 | 189 | 13.81 | 26 | 3.49 | 16 | 3.49 | 43 | 6.89 | 102 | 8.45 | 39 | 6.19 | 27 | 12.22 |
| 3 | 401 | 29.29 | 29 | 3.89 | 40 | 3.89 | 94 | 15.06 | 77 | 6.38 | 143 | 22.70 | 38 | 17.19 |
| 4 | 38 | 2.78 | 5 | 0.67 | 4 | 0.67 | 58 | 9.29 | 134 | 11.10 | 38 | 6.03 | 3 | 1.36 |
| 5 | 159 | 11.61 | 38 | 5.09 | 10 | 5.09 | 33 | 5.29 | 263 | 21.79 | 56 | 8.89 | 5 | 2.26 |
| 6 | 207 | 15.12 | 15 | 2.01 | 16 | 2.01 | 48 | 7.69 | 91 | 7.54 | 50 | 7.94 | 7 | 3.17 |
| 7 | 68 | 4.97 | 32 | 4.29 | 12 | 4.29 | 43 | 6.89 | 58 | 4.81 | 101 | 16.03 | 60 | 27.15 |
| 8 | 14 | 1.02 | 21 | 2.82 | 2 | 2.82 | 1 | 0.16 | 27 | 2.24 | 9 | 1.43 | 6 | 2.71 |
| 9 | 12 | 0.88 | 8 | 1.07 | 22 | 1.07 | 35 | 5.61 | 72 | 5.97 | 17 | 2.70 | 8 | 3.62 |
| 10 | 8 | 0.58 | 17 | 2.28 | 11 | 2.28 | 23 | 3.69 | 24 | 1.99 | 2 | 0.32 | 1 | 0.45 |
| 11 | 19 | 1.39 | 117 | 15.68 | 37 | 15.68 | 19 | 3.04 | 86 | 7.13 | 22 | 3.49 | 1 | 0.45 |
| 12 | 10 | 0.73 | 144 | 19.30 | 67 | 19.30 | 26 | 4.17 | 64 | 5.30 | 10 | 1.59 | 1 | 0.45 |
| 13 | 56 | 4.09 | 109 | 14.61 | 94 | 14.61 | 61 | 9.78 | 45 | 3.73 | 40 | 6.35 | 3 | 1.36 |
| 14 | 24 | 1.75 | 97 | 13.00 | 49 | 13.00 | 38 | 6.09 | 24 | 1.99 | 11 | 1.75 | 3 | 1.36 |
| 15 | 6 | 0.44 | 72 | 9.65 | 21 | 9.65 | 6 | 0.96 | 17 | 1.41 | 13 | 2.06 | 10 | 4.52 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>746</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>413</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>624</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>1207</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>630</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>221</i> | <i>100</i> |

6. Conclusions

Our database shows considerable differences between the analysed countries in terms of the corruption cases. There are differences in the representation of the type and position of actors, the exchanged objects, as well as the type of transactions. General conclusions can also be made about the representation of corruption cases by the analysed news outlets.

Concerning the representation of the agent and the client in the articles, the main emphasis on corruption as a transaction is usually on the agent because the agent is more likely to be associated with a public institution, while in many cases it is hard to know who the client is. Also, agents are more likely to be politicians who should have a higher level of social responsibility, so articles about them may have greater social impact. Clients, who are more likely to be businessmen involved in grand corruption, remain in the background because they are less interesting to the audience, or because of a lack of journalistic investigation.

Single actor agents are more likely to be named at the local level. This might be because news outlets politically instrumentalize corruption cases involving opposition politicians. However, it may be that audiences are less interested in reporting about international politicians.

Local-level action in specific corruption cases is significant in the case of Latvia and Italy. In Italy, actors involved in corruption are often groups. This may be because in Italy corruption is traditionally more institutionalized, involving groups and institutions (Sberna et al., 2015).

Not every similarity in the type of actors involved in the corruption cases entailed similar situations. The articles published in the UK described similar types of agents involved in corruption to, for example, their Hungarian counterparts: about forty percent of single and thirty percent of group actors. British news outlets mostly described international corruption cases. In many aspects they are similar to French news outlets.

The closer the event arena is to the local level, the fewer the not applicable cases, and the more one-off corruption transactions were reported. The more international a transaction was, the more repeated transactions were reported by the news outlets. The explanation for this could be that, on the international level, corruption is represented as a more general phenomenon. At the same time, when a case receives international attention it was supposedly already ongoing for a while. One-off trans-

actions were more likely to be represented on the local level, but this style of representation did not emerge uniformly in every country. Distinction could be made by new and old EU member countries.

The media of new EU members report more one-off transaction at a local and national level, while old EU members report about repeated transactions more. In old EU member states' news outlets there is a stronger tradition of journalism and stronger competition between media products. While new EU members' media outlets still consider one-off transactions to be important news, France's Italy's and the UK's media report more on "huge" or "important" cases that make their media products more marketable.

Finally, we defined interaction types in our corruption cases to see what kind of interactions were characteristic for each country. From the CHAID analysis the following conclusions were arrived at: Italy was the most characteristic country in the case when the event arena was local or national, and the case was committed by single actors or non-single actors, no matter whether the transaction was one-off, repeated or not possible to identify. Hungary was most characteristic when the event arena was local or national and the case was committed by non-single (group or institution) or unidentified actors, regardless of whether the transaction was repeated or not. Hungary was the most characteristic country in the case of the international or foreign event arena when the type of transaction was one-off, regardless of whether the agent was a governmental representative or non-governmental actor. Slovakia was similar to Hungary in this sense, being the second most characteristic country in these outcome categories.

Latvia was the most characteristic country in one outcome category: when the event arena was local/national or missing, the case was committed by an unidentified actor, and in the case of one-off transactions. UK was the most representative country in all the foreign/international case-dominated outcome categories, while French media had a very similar position to the British.

References

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Appendix:

Table 1: Main topic of articles by country

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| A case (or some cases) of corruption | 1369 77.3% | 746 72.5% | 413 74.4% | 624 72.3% | 1207 84.5% | 630 54.9% | 223 87.1% | 5212 73.9% |
| Corruption as a general phenomenon | 192 10.8% | 182 17.7% | 96 17.3% | 103 11.9% | 136 9.5% | 204 17.8% | 29 11.3% | 942 13.4% |
| Anticorruption, regulation law or anticorruption national authorities' activities | 201 11.3% | 68 6.6% | 29 5.2% | 96 11.1% | 52 3.6% | 286 24.9% | 3 1.2% | 735 10.4% |
| Anticorruption activities by citizens, NGO.... | 10 0.6% | 33 3.2% | 17 3.1% | 40 4.6% | 34 2.4% | 28 2.4% | 1 0.4% | 163 2.3% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1772</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1029</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>555</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>863</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1429</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1148</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>256</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>7052</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 2: Agent or client focus

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Agent | 910 66.5% | 421 56.4% | 304 73.6% | 396 63.5% | 918 76.1% | 398 63.2% | 108 48.4% | 3455 66.3% |
| Client | 126 9.2% | 177 23.7% | 72 17.4% | 40 6.4% | 88 7.3% | 129 20.5% | 35 15.7% | 667 12.8% |
| Both | 204 14.9% | 43 5.8% | 19 4.6% | 134 21.5% | 96 8.0% | 46 7.3% | 21 9.4% | 563 10.8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 129 9.4% | 105 14.1% | 18 4.4% | 54 8.7% | 105 8.7% | 57 9.0% | 59 26.5% | 527 10.1% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 3: Type of agent by country

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| A single actor or several actors acting independently | 815 59.5% | 312 41.8% | 252 61.0% | 348 55.8% | 460 38.1% | 319 50.6% | 124 55.6% | 2630 50.5% |
| A group or network of actors | 429 31.3% | 199 26.7% | 52 12.6% | 145 23.2% | 452 37.4% | 92 14.6% | 9 4.0% | 1378 26.4% |
| An institution, company, association, political party | 35 2.6% | 74 9.9% | 54 13.1% | 59 9.5% | 166 13.8% | 87 13.8% | 9 4.0% | 484 9.3% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 90 6.6% | 161 21.6% | 55 13.3% | 72 11.5% | 129 10.7% | 132 21.0% | 81 36.3% | 720 13.8% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 4: Type of client by country

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| A single actor or several actors acting independently | 382 27.9% | 162 21.7% | 59 14.3% | 169 27.1% | 192 15.9% | 117 18.6% | 88 39.5% | 1169 22.4% |
| A group or network of actors | 266 19.4% | 78 10.5% | 15 3.6% | 48 7.7% | 118 9.8% | 66 10.5% | 8 3.6% | 599 11.5% |
| An institution, company, association, political party | 94 6.9% | 126 16.9% | 67 16.2% | 118 18.9% | 119 9.9% | 60 9.5% | 10 4.5% | 594 11.4% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 627 45.8% | 380 50.9% | 272 65.9% | 289 46.3% | 778 64.5% | 387 61.4% | 117 52.5% | 2850 54.7% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 5: Type of agent in the articles by main event area

| | International | Foreign country | National | Local | Total |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| A single actor or several actors acting independently | 154 35,5% | 680 54,5% | 996 49,8% | 795 52,2% | 2625 50,4% |
| A group or network of actors | 139 32,0% | 290 23,2% | 446 22,3% | 502 33,0% | 1377 26,5% |
| An institution, company, association, political party | 54 12,4% | 101 8,1% | 237 11,9% | 92 6,0% | 484 9,3% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 87 20,0% | 177 14,2% | 320 16,0% | 134 8,8% | 718 13,8% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>434</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1248</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1999</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1523</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5204</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 6: Type of client in the articles by main event area

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| A single actor or several actors acting independently | 382 27,9% | 162 21,7% | 59 14,3% | 169 27,1% | 192 15,9% | 117 18,6% | 88 39,5% | 1169 22,4% |
| A group or network of actors | 266 19,4% | 78 10,5% | 15 3,6% | 48 7,7% | 118 9,8% | 66 10,5% | 8 3,6% | 599 11,5% |
| An institution, company, association, political party | 94 6,9% | 126 16,9% | 67 16,2% | 118 18,9% | 119 9,9% | 60 9,5% | 10 4,5% | 594 11,4% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 627 45,8% | 380 50,9% | 272 65,9% | 289 46,3% | 778 64,5% | 387 61,4% | 117 52,5% | 2850 54,7% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 7: Position of agent by country

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Government or state high representative | 232 16,9% | 164 22,0% | 114 27,6% | 143 22,9% | 398 33,0% | 99 15,7% | 42 18,8% | 1192 22,9% |
| Public official, manager, consultant | 182 13,3% | 59 7,9% | 32 7,7% | 86 13,8% | 130 10,8% | 117 18,6% | 28 12,6% | 634 12,2% |
| Politician | 121 8,8% | 33 4,4% | 50 12,1% | 60 9,6% | 34 2,8% | 69 11,0% | 4 1,8% | 371 7,1% |
| Mayor, local administrators | 311 22,7% | 8 1,1% | 16 3,9% | 59 9,5% | 145 12,0% | 131 20,8% | 16 7,2% | 686 13,2% |
| Businessman | 107 7,8% | 95 12,7% | 62 15,0% | 33 5,3% | 137 11,4% | 19 3,0% | 5 2,2% | 458 8,8% |
| Judge, Prosecutor, Inspector, Detective | 28 2,0% | 7 0,9% | 11 2,7% | 42 6,7% | 24 2,0% | 22 3,5% | 11 4,9% | 145 2,8% |
| Policeman | 67 4,9% | 46 6,2% | 17 4,1% | 24 3,8% | 39 3,2% | 29 4,6% | 13 5,8% | 235 4,5% |
| Medical doctor, nurse | 54 3,9% | 10 1,3% | 3 0,7% | 21 3,4% | 9 0,7% | 4 0,6% | 4 1,8% | 105 2,0% |
| Sports-related actor | 25 1,8% | 97 13,0% | 15 3,6% | 64 10,3% | 18 1,5% | 2 0,3% | 11 4,9% | 232 4,5% |
| Other | 153 11,2% | 70 9,4% | 35 8,5% | 37 5,9% | 130 10,8% | 30 4,8% | 18 8,1% | 473 9,1% |
| Not applicable | 89 6,5% | 157 21,0% | 58 14,0% | 55 8,8% | 143 11,8% | 108 17,1% | 71 31,8% | 681 13,1% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 8: Position of agent by country (aggregated)

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Government or state high representative | 855 62,5% | 266 35,7% | 212 51,3% | 349 55,9% | 716 59,3% | 417 66,2% | 91 40,8% | 2906 55,8% |
| Businessman | 107 7,8% | 95 12,7% | 62 15,0% | 33 5,3% | 137 11,4% | 19 3,0% | 5 2,2% | 458 8,8% |
| Judge, Prosecutor, Inspector, Detective | 28 2,0% | 7 0,9% | 11 2,7% | 42 6,7% | 24 2,0% | 22 3,5% | 11 4,9% | 145 2,8% |
| Policeman | 67 4,9% | 46 6,2% | 17 4,1% | 24 3,8% | 39 3,2% | 29 4,6% | 13 5,8% | 235 4,5% |
| Medical doctor, nurse | 54 3,9% | 10 1,3% | 3 0,7% | 21 3,4% | 9 0,7% | 4 0,6% | 4 1,8% | 105 2,0% |
| Sports-related actor | 25 1,8% | 97 13,0% | 15 3,6% | 64 10,3% | 18 1,5% | 2 0,3% | 11 4,9% | 232 4,5% |
| Other | 144 10,5% | 68 9,1% | 35 8,5% | 36 5,8% | 121 10,0% | 29 4,6% | 17 7,6% | 450 8,6% |
| Not applicable | 89 6,5% | 157 21,0% | 58 14,0% | 55 8,8% | 143 11,8% | 108 17,1% | 71 31,8% | 681 13,1% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 9: Position of client by country (aggregated)

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Government or state high representative | 92 6,7% | 41 5,5% | 41 9,9% | 13 2,1% | 49 4,1% | 9 1,4% | 11 4,9% | 256 4,9% |
| Businessman | 393 28,7% | 176 23,6% | 59 14,3% | 176 28,2% | 219 18,1% | 127 20,2% | 52 23,3% | 1202 23,1% |
| Citizen | 73 5,3% | 21 2,8% | 4 1,0% | 12 1,9% | 47 3,9% | 10 1,6% | 8 3,6% | 175 3,4% |
| Other | 187 13,7% | 123 16,5% | 36 8,7% | 118 18,9% | 104 8,6% | 110 17,5% | 28 12,6% | 706 13,5% |
| Not applicable | 624 45,6% | 385 51,6% | 273 66,1% | 305 48,9% | 788 65,3% | 374 59,4% | 124 55,6% | 2873 55,1% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 10: ‘What does the agent give to the client?’ Object of exchange by country

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Purely material goods | 244 17,8% | 115 15,4% | 95 23,0% | 32 5,1% | 504 41,8% | 35 5,6% | 53 23,8% | 1078 20,7% |
| Non-material goods | 484 35,4% | 257 34,5% | 115 27,8% | 341 54,6% | 323 26,8% | 233 37,0% | 61 27,4% | 1814 34,8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 641 46,8% | 374 50,1% | 203 49,2% | 251 40,2% | 380 31,5% | 362 57,5% | 109 48,9% | 2320 44,5% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 11: ‘What does the client give to the agent?’ Object of exchange by country

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Purely material goods | 480 35,1% | 315 42,2% | 153 37,0% | 349 55,9% | 233 19,3% | 238 37,8% | 83 37,2% | 1851 35,5% |
| Non-material goods | 171 12,5% | 42 5,6% | 52 12,6% | 6 1,0% | 39 3,2% | 28 4,4% | 16 7,2% | 354 6,8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 718 52,4% | 389 52,1% | 208 50,4% | 269 43,1% | 935 77,5% | 364 57,8% | 124 55,6% | 3007 57,7% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 12: Type of original transaction by country

| | Italy | UK | France | Slovakia | Hungary | Latvia | Romania | Total |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| One-off transaction | 226 16,5% | 47 6,3% | 50 12,1% | 223 35,7% | 363 30,1% | 157 24,9% | 70 31,4% | 1136 21,8% |
| Repeated transactions | 391 28,6% | 346 46,4% | 132 32,0% | 122 19,6% | 542 44,9% | 136 21,6% | 40 17,9% | 1709 32,8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 752 54,9% | 353 47,3% | 231 55,9% | 279 44,7% | 302 25,0% | 337 53,5% | 113 50,7% | 2367 45,4% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>1369</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>746</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>413</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>624</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1207</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>630</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>223</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 13: Type of original transaction by main event arena

| | International | Foreign country | National | Local | Total |
|--|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| One-off transaction | 51 11,8% | 209 16,7% | 477 23,9% | 396 26,0% | 1133 21,8% |
| Repeated transactions | 179 41,2% | 444 35,6% | 584 29,2% | 502 33,0% | 1709 32,8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 204 47,0% | 595 47,7% | 938 46,9% | 625 41,0% | 2362 45,4% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>434</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1248</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1999</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>1523</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5204</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 14: Type of agent by corruption type

| | Bribery, kickback | Embezzlement | Illegal party financing | Solicitation, extortion | Abuse of power/office | Collusion, cartel | Clientelism, nepotism, familism | Fraud | Other | Total |
|--|------------------------------|---------------------------|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| A single actor or several actors acting independently | 1224 52,4% | 411 44,7% | 49 48,5% | 222 66,9% | 154 58,1% | 28 18,1% | 187 51,5% | 119 47,6% | 236 47,9% | 2630 50,5% |
| A group or network of actors | 638 27,3% | 341 37,1% | 11 10,9% | 96 28,9% | 68 25,7% | 26 16,8% | 65 17,9% | 84 33,6% | 49 9,9% | 1378 26,4% |
| An institution, company, association, political party | 140 6,0% | 110 12,0% | 34 33,7% | 6 1,8% | 22 8,3% | 21 13,5% | 58 16,0% | 31 12,4% | 62 12,6% | 484 9,3% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 332 14,2% | 57 6,2% | 7 6,9% | 8 2,4% | 21 7,9% | 80 51,6% | 53 14,6% | 16 6,4% | 146 29,6% | 720 13,8% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>2334</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>919</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>101</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>332</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>265</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>155</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>363</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>250</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>493</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 15: Type of clients by corruption type

| | Bribery, kickback | Embezzlement | Illegal party financing | Solicitation, extortion | Abuse of power/office | Collusion, cartel | Clientelism, nepotism, familism | Fraud | Corruption in general | Other | Total |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| A single actor or several actors acting independently | 703 30,1% | 56 6,1% | 26 25,7% | 134 40,4% | 41 15,5% | 25 16,1% | 102 28,1% | 22 8,8% | 21 8,9% | 39 15,2% | 1169 22,4% |
| A group or network of actors | 360 15,4% | 27 2,9% | 20 19,8% | 61 18,4% | 17 6,4% | 28 18,1% | 48 13,2% | 23 9,2% | 8 3,4% | 7 2,7% | 599 11,5% |
| An institution, company, association, political party | 316 13,5% | 55 6,0% | 10 9,9% | 25 7,5% | 19 7,2% | 52 33,5% | 52 14,3% | 18 7,2% | 14 5,9% | 33 12,8% | 594 11,4% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 955 40,9% | 781 85,0% | 45 44,6% | 112 33,7% | 188 70,9% | 50 32,3% | 161 44,4% | 187 74,8% | 193 81,8% | 178 69,3% | 2850 54,7% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>2334</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>919</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>101</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>332</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>265</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>155</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>363</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>250</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>236</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>257</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 16: ‘What does the agent give to the client?’ Object of exchange by corruption type

| | Bribery, kickback | Embezzlement | Illegal party financing | Solicitation, extortion | Abuse of power/office | Collusion, cartel | Clientelism, nepotism, familism | Fraud | Corruption in general | Other | Total |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Purely material goods | 292 12,5% | 523 56,9% | 21 20,8% | 44 13,3% | 42 15,8% | 13 8,4% | 39 10,7% | 66 26,4% | 5 2,1% | 33 12,8% | 1078 20,7% |
| Non-material goods | 1106 47,4% | 68 7,4% | 29 28,7% | 166 50,0% | 98 37,0% | 37 23,9% | 190 52,3% | 48 19,2% | 32 13,6% | 40 15,6% | 1814 34,8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 936 40,1% | 328 35,7% | 51 50,5% | 122 36,7% | 125 47,2% | 105 67,7% | 134 36,9% | 136 54,4% | 199 84,3% | 184 71,6% | 2320 44,5% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>2334</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>919</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>101</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>332</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>265</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>155</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>363</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>250</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>236</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>257</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 17: What does the client give to the agent?’ Object of exchange by corruption type

| | Bribery, kickback | Embezzlement | Illegal party financing | Solicitation, extortion | Abuse of power/office | Collusion, cartel | Clientelism, nepotism, familism | Fraud | Corruption in general | Other | Total |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Purely material goods | 1364 58,4% | 85 9,2% | 54 53,5% | 137 41,3% | 33 12,5% | 25 16,1% | 56 15,4% | 53 21,2% | 21 8,9% | 23 8,9% | 1851 35,5% |
| Non-material goods | 161 6,9% | 18 2,0% | 16 15,8% | 66 19,9% | 19 7,2% | 10 6,5% | 38 10,5% | 5 2,0% | 7 3,0% | 14 5,4% | 354 6,8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 809 34,7% | 816 88,8% | 31 30,7% | 129 38,9% | 213 80,4% | 120 77,4% | 269 74,1% | 192 76,8% | 208 88,1% | 220 85,6% | 3007 57,7% |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>2334</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>919</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>101</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>332</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>265</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>155</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>363</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>250</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>236</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>257</i> <i>100%</i> | <i>5212</i> <i>100%</i> |

Table 18: Type of original transaction by corruption

| | Bribery, kickback | Embezzlement | Illegal party financing | Solicitation, extortion | Abuse of power/office | Collusion, cartel | Clientelism, nepotism, familism | Fraud | Corruption in general | Other | Total |
|---|------------------------------|---------------------|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|--|--------------|----------------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| One-off transaction | 554 23,7% | 202 22,0% | 28 27,7% | 88 26,5% | 70 26,4% | 19 12,3% | 83 22,9% | 27 10,8% | 22 9,3% | 43 16,7% | 1136 21,8% |
| Repeated transactions | 720 30,8% | 414 45,0% | 41 40,6% | 93 28,0% | 78 29,4% | 57 36,8% | 128 35,3% | 110 44,0% | 22 9,3% | 46 17,9% | 1709 32,8% |
| Not applicable/Not possible to determine | 1060 45,4% | 303 33,0% | 32 31,7% | 151 45,5% | 117 44,2% | 79 51,0% | 152 41,9% | 113 45,2% | 192 81,4% | 168 65,4% | 2367 45,4% |
| Total | 2334 100% | 919 100% | 101 100% | 332 100% | 265 100% | 155 100% | 363 100% | 250 100% | 236 100% | 257 100% | 5212 100% |



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Project profile

ANTICORRP is a large-scale research project funded by the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme. The full name of the project is "Anti-corruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption". The project started in March 2012 and will last for five years. The research is conducted by 20 research groups in fifteen countries.

The fundamental purpose of ANTICORRP is to investigate and explain the factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anti-corruption policies and impartial government institutions. A central issue is how policy responses can be tailored to deal effectively with various forms of corruption. Through this approach ANTICORRP seeks to advance the knowledge on how corruption can be curbed in Europe and elsewhere. Special emphasis is laid on the agency of different state and non-state actors to contribute to building good governance.

Project acronym: ANTICORRP

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