The half-blind watchdog
Remarks on the online citizenship, transparency and public administration’s integrity in Hungary

Keywords: integrity, online communication, citizenship, transparency, public sector

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Abstract

Albeit Hungary is in the first third of the world in the field of transparency and accountability, its position is quite weak in the European Union as well as among the world’s most developed countries at all. In this paper, four reasons of this weakness are observed: existence of digital divide; visions about democracy are various without certain consensus, due to the colourful historical heritage; online and offline civic life and journalism (the “watchdogs” of society) are either bound to governmental organizations or they are forced into financial dependency (currently, there are only two relatively well-known Hungarian homepages dealing with accountability of public and private sectors); and as a result of the previous three, institutional accountability is not a real need for citizens. These factors can only be changed by time, while international and governmental subsidy would be necessary to invigorate transparency, furthermore civic integrity trainings and courses could catalyse the process.
Introduction

According to a well-known truism, online communication helps to develop a society’s transparency and accountability. To mention another cliché, citizenship in the 21st century is easy to make and live via online channels due to the constant technical and social development. Theoretically, these phrases are inevitably true, although a complete set of circumstances impede the evolution of social participation. Just to mention a few factors which are necessary for a well-built postmodern democracy: decreasing the impacts of digital divide, clarifying different meanings of democracy itself in the society, increasing the civic awareness towards commonwealth, and intensifying the transparency and accountability of institutional operation both in public and private sectors. These taxonomically consequent factors are all necessary to make the dream come true about online citizenship – and the line can be arbitrarily long-continued.

Albeit Hungary is in the first third of the world considering the field of transparency and accountability, its position is quite weak in the European Union as well as among the world’s most developed countries at all. The reasons are various: digital divide exists and doesn’t really decreases; visions about democracy are various without certain consensus due to the colorful historical heritage; online and offline civic life and journalism (the “watchdogs” of society) are either bound to governmental organizations or they are forced into financial dependency in a way or another.

In the last decade, many initiations aimed to strengthen the accountability of public sector in this country in order to enhance the trust in governmental institutions as well as to make public life transparent. The slow change has started. Even so, institutions aiming to increase the citizens’ consciousness and the creation of vivid online citizenship can only do their job like a half-blind watchdog yet. Hungarian society is currently halfway to see all the affairs of their public life – and the consequences of them.

In this paper we provide a status report of the Hungarian public and private sector’s accountability, concentrating on the above-mentioned factors which influence the development process. This descriptive approach we use involves some theoretical frameworks of anti-corruption and integrity management, emphasizing the role and importance of new media.

Factors of integrity in the society

The concept of integrity applied for individuals is the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles. Relating to institutes and physical entities, integrity means the state of being whole and undivided (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2014). Whereas one can make a difference between personal and institutional integrity, both types have the same property of accountability, transparent behaviour and clear-cut functionality, of course with different meanings in the two cases.

Speaking about institutional integrity, it is often said that corruption is logically inconsistent with the principles of accountability and transparency. That’s why corruption is the greatest barrier to be “integer” regardless of being a country, a civic movement or a for-profit firm. Corruption and integrity are therefore different sides of the same coin: the more corruption proliferates, the less integrity blossoms in an institution or in a society.

The condition of developed integrity, moreover, can’t be realized by only top-bottom actions in a social system (Mulcahy, 2011). It is especially true to democratic societies. Whereas transparency and accountability are typical socially built conditions, integrity can be built only in case if bottom-up actions are also presence in societies beside the top-bottom ones. National and other integrity management systems are a conscious way to develop integrity, which aims to create a healthy balance of top-bottom and bottom-up actions.

The multi-sided and rich inquired phenomenon of integrity is used as a general term in this paper: we apply it for the whole society. Here we observe and describe the Hungarian state of integrity
concentrating on the public sector on the one hand and on the public opinion on the other hand. The guideline of thoughts is provided by the concept of mediated social communication: a typical postmodern democratic state is reliant on computer mediated communication and on other forms of new media, for the mere number of population definitely turns out to be an essential barrier to the free flow of (political and other) ideas, or to put it in another words: the rational discourse described by Habermas (1991).

According to the above-mentioned property of new media communication, the first crucial question to answer is about the mere accessibility of new media. In whole-society discourses – e. g. on governmental exploiting of public funds or problematic issues around community investments – appears a wide stakeholder base, well hundred thousands or millions of people. Since personal communication is impossible to apply for a rational discourse, the ultimate resolution should be inevitably new media, providing quasi-real-time multilateral communication forms (in contrary to mass media): now it is a question how much people can reach the fruits of digital world and what can we do against digital divide.

After that mainframes of rational discourse have been technically built, it is necessary to observe the theoretical framework of it. Whereas we are engaged in inquiring a democratic country’s integrity, this theoretical building is suited around the concept of democracy: how do we define the essence of our political system? What kind of “lowest common denominator” do we have considering democracy? How do citizens evaluate their own state and society in general? To what extent are we democracy-conscious? Many important questions waiting for an answer...

Beside the theoretic approach, the concept of democracy has a practical side as well. If a consensus is ready in a society, certain groups and civic subsystems play the role of “watchdog”: this is how the whole political system gets a control, checks and balances from the civic side of society. This fairy tale of democratic theory is heavily toned in almost every country, this way or that: there is a wide range of varieties among democratic countries by the stage of free speech, the traits of civil rights, the financial culture and historical heritage. These factors seriously influence to what extent a society is sensitive towards corruption, bribe and other types of integrity violations.

The other side of the coin is the question of institutional integrity: national integrity system implicitly claims that reaching of an integer condition may require well decades. It is important to see the current status (in the mirror of digital divide, democracy-concepts and civic awareness), however it is also an important issue how officers, politicians and the employees of public administration in general aim to achieve the condition of integrity. Governmental measures today not only show the aspiration for integrity: they can really help to reach it in a certain time (beside a theoretical frame, some good examples are given by Galtung, 2013).

If theoretical and practical frames are ready, if civic awareness and top-bottom measures support each other in order to make public life transparent, the next task is a scheduled evaluation – of course this has to be transparent as well, just like all the other functions of policy and decision-making. How does Hungary stand in this process? As we will see, the country is kneeling on the starting line towards a sound integrity management system (Bertók et al., 2010). In the meantime, media and civic awareness are like a half-blind watchdog due to political and societal reasons.

**Decreasing the impacts of digital divide**

Community decision-making in antique democracies had a relatively well-elaborated and fruitful model with a functional and transactional method (Mazzoleni, 1999). In a typical agora, every single citizen who had his right to proclaim his will could personally participate in public debate and voting. A few hundred men per city could easily be listened to; expression of meanings had no substantial barriers this way in democratic decision-making process. In a modern society, the mere number of voters impedes the functionality of the antique debating and voting model. That’s why mediated
political decision-making started to have a great role in the previous century. The consequences of media-led political life are serious – and more or less disappointing for those who see the substance of politics in a rational discourse. Manipulation and populism blossom in the age of mass media and later, in the era of computer mediated communication as well.

As most postmodern political scientists claim, platforms of the digital world can enhance the democratic acts in societies: online public participation makes policy decisions more and more transparent, “living democracy” may well return into the states after a few hundreds of years, transforming into “liquid democracy” which is a continuous awareness-based process instead of representative democracy with regular voting cycles. Theoretically it could be true (Breidl-Francq, 2008): voters can debate and negotiate public issues because online platforms allow real-time mediated participation in the decision-making process, what is more, mobile applications allow a non-located decision-making: ultimately, this widens the number of conscious citizens. However, several critics tone these optimistic thoughts. Considering digital divide, the first crucial question is how large proportion of the whole population can access online platforms. In an ideal democracy, every single people with voting rights have an access to the public debate.

As a statistic from 2011 shows, the rate of active internet users among the whole Hungarian population is relatively high (61.8%), while in Europe it is marginally lower (only 58.4%), for later and more data see e. g. World Internet Project (2013). This means that more than six million people use internet at least one time per week. Since 2011 this rate has slightly increased. However, digital divide inevitably exists regarding the usage rate of internet users by age groups. The average age of internet users is currently 34 years. If we take into consideration the population over 14 years, it turns out that the usage rate is much lower, only about 53%. Internet users’ rate among 14-17 years old people are almost 100%: they are all digitally socialized and have pleasing digital literacy skills. Parallel with the age, even less people may be called “frequent user”. Hungarian people in their thirties only participate not quite two-thirds part, and about a half part of people over 40 years avoid frequent internet usage.

Not surprisingly, the main factors of digital divide are basically the same in Hungary as in other countries: age, profession, educational attainment, financial conditions, type of settlement, provenance and gender. The most crucial coefficients are age and financial conditions: the older and/or the poorer people are, the less they surf on the net.

Talking about the general phenomenon of digital divide, we have to discern cognitive divide and access divide. Mainly cognitive avoidance can be recognized in Hungary in elder generations: they ordinarily can’t recognize the fruits of internet use as long as they aren’t motivated in it. (E. g. an abroad-living family member or friend can change this attitude.) The other main reason not to use internet relates to a more difficult question: if someone has not got enough financial resources to have an own computer or a smartphone with internet connection, they omit the benefits of digital world. There are of course different stages considering this phenomenon. In an extreme case, one has not enough money to gain the necessary food, while others spend their (little) money rather on their offline hobbies instead of investing it in digital tools and services, of course without any serious motivation.

After the question of access we have to pay attention to another substantial factor: what type of political platforms does population have to publish they thoughts about public issues?

In Hungary, there are only a few organizations willing to break the traditional representative democratic system’s frames. One of the most successful attempts among liquid democracy initiatives was the debut of Hungarian Pirate Party in April 2014, according to the Swedish model. Pirates’ main goals are settled around the free flow of ideas: legal file transfer, torrent and P2P stem from this doctrine. In the Central European Region it seems to be necessary to complete this with a more tangible debt which is understandable to the average “offline” people on the other side of the digital gap. For this reason, Hungarian Pirate Party introduced the idea of constantly recallable parliamentarians: work of the chosen members of the Parliament has to be continuously monitored by the civic awareness and in case of insufficiency, representatives shall not finish the four-years-long
The principle is hard to suit to the current system, so this kind of democratic model would require a total restructuring of the Hungarian constitutional arrangement. The Hungarian Pirate Party could set only one candidate in an inner district of the capital with the result of 64(!) votes among more thousand local voters, but their existence proves the slight need for a liquid democratic model in Hungary.

Other example stem from another sector of liquid democracy. This one emphasizes the importance of direct personal communication, claiming that satisfactory results in local and regional issues can only be borne by community co-thinking. Theoretically this means that if a local problem occur – e. g. a dilemma about urban development or the allocation of development funds – local voters with local politicians and entrepreneurs sit together to find the best resolution via rational discourse. In the observed country it’s hard to find such a well-built system in practice except in a few small towns (although there are several elaborated didactical mediation and participation models). The reason of hypo-functionality is mainly the general political uncertainty and distrust towards new decision-making methods. Beside this, the local politicians’ need for controlling the processes is pronounced – this way, lack of transparency is maintained in most regional and local governmental institutions. This leads often to the blossom of everyday corruption.

**Meanings of democracy**

The second essential factor of a democratic society’s integrity and need for accountability is how they define “democracy” itself. This theoretical frame about democratic concept circumscribes how a population evaluates their country and community as well, what is more, a definition of democracy tells a whole story about their past and history. An abstract concept like this may vary in different states and regions, not to mention in different socio-demographic classes of society. An exact sample to query how people think about democracy is provided by the members of the Hungarian public administration. Thanks to the support of several EU-funded applications, many programs about anticorruption and integrity have been running since the Millennium.

A recent example of them provides a best practice in the field of integrity-centred courses. In September 2013 started a training series titled “Ethics and Integrity of Public Service” for the workers of Hungarian public administration. State Reform Operative Program 1.1.21, funded by the European Union aimed to spread the integrity approach among public servants. More than 3000 employees attended a one-day-training (8 teaching hours) which included a module about the concept of well-functioning groups, democracy and corruption. According to the curricula’s guideline, trainers clarified the definition of integrity in the context of public good and public welfare in a frontal section, mentioning that integrity plays an extremely important role in democratic states, serving the development of public welfare. After that it had happened by the first thirty minutes of the training, a longer module took place: in the above-mentioned creative section of the training, participants had to create a working definition for democracy in small groups (ca. 4-6 members per group).

As a quest showed, the keywords “public good” and “welfare” almost never appeared in the working definitions (Bokor, 2014). This is surprising, notably for two reasons. Firstly, the frontal introduction pretensions the knowledge about correlation of democracy and public welfare, so participants got a pronounced idea on the essence of democracy. Secondly, all the participants work in the public administration sector. They don’t necessarily have a degree in law or intense knowledge on constitutional doctrines, however theoretically they all have some kind of knowledge on the core of public administration work – the latter is underlined by a compulsory administrative exam in this sector. What is more, an ethical codex for the employees of public administration emphasizes the service of public welfare in its introduction – the acceptance of the codex is also a mandatory for the employees since 01. September 2013. Recognized that all the members of public administration do their work at a high stage of professional skills and honor, the observation of these trainings showed that they mostly omit the substantial content of democracy and its essential relation to public welfare.
Instead of this, they rather see democracy as a procedural framework which enables to fit everyday life to the law and codes. Eventually, if public servants with their professional skills see democracy as a practical framework instead of a society’s cement, average people may also think that the essence of this state organizational model is serving the law instead of serving the people (Plant, 2001). Thus the dividing line between law and ethic strengthens while these two spheres move away from each other: what legal is isn’t necessarily ethical and vice versa (Thompson, 1992). We see the resolution of this problem in a more enhanced awareness toward the substance of democracy.

**Civic awareness toward commonwealth**

Corruptive acts can be characterized in different ways. One of them (Nagy, 2013, see detailed below) makes a difference between political, public administrational and economic corruption, situating on various types and stages from personal (face-to-face) corruption to complex bribes and total occupancy of a sector in favour of vindicating a certain group’s own interest to an ultimate level. Little everyday corruptions may lead to more complex structures, for this process is based on individual and group factors as well, according to the fraud triangle by Cressey (1973).¹ As the criminal-psychologist delineates, corruption occurs mainly in those societies where 1.) institutional opportunity is given by the lacks of legal regulation (wickets in system), 2.) individual determination exists (driven by desire for advantage or benefit and/or driven by constraint), and 3.) recipient social environment interprets corruption as an admissible use in the community. The latter is the most crucial thing in reducing the consequences of corruption: the mere institutional acts (e.g. even stricter laws, regulations, codes) as top-bottom actions can just influence people “from the outside”, without any persistent result. Only bottom-top tools (creating ethical consensus, inner motivated attention for transparency) can create a change in factors 2. and 3., namely on the individual and social reasons of corruption.

**Figure 1.: Types of corruption (Nagy, 2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of corruption</th>
<th>Political sphere</th>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>Economic sphere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differentiation for mutual personal benefit</td>
<td>Political corruption</td>
<td>Corruption in public administration</td>
<td>Economic corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferring relatives and friends</td>
<td>Political nepotism</td>
<td>Nepotism in public administration</td>
<td>Economical nepotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferring a person</td>
<td>Political protection</td>
<td>Protection in public administration</td>
<td>Economical protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferring a social group identified by a certain property</td>
<td>Political favoritism</td>
<td>Favoritism in public administration</td>
<td>Economical favoritism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiation of a person who shoulders a depending status in order to gain profit</td>
<td>Political clientism</td>
<td>Public administrational clientism</td>
<td>Economical clientism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹The fraud triangle originated from Donald Cressey's hypothesis: Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable, are aware this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property. (Cressey, 1973: 30.)
As corruptive acts can be described in many ways, in this paper we have to concentrate on those which are described and thematised in well-visited social media platforms: these get namely publicity with a more or less wide public via online. Eventually only these cases count as “widely known” ones. We have to say, a corruptive event without any social media publicity can’t reach a wide public: media market in Hungary is too fragmented for this. Media consuming behaviour has created a multi-channel environment in the last decade: various media products came into use, so mass media has lost its former leading position among digital media users in information gathering.

Talking about Hungarian civil social media platforms engaged to accountability and transparency, there are at least three topics they are organized along: political, public administrational and economics-oriented surfaces (including manufacturing and service sector), according to the three fields of corruption detailed above. For obvious reasons, most of the editors committed themselves operating their sites as blogs with at least daily refreshed posts, comment options and embedded links, whereas information gathering and opinion sharing can be seriously invigorated by bidirectional and real-time communicational options. On most of the surfaces, different topics or columns can be found rather mixed, yet an emphasis and editorial dedication can be easily recognized in most cases towards one of the above-mentioned three topics.

There are only a few frequently visited sites on transparency and accountability in Hungary. Not surprisingly, the spread of them relates to the strengthening of current government. To cite and characterize the two most relevant ones, here we summarize some general information about them. (In order to create a logically consistent structure, we only apply an alphabetical order in the list below instead of vague and controversial categorisation.)

- atlatszo.hu: the name of this site is actually a game with words. On the one hand it means “transparent” in Hungarian, on the other hand “átlátszó” is an adjective means “showing the cloven hoof”. The main page of this site basically deals with corruptive cases mainly from the political scene. Beside this, many actual different case studies are provided from the borderline of political and business sphere, from the cooperation of political and business sphere. Its subchapters focus on educational, police and many other bribes. Each reader is allowed to send in stories about corruptive cases with names and other data as well as comment on these stories.
  o atlatszo.hu provides many important subchapters: the blogs include for example “mutyimondó” (“the storyteller about going shares”), “vastagbőr” (“thick skin”, a blog for typical political and public sector trespasses), “transparency” (the blog of the Hungarian Transparency International Chapter), and many more blogs including investigative journalists;
  o kimitud: another part of atlatszo.hu is a subportal dealing with public information request in dubious issues: the results of successful requests can be seen here as well as articles of unsuccessful request processes;
  o fizettem.hu: an interactive whistleblowing homepage for description of bribes and small corruptive situations. It is usually full of bribes on driving license exams, healthcare, local transport and other everyday situations. By tracking the data
recorded by civic whistleblowers, one can summarize the “market price” of corruption in certain fields of public sector and economy.

- magyarleaks (“Hungarian Leaks”) aims to provide information for citizens of which public interest is attached to. In the frame of the high-secured Tor-project, one can easily and safely leak official and informal documents on corruptive acts, loops and more without the danger of retaliation.

- blog.homar.hu: this weblog Tékozló Homár (“Prodigal Lobster”) makes for a good example for business accountability. This colourful collection with a slogan “consume, lavish, suffer” gives place for posts by unsatisfied customers from many fields of industry and mainly services, furthermore it also presents embarrassing, wrongdoer or immoral advertisements. The most 12 keywords go about naive client (4123), advertisement (1001), ‘orally’ (654, referring to the importance of sent-in material collected by customers), market garden (650), food (560), stupid text (553), hypermarket (498), customer service (407), bank (382), gadget (353), travelling (328), car (325) (number of tags in 31. March, 2013 are in brackets). There are also certain national and multinational companies among the tags, e. g. Apple, Asus, Auchan, DHL, ELMŰ (a Hungarian electricity distributor), E.On, IKEA, Invitel, Malév (the former Hungarian national airflight company), MÁV (Hungarian State Railways), Nokia, OrangeWays, OTP (the biggest Hungarian bank), RyanAir, Samsung, Spar, T-Home, T-Mobile, Telenor, Tesco, Tigáz (a Hungarian natural gas provider), UPC, Vodafone, Windows, WizzAir and Zepter. They all have least three, at best 35 tags. Hereby it is easy to see that consumers have certain “favourite” scapegoats to attack verbally in (and by) their posts. These can be distinguished into three main groups: typical Hungarian governmental organisations, energy provider companies, respectively multinational trade and service companies. All posts in the “Prodigal Lobster” site have a two-sided, five-degree rating system: on the one hand, the editors rate all posts (“lobster factor”), on the other hand laic readers can do it as well. So a democratic deliverance method has been built up, which ensures a reliable quality rating among posts. There are no certain and official data about the visitors’ number. However, judging by the amount of comments (generally 25-400 per post) wide reading can be suspected regarding the size of Hungarian internet community. Thus the conclusion is that homar.blog.hu is one of the greatest Hungarian consumer complaint forums, and perhaps the greatest of non-official ones (Bokor, 2014c).

These two sites as the most relevant ones have their difficulties in their everyday operation: the latter gets enough indignant letters from readers to maintain the daily content update, however marketing specialists omit the Prodigal Lobster in planning media mix, so advertisers are rare as a white crow. The former one has to face financial problems: government, not surprisingly, gives no subsidization for the providers of atlatszo.hu, so by this year they have launched a civic fund-raising action to stay on the online scene as a unique Hungarian accountability-focused site as well as a hotbed of Hungarian investigative journalism.

**Transparency and accountability in societal and institutional operation**

Transparency International (TI) consists of more than 100 chapters – locally established, independent organisations – that fight corruption in their respective countries. From small bribes to large-scale looting, corruption differs from country to country. As chapters are staffed with local experts they are ideally placed to determine the priorities and approaches best suited to tackling corruption in their countries. This work ranges from visiting rural communities to provide free legal support to advising their government on policy reform. This coalition aims “to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society. Our Core Values are: transparency, accountability, integrity, solidarity, courage, justice and democracy” (transparency.org). They want a world in which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of people...
are free of corruption. Of course a chapter exists in Hungary as well, providing all the services and activities mentioned above.

Regarding the public and private sector’s integrity, the most relevant topic in TI’s work is assembling the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) every year since 1994. According to the last year’s results, Hungary stands in the 47th position among 177 countries worldwide. In the previous years, there was a 46th position (in 2012), former a 54th (in 2011) and earlier a 50th (in 2010). The main tendencies are more or less the same: Hungary has always been by the end of the first third of the list since CPI exists. However, its position compared to other EU-countries is not quite satisfactory. While Czech Republic and Slovakia turned out to be in worse condition, Hungary stands in the 23th position among 31 European countries, so it is among the last ten European states regarding corruption. The country-specified CPI index accumulates several different statistics (e. g. in case of Hungary it consist of ten separated queries) which examine how business sector perceive corruption in a country’s public administration.²

In an ideal world, a state’s integrity is built by the democracy-conscious community itself, not by any politicians. “Community Integrity Building is not an anti-corruption drive, however. The first priority of this work is to fix and resolve problems that affect local communities. Pursuing or denouncing specific cases of corruption is not an effective objective for local communities. The pursuit of incidental corruption cases is ultimately a state responsibility or at best something the media should take up” (Galtung, 2013: 20).

Moreover, if we observe the coincidence of interest in politics and users’ age, we see that a large proportion of youngsters (Y and Z generations) mainly don’t deal with direct political issues. “The political activity of young Hungarians gives no cause for optimism; 25 per cent of respondents are certain that they will not take part in elections, 9 per cent would probably not cast their vote and 17 per cent are undecided on whether or not to attend polling stations. In total, half (51 per cent) of Hungarian young people interviewed are characterised by an inactive disposition towards voting” (Oross, 2012: 356.). The only case when they pay attention to political topics is if it has a humorous content. Construction of online political memes is typically a deal of elder people, whereas youngsters also relatively often create and repost, retweet such contents (Bokor, 2014b). However, what is important: real movement (activity) and online posting, commenting (virtual presence) are strictly separated in young people’s political behaviour.

**Summing up: evaluation of the current status**

Community Integrity Building theoretically requires three things at a minimum: 1.) capacity building to introduce the concept of an integrity lens, 2.) the formation of Joint Working Groups (or their strengthening where similar arrangements already exist) and 3.) the evidence base against which solutions are measured and the leverage for change is created (Klotz, 2012).

To make the concept of sound integrity management system (OECD, 2001) come true, it would be necessary to decrease digital divide and create a social consensus about the meaning and content of democracy. These simple premises are not enough, just like increasing civic awareness and institutional transparency in public sector are neither easy-to-make action. The cure to give an intact sight to the addressed half-blind Hungarian watchdog should start with a certain step: international and governmental subsidy for the whole civil sector including the non-government-friendly organizations as well. It is, of course, a naïve fallacy: financial support is interwoven with the suspicion of prejudice, causing newer and newer problems in the societal system. “If the government wishes to

² The whole and detailed methodology can be downloaded from http://files.transparency.org/content/download/702/3015/file/CPI2013_DataBundle.zip
credibly introduce (...) reforms, it must play a two-level-game: one with the general public and another one with the elite” – points out Ovseiko (2004: 240.). This game is always a risky business, especially in societies where the gap between the elite and general public is as big as in Hungary. For these reasons, the cure is given by the time itself – and by even more and more citizens, who care of their commonwealth’s destiny. As long as we have to wait, civic integrity trainings and courses may help to catalyse the slow development process.

Resources


www.transparency.org (retrieved on 28.09.14)

http://files.transparency.org/content/download/702/3015/file/CPI2013_DataBundle.zip (retrieved on 28.09.14)