A Price-setting Game with a Nonatomic Fringe

Tasnádi, Attila (2000) A Price-setting Game with a Nonatomic Fringe. Economics Letters, 69 (1). pp. 63-69. DOI 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0

Preview

PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
147kB

Official URL: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176500002640

Abstract

This paper extends the Bertrand-Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership.

Item Type:

Article

Series Number / Identification Number:

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0

Uncontrolled Keywords:

Bertrand-Edgeworth; Dominant firm; Price leadership, JEL classification: D43; L13

Divisions:

Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics

Subjects:

Mathematics, Econometrics

DOI:

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0