A Price-setting Game with a Nonatomic Fringe

Tasnádi, Attila (2000) A Price-setting Game with a Nonatomic Fringe. Economics Letters, 69 (1). pp. 63-69. DOI 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0

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This paper extends the Bertrand-Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership.

Item Type:Article
Series Number / Identification Number:10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bertrand-Edgeworth; Dominant firm; Price leadership, JEL classification: D43; L13
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
ID Code:298
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:08 Mar 2011 12:00
Last Modified:03 Jul 2012 00:24

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