A Two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth Game

Tasnádi, Attila (1999) A Two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth Game. Economics Letters, 65 (3). pp. 353-358. DOI 10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00170-6

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Official URL: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176599001706

Abstract

In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which during the first stage the firms can select their rationing rule. We will show that under certain conditions the efficient rationing rule is an equilibrium action of the first stage.

Item Type:

Article

Series Number / Identification Number:

10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00170-6

Uncontrolled Keywords:

Duopoly, Rationing, JEL code: D43, L13

Divisions:

Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics

Subjects:

Mathematics, Econometrics

DOI:

10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00170-6