A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol

Forgó, Ferenc (2010) A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol. Mathematical Social Sciences, 60 (3). pp. 186-190. DOI 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.002

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A new correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is introduced for finite games. After randomization over the outcome space, players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of an umpire blindly or freely choose some other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-better outcomes than the simple extension introduced by [Moulin, H., Vial, J.-P., 1978. Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory 7, 201–221]. The informational and interpretational aspects of soft correlated equilibria are also discussed in detail. The power of the generalization is illustrated in the prisoners’s dilemma and a congestion game.

Item Type:Article
Series Number / Identification Number:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.002
Uncontrolled Keywords:Correlation; Nash equilibrium; Protocol, C72
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
ID Code:350
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:13 May 2011 12:00
Last Modified:01 Jun 2011 13:48

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