Corvinus
Corvinus

Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

Forgó, Ferenc (2011) Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 19 (2). pp. 201-213. DOI 10.1007/s10100-010-0142-y

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/e6647328k85707uw/


Abstract

A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is applied for two-person finite games in extensive form with perfect information. Randomization by an umpire takes place over the leaves of the game tree. At every decision point players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of the umpire blindly or freely choose any other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are considered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is given for a special procedure called “subgame perfect optimization”.

Item Type:Article
Series Number / Identification Number:10.1007/s10100-010-0142-y
Uncontrolled Keywords:Correlation, Nash equilibrium, Behavioral strategies, Protocol
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
DOI:10.1007/s10100-010-0142-y
ID Code:354
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:16 May 2011 15:01
Last Modified:01 Jun 2011 13:48

Repository Staff Only: item control page