Corvinus
Corvinus

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

Forgó, Ferenc (2008) On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 16 (4). pp. 359-377. DOI 10.1007/s10100-008-0064-0

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/u475668411w76166/


Abstract

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.

Item Type:Article
Series Number / Identification Number:10.1007/s10100-008-0064-0
Uncontrolled Keywords:Nash bargaining solution, L-Nash bargaining solution, Noncooperative bargaining
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
DOI:10.1007/s10100-008-0064-0
ID Code:375
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:01 Jun 2011 13:47
Last Modified:01 Jun 2011 13:47

Repository Staff Only: item control page