The Shapley Value for Upstream Responsibility Games

Radványi, Anna (2018) The Shapley Value for Upstream Responsibility Games. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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In this paper sharing the cost of emission in supply chains are considered. We focus on allocation problems that can be described by rooted trees, called cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called upstream responsibility games (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2017). The formal notion of upstream responsibility games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is probably the most popular value for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) show respectively, that Shapley (1953)’s and Young (1985)’s axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of airport games. We extend Dubey's and Moulin and Shenker's results onto the class of upstream responsibility games, that is, we provide two characterizations of the Shapley value for upstream responsibility games.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2018/06
Uncontrolled Keywords:upstream responsibility games, cost sharing, emission, supply chain, shapley value, rooted tree, axiomatization of the shapley value
JEL classification:C71 - Cooperative Games
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Funders:National Research, Development and Innovation Office, GAMENET
Projects:NKFIH 119930, CA16228 GAMENET
ID Code:3779
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:28 Nov 2018 12:17
Last Modified:30 Nov 2018 17:23

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