Corvinus
Corvinus

Mixed duopolies with advance production

Balogh, Tamás László and Tasnádi, Attila (2018) Mixed duopolies with advance production. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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Abstract

Production to order and production in advance have been compared in many frameworks. In this paper we investigate a production in advance version of the capacityconstrained Bertrand-Edgeworth mixed duopoly game and determine the solution of the respective timing game. We show that a pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nashequilibrium exists for all possible orderings of moves. It is pointed out that unlike the production-to-order case, the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves. An analysis of the public firm's impact on social surplus is also carried out. All the results are compared with those of the production-to order version of the respective game and with those of the mixed duopoly timing games.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2018/08
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bertrand-Edgeworth, mixed duopoly, timing games
JEL classification:D43 - Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Projects:Pallas Athéné Domus Sapientiae Leading Researcher Program
ID Code:3811
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:05 Dec 2018 14:06
Last Modified:16 Jan 2019 15:50

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