Dictatorship versus manipulability

Bednay, Dezső and Moskalenko, Anna and Tasnádi, Attila (2018) Dictatorship versus manipulability. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973/75) theorem roughly states that we have to accept dictatorship or manipulability in case of at least three alternatives. A large strand of the literature estimates the degree of manipulability of social choice functions (e.g. Aleskerov and Kurbanov, 1999, Favardin et al., 2002, and Aleskerov et al., 2012), most of them employing the Nitzan-Kelly index of manipulability. We take a different approach and introduce a non-dictatorship index based on our recent work (Bednay et al., 2017), where we have analysed social choice functions based on their distances to the dictatorial rules. By employing computer simulations, we investigate the relationship between the manipulability and nondictatorship indices of some prominent social choice functions, putting them into a common framework.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2018/09
Uncontrolled Keywords:voting rules, dictatorship, manipulability, manipulability index, dictatorship index
JEL classification:D71 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Funders:Pallas Athene Domus Sapientiae Foundation - PADS Leading Researcher Program
Projects:OTKA K-112975
ID Code:3845
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:03 Jan 2019 15:03
Last Modified:03 Jan 2019 15:03

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