# Jegyzet az NKMDI hallgatói számára

A jegyzet a Pallas Athéné Domus Educationis Alapítvány (PADE) és a Pallas Athéné Innovációs és Geopolitikai Alapítvány (PAIGEO) támogatásával készült.

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Regionalism and inter-regionalism in international relations

2019

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I Basic Concepts

I.1 What is the course about?

Regionalism gives an essential phenomena of 20th-21st century international relations; globalizing system of regional integrations, relations between regions and institutions, inter-regional links connecting different regions all have more and more intense impact on the various actors of international relations, such as states, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and also individuals.

The course attempts to give an insight into the historical development, successes and dilemmas of regional structures targeting regional cooperation and development, emphasizing the extreme diversity of forms of regional integrations and analysing the most important tendencies of the contemporary world. States of the global South are more and more active participants of regionalism and their role has dual importance: their involvement in regional structures has an impact on their status in international relations, while forms of regional cooperation they build have special features distinguishing these from regional cooperation among Western /developed states. The aim of the course is to give an overall picture of today's system of regional and inter-regional cooperation and its forums, and to describe regions in a more complex interpretation focusing on political, economic and cultural links among the members, analysing the role of regionalism in conflict resolution, development and identity formation.

After the theoretical introduction (concepts, definitions, history and theories of regionalism), we focus on different dimensions of regionalism, such as security, development and identity and how these elements are connected to different forms of regional cooperation. Regions are presented as case studies, introducing those mechanisms and actors that form the opportunities and the concrete forms of regionalism. Finally, inter-regionalism – as the latest development of regionalism – will be analysed as a new level of global governance.

I.2 What constitutes a region?

The term 'region' is derived from the Latin word '**regio',** which is derived from '*regere'* meaning to direct or to rule, so originally regions were interpreted as administrative units within a wider entity – such as an empire or a kingdom. From the very beginning, geographical closeness was an essential element in defining a region and it is an important character till today, but in the 21st century geographical connection is loosing its importance – for example in the case of so-called 'currency regions' countries from different continents might constitute a 'region', of which 'dollar zone' is the most well-known case. The 'Hispanic world' – Spanish speaking territories in Europe and the Americas is also interpreted as a region, though geographically it is not a connected area. It is important to emphasize that it is basically impossible to give one single definition of the concept 'region' as different disciplines (history, geography, political science, law, sociology, economics, international relations, etc.) examine different aspects of regions and regionalism focusing on different elements and dimensions of the phenomena.

Let's have a look how dictionaries and encyclopaedias define a region. Cambridge Dictionary says: 'region is a particular area or part of the world or any of the large official areas into which a country is divided', then gives the following examples: one of China's autonomous regions, the Nordic/Asia-Pacific region, the Basque region. Oxford Dictionaries give the following definition: 'region is an area, especially part of a country or the world having definable characteristics but not always fixed boundaries'. Examples are 'the equatorial regions' or 'a major wine-producing region'.

It is obvious that regions have different categories: below the state level (a region on the territory of a state, such as Baranya county in Hungary), above the state level (a region consisting of a group of countries, such as East Asia or Western Europe) and transnational level (regions that reach the territory of different states, but do not follow state boundaries, such as the Andean region). These examples describe very well how categories of various disciplines (states, continents, counties, world regions, ethnic regions, etc.) meet and interact in the term 'region'. Most definitions emphasize four elements at various intensity, which are the following: (1) geography, (2) regularity and intensity of interactions, (3) shared regional perceptions, and (4) agency (Tavares, 2004. p. 4). Not all the definitions include all the four elements mentioned above, but these aspects appear in most of the definitions.

Tavares summarizes definitions of a region following these four lines:

'… despite the debate on the de-territorialization of geography … very few authors would disagree that a region ought to be typified by some level of geographical proximity. The degree of importance that is given to territory, however, shows a considerable discrepancy. For intellectuals as Palmer … , geography is the pillar in the definition of region; the world is thereby an arrangement of neatly demarcated territorial macro-regions. In marked opposition constructivists and post-moderns underline that regions are not 'natural', 'given' or 'essential'. … other scholars focus primarily on the second component, i.e. the constitutive content and the degree of internal cohesion of a region. In this endeavour, the literature normally converges attention to the formation of regional social linkages (language, culture, ethnicity, awareness of a common historical heritage), political linkages (political institutions, ideology, regime types) or economic linkages (preferential trade arrangements). … to social constructivists focus should not be put as much upon geography nor on material interdependence but mainly on the cognitive idea of region brought upon by socialization processes conducted by region-builders. … The last item is a most debated one. Classic approaches on regional studies emphasize the role of the state in the carving out of regional subsystems. Drawing on Karl Deutsch, Peter Katzenstein defines a region as "a *set of countries* markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions. This is often, but not always, indicated by a flow of socio -economic transactions and communications and high political salience that differentiates a *group of countries* from others" (1996:130. Italics added). Defining region in this way is more of a limitation than an opportunity to post-moderns and social constructivists. They deal with the structure/agency and state/nonstate divides by manifestly adopting a micro-oriented perspective that stresses the role of bottom up agents.'

Depending on disciplines, authors have different views and perspectives about what type of links and connections give the base of the region. What gives coherence of regions, what connects them? Here you find some examples.

In **geography,** regions are areas broadly divided by physical characteristics, human impact features, and the interaction of humanity and the environment.

In the field of **political geography** regions tend to follow political units such as sovereign states; subnational units such as provinces, counties, townships, territories, etc.; and

multinational groupings, including institutionalized actors such as the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Organisation of American States (OAS), as well as 'informally' defined regions such as the developing world or the Middle East – though the concrete boundaries of last two are not obvious.

Natural resources can also serve as basis of regions. Natural resource regions can be a topic of physical geography or environmental geography, but also have a strong element of human geography and economic geography. A coal region, for example, is a physical or geomorphological region, but its development and exploitation can make it into an economic or a cultural region. (Rumelia Field, the oil field that lies along the border or Iraq and Kuwait has a strong historical role and it also played a role in the Gulf War; the Coal Region of Pennsylvania).

Sometimes a region is associated with a **religion** or **an ethnic group**. For example, Christendom, a term with medieval and renaissance connotations of Christianity is interpreted as a sort of social and political polity. The term Muslim world is sometimes used to refer to the region of the world where Islam is dominant. Hispanic world means those territories where Spanish is spoken as a first language, while the term Arab world refers to those areas where Arabic people give majority of the population.

On a social-constructivist base, **Charles Kupchan** defines region as a 'group of countries sharing a common identity, this collective identity might have several sources' – depending on the region. This perspective supposes that the identity of people living in a group of countries (not necessarily neighbouring countries) serves as a starting point and a strong element in building a region, it has a priority above geographical situation.

For international relations (IR) studies end experts, a region is interpreted at the above the state level, constituting macro regions or international regions. **Joseph Nye** gives a well-known and widely used definition: a region is 'a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence' (international region). Mutual interdependence is the innovation of this definition, it gives a new perspective and examines regions in the context of globalization in the sense that the process of globalization multiplies mutual interdependencies between actors of the international system. It basically describes a region in terms of levels of analysis, as a level between the state and the international system.

I.3 What is regionalism?

Similarly, to the definition of a region, the phenomena of **regionalism** is also approached in many different ways putting emphasis on different elements and dimensions. Cambridge Dictionary gives the following definition: 'a feeling of loyalty to a particular part of a country and a wish for it to be more politically independent', while the Oxford Dictionaries describes regionalism as 'The theory or practice of regional rather than central systems of administration or economic, cultural, or political affiliation.' Both definitions focus on below the state level and introduce regionalism as kind of a stronger and more intense connection to the region instead of a wider (national) framework.

Based on his own concept of a region (international region), Joseph Nye defines regionalism as 'Concentrated along some dimension(s), unproportionally, extremely dense network of contacts, cooperation, interactivity, interdependence between countries geographically close or far from one another'. It concentrates on inter-state links, and he does not specify the nature of interactions, giving rather a wide interpretation of regionalism focusing on stronger than usual interactivity and interdependence between a group of countries – not necessarily neighbouring ones.

Cohesion between states involved might be given by political (ideology, political system), economic (trade partners, economic complementarity), social (common ethnic background, religion, language, culture, historical heritage) or institutional (existence of formal regional institutions) background. Regionalism always sets common objectives and attempts to find different measures to reach or support these objectives. Soft regionalism means that a collective regional conscience is built through regional groups and networks, while hard regionalism is developed through interstate agreements and institutions, which gives a regular structure and performs as an actor in international relations. Relations between soft and hard regionalism is rather complex, difficult to describe, but in most cases they reinforce each other – soft regionalism might end up in institutions, while regional organisations might strengthen regional cooperation in new fields as a result of a spill-over effect with the participation of non-state actors.

What is the difference between **regionalism and regionalisation**? The two terms are often used interchangeably, although academic literature makes a clear distinction. Here is a summary again by Rodrigo Tavares on the difference and connection between the two phenomena.

'The dislodgment of regional studies is not only evident in the definition of region but on the associated ideas of 'regionalism' and 'regionalization'. For some authors, as Bjorn Hettne and Peter Katzenstein, the conceptual differentiation of these terms is very clear. The first means the set of *ideas* and *principles* that highlight the enmeshing of units in a regional context, whereas the second is most often defined as the *process* of regional interaction (Hettne, 1999-2001; Katzenstein, forthcoming 2004). Embarking upon the same perception, Andrew Hurrell takes regionalization to mean 'the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often undirected *processes* of social and economic interaction" (1995:39. Italics added). Slightly different is Raimo Väyrynen's stance (2003:43). Although he moves along the same lines looking upon regionalization as the dynamic process associated with region formation, regionalism is understood as being based on institutionalized intergovernmental coalitions that control access to a region. This reading is, however, by any means universally accepted. Fishlow and Haggard (1992) sharply distinguish between regionalization, which refers to the regional concentration of economic flows, and regionalism, which they define as a political process characterized by economic policy cooperation and coordination among countries. On the contrary, Bhagwati defines regionalism as a preferential trade agreement among a subset of nations (1999). Gamble and Payne, walking on a different route, define regionalism as a state-led project, whereas regionalization is primarily taken as a societal construction (1996). As no particular classification is taken as prevalent and as all of them presuppose a degree of correctness, my suggestion is, by moving away from content/agency distinctions, assessing the etymologic nature of the words. The word 'regionalism' contains the Greek Sufism 'ism', which means 'the act, state, or theory of'. Regionalism shall, therefore, be approached as the *theory* that investigates the *process* of regionalization.'

Regional cooperation is an open-ended process, where states and/or non-state actors act together to solve certain tasks – these tasks might range from infrastructural projects through energy plans to better education. Actors might have conflicting interests in several other questions, but they cooperate for the sake of the region in a given area. Regional cooperation might be temporary or permanent, and it also might lead to deeper and more regular interactions in the future.

Regional integration is a more permanent and deeper phenomena, as in this case previously autonomous entities form a totally new whole, a new unity that is able to act on its own. We make distinction between political integration (meaning a transnational political system after all), economic integration (emergence of transnational economic links) and social integration (leading to a transnational society). Reinforced cooperation results in complex transformation where units from isolation move towards partial or total integration giving a new entity that is more than its original components and will be able to act on its own.

I.4 Evolution of regionalism

Regionalism has shown different forms and types during history – from regional alliances to deeply institutionalized regional organisations, such as the European Union. The following table gives a summary of the most often types of regionalism, that till today exist parallelly showing the different types of this rather diverse phenomena.

Type	Actors	Level	Regional Program	External Goals	Most important issues
Old	Social movements (conservative, ethno-nationalist)	Subnational, sub-state	Symbolic reproduction, exclusion of multicultural identities	Nationastate through separatism	Ethnic policy, minorities
New	Social and cultural movements	Subnational, sub-state	Formal reproduction, exclusion of centralized developemnt	Decentralization, federalism	Modernisation, colonisation
Postmodern	Social and individual (companies, technology and innovation)	Subnational economic areas	Material reproduction	SMEs, make regional (local) economy more competitive	Globalization, global economy, competition

Transnational	Collective, social and individual (regional authorities, private organisations)	Subnational, transnational and supranational	Formal, material and symbolic reproduction excluding strategies of old and new regionalism	European integration as a field of transnational learning	Supranational institutions, european integration, inter-regional networking
International	Collective (nation states and IOs)	International region	Formal and/or material reproduction with political and economic strategies	Security, economic development	World politics, global governance, globalisation, regional economic development

Based on the above table and article of Schmitt-Egner, the different types of regionalism could be described as follows:

Old regionalism. This type of regionalism basically means ethno-nationalist movements, a central element is identity policy strongly attached to the region and an important aim is separatism, to build a new entity outside the current state-framework. Ex-Yugoslavia is a typical example here, Scottish and Catalan ambitions are also often mentioned in this case.

New regionalism. It is similar to the previous one, but this new form leaves behind the desire to redraw state borders, it rather targets regional modernization and autonomy to more independent from the central government. Decentralization and federalism are keywords for these social-cultural movements, from the 1970s we can see various examples, such as Bretagne in France or indigenous movements in Bolivia.

(It is important to emphasize that these forms of 'old' and 'new' regionalism are different from the first and second wave of regionalism discussed later, that are also mentioned as old and new regionalism.)

Postmodern regionalism. This type is totally different from the previous two, as it does not insist on formal reality or cultural homogeneity, it is rather described as local answers given to

global challenges. It uses new, modern technologies to build and strengthen the region, focuses on smaller areas, such as industrial zones that achieve competitiveness through innovation, flexibility and quick reactions.

Transnational regionalism. In this case, transnational processes and interactions are in focus, the emergence of transnational networks give the base of this type of regionalism. The European Union is the most obvious and visible example here, as borders are permeable and transnational flow of information and knowledge is an essential tendency. These transnational flows reinforce integration and make the parts more connected.

International regionalism. This type refers to inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and networks focusing on a given territory. It focuses on the above the region level, so basically this type of regionalism is that matters most in international relations. These actors attempt to guarantee their own security and well-being in the framework of globalisation and global governance – the phenomena of global governance will be discussed later.

When theory of regionalism is described, the evolution of regionalism and the level of 'regionness' must be detailed as it serves as basis for many research in this field and determines the academic perspective on international regionalism.

The concept 'regionness' was introduced by **Björn Hettne** and it is used regularly in academic literature discussing regionalism, regionalisation and various forms of regional cooperation. It basically attempts to describe the depth of regionalisation, distinguishing different phases of the process measured by the level of 'regionness'.

Hettne outlined a five-level model, which follows the logic of modernization theories, and gives an evolutionary approach, though instead of supposing that all the regions go through similar phases of a linear development he emphasizes that the level of regionness might increase or decrease. He writes: 'There are no 'natural' or 'given' regions, but these are created and recreated in the process of global transformation. Regionness can be understood in analogy with concepts such as 'stateness' and 'nationness'. The regionalisation process can be intentional or non-intentional and may proceed unevenly along the various dimensions of the 'new regionalism' (i.e. economics, politics, culture, security etc.). In what follows we will describe five generalised levels of regionness, which can be said to define a particular region in terms of regional coherence and community.'

Here you find the most important characteristics and elements of the five levels Hettne distinguishes:

'**Regional space.** First of all one can therefore identify a potential region as a primarily geographical unit, delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and marked by ecological characteristics: 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural', North America, the Southern cone of South America, 'Africa South of Sahara', Central Asia, or 'the Indian subcontinent'. In the earliest history of such an area, people presumably lived in small isolated communities with little contact. This first level can therefore be referred to as a 'proto-region', or a 'pre-regional zone', since there is no organised international/world society in this situation. … In order to further regionalise, a particular territory must, necessarily, experience increasing interaction and more frequent contact between human communities, which after living as 'isolated' groupings are moving towards some kind of translocal relationship, giving rise to a regional social system or what will be called regional complex below.

Regional Complex. Increased social contacts and transactions between previously more isolated groups —the creation of a social system —facilitates some sort of regionness, albeit on a low level. The creation of Latin Christendom between 800 and 1200, which also implied the birth of a European identity, is a case in point. The emergence of a regional complex thus implies ever widening translocal relations —positive and/or negative —between human groups and influences between cultures ('little traditions'). It is reasonable to assume that regional identities may be historically deep-seated. … The territorial states by definition monopolise all external relations and decide who are friend or foe, which implies a discouragement of whatever regional consciousness there might be. The existing social relations in a nation-state system may very well be hostile and completely lacking in cooperation. In fact this is a defining feature of a nation-state system according to the dominant theoretical school in IR. The people of the separate 'nation-states' are not likely to have much knowledge of or mutual trust in each other, much less a shared identity. When the states relax their 'inward-orientedness' and become more open to external relations, the degree of transnational contact may increase dramatically, which may trigger a process of further regionalisation in various fields. In security terms the region at this level is best understood as a 'conflict formation' or a 'regional (in)security complex', in which the constituent units, as far as their own security is concerned, are dependent on each other as well as on the overall stability of the regional system. … At this low level of regionness,

a balance of power, or some kind of 'concert', is the sole security guarantee for the states constituting the system. This is a rather primitive security mechanism. We could therefore talk of a 'primitive' region, exemplified by the Balkans today, and as far as political security is concerned (in spite of a relatively high degree of economic regionalisation) by East Asia. Similarly to security matters, the political economy of development can be understood as 'anarchic', implying that there exists no transnational welfare mechanism which can ensure a functioning regional economic system. … There is no shared sense of 'sitting in the same boat'. Exchanges and economic interactions are unstable, short-sighted and based on self-interest rather than expectations of economic reciprocity, social communication and mutual trust.

Regional Society. This is the level where the crucial regionalisation process develops and intensifies, in the sense that a number of different actors apart from states appear on different societal levels and move towards transcendence of national space, making use of a more rule-based pattern of relations. The dynamics at this stage implies the emergence of a variety of processes of communication and interaction between a multitude of state and non-state actors and along several dimensions, economic as well as political and cultural, i.e. multidimensional regionalisation. This rise in intensity, scope and width of regionalisation may come about through formalised regional cooperation or more spontaneously. … In order to further regionalise, the great diversity of processes at various levels (i.e. macro-micro) and in various sectors must to an increasing extent become mutually reinforcing and evolve in a complementary or mutually reinforcing rather than competitive and diverging direction. The increasing and widening relationships between the formal and the real region lead to an institutionalisation of cognitive structures and a gradual deepening of mutual trust and responsiveness. Formal organisations and social institutions play a crucial role in this process leading towards community and region-building.

Regional Community. … refers to the process whereby the region increasingly turns into an active subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised or informal actor capability, legitimacy, and structure ofdecision-making, in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil society, transcending the old state borders. It implies a convergence and compatibility of ideas, organisations and processes within a particular region. In security terms, to continue this line of argument, the reference is to 'security community', and its recent rediscovery, which means that the level of regionness achieved makes it inconceivable to solve conflicts by violent means, between as well as within former states. With regard to development, the regional sphere is not merely reduced to a 'market', but there exist also regional mechanisms that can offset the

polarisation effects inherent in the market and ensure social security, regional balance and welfare, with similar albeit still embryonic functions as in the old states. regional community is characterised by a mutually reinforcing relationship between the 'formal' region, defined by the community of states, and the 'real' region, in which a transnationalised regional civil society also has a role to play. The regional civil society may emerge spontaneously from 'below', but is ultimately dependent on that enduring (formal and informal) institutions and 'regimes' facilitate and promote security, welfare, social communication and convergence of values, norms, identities and actions throughout the region. … The defining element is rather the multidimensional and voluntary quality of regional interaction, and the societal characteristics indicating an emerging regional community. Some examples are the Nordic group of countries and perhaps North America (gradually including Mexico). On their way are the Southern Cone of South America and (at least the original) members of ASEAN.

Region-state. In the still rather hypothetical and perhaps unlikely fifth level of regionness, the processes shaping the 'formal' and 'real' region are similar, but by no means identical, to state-formation and nation-building. The ultimate outcome could be a region-state, which in terms ofscope and cultural heterogeneity can be compared to the classical empires. A region-state must be distinguished from a nation-state. It will never aspire to that degree of homogeneity and sovereignty as the Westphalian type of state, and therefore a regionalised order cannot be regarded simply as Westphalianism with fever units. … n terms of political order, a region-state constitutes a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national communities into a new form of political entity, where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all, and which is radically more democratic than other 'international' polities. National interests may prevail but do not necessarily become identical with nation-states. Moreover, authority, power and decision-making are not centralised but layered, decentralised to the local, micro-regional, national and macro-regional/supranational levels. This is basically the idea of the EU as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. … For other regions than Europe this may be far into the future, but should by no means be ruled out. Stranger things have happened in history. Besides, we do not suggest repetitions of a European path, simply that the decreasing nation-state capacity will give room for a multilevel governance structure, where the regional level for historical and pragmatic reasons will play a significant role.' (Hettne –Söderbaum, 2000 pp. 457-473.)

Hettne's theory gives concrete historical and current examples of the different levels he describes. He characterizes these stages in terms of political, economic and social connectedness and also emphasizes the role of non-state actors, the layers of governance in case of all the levels. Basically, he uses the European integration process as a role model as the final stage (region-state) is described as an entity that functions in a very similar way to states – and obviously the European Union is closest to this level of 'regionness', although the author himself admits that a future where the international system consists of of region-states is highly hypothetical.

About regionalism theory another essential model is given by **Andrew Hurrell,** introducing the following categories regarding the varieties of regionalism:

- regionalisation (he also uses the term informal/soft regionalism) means strengthening regional interactions without direct state involvement, mostly initiated and led by market forces and business actors;

- regional consciousness and identity is often the most essential driving force in regionalism, and it might be the consequence of internal (common historical heritage, culture and religion) and/or external (security or other threats) factors;

- regional inter-state cooperation equals negotiations about and establishment of inter-governmental agreements and regimes, this form might be formal or informal – the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) is a good example here;

- state supported regional integration is basically a sub-category of the previous one meaning specific decisions by governments in a given policy area, for example the elimination of trade barriers or the introduction of free movement of people;

- regional cohesion is basically kind of a result of the coexistence of the previous four meaning a united, permanent, consolidated regional unit. 'Cohesion can be understood in two senses: (a) when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states (and other major actors) of that region and the rest of the world; and (b) when the region forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issue' (Hurrell, 1995, pp. 334-338.)

I.5 What drives regionalism?

Regarding drivers of regionalism it is always debated whether regionalism is the result of conscious policy making by state leaders (from above regionalism) or it is rather the consequence of spontaneous cooperation and networking of business and societal groups and/or individuals (from below regionalism). In both cases a very simple and natural desire motivates actions: to make the narrower or wider regional environment more peaceful, prosperous, pleasant, clean, liveable, viable, etc. – altogether to reach results that are perceived as positive changes by state leaders, business groups, inhabitants, etc. of the region. Here I introduce those most essential political and economic factors that motivate and reinforce regionalism.

I.5.1 Political factors

Identity. Belonging to a region supports involvement and active participation in regional affairs. Identity plays an essential part in which states and other actors identify themselves with the given region. Internal factors behind common regional identity might be common religion, culture and history, while external factors are often common security or economic threat. Regional identity in itself does not necessarily lead to regional cooperation, usually a common decision is needed to make the region a better place.

Internal and external threat. Perceived threat might be essential in stronger and more regular regional cooperation, it is often an important motivation in case of institution building. During the Cold War threat of Soviet expansionism gave impetus to integration in Western Europe and also had a direct impact on the establishment of NATO. The case of Germany is interesting in the European integration, as for the signing parties of the Treaty of Rome, it was an essential motivation to control Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) and prevent a dominant Germany in Europe, but instead of excluding Germany from the integration process they rather included it and built strong political and economic connections among all the member states. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 with the motivation of the founding members to defend themselves from Communist China. The League of Arab Nations (1945) aims to protect its members from Israel (though the state of Israel was established in 1948) from the beginning till today.

Domestic politics. Domestic power structures and domestic actors often have an impact on state participation in regional integration. Producers, employers, business groups, small and medium

enterprises, farmers, trade unions, etc. all have interests regarding regionalism – the support or reject involvement in regional cooperation or regional institutions depending on the possible benefits and/or challenges of participation.

Dominance/leadership. Regionalism requires leadership of key actor or actors in the region; when the European integration began, the French and the Germans played important roles, in the case of ASEAN, Indonesia attempted to have a major role in defining objectives and declare goals, Egypt had an essential part in the establishment of the League of Arab Nations, while the United States grounded the Organisation of American States (OAS) and NATO in the 1940s. It is always a sensitive issue and it is difficult to find balance in these situations: the leader(s) should pay the costs, but the leader(s) should not get into a totally dominant position leading to an hierarchical structure. After the end of the Cold War, two further factors motivated the birth of regional institutions: competition among rival trade blocs led to the situation that no one wanted to lag behind in this process, while with the end of East-West rivalry, several regions or groups of states got afraid of marginalization and perceived regional cooperation as a way to prevent it.

I.5.2 Economic factors

High level of economic interdependencies, intense trade relations, complementary economies, desire to attract more foreign investments, to widen domestic markets are the most essential and general motivating forces. Interdependencies result in higher costs, if agreed and coordinated national policies lack. Increasing economic interdependencies increase the pressure on governments to cooperate in their own interests.

The emergence of multinational companies (MNCs) as non-state actors – having increasing importance in international relations – is an important driving force behind strengthening regional economic cooperation. In many cases, regional economic cooperation occurs with the strong involvement of MNCs, business firms and local companies.

Development is another essential driving force, especially in the case of developing countries. This issue will be discussed in more details later, but diversification of trade relations and a deeper integration into world economy are often considered as important sources of development; and joining regional blocs is considered to be a step into this direction.

I.6 Regions in the world

Which are the most obvious and most important regions in the international system? It is not easy to answer this question as we can find different classifications based on continents, natural resources, religions, languages, identity, standard of living, etc. As a starting point, let's have a look at methodology of the UN, how UN statistics divide the world into regions. UN Geoshceme follows the next categorization:

Africa

Northern Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara.

Sub-Saharan Africa

- Eastern Africa – British Indian Ocean Territory, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, French Southern Territories, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
- Middle Africa – Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe
- Southern Africa – Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa
- Western Africa – Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone és Togo

The Americas

Latin America and the Caribbean

- Caribbean – Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Névis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin (French Part), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands

- Central America – Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
- South America – Argentina, Bolivia, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

Northern America – Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, United States of America

Asia

Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Eastern Asia – China, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, Macao Special Administrative Region, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea

South-eastern Asia - Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam

Southern Asia – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Western Asia – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrein, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

Europe

Eastern Europe – Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine

Northern Europe - Åland Islands, Channel Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Southern Europe – Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain

Western Europe – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland

Oceania

Australia and New Zealand – Australia, Christmas Island, Cocos Island, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, New Zealand, Norfolk Island

Melanesia – Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu

Micronesia – Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Island, Micronesia (Federal States of), Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, United States Minor Outlying Islands

Polynesia – American Samoa, Cook Island, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna Islands

The list of geographic regions above presents the composition of geographical regions used by the Statistics Division (UN) in its publications and databases. Each country or area is shown in one region only. These geographic regions are based on continental regions; which are further subdivided into sub-regions and intermediary regions drawn as to obtain greater homogeneity in sizes of population, demographic circumstances and accuracy of demographic statistics. So, these regions are strictly geographical ones, they do not follow political, economic or cultural background.

Besides this list, the UN adds further categories, but they follow classification based on level of development. Developed and developing regions are 'old' expressions, though till today there is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or regions in the United Nations system. Categories, like Least Developed Countries (LDC), Land Locked Developing Countries (LLDC) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are relatively new ones and they are responses to the more and more obvious diversity of the so-called developing world.

The following map demonstrates the five regions of the world used in UN organs and bodies, for example regarding membership in certain forums. These regions give the base for the election of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council guaranteeing geographical representation.

This map shows the geographic regions used by the United Nations

The World Bank gives another division of the world, taking into consideration political and economic factors besides geography

I.7 Regional international organisations

Regional international organisations are permanent, structured forms of regional cooperation. For IR Scholars, regional organisations (and international organisations in general) are perceived as actors in the international system. They are not as old as states and they do not have as essential influence as states have, but their participation and involvement in international affairs is undeniable. International organisations are defined as 'IGOs are organizations that include at least three states as members, that have activities in several states, and that are created through a formal inter-governmental agreement such as a treaty, charter, or statute. They also have headquarters, executive heads, bureaucracies, and budgets. In 2013–2014, the Yearbook of International Organizations identified about 265 IGOs ranging in size from 3 members (the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]) to more than 190 members (the Universal Postal Union [UPU]). Members may come primarily from one geographic region (as in the case of the Organization of American States [OAS]) or from all geographic regions (as in the case of the World Bank).' (Karns-Mingst-Stiles, 2015, p. 12)

In terms of geographic scope IGOs are classified as global (e. g. UN, WHO), regional (EU, AU, ASEAN) and sub-regional (Mercosur, ECOWAS) IGOs. Regional international organisations

can be classified into further categories – after name of the organisation, year of establishment, number of member states:

- **Multipurpose organisations** (Organisation of American States, 1948, 35; League of Arab Nations, 1945, 22; Organisation of African Unity, 1963, 52; Nordic Council, 1949, 8)

- **Security/Defense organisations** (NATO, 1949, 28; ANZUS, 1952, 3)

- **Functional organisations** (Inter-American Development Bank, 1959, 46; ECOWAS, 1975, 16; APEC, 1989, 19, Council of Europe, 1949, 47)

- **UN Regional Commissions** (Economic Commission for Europe, 1947, 55; Economic Commission for Africa, 1958, 53; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1948, 41; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1947, 53; Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 1973, 13)

Most of the examples mentioned above are regional organisations in geographic sense, meaning that members identify themselves with the same region/subregion and these institutions work for the interests (well-being, defence, stronger position, more intense trade, etc.) of the given region. But, in some cases, geographical closeness or belonging to the same region is far from obvious. For example, NATO in principle – as its name suggests – connects members of the Transatlantic world, but the membership of Turkey, which is obviously not member of the Transatlantic community, shows that strategic interests and Cold War reality overwrote geographical situation. Or, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has Europe in its name, but it comprises 57 participating States that span the globe, encompassing three continents - North America, Europe and Asia – with membership of the United States, Canada and Turkmenistan, which geographically do not belong to Europe. In the 21st century, we can see more and more examples of transcontinental regional organisations, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with the membership of the United States, Chile, Japan and Australia, just to mention a few of them.

For IR scholars, regional international organisations are the most studied actors when regionalism is discussed, so we also focus on them as units influencing international political and economic tendencies. Meanwhile, it has to be emphasized that the role of regional

organisations is limited, it is not comparable to the status and influence of states – maybe with the exception of the European Union as a *quasi* supranational entity. On the other hand, as in the 21st century states all around the world are usually members of more than one regional institution, these new actors have impact on state behaviour, their agenda declares regional objectives and targets, their operation might create regional plans and projects, so after all, they have a strong role in the future of the regions they represent and they influence the bilateral relations between parts of the region. As regional organisations are permanent structures, they often require permanent presence on behalf of the states, which means that members of the organisation have to articulate their regional interests and are forced to react to ideas and plans of other members.

Regional organisations are the highest level or strongest form of regular regional cooperation, as they have a permanent structure and declared objective; they are also agents representing the group of member states. With the rise of the phenomena inter-regionalism (see below), they are more and more active members of the international community reflecting on the challenges of globalization and rivalry among regions. Although regionalism is a much wider phenomena than regional organisations, IR scholars focus on regional organisations in research as they are essential actors in regional cooperation and their achievements and limitations often describe perfectly regional dynamics and relations between states of the given region.

I.8 The United Nations and regional organisations

Links between regional and universal organisations (the UN family) is essential to understand the role and opportunities of regional organisations in the international system. Regional organisations are older than the UN system, at the birth of the United Nations the Pan-American Union and the League of Arab Nations already existed, therefore the future of these regional institutions were on the table at the San Francisco conference, where the UN Charter was completed. The Charter attempted to find a role for regional organisations in the future, but it is rather obvious that at the birth of the UN, the founding fathers was not aware of the later rise in number of international organisations and it is also obvious that they wanted to preserve priority for the UN, especially in peace and security matters.

What does the UN Charter say about regional organisations? Chapter VIII outlines the opportunities of cooperation between the Un and regional organisations.

'Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.' (UN Charter)

It means, that the UN Security Council has a priority over 'regional arrangements', meaning that regional agencies should respect all the purposes and principles of the UN, they can initiate enforcement actions only with the approval of the Security Council and the UNSC has to be fully informed about regional actions aiming the maintenance of international peace and security. These ideas reinforce the primary role of the UNSC in preserving international peace and security which was an essential idea of the UN structure.

During the Cold War era, regional arrangements and agencies were not too active in conflict settlement – with a few exceptions, such as the Organisation of American States under US dominance. But after the end of the Cold War, regional and local armed conflicts spread resulting in renewed interest in regional organisations and their more intense involvement in solving these regional conflicts. The United Nations system seemed to be unable to solve the rising number of conflicts all around the world on its own, so new forms and opportunities of cooperation emerged between the UN and regional actors. 'United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had an important role when he gave speech in 1992 at the UN General Assembly stating, that 'Regional action […] could not only lighten the burden of the (UN Security) Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs,' focusing on possible positive consequences of reinforced links between the UN and regional organisations. Since 1992 a more and more intense cooperation and partnership has been experienced. The Security Council issued Resolution 1631 on the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in order to maintain international peace and security in 2005, after holding several debates on the topic. (Luk Van Langenhove, 2014)

Innovation of Resolution 1631 is the topic itself, it called attention for the necessity of cooperation between universal and regional organisations for better efficiency and it also declared that regional organisations contribute more and more actively to maintaining international peace and security and that they complement the work of the UN.

It says that the UNSC

'1. Expresses its determination to take appropriate steps to the **further development of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations** in maintaining international peace and security, consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and invites regional and subregional organizations that have a capacity for conflict

prevention or peacekeeping to place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Stand by Arrangements System;

2. Urges all States and relevant international organizations to contribute to **strengthening the capacity of regional and subregional organizations,** in particular of African regional and subregional organizations, in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabilization, including through the provision of human, technical and financial assistance, and welcomes in this regard the establishment by the European Union of the Peace Facility for Africa;

3. Stresses the importance for the United Nations of developing regional and subregional organizations' ability to deploy **peacekeeping forces** rapidly in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations or other Security Council-mandated operations, and welcomes relevant initiatives taken in this regard;

4. Stresses the potential role of regional and subregional organizations in addressing **the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons** and the need to take into account in the **peacekeeping** operations' mandates, where appropriate, the regional instruments enabling states to identify and trace illegal small arms and light weapons;

5.   Reiterates the need to encourage regional cooperation, including through the involvement of regional and subregional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to include, where appropriate, specific provisions to this aim in future mandates of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations authorized by the Security Council;

6. We l c o m e s the efforts undertaken by its subsidiary bodies with responsibilities in **counter-terrorism** to foster cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, notes with appreciation the efforts made by an increasing number of regional and subregional organizations in the fight against terrorism and urges all relevant regional and subregional organizations to enhance the effectiveness of their counter-terrorism efforts within their respective mandates, including with a view to develop their capacity to help Member States in their efforts to tackle the threats to international peace and security posed by acts of terrorism;

7. Expresses its intention to hold **regular meetings** as appropriate with heads of regional and subregional organizations in order to strengthen the interaction and cooperation with these organizations in maintaining international peace and security, ensuring if possible that such meetings coincide with the annual high-level meetings held by the United Nations with regional and other intergovernmental organizations for better efficiency of participation and substantive complementarity of agendas;

8. Recommends **better communication** between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations through, notably, liaison officers and holding of consultations at all appropriate levels;' (UNSC Resolution 1631)

Cooperation between regional organisations and the UN is expected to be deeper and more intense in the future. The most important issue about the role of the universal and regional level of governance is whether they complement or they compete with each other. Often, they establish parallel structures in conflict prevention, trade relations or human rights protection resulting in a less efficient system. Historically, mutual distrust between universal and regional organisations prevents effective and more regular cooperation, but positive examples, such as Kosovo, the Darfur crisis or humanitarian catastrophes could be mentioned, too, which could serve as models for future cooperation. These forms of joint action have the advantage that they give the weight of the international community, but they also guarantee that roots and causes of local challenges are well known and regional players are involved in the solution, which might have long-term benefits.

Debate between universalists and regionalists are strongly connected to the role and effectiveness of international organisations. After WWII, with the establishment of the United Nations (UN) system, universalism seemed to be the most convenient approach towards the settlement of international conflicts, prevention of a WWIII and a more harmonious international system. Parallelly, also from the 1940s, regional frameworks emerged all around the world as regional responses to political, economic and social challenges. Universal and regional institutions show different attitudes towards international cooperation with different number of participants and in many cases with different objectives.

The debate is about whether regional or universal organisations are the most efficient, appropriate and successful forums to give answers to political and economic challenges. Which serves better the interests of the international community and which guarantees peace? Of course, universalists and regionalists both have their own arguments, which are the following.

Universalists emphasize that symmetrical and asymmetrical dependencies, just like global challenges can be tackled at the global level – these issues cross borders and also regions, they have impacts on the international system as a whole, therefore only global solutions could be appropriate. Besides, regional resources are often not sufficient to tackle political conflicts or humanitarian issues, this is especially the case with developing regions. African, Asian and

Latin American regional frameworks often lack capital and resources to build a more efficient system. Another argument on behalf of the universalists is that regional organisations are often dominated by one or two strong regional actors, but universal frameworks, such as the UN, are able to counterbalance the role of dominant powers and are able to contain their influence. In a similar way, universal institutions are capable to act against aggressor countries as these organisations represent the international community, therefore they influence strong countries' behaviour. Regions are not permanent – universalists emphasize and they argue that global order can not be based on such unstable and indefinite contours. Regional dynamics and regional actors' interests might change in time, while for long term solutions permanent structures are needed. Regional alliances are often rivals, which undermines the creation of a global peaceful system. Military rivalry among regions might result in wars and regionalism in itself might lead to stronger and more visible differences between regions that do not support harmony in international relations.

On the other side, which are the arguments of regionalists? First of all, they perceive it as a natural tendency that neighbouring countries attempt to build good relations for a more safe, more developed and harmonious region. Actors have common (or similar) historical and cultural background resulting in common values and traditions and these might serve as important bases for regional coherence.

Another essential argument goes that lower number of actors guarantee easier decision-making process and easier political, economic and social integration. Global procedures are extremely slow and often it is impossible to find common ground because of conflicting interests, so global integration is rather impossible.

A third argument emphasizes that regional economic cooperation establishes effective economic units, which are more well-equipped and as a result might be more successful in global competition. Based on this, a possible future scenario could be kind of a global equilibrium formed by strong and integrated regional actors supporting international peace and security, as possible aggressors are controlled by regional integration systems. G8 could be replaced by regional organisations representing all the regions of the world. At the moment – regionalists emphasize – the world is not prepared for a global authority or global government, but reinforced regional structures could serve as models and could collect experiences in this field, and finally end up in a more effective way of global governance. (Blahó – Prandler, 2001, pp. 251-252)

So, regionalism could also be defined as kind of a 'bridge' between bilateral and global cooperation. Different forms of regional cooperation – in fields of politics, economics, security, culture, etc. – are reinforced by multipolarity in the world.

I.9 Waves of regionalism

History of regionalism is divided into three waves or three phases of regionalism by experts, showing different periods of time and different characteristics. This categorization of regionalism reflects the motivation of academia to describe the phenomena of regionalism in a more structured and 'organized' way to have a deeper understanding.

First wave of regionalism emerged in the 1950s – although there already had existed regional institutions at that time. After WWII, two different lines of regionalism started do develop parallelly in time – Cold War institutionalisation focusing on security issues that made the blocs more structured and well-defined and attempts at integrations following the European integrations. In the second case, motivation was to build strong trade blocs with the objective to create a common market later on for economic benefits. Outside the EU and mainly in Latin America theoretical background was the 'trade-creation vs. trade-diversion' theory with the aim to divert or reorient trade with third partners towards regional partners. (Based on András Inotai's remarks on this paper, 2019). These regional institutions focused on 'traditional' trade as Latin Americans attempted to extend the most often failed national import substitution to a region-wide import substitution (for bigger markets) in order to save the enormous amounts of money invested in import substitution projects.

European integration was set as kind of a standard, groups of countries all around the world attempted to repeat the 'European success' and establish similar institutions. Which were the most important characteristics of this first wave? Basically, features are determined by what integration theorists thought about successful integration and what the process of European integration showed.

Homogenous membership. In the first wave of regionalism, regional organisations collected members of rather similar size, population, economic power, level of development and standard of living. The idea was that similar members could be integrated faster and easier, so homogenous membership was necessary or kind of a prerequisite of successful and deep regional cooperation.

Deep institutionalisation. Following the model of the European integration, institution-building was rather strong in this first phase, inter-state cooperation was regulated and supported by the establishment of different organs responsible for different functions and topics. Sophisticated institutions guaranteed regular participation of all the members and created a strong framework for settling possible challenges and conflicts between the member states.

Protectionist trade policy. To develop trade relations and increase the volume of inner trade was an essential objective in the first wave, therefore trade and non-trade barriers were eliminated between member states, while trade with third countries followed very similar rules and standards. This resulted in an inward-looking system, as it was easier for member states to trade with each other, than to trade with third countries, so members enjoyed an advantageous position compared to other countries.

'Positive' integration. This means that in the first wave of regionalism, the motivation behind regional cooperation was to strengthen the role of sates, to make their regulating force stronger and to support state functions through the integration process. Attempts to establish supranational structures or to give certain state functions to the organisation were not on the table. Regionalism was perceived as a means to vindicate state interests and to implement a successful foreign policy.

Specific objectives. In the first phase of regionalism, regional organisations were typically established to reach a certain objective, so these regional institutions usually focused on one given policy area, let it be security (which was rather usual in the case of Cold War institutions), trade or culture. Typical first wave regional organisations targeted economic cooperation and well-being. Of course, exceptions should be mentioned, too – the Organisation of American States or the League of Arab Nations emerged as typical multi-purpose organisations.

In sum, first-wave regionalism resulted in failure and disappointments in most cases – these organisations could not reach their original goals, and members were far from satisfied with the results in most cases. Here you can see the examples of the first wave on a regional basis. It is important to emphasize that the characteristics described above are general ones, they are not valid in all single cases.

- Europe and the Eastern bloc: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1949), Western European Union (WEU, 1954-), Warsaw Pact (1955-1991), Council of Europe (CoE, 1949-), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom, 1957-), European Economic Community (1957-), Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon, 1949-1991)

- Western- and East Asia: Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO, 1955-1979), South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO, 1954-1977), Association of Southern Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1967-)

- American continent: Organisation of American States (OAS, 1948-), Rio Pact (1947), Central American Common Market (CACM, 1961-), Andean Group (1969-), Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM, 1973-), Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA, 1962-1980) – Latin American Integration Association (ALADI, 1980-)

- Middle East: League of Arab Nations (1945-)

- Africa: Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963-2002) - African Union (AU, 2002-)

Second wave of regionalism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of various events and processes. Globalisation got more and more visible and had various consequences, so in a way, this second phase of regionalism might be defined as a response to this phenomena; regional structures emerged or existing regional frameworks got new impetus parallelly with intensifying globalisation.

Which were those changes that contributed to the appearance of this second wave of regionalism?

First of all, new opportunities of cooperation emerged, as decline of the East-West rivalry restructured inter-state relations and let regions to focus on their own development. The Cold War era guaranteed kind of a 'protection' for small, weak and less developed countries if they joined on of the blocs, but in the post-Cold War system, these entities were afraid of marginalization, they were threatened by being neglected in the international system, therefore they typically started to reinforce regional links in order to avoid to be left out. They hoped that regional embeddedness would help them to participate and become an integral part of the global

system. Regional cooperation seemed to be a rational choice for most of the actors in order to demonstrate their autonomy and prove that they are important actors of the international system.

Globalisation in general is an essential motivation behind the second wave of regionalism, as the emergence of global challenges in the 1970s automatically resulted in stronger regional cooperation. Westphalian state-system faced serious dilemmas and it seemed that state authority and state sovereignty had serious limitations in the age of transnationalism. These developments urged states all around the world to build permanent and regular forms of cooperation in order to be able to manage global and regional challenges, such as spread of organised crime, terrorism, epidemics and migration. In this sense, second wave-regionalism might be interpreted as kind of a response or reaction to globalisation, an attempt to counterbalance its negative results. Great powers, such as the United States, regional powers, such as Brazil and developing countries all turned to the regional level and did not want to be left out from this phenomena in order to strengthen their status in the world and be more effective when it comes to global challenges.

Economic changes in the 1980s and 1990s also led to strengthening regional links. Economic liberalization and the spread of free trade basically 'forced' countries to have closer regional links to be more competitive and appear as bigger markets in world economy. Outward-looking economics were on the rise and export-led growth became an often-applied model for states, these tendencies all led to closer connections between regional actors. The threat of lagging behind proved to be rather a strong motivating force in this wave of regionalism.

End of the 'third world' was also an important reason behind reinforced regionalism; during the Cold War frameworks as Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement or Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) all built on South-South solidarity and common development, members wanted to get influence through stronger cooperation between high number of actors. By the 1980s, diversity of third world countries was a reality, and it resulted in different interests and motivations on behalf of these states, so the broad and loose institutions of the Cold War era lost relevance, while developing regions attempted to be more coherent to be able to have stronger influence.

The process of democratisation should also be mentioned as a factor contributing to the emergence of second wave regionalism. **Samuel P. Huntington** describes three waves of democratisation: 'The first "long" wave of democratization began in the 1820s, with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and

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continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies. In 1922, however, the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy marked the beginning of a first "reverse wave" that by 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states in the world to 12. The triumph of the Allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically, only to be followed by a second reverse wave (1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30." About the third wave he writes: "Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world. … Five major factors have contributed significantly to the occurrence and the timing of the third-wave transitions to democracy:

1) The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful performance, and their inability to maintain "performance legitimacy" due to economic (and sometimes military) failure.

2) The unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries.

3) A striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second Vatican Council of 1963-65 and the transformation of national Catholic churches from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism.

4) Changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

5) "Snowballing," or the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization. … Historically, there has been a strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy. By the early 1970s, most of the Protestant countries in the world had already become democratic. The third wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. Beginning in Portugal and Spain, it swept through six South American and three Central American countries, moved on to the Philippines, doubled back to Mexico and Chile, and then burst through in the two Catholic countries of Eastern Europe, Poland and Hungary. Roughly three-quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were predominantly Catholic.' (Huntington, 1991, pp. 12-13.)

Connection between democratic political systems and stronger regional cooperation is rather a debated issue till today. Originally Western authors emphasized that democracy supports more peaceful regional links and democracies are more willing to build stronger and more transparent regional institutions. Democratisation in Latin America during the 1980s and in Central Eastern Europe in the 1990s obviously contributed to the birth of new regional organisations and more active policy on behalf of these actors in regional forums. On the other hand, by today it is rather obvious that democratic political systems are not prerequisites of the emergence of regional organisations or deeper forms of regional cooperation, for example countries in the Middle East or Africa have shown willingness for closer regional cooperation in the last twenty years, although they have not reached the system of liberal democracy. Or the case of China could be mentioned – as Beijing has become more active in regional affairs since the 1990s, but it is still a one-party system. Another interesting question is whether regional organisations are more successful if they are formed by liberal democracies?

Three different forms of second generation-regionalism can be distinguished. The first one is when already existing institutions move towards deeper integration or stronger unity. Several examples of this type could be mentioned, such as the Maastricht Treaty in the case of the European integration, establishment of the Andean Community (previously Andean Pact) or the Summit of the Americas process from 1994 in the framework of the Organisation of American States is also an example. The second type is enlargement; it is a typical consequence of the end of the Cold War as countries in the world got free of the East-West system dictated by Cold War logic. Most typically it meant that Central Eastern European countries joined the different regional organisations in Europe, such as the European Union or the Council of Europe. ASEAN also had new members in the 1980s and 1990s – Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam joined in 1995, while Laos and Myanmar in 1997. These enlargements often resulted in much more heterogenous organisations, as we will see later. The third type of second wave-regionalism was the establishment of totally new regional frameworks – examples will be listed below according to regions. These new institutions show somewhat different features compared to the regional organisations that emerged after WWII.

Which are the characteristics of second generation-regionalism? First of all, it has to be emphasized that these features are not absolute meaning that they are not valid in all cases, they could rather be described as tendencies, relative innovations compared to the first generation.

Heterogeneous membership. Probably the most important innovation of this second wave of regionalism was that countries of very different size, political power and economic strength

became members of the very same regional organisation. On the one hand, it resulted in more regular and institutionalised links between the developed, the developing world and the so-called countries in transitions. The most obvious example is the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 with the membership of the United States, Canada and Mexico, three states with rather different level of development. On the other hand, heterogenous membership brought challenges of hierarchy, disequilibrium and lack of consent on ideas and objectives. In most cases, for less developed countries it seemed to be an opportunity that joining a regional economic bloc might bring development and prosperity for them. But rather, the model of two-speed integrations emerged, describing the situation of a more integrated inner bloc surrounded by the new members facing serious barriers of 'real' integration and poor countries were often labelled as free riders and perceived as burdens.

Lack of special treatment. As it was discussed above, in the case of first wave-regionalism, member states and non-member states were treated in different manner and more favourable terms in case of member states resulted in more coherence and deeper integration. By the 1980s and 1990s free trade and neoliberal economic policy became widespread as a result of globalisation, so special treatment could not really be maintained or was not as strong and as 'special' as in the previous decades. Often developing countries were given longer period of time for adjustment, but special privileges were not guaranteed by membership as the whole world was going towards integration as a result of globalisation.

Integration to world economy. First generation-regionalism often served as kind of a protection, in many cases – especially developing – countries wanted to be isolated in world economy thorough regionalism in order to lessen their dependence on developed partners. Second wave-regionalism had a very different logic as these new forms of integration wanted to integrate into world economy in a more effective way, so in many cases member states hoped, that in a wider regional framework – as bigger markets, more attractive targets of investments – thy could be more successful in world economy as on their own. So, regional autarky was replaced by an outward-looking attitude, that is why second generation-regionalism is often called 'open regionalism' emphasizing that this is the most important innovation of new regionalism – which is another expression describing regionalism of the 1980s and 1990s.

Multi-dimensional integration. Forms of new regionalism often go much further than simply making trade between members more intense, they attempt to deepen cooperation in different fields, such as politics, development, protection of human rights, environmental issues,

education, migration, etc. Borders of these issues are less clear today, as they are more intertwined with each other, so cooperation easily 'spreads' to new fields.

Participation of non-state actors. As importance of non-state actors increase in international relations in general, it is not surprising that involvement of non-state actors in regional affairs is also on the rise. Originally, regional organisations operated on an inter-state basis, but in the second wave more and more NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and social movements worked actively in regional organisations. This phenomena is closely linked to the fact, that second generation-regionalism is a much more spontaneous, 'from below' process compared to the typical 'from above' structure of the 1950s and 1960s, when inter-governmental links dominated the regional organisations.

'Loose' institutions. Compared to the first wave, new forms of regionalism in the second wave show much looser institutions with lack of any attempt at supranationalism. An explaining factor is that actors from the non-Western world got much more active in the second wave, and their attitude towards state sovereignty is rather different than that of developed states – based on the experiences of colonialism and other historical events. Regarding institutions we can see kind of a contradiction in the sense that on the one hand institutions get more sophisticated in many already existing organisations, while on the other hand, parallelly with these, new regional frameworks with the involvement of members from the developing world rather show a model of regular regional forums with less detailed and fixed institutional background. Mercosur is a typical example in the 1990s or the North American Free Trade Agreement that does not build regional organs till today.

More direct North-South links. As a result of the features described above, new regionalism offers an opportunity of regular meetings and cooperation between members of the developed and developing world. Therefore, developing countries often perceive new regionalism as measures to give them permanent presence, stronger position and stronger bargaining power in these regional frameworks. As group of developed and developing countries are both more and more heterogeneous, these lines are not obvious today, and regionalism supports the process of finding common grounds and common objectives. (Inotai, 1994. pp. 28-30.)

Altogether, new or open regionalism 'implies a stronger emphasis on the political dimensions. Regional organizations which emerged after the Second World War, whether economic or more security oriented, were usually organized from above and from outside the region. The new regionalism is emerging in a post-Cold War context, in a situation where 'national' economies

are outgrowing their national polities. It is, furthermore, a world wide phenomenon, although, just like in the first wave, it started from Europe. It can be defined as a world order concept, since any particular regionalization process has systemic repercussions in individual regions throughout the world.' (Hettne, 1994, p. 2)

Here you find the examples of new regionalism in the world:

- Europe: Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) / Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, 1975-), EU (1992-), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (1991-)

- Asia and Pacific region: Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989-), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994-)

- Middle East: Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, 1981

- Latin America: Southern Common Market (Mercosur, 1991-), Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, 1994-), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994-)

- Africa: Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975-), Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1992-), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, 1993-)

Third wave regionalism. Parallelly in time with second-wave regionalism, in the 1990s – as it was discussed above – regional groupings started to look outward as global players and relations between regions became a new dimension in international relations and a new level of global governance.

The next part discussing the phenomena and theoretical background of inter-regionalism is from an article of mine published in the journal 'Society and Economy'. The idea of multiregionalism anticipates a world order based on global regionalization where systematic relations emerge between regional organizations of the world, which can ultimately become a new level and efficient form of global governance (Van Langenhove – Costea – Gavin 2004). This future was forecast by Guy Verhofstadt in September 2001 saying that G8 should be replaced by a G8 having a more satisfactory regional representation where representatives of EU (European Union), AU (African Union), Mercosur (Common Market of the South), ASEAN (Association

of Southeast Asian Nations) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) would have an equal position for negotiation (Söderbaum – Van Langenhove 2005). For the time being regional groupings are not likely to take over the place of nation states, inter-regional frameworks, however, become increasingly important and diverse therefore their significance in the international system is expected to grow.

The main innovation of inter-regionalism was that while the first two generations of regionalism emphasized the strengthening of the regions inside, third generation integration includes relations outside regions and the harmonization with other regions. In this wave of regionalism therefore the regions are 'looking outward' and initiating agreements on various topics with other regions. In the beginning the European Union was the 'leader' of this phenomenon but today integration blocks in other continents (inter alia ASEAN and Mercosur) are increasingly active in approaching other regions (Van Langenhove – Costea 2005).

Inter-regional relations are the logical and chronological consequence of regional integration. It is about how the institutions of new, open regionalism build relations with each other. So at this wave of regionalism geographical proximity loses its importance. The reasons for institutionalization of interregional relations are the following: there is some kind of systematization of the more and more complex and interdependent world and this is a way in which regions are wishing to compensate the alliances of other regions (Hänggi 2000).

In the beginning the European integration's so called *group to group* concept formed the basis of thinking in the region. In the 1990s the third generation of regionalism basically meant the relation system of the so called members of the Triad. The basic of the Triad concept was formed by the trilateral relations between the USA, the European Communities and Japan – the three powers of capitalist world economy – during the Cold War period. In the meantime this concept has changed referring to the relation system of three regions (North America, Western Europe and East Asia). In the last decades of the twentieth century the members of the Triad accounted for three quarters of global trade, 90% of FDI and also 85% of the world's GNP (Hänggi 2000). APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) established in 1989, New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 between the USA and the European Union, Transatlantic Economic Partnership of 1998 and finally Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) between Western Europe and Asia launched in 1996 meant the basic frameworks for inter-regionalism. These inter-regional groupings linked the members of the Triad boosting their position in global economic processes.

After the Millennium, however, regional groupings of the developing world also began to participate in building global inter-regionalism. One of the major reasons for this is the increasing fragmentation of the developing world both in terms of political influence and economic performance. The strengthening and dynamic economic growth of the so called emerging powers seem to pose a real challenge to the global order dominated by Triad members, in that they appear as new centres of power, even building their own regional groups to support themselves. The strengthening position of emerging powers is a prime factor concerning the uniform opinion of the international literature relating to the twenty-first century world order moving towards multipolarity. While in the 1990s the issue of unipolar/multipolar world order was in the centre of debates, today the latter scenarios seems relevant and the debate revolves rather about where poles and the centre of these poles will be. Not surprisingly, emerging powers and members of the developing world are more and more active in building inter-regional relations, as on the one hand this is a prerequisite for strengthening their positions and on the other hand it enables them to participate in global governance more powerfully than ever before, and for developing countries in can be useful for the purpose of avoiding marginalization (too). In the 1990s the European Union – continuing its policy of the previous years – strengthened its relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America but now we can see that the emerging powers of these continents will be active initiators especially when building relations outside the Triad.

Based on the above inter-regional relations can (also) be categorized as follows: inter-regional relations inside the Triad; between a triadic member and a different region in the world; between non-triadic members. The last type of relations is still in its infancy, it is more like first attempts or getting to know each other rather than building institutionalized relations. For this reason the theories describing inter-triadic relations cannot really be applied for these relations, studying them, however, is relevant because they are expected to strengthen and inter-regional cooperation will have typical traits the same way as integrational groupings of other regions have their own specific traits in comparison with the European Union.

Three Waves of regionalism

	When	Features	Actors	Examples
Old regionalism	1950s-1970s	inward looking policies, protectionism, deep institutions	States with similar economic and political background	EEC, Andean Group, NATO, ASEAN, CoE
New/open regionalism	1980s-	extrovert policies with the aim of integration into world economy, free trade, minimal state intervention, loose institutions, multiple objectives	States with geographical proximity	EU, Mercosur, NAFTA, OSCE, AU
Inter-regionalism	1990s-	looking outward, strengthening cooperation with other regions, multiple objectives, geographical proximity loses importance	States, regions, subregions, regional organisations	APEC, ASEM, FEALAC, EU-Mercosur, China-CELAC

Constructed by the author

Hänggi's often referred categorization distinguishes three groups of inter-regional relations (Hänggi 2000):

A) Relations between regional groupings. These can be considered the prototype of inter-regional arrangements, a relationship that is closely linked to 'old regionalism'. Examples are the EU-Mercosur, EU-Andean Community, EU-Rio Group, ASEAN-Mercosur, ASEAN-Rio Group, and CER (Closer Economic Relations, a free trade agreement Australia and New Zealand)-Mercosur relations.

B) Biregional and transregional relations. They are a rather recent phenomenon in international relations. Membership in these rather heterogeneous arrangements is more diffuse than in traditional group-to-group dialogues; it does not necessarily coincide with regional groupings and may include member states from more than two regions. Examples are APEC, Europe-Latin America Forum, Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

C) Hybrid systems. These are relations between regional groupings and single powers in other worldregions. Relations between China and Latin America for example give this form of interregional cooperation, like China-Mercosur, China-Community of Latin American Countries (CELAC) and China-Pacific Alliance (PA) cooperation.

Actors of inter-regionalism seem difficult to be defined and grasped; they can be states, regional organizations/groups and regions. The term region requires here a flexible interpretation relating to a continent, geographical area or areas difficult to define such as Latin America. In the case of interstate relations actors form their opinions, take part in negotiations through working, old-established mechanisms, as to inter-regional relations the internal structure of actors is mostly under development and change, so most of the time common actions are difficult to take and require preliminary internal negotiations. Another important feature is that inter-regional relations are often asymmetric because mostly regions with different level of development are connected. The fundamental question influencing the future impacts of inter-regionalism is how much the initiator emerging powers will follow the traditional centre-periphery relation between developed-developing countries in their inter-regional relations and how much they will be able to move beyond that.

The difference between inter-regionalism and inter-regional cooperation depends on the existence or lack of institutions. Although the two phenomena are difficult to separate and in my opinion it is not even worth it because of the diversity of actors on the one hand and because the actions of emerging states (and the developing world in general) show that the inter-regional relations they build are looser, without institutions and often ad hoc, on the other (e.g. BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, IBSA – India, Brazil, South Africa forums). We should not exclude these formations from the study of inter-regionalism since considering world economy trends emerging powers are expected to become ever more active builders of inter-regional relations, moreover the so called hybrid forms begin to take over the European practice following the group to group concept: for example the annual EU–Brazil and EU–China Summit. A general feature is that inter-regional relations today – as yet – miss actual

institutional frameworks instead there are regular ministerial meetings i.e. forums which systematize the relations of each regions/regional groupings. We can see that an important feature of inter-regionalism is the diversity of actors and the diversity of cooperation forms.

The literature on this phenomenon[1] has only reached the surface of the process, since the contours are misty, and it is by far not a linear, even process. Some authors state that inter-regionalism is one of the most focused and regulated form of globalization (Hettne 2004), which can be an important handhold and framework in today's world order/disorder. Researchers agree that inter-regionalism is a long term, uncertain, but irreversible process. End product could be multiregionalism that would mean a new, regionalized form of multilateral world order in which inter-regional relations dominate. Today agreements among regions are voluntary and cooperative, but in the future these could be institutionalized which would affect the structure of world order (Hettne 2005).

The future direction and frameworks of inter-regionalism will highly depend on how much the triadic members will be interested in building inter-regional relations, how much they will promote the strengthening of inter-regional frameworks. The geopolitical and geoeconomic position of regions outside the Triad will fundamentally be defined by how successful their inter-regional relations with each triadic member and with each other will be. The significance of inter-regionalism beyond the Triad lies in that it can open a new chapter in South–South cooperation, if cooperation between these regions receives a systematic structure supported by active participation of emerging powers, which can help disadvantaged countries catch up (or at least hang on, provided that they are part of the system), may extend economic opportunities and the political influence of these regions.

I.9 Globalization and regionalization

Globalization and regionalization are two parallel and intertwined phenomena. Although there exists a globalization vs. regionalization debate, it is worth exploring the links between the two to have a deeper understanding of global and regional tendencies as forces of the two can not be separated. As a starting point, it is important to understand, that globalization and

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[1] Researchers studying inter-regionalism are mainly representatives of new regionalism's research, e. g. Hänggi, Hettne or Söderbaum. This is because of the relatively short time period between the second and third wave and the fact that many features of inter-regionalism are logical consequences of the characteristics of new regionalism.

regionalization have a strong presence at the same time and they are complementary and contradictory at the same time.

'The inexorable forces of globalization and regionalization have reshaped the world economic landscape over the past quarter century. Global trade and financial flows have registered unprecedented growth during this period. Intra-regional economic linkages have also become much stronger with the proliferation of regional trade agreements and common currency areas. There have been profound changes in the volume, direction, and nature of international trade and financial flows over the past quarter century (…). These changes certainly have global dimensions, but at the same time they have also been driven by regional forces. First, while global trade flows have been growing at a much faster rate than world output, intra-regional trade flows have been playing an increasingly more prominent role in global trade. This reflects, in part, the process of economic unification in different regions and some emerging economies' (e.g., China, India, and Korea) rapid growth during the past quarter century. In addition, intra-regional trade and financial linkages have further strengthened by the explosion in the number of regional trade agreements (from 5 in 1985 to 200 in 2011). Second, intra-industry trade flows have contributed significantly to the unprecedented increase in global trade during the past two decades. These flows have grown rapidly in certain regions, including North America, Europe and Asia. International vertical specialization, which refers to the fragmentation of production processes into sequential chains in multiple countries, has been a major factor fuelling the substantial increase in global trade flows. This has led to a significant rise in the ratio of trade to value added in North America, Europe, Asia, and some parts of Latin America (…). Moreover, the volume of global financial flows has reached unprecedented levels since the mid-1980s overshadowing the increase in global trade over the same period. Intra-regional flows have also been on the rise for the past 15 years, especially in Europe and Asia. Financial flows among advanced economies have still been the main driving force of the increase in international financial flows, but there has also been a significant rise in flows between regions with advanced countries and those with developing economies over the past 25 years.' (Hirata – Kose – Otrok, 2013. pp. 4-5)

Globalization and regionalization both 'form new institutions in the global economic space which determine the actions of macroeconomic subjects, thus there is transplantation of institutions in most developed countries, which in turn causes a strong socio-economic dependence of recipient countries, hinders their development and enhances the technical - economic underdevelopment, reduces welfare, and increases economic and political risks.

These problems could be solved by the development of modern market institutions at the regional level, especially in innovative and investment area.' (Matveev – Valieva – Trubetskaya – Kislov, 2016. p. 3115)

Parallel institutions are often less effective and hinder coherent development. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are often perceived to be obstacles of successful negotiations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework. RTAs have their own objectives, agendas and mechanisms which often do not fit into the global level mechanisms. Another 'result' of FTAs is that members are often able to act together and struggle for their interests in multilateral forums as their bargaining power is stronger. On the other hand, emergence of RTAs might support the multilateral trade system, because number of actors might diminish leading to easier decision making. Regional blocs might be able to articulate their interest and together influence the agenda of multilateral forums and make them more effective.

Similar interrelation is perceived between national, regional and global security issues. A visible and obvious example is international migration. Perception of migration might be different at the national, regional and global level. Although migration is an important issue at the regional level, regional structures and institutions rarely regulate the flow of migrants and refugees – the European Union is an exception, although it clearly shows the deep conflicts between the national and the regional level. Similar tendencies are seen at the global level: 'On 19 September 2016 Heads of State and Government came together for the first time ever at the global level within the UN General Assembly to discuss issues related to migration and refugees. This sent a powerful political message that migration and refugee matters had become major issues squarely in the international agenda. In adopting the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the 193 UN Member States recognized the need for a comprehensive approach to human mobility and enhanced cooperation at the global level.

Annex II of the New York Declaration set in motion a process of intergovernmental consultations and negotiations towards the development of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. This process concluded on 10 December 2018 with the adoption of the Global Compact by the majority of UN Member States at an Intergovernmental Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco, followed closely by formal endorsement by the UN General Assembly on 19 December.

The Global Compact is the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement, prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, covering all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner. It is a non-binding document that respects states' sovereign right to determine who enters and stays in their territory and demonstrates commitment to international cooperation on migration.' (IOM, 2019) The Global Compact brought serious criticisms at the national level, five countries (the United States, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Israel) voted against it, while twelve countries abstained. As a politically sensitive issue, it perfectly symbolizes the limitations of harmonious cooperation among the national, regional and global level.

Regional blocs are not coherent and unified entities that are able to give a single voice, and they often act against the perceived negative consequences of globalization. On the other hand, states and governments often feel threatened by the forces of globalization and/or they feel themselves as 'losers' of regional blocs they belong to. These contradictory perceptions create a situation where the national, regional and global levels of governance are rather competitors and can hardly reinforce each other – which could also be the case.

I.10 Research on regionalism

Research on regionalism was initiated in the early fifties, when Western scholars attempted to describe the origins and evolution of regional integration, especially focusing on the case of the European integration. In the beginning a strong legal attitude dominated the research on regional organisations targeting the analysis of bodies, functions, voting procedures, etc. of these new actors in the world. Analysis on the European integration found formal organisational structure with distinct budget, a complex voting procedure and a high level of transparency and monitoring. Till today the European case is characterized by burocratic institutions and a dense network of legal regulations that have a relatively direct impact on state sovereignty. From the 1960s state research on regionalism started to focus on comparative analysis between case of the European Economic Community and other regional organisations established on other continents (see above).

The starting point of these analyses were that the European integration is the most 'developed' example of regionalism serving as kind of a model for the rest of the world and it treated the

issue of regionalism as an evolutionary process (reflecting the later ideas of Björn Hettne discussed above). It was supposed that regional organisations outside Europe all attempt to reach a similar regional structure as the EEC. Later on, from the 1980s and 1990s, when second wave regionalism emerged, it became rather obvious that these new forms do not follow the line of the European integration (especially not the way of the European Union). As a result, the idea of *regionalisms* appeared meaning that research started to focus on the analysis of the different features of regional organisations in Latin America, Asia and Africa, so the attitude that these regional organisations should be examined on their own, got rather widespread. This new approach attempted to describe the regionalism as a phenomena closely linked to the historical and cultural background, geostrategic situation, economic opportunities and political leadership of the given region and actors in the region. Consequently, it is rather unrealistic to assume that they would follow a similar way of regional cooperation and integration, so comparative analyses is rather useless.

From the perspective of global governance, regional organisations are essential actors. The Commission on Global Governance defined global governance as 'the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal … and informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest' in 1995. Global governance as an expression and as a phenomena has reached growing importance in international relations of the 21st century resulting from the more and more visible consequences and impacts of globalisation.

Global governance has various pieces or elements, such as:

- **International structures and mechanisms** (IGOs and NGOs) Most IGOs are not global, but have a regional scope, and based on common interests states are motivated to cooperate on issues important for them.

- **International rules and laws** (multilateral agreements, customary practices, judicial decisions, regulatory standards) The scope of what is generally mentioned as public international law has expanded significantly since the end of WWII. International conventions show an extreme variety of topics, such as human rights law, trade and

investment law, non-proliferation, whaling, climate change, migration, humanitarian issues and so on.

- **International norms or soft law** (framework agreements, UN resolutions) Many international legal conventions mean non-binding obligations for states, these are in fact norms and often labelled as 'soft law'.

- **International regimes** (rules and norms, as well as practices of actors to show both how their expectations converge and their acceptance of and compliance with rules – governance without government)

- **Ad hoc groups, global conferences** These are less permanent forums giving opportunity for discussion of certain topics. Examples are the UN conferences or world summits from the 1970s, such as the Summit for Children (New York, 1990), the Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) or the Climate Change Conference (Bali, 2007). Examples of ad hoc groups are G8 or G20. (Karns – Mingst – Stiles, 2015, pp. 25-30)

Most of these elements have regional importance and regional structures; besides the widening network of regional international organisations all around the world, the regional (European, American and African) regimes of human rights, the regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones (covering Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia with the following treaties: Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967; Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985; Treaty of Bangkok, 1995; Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996; Treaty of Semipalatinsk, 2006) and inter-regional groups, such as BRICS (consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) or the Group of 20 are all examples.

This map shows regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones in four continents

Source: https://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/nuclear-weapon-free-zones-regional-security-middle-east-north-east-asia-europe/

The following table gives a good description of how regional structures have emerged in the system of global governance and influence processes especially in the field of economics and trade regulation. It proves rather an obvious shift from dominance of wider structures in the post-WWII era to the present situation of parallel existence and operation of global and regional frameworks:

The development of global governance

Identified externality	Postwar	Now
Macroeconomic management spillovers/coordination	IMF (adjustable peg system)	G7, European Union/EMU (OECD, IMF)
Rules for promoting liberal trade	GATT	WTO Regional customs unions and free trade areas

Rules for direct foreign investment	UN	WTO, OECD, European Union, World Bank (MIGA)
Systemic stability for capital markets and international banking	(Exchange controls)	Self-regulation (IOSCO), BIS (IMF)
Economic development	World Bank (UN)	World Bank, IMF, Regional banks
International environmental spillovers and agreements	UN agencies and ILO	UN agencies (e. g. UNEP and WMO), Regional agreements
Standard setting		Self-regulation, ISO, Regional agreements (EU Single Market), (WTO), (UN Agencies)
Network management	UN Agencies (ICAO, WMO, ITU)	Internet, UN agencies plus private self-regulation
Commodity price stability	(UN – commodity control)	Regional agreements, Self-regulation (OPEC)

Source: Cable, Vincent: Globalisation and Global Governance, 1999. Chatham House Papers, p. 47

Relations between global and regional governance is a debated question: are these complementing or competing structures? How could they be more effective? Basically, it raises similar questions as already discussed above regarding the debate between universalists and regionalists.

Regarding challenges and dilemmas of today's and future multi-level governance, here is a good summary from 2005: 'This emerging multi-level governance calls for new ideas and practices to organise governance at local, national, regional and global levels and deal with questions of:

1. How to co-ordinate policies at different levels of governance with supranational or macro-regional organisations.

2. How to make provision for the improved effective performance of multilateral institutions of global governance whose decision making is skewed by asymmetrical, or power influences or deadlocks—pace the contemporary UN or the WTO.

3. How to (re) organise regional representation of, and in, supranational organisations; such as the representation of the EU in international organisations like the UN.

4. How to understand the main drivers towards regionalisation and to monitor the impacts of regional integration processes in Europe and in extra-European areas; especially the role of the EU governance model on developments in accession states and other near neighbours.

5. How to understand the interface between supranational organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE, the CoE on the one hand and sub-regional state and local structures of governance on the other….' (Richard Higgott, 2005)

The role of regional organisations and further forms of regional cooperation in global governance gives a totally different perspective in research on regionalism, as instead of examining the institutions themselves it focuses on the influence of regional actors in a wider sense interpreting them as a relatively new and strengthening level of governance besides the global, national and local levels.

One of the most essential question in research on regionalism is what makes a regional organisation or any form of regional cooperation successful? What is success and how is it measured? It is important to see, that regional organisations are established with various and rather different objectives. It is rather an easy way to evaluate regional organisations if original goals are taken into consideration and their achievement or lack of achievement is examined. Most regional structures focus on trade and economic relations – these objectives are the easiest to quantify: increase of the volume and share of inner trade, similar indicators with investments, per capita GDP, poverty rate, etc. are the most regular data taken into consideration. But of course, the opportunities of certain regions are extremely different, so these indicators are relative, can not be compared directly. Prevention of peace and conflict management among member states is another aspect that is often examined when regional organisations are evaluated. Another important factor might be, that how flexibly the given regional organisation is able to react to internal and external changes, whether it is able to create new practices, find new solutions to arising problems and challenges. Enlargement is an interesting issue in this case; on the one hand it suggests that the given regional organisation is successful as further countries apply for membership, while on the other hand, in many cases enlargement results in slower decision-making and less effective operation in general.

II Regionalism and security

Traditionally, the issue of security in international relations focused on inter-state relations, first of all inter-state wars and conflicts. In the second half of the 20th century, the Cold War brought conflict between blocs (groups of countries), and security had a central role in this era under the logic of mutual deterrence that basically dominated the behaviour of the great powers during these decades. From the beginning of the 1990s, several regional conflicts have erupted (in ex-Yugoslavia, ex-Soviet Union, Africa, etc.) that had been 'frozen' during the Cold War. So-called 'new security challenges' also got more intense and limitations of state reactions were more and more obvious forcing states to open towards regional security cooperation to manage these challenges with joint efforts. Transnational security challenges, such as terrorism, ethnic conflicts, transnational crimes, natural disasters, migration or the spread of epidemics are different in nature and require different attitude on behalf of the states as they do not follow and 'respect' state borders. These developments all supported the more active and intense involvement of regional structures in conflict settlement and management.

II.1 Regional security cooperation

The United Nations is the most trustee of maintaining international peace and security. What role for regional organisations then? Historically, the first examples of regional cooperation on security issues are the following: 'a number of independent commissions were formed during the 1800s and early 1900s, including the Central Rhine Commission (1816), the U.S.-Canada International Joint Commission (1909), and the U.S.-Mexico International Boundary Commission (1889). The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine was established in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna to mediate conflicts and negotiate agreements regarding trade and use of the Rhine; this early organization has been one of the most enduring regional organizations and has been central in the establishment of waterway regimes'. (Hansen et. al. 2008, p. 297)

First security architectures were the so-called European Concert targeting regional security with balance of power principle and the Monroe-doctrine in 1823, that had the objective to keep European powers out of the Western hemisphere. After WWII one of the consequences of the Cold War was the establishment of regional security organisations, such as the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1949), the ANZUS Treaty (1951) with the participation of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, or the Warsaw Pact (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) in 1955, which were typically defence organisations counting with external threats. After the Cold War, establishment of the Community of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) brought new security structures that rather focus on new security challenges, such as terrorism or organised crime. Of course, already existing regional organisations (such as the European Union, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Organisation of American States) are also reacting to these new challenges, creating new programs and organs to fight these phenomena.

International peacekeeping and peacebuilding also have to be mentioned as this is a typical activity where during the last decades regional organisations have entered as new actors and seem to be more and more visible. Besides the EU and OSCE, the African Union is an important example – these regional organisations have considerable experiences in working together with the United Nations in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Although the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), were not willing to include conflict management in the founding document of the organisation, but they added conflict mediation to the organization's functions (consultation and arbitration responsibilities) during the Summit in Bali (1976).

By today, different models of regional security cooperation can be distinguished showing the diversity of the phenomena. These are alliances, collective security, security regimes and security communities. The most important features of these with examples are well introduced in SIPRI Yearbook, 2006.

'Alliances are one of the oldest forms of international cooperation, designed for both defence and attack (typically by military means) against a common external, or even internal, threat or opponent. They use cooperation as a means to an end rather than a good in itself, and an alliance's membership necessarily excludes the enemy. These relatively zero-sum characteristics are matched by the often negative practical impacts of the alliance method on international security: even a purely defensive alliance may heighten its members' threat consciousness more than it eases it, may exacerbate tensions and entrench dividing lines, and may take part in competitive arms acquisition. Alliances that turn on internal enemies (whether aberrant states or religious or ethnic groups) can also radicalize the latter and encourage them to seek external backers. On the other hand, an alliance should at least reduce the likelihood of

war between its members by promoting confidence, encouraging dispute avoidance and resolution, and perhaps triggering cooperation in other non-security areas. Both ASEAN and NATO may be seen as examples of this type of dynamic. Despite the ending of the classic East–West confrontation in 1989–90, NATO and (albeit much less intensely) a number of other groupings continue to fulfil at least some of the roles associated with alliances.'

It is interesting to see that ASEAN and NATO are both institutions that survived the Cold War, were joined by new members in the last decades, but they represent rather a traditional attitude on security challenges, so they react rather slowly to security dilemmas of the 21st century.

The next model is collective security, that 'emerged in the 20th century in response to the ambivalent effects of older-style balance-of-power politics and alliances. First attempted in the framework of the League of Nations and again in the United Nations (UN), a collective security system aims to prevent or contain war by assuring a response to any act of aggression or threat to peace among its members. To work as intended, any such system must include all states in a region or the world, and it directs its attention inwardly at their actions. Apart from the global UN, some larger regional entities—such as the AU, the OAS and the OSCE — may be viewed as institutions that explicitly or implicitly aim at, and at least partially produce, collective security. Notoriously, however, no such system has ever been made to work perfectly because of the evident problem—which is more difficult the larger the membership — of arriving at a common judgement and common will to act against offenders.' (SIPRI Yearbook, 2006) The regional organisations mentioned here basically attempted to follow the idea and model of the United Nations on a regional bases – but in many cases they faced very similar limitations as the UN in maintaining peace and security.

Emergence of security regimes is a later phenomena compared to the previous types of regional security cooperation, and their existence proves that regional security structure work and are able to create common norms and principles. 'A security-related regime may cover broad prescripts for behaviour such as the non-use of force and respect for existing international borders, or may more concretely regulate certain types and uses of weapons or activities like military movements and transparency. Several regional constructs, notably the OSCE and some Latin American initiatives, may be understood as security regimes, as may regional arms control measures such as nuclear weapon-free zones or the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The value of all such constructs depends on how well their norms are respected, and there is much debate on what features—in terms of internal power patterns, institutionalization, incentives and penalties—are needed to ensure observance. It should be

noted that regimes with functional security goals may not need, or lend themselves to, a geographically contiguous membership.' (SIPRI Yearbook 2006) Although today regional security regimes are limited in scope, probably in the future they will spread to new areas and might involve further regions.

At last, the more integrated form of regional security cooperation is a security community, which is 'defined as a group of states among which there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way'. The concept was developed by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950s to reflect the particularly far-reaching goals of post-World War II European integration, which in turn placed Europe in a larger security community of the world's industrial-ized democracies. A security community implies more intense, sustained and comprehensive interaction than any of the above models. Starting by removing the risk of conflict within the group, it can develop strengths that are greater than the sum of its parts for security tasks going well beyond the prevention of specific ills. Ambitions to build such communities have recently been displayed also in several non-European regions, but the nature and effects of regional integration in the security domain remain poorly understood. The EU experiment has eliminated conflict between but not within its states (*vide* Northern Ireland and the Basque region). The tendency of security com-munities to weaken internal frontiers potentially means that they can be more quickly affected by 'transnational' threats (e.g., terrorism, criminal traffic and disease). Their open-ended agendas tend to lead them to confront new security challenges as soon as old ones are settled and, in particular, to feel an impulse to start 'exporting' their surplus of security to others, notably in the form of peace missions ....' (SIPRI Yearbook 2006)

This model is rather far from the original concept of security alliance and as harmonious co-existence between the members is given, it turns outward to serve as kind of a source of experience and good practice in maintaining peace and security in other regions. The fact, that the European integration is till today the single example of a security community means that this type of regional security cooperation might be a European development, that will not be followed by other regions.

What is for sure, is that rather a high number of regional organisations have some kind of security dimension and this number is still on the rise. By today, institutionalised forms of security cooperation is apparent in all the world regions. The next table gives a good summary of these structures region by region.

Regional organizations and groups with security functions

Organisation	Year founded
Africa	
African Union (AU)	2001
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	1994
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)	1998
East African Community (EAC)	1999
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)	1998
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	1975
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	1996
Mano River Union	1973
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	1992
Americas	
Andean Community of Nations (Andean Pact)	1969
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)	1973
Central American Integration System (SICA)	1991
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)	1980
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)	1991
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	1994
Organization of American States (OAS)	1948

Rio Group	1987
Asia	
Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty	1951
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)	1989
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)	1967
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)	1994
ASEAN Plus Three (APT)	1997
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building measures in Asia (CICA)	1992
Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO)	1985
Pacific Community	1947
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	1971
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)	2001
South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)	1985
Europe and Euro-Atlantic	
Arctic Council	1996
Baltic Council	1993
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC)	1993
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)	1992
Central European Initiative (CEI)	1989
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)	2003
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	1991
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)	1992
Council of Europe	1949
European Union	1951
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)	1949

	1997
Nordic Council	1952
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	1973
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe	1999
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)	1996
Visegrad Group (V4)	1991
Western European Union (WEU)	1954
Middle East	
Arab League	1945
Arab Maghreb Union	1989
Council of Arab Economic Unity	1964
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	1981
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)	1971

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 2006. pp. 196-197.

II.2 Regional organisations and international conflict management

How is the effectiveness of regional organisations in international conflict management evaluated? Here is a good summary on this by Hansen mentioning the most important authors researching on this topic:

'Early literature suggested that regional organizations help reduce conflict by isolating and dividing local conflicts before they become intractable global issues (Burton 1962; Fisher 1964). Regional organizations lack the perceived impartiality that global organizations gain from their distance, cited as necessary for viable mediation (Moore 1987). On the other hand, regional organizations may be more effective at mediating conflict because their member states share common interests that make their actions more timely and effective. Wehr and Lederach (1991) argue that mediators who are ''closer'' to the disputants are more likely to promote trust-based mediation, which may be effective at creating more binding agreements.

A number of studies have questioned the accuracy of these claims and instead caution that regional organizations have only limited success at resolving the issues behind disputes (Nye 1971; Meyers 1974; Haas 1983). … Like global organizations, regional organizations are likely to be most effective as conflict mediators when they are independent from their member states, they have sufficient resources to accomplish their goals, and their organizational charter includes more stringent methods of conflict mediation. Taking each of these factors in turn, Meyers (1974) has argued that a lack of centralized authority is a principal reason why the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is only marginally successful at mediating conflict. This lack of independence has made the OAU dependent on member states voluntarily complying with agreements, and because of this, the OAU was only effective when both disputants in a conflict were member states and when leaders' positions were not threatened by rulings of the OAU. Organizational resources may include material (money, peacekeeping troops), informational (expertise or a centralized bureaucracy), or ideational (legitimacy and impartiality) resources (Nye 1971; Meyers 1974).

While regional organizations often possess less material or ideational resources than many global organizations, they do have an advantage in information. As Peck (1998) discusses, regional organizations, because of their proximity to the conflict and to the disputants, are able to more efficiently assess potential conflicts and direct their limited organizational resources to more effectively prevent and mediate conflict. The similarity of preferences between regional disputants and regional IO mediators enhances the credibility of informative signals sent by the IO (Thompson 2006, 7). Organizations will be most successful at resolving disputes if they can provide expert knowledge and an experienced diplomatic corps and can process information from a variety of sources (i.e., states, NGOs, research institutions) to make more effective recommendations. Furthermore, organizations can increase compliance with agreements if they can more effectively monitor disputant behaviours and offer advice to the parties in the dispute (Peck 1998). Finally, organizations with charters that include binding methods of conflict mediation, such as arbitration, are often more effective at resolving disputes (Nye1971; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991) find that the more active a role the mediator takes in dispute resolution, the greater the chance of success of the mediation attempt. Organizations like the OAU may be able to provide ''good offices'' and act as a forum for state leaders and resolve interstate disputes in that matter, but they are likely to meet less success in creating and enforcing agreements than organizations such as the European Union, which can initiate binding

adjudication between member states—with or without member state approval.' (Hansen et., 2008)

II.3 Regional Security Complex Theory

When discussing regional security issues and regional cooperation on security challenges, the Regional Security Complex Theory has to be mentioned as it basically divides the world into regional security units and brings a new perspective to research on regional security cooperation. Barry Buzan writes about the evolution of the theory: 'The original definition of a security complex (Buzan 1983 106) was: 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another'. In our 1998 book (Buzan and Wćver 1998: 201), the definition of RSCs was reformulated to shed the state-centric and military-political focus and to rephrase the same basic conception for the possibility of different actors and several sectors of security: '*a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another*'. This more complicated formulation does not change the underlying idea or the main properties of the concept. The central idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation and desecuritisation processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters. These clusters are both durable and distinct from global level processes of (de)securitisation. Each level needs to be understood both in itself and in how it interplays with the other.' (Buzan, Barry - Waever, Ole, 2003, p. 44)

Birth of this theory reflects that when thinking about security issues and challenges, besides the national and global actors, the regional level participants should not be left out from analysis and the role of these regional security complexes is on the rise compared to the role of great powers or the global collective security system (UN)

Regional security complexes in the world

Armed conflicts by region and years

Source: Uppsala University, https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/667/c_667494-l_1-k_armed-conflict-by-region--1946-2017a.png

III Regionalism and development

Despite the fact that development is often an essential motivation for regional institution building, especially in the case of the developing world, it is quite difficult to explore direct connections between the two and it is also challenging to describe the mechanisms of interaction between regionalism and development.

An essential limitation is that development is quite a debated issue. What is development? Concepts and interpretations vary, and it makes development rather a controversial issue in international relations. In academic literature the 'development debate' is a conflict between the 'orthodox' and the 'critical' approach. These are contrasting views on the background and reasons of development and underdevelopment and they reflect the dividedness of countries and policy-makers on the issue of development.

'The orthodox approach largely follows the mainstream tradition, interpreting development in the Western, liberal manner. Measured quantitatively with economic statistics, development means increases in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over time and rising level of industrialization (Sen, 1996). It involves the transition of traditional societies, which are agrarian and subsistence-based, into modern societies founded on wage labor, cash, and consumerism (Rostow, 1971). Markets are the preferred solution to poverty and underdevelopment because they have proven to be the most efficient way to promote economic growth, diversification, industrialization and production. Markets also efficiently distribute resources and generate significant levels of wealth. The quality of life for the poor improves as the economy expands.' (Pease, 2012, p. 186).

According to the orthodox approach the reasons behind poverty and underdevelopment are most often bad, inefficient, irrational, corrupt, etc. state policies and regulations. A typical case is the protectionist trade policy or industrialization in sectors where the economy does not have comparative advantage. The obvious result – the orthodox approach goes – will be (and must be) failure as inefficient industries are supported by the state. This automatically leads to the production expensive, non-competitive export products that can not be sold in world markets. Governments should not intervene in the market, otherwise they scarify growth and efficiency. 'The obstacles to development in the orthodox sense include population growth, corruption, and excessive government spending. The poorest developing states have high population

growth rate, which undermine their economies' sustainability. Corruption compounds the problem. Venal government officials steal millions in foreign assistance for personal gain while forcing MNCs to pay millions in kickbacks and bribes, thus deterring foreign investment. Excessive government spending to subsidize transportation, energy or prices of manufactured goods creates huge development deficits and massive debt. Many developing states are mires in a cycle of poverty and debt that undermines long-term, stable, sustained economic growth. Development can be accomplished only by introducing significant market reforms and reducing state intervention in the market' (Pease, 2012, p. 186). This attitude towards the development issue is often rejected by developing countries as they perceive it as blaming them for their fate, as if it was only their fault to lag behind and suffer from poverty and underdevelopment. Dependency theory emerged in the 1960s in Latin America and it was the very first theory that rejected modernization theory and emphasized the limitations of development opportunities of development countries and referred to the responsibility of Western, industrialized countries.

Critical approach theorists emphasize the importance of colonial history of the developing world and the consequences of colonialism and the remaining patterns of exploitation by the ex-colonizers. These historical events and their structural consequences for ex-colonies' economies should be considered when talking about the reasons behind underdevelopment.

Critical development theory authors argue, that 'development is the process whereby other peoples are dominated and their destinies are shaped according to an essentially Western way of conceiving and perceiving the world. The development discourse is part of an imperial process whereby other peoples are appropriated and turn into objects. … The economic, social and political transformations of the Third World are inseparable from the production and reproduction of meanings, symbols and knowledge, that is, cultural reproduction. Considerable attention has been given to the analysis of the economic mechanisms of underdevelopment and, to a lesser extent, the social and political processes'. (Munck – O'Hearn, 1999, pp. 1-2) Later on, in the 1990s criticism of the critique emerged, the so-called post-development theory appeared, that basically rejected the idea of development – it went further as it did not offer a new perspective on development as the critical approach did, but rather it wanted to get rid of the term 'development' as a symbol of Westernization. Post-development authors often follow anti-globalisation attitude and are linked with social movements all around the world.

According to the critical authors, development is rather about how people are able to 'meet their material and non-material needs through their own efforts'. (Pease, p. 187) Therefore, indicators used by the orthodox approach are useless to measure the essence of development.

The debate on development described above is well represented in international organisations such as World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the UN Development Program (UNDP). These frameworks serve as forums of debate on development and attempt to find solutions for poverty and underdevelopment. World Bank and IMF basically were founded on the orthodox ideas of development, while the birth of UNCTAD and UNDP meant that the attitude and perceptions on behalf of the developing countries could also be 'institutionalised' in the UN family.

What about regional organisations? Most regional institutions set development as a goal in their founding documents – though they focus on different topics. Here is a list of quotations from founding treaties collected by a World Bank publication (Shiff – Winters, 2003)

Trade and income

"To enhance the competitiveness of their firms in global markets" NAFTA, 1992

"To create an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in their territories. To reduce distortions to trade" G3 Treaty (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela), 1994

"To modernize their economies in order to expand the supply and improve the quality of available goods and services, with a view to enhancing the living conditions of their populations" MERCOSUR Agreement, 1991

Investment

"To ensure a predictable commercial framework for production activities and investment" G3 Treaty, 1994

"Prerequisite for the stimulation of domestic, regional and foreign direct investment and the expansion, growth and the development of the economies of each member state and the region as a whole" Kinshasa Resolution on the Establishment of COMESA, 1998

"A stimulus to the development of the national economies by expanding investment and production opportunities, trade, and foreign exchange earnings" Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 1992

Development

"To ensure in particular that these arrangements encourage the development of the less advanced members of the customs union and the diversification of their economies" Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement, 1969

Democracy and human rights

"To involve the peoples of the Region centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law" SADC Treaty, 1992

"To strengthen democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, to combat poverty and promote greater understanding between cultures" Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995

Inter-state regional institutions most often follow the ideas of the orthodox approach to development, therefore – as described above with the goals of the mentioned organisations – they believe that joining a regional integration would help them to increase trade with member states and also with non-member countries (especially in second-wave regionalism) and attract investments. They consider these opportunities as essential factors in economic development.

Social movements and NGOs rather tend to focus on the critical approach in their activities helping people more directly in their everyday lives and trying to satisfy their needs based on their background, concrete situation and challenges. In many cases, these forms of regional or global cooperation go against the ideas of the orthodox model and attack exactly those institutions (such as free trade agreements) that are perceived as important tools of development in inter-governmental regional cooperation. The Zapatista movement in Mexico is a typical case as Zapatistas initiated an armed (and later peaceful) struggle on the day when the North American Free Trade Agreement entered into force, on the 1st January, 1994.

It is rather impossible to evaluate regional organisations' performance regarding development – first of all, because development means different things to different actors participating in regionalism. What is for sure, is that regional organisations in the developing world have not been able to change the status of these countries and make them developed. The success of the first Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in East Asia – Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea – did not have any institutionalised regional background. The rise of China can not be connected to the support of regional cooperation either.

Still, regional organisations can show results in development, now regions outside Europe (Latin America, Africa and Asia) are examined very shortly from the perspective, whether development is central to regionalism in the given area and how thy attempt to achieve it.

III.1 Latin America

The Latin American region is maybe the most active in building regional organisations from the 1960s and their attitude is the closest to the orthodox development theory – in spite of the fact, that dependency theory is a Latin American invention.

Regional organisations in Latin America mostly follow subregions geographically – Central America, the Caribbean, Andean region, South America, etc.

Source: Wikipedia

Historically, experience of the independence is crucial in Latin American regionalism; the 'Dream of Bolívar' (strong and permanent regional cooperation among all the Latin American

states) failed in the 19th century, while the United States brought all the English colonies into one single country. For Latin American policy makers, the missed opportunity to be more united is often intertwined with developmental challenges in the region. The United States – which was able to create a single entity after independence followed a path of development that led to the group of developed states. Meanwhile, Latin America lagged behind and joined the group of developing countries resulting in deep frustration, so regionalism and stronger regional cooperation has been a revolving issue since independence.

This is one of the explaining factors for the relatively high number of regional organisations targeting common development. As it is obvious from the picture above, Latin American countries are mostly members of more than one regional organisations, which reflects the desire not to be left out from any opportunity to develop.

Emergence of new regionalism in Latin America was rather dynamic and led by different motivations. András Inotai collects these factors in four baskets of arguments: '(a) Latin American interests; (b) US interests; (c) common(ly felt) interests of the Western Hemisphere; and (d) external (or global) developments.'. Latin American interests are rather complex, first of all economic factors have to be mentioned. During the 1990s, Latin American countries carried out structural reforms following the prescriptions of the so-called Washington Consensus and 'opening up vis-a-vis the world has to be accompanied by a similar process between and among Latin American countries in order to avoid trade diversion from the region to other countries offering better market access conditions (…) The stabilization and adjustment policies had a number of common features and made use of similar or identical policy instruments. Therefore, it is supposed that national economies are not only stronger but also more homogeneous in their economic priorities than in the past.' (Inotai, 1994. p. 65.) End of military dictatorships and the process of democratization strengthened regional trust and hence was a motivating factor in regional institution-building. Avoiding marginalisation in the global markets and to create conditions for successful adjustment to the global challenges of the nineties were also important factors. 'Finally, Mexico's turnaround in favour of inter-American regionalism has to be mentioned. It has not only created a unique demonstration effect to be followed by others, but contains a strong psychological element by challenging the traditional pattern of Latin American political and cultural unity vis-a-vis the Northern neighbour representing different socio-cultural values.' (Inotai, 1994, p. 66) Political and economic situation of the US in the post-Cold war era and its motivation to preserve its leading position in the world turned Washington's attention towards the Latin American region. Rapidly

growing Latino share in US population and rapidly increasing purchasing power of Latin American societies were also important motivating factors of deeper regionalism in the Western Hemisphere on behalf of the US. Common interests can be defined as 'Larger economic units usually possess higher bargaining power that may be crucial, if one considers the growing conflictive potential in the economic relations of internationally leading actors. Both Latin American and US interests are expected to be represented, recognized or protected more efficiently if the new regionalism takes shape.' (Inotai, 1994. p. 67) External (global) developments also contributed to the rise of new regionalism in the Americas: first of all, developments in Europe (the Maastricht Treaty and the birth of the European Union), the appearance of Central Eastern European countries meant obviously new competitors for Latin America (Inotai, 1994. p. 68) and the economic rise of the Pacific region all lead to joint efforts to deepen regional integration in the Western Hemisphere.

It is important to see, that Latin American political developments after 2000 (the so-called *pink tide* in the region) brought new, mostly left-wing governments in South America. Parallelly, US foreign policy initiated 'War on Terror' that was rather unpopular in Latin America, while new presidents in Latin America blamed Washington (and the IMF) for the social costs of structural reforms introduced in the 1990s. Therefore, in Latin America new types of regional alliances emerged, mostly in institutionalised form to give an alternative of the Western way of regional integration. Academic literature calls this phenomena 'post-hegemonic' regionalism, referring to the essential Latin American motivation to get rid of US influence and find a sovereign way of development.[2]

A serious limitation of more intense trade and investment links between Latin American countries is that these economies are mostly competitive ones – they are fighting with each other for market share in the United States, the EU and Asian markets. Besides this, the relative backwardness of infrastructure in Latin America is also an important factor when it comes to increase in trade relations. For Latin Americans, external partners (the US, European countries and Asian partners) have always been more important, than regional ones – historically Latin American governments and business actors have always concentrated on building strong relations with extra-regional partners.

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[2] For more details see Pía Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie (ed.): *The Rise of Post-hegemonic Regionalism. The Case of Latin America.* Srpinger, 2012.

Originally – after WWII – African regionalism focused on the issue of decolonization and fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa. As a result, the topic of development could only be added later to the 'agenda' of regionalism, after political independence was already a reality.

A centrepiece of economic integration in Africa is the Treaty of Abuja, which was signed in 1991, entered into force in 1994 and it created the African Economic Community (AEC) – a long term and ambitious project to make economic cooperation strong and permanent among the more than fifty African countries. AEC is already in operation and will be completed (meaning an economic and monetary union) by 2028 in principle. The idea behind AEC is that collecting the sub-regional economic integrations a united economic community would be created in Africa that could reinforce the continent's bargaining power in global forums and would also serve economic development is member states.

Regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa started to emerge in the 1970s, more than a decade before the establishment of AEC. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was established in 1975; SADC (South Africa Development Community) was started in 1980; COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) goes back to 1981; Arab Maghreb Union, 1989; CENSAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) was created in 1998; EAC (East African Community) in 2000; IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) in 1986 and ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) in 1985. These are those RECs in Africa that are acknowledged by the African Union and treated as elements of the African Economic community.

UMA
Algeria
Mauritania

Libya
Morocco
Tunisia

Somalia

IGAD

Kenya
Uganda

EAC

Djibouti
Eritrea
Sudan

Ethiopia

CEN-SAD

Egypt

Tanzania

SADC

Malawi
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Mozambique

CEMAC

C.A.R.
Chad

Burundi

CEPGL   DRC

Botswana
Lesotho
Namibia
South Africa

ECCAS
Sao Tome
and Principe

Rwanda

Angola

Swaziland

SACU

Mauritius
Seychelles

Comoros
Madagascar

COMESA

Burkina Faso

Benin
Mali
Niger
Senegal

Ga
mbi

IOC

UEMOA

Guinea
Bissau

Reunion

ECOWAS
Cape Verde
Ghana

MRU
Liberia
Guinea

This relatively high number of RECs in Africa proves the motivation for intense regional cooperation, but concrete results of these forms of integration are not convincing. Which are those factors that make effective regional integration in Africa difficult?

An important challenge is overlapping membership in RECs in Africa; usually African states are members of two or more regional organisations. This means that they have to comply with different – often conflicting – duties resulted from membership and it significantly raises the costs of integration. In many cases, political will needed for the fulfilment of obligations is often missing on behalf of the governments involved. In sub-regional integrations economic connectedness of member economies is rather low, as most of them are exporters of natural

resources and thy target markets of developed countries. As a result, share of regional trade in most cases is rather limited; members' economic structures are rather competitive than complementary. Regional trade is also challenged by – in a similar way to Latin America – the underdevelopment of regional infrastructure and communication. Regional organisations have very low budgets, officials working for them are underpaid and they are simply not able to influence the behaviour of member countries. At last, but not at least, in the case of Africa there is no regional power that was able and willing to take the costs of integration (Szent-Iványi, 2010, pp. 330-334) – as Germany in case of the European Union, the United States in OAS or Brazil in Mercosur.

Overlapping membership in Regional Economic Communities in Africa

Source: https://bedsidereadings.com/economics/what-are-the-benefits-of-african-integration/

III.3 Asia

Regionalism in Asia is rather atypical as its core is given by Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) established in 1967 – that basically did not involve the most essential regional powers, like China, Japan or India. It was rather created to defend member states from the influence of regional powers. Asian regional powers were not initiators of regional

cooperation frameworks. In a similar way, as in Africa, Asian regionalism focused on political issues in the beginning and the topic of development appeared later, in the 1980s and 1990s.

ASEAN plus Three (APT) cooperation process started in 1997 – with the involvement of China, Japan and South Korea, the most essential economic powers in the region. The first East Asia summit convened in 2005 widened the framework to ASEAN plus Six with India, Australia and New Zealand.

Regional Economic Institutions in Asia-Pacific

Source: http://archive.the-ipf.com/anyone-for-alphabet-soup-a-guide-to-asia-pacific-regionalism/

As ASEAN Plus Three involves actors with substantial economic power in world economy, it has achieved important results in terms of free trade and investments. 'ASEAN's trade with the Plus Three Countries retained its momentum despites challenges derived from uncertainties in the global economy. Total trade between ASEAN and the Plus Three countries in 2017 amounted to USD 807.3billion which accounted for 31.6 per cent of ASEAN's total trade. In the same year, the total foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from the Plus Three countries into ASEAN reached USD 29.9 billion, accounting for 21,8 per cent of total FDI inflow to ASEAN. In order to strengthen economic cooperation among the APT countries, the East Asia

Business Council (EABC) which was established in April 2004 in Kuala Lumpur continues to strengthen cooperation among the private sector and entrepreneurs of the East Asia countries. The EABC launched the East Asia Business Exchange (EABEX) Portal at the 5th East Asia Business Forum on 18 June 2013 in Tianjin, China.' (ASEAN, 2018)

When discussing the attempts of Asian regional organisations to contribute to regional development, the – less known – CAREC program has to be mentioned, too. 'The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program is a partnership of 11 countries and development partners working together to promote development through cooperation, leading to accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction. It is guided by the overarching vision of "Good Neighbours, Good Partners, and Good Prospects.' (CAREC official website)

The program is a proactive facilitator of practical, results-based regional projects, and policy initiatives critical to sustainable economic growth and shared prosperity in the region. Since its inception in 2001 and as of September 2018, CAREC has mobilized more than $32.9 billion investments that have helped establish multimodal transportation networks, increased energy trade and security, facilitated free movement of people and freight, and laid the groundwork for economic corridor development.

CAREC 2030 provides the new long-term strategic framework for the program leading to 2030. It is anchored on a broader mission to connect people, policies and projects for shared and sustainable development, serving as the premier economic and social cooperation platform for the region.' (CAREC official website)

Regional integration process in Asia got a new impetus after the Asian financial crisis as countries in the region faced their vulnerability and economic interdependence. The role of China is extremely important today, Chinese attitude towards regional cooperation has been shifting from the role of a passive outsider to a more and more active regional leader. The 'Belt and Road Initiative' declared by the Chinese government in 2015 with a targeted end date of 2049 will probably reinforce Beijing's role in Asian regionalism and will also contribute to easier regional trade and investments.

MAPPING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE'S PROGRESS

Source: CSIS Reconnecting Asia Project, U.S. Global Investors

Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/09/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-opens-up-unprecedented-opportunities/#6b71ca353e9a

Compared to the case of Latin America and Africa, we can see that although institution building is 'less developed' in Asia, the results in increased regional trade and investments and developing infrastructure, East Asia has an advantage now resulting from the extremely active period of the last two decades. China as an economic powerhouse has taken a more active role giving impetus to the process of Asian regionalism. The future patterns of Asian regionalism might have global impacts in the next decade.

IV Regionalism and identity

In research on regionalism, identity is a more and more often examined factor influencing the opportunities of regional organisations. First of all, the concept of identity has to be introduced; it has several meanings as different disciplines emphasize different aspects of identity.

Some definitions from different authors and perspectives:

- **-** who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others (Cambridge Dictionary)

- an internalized psychic system that integrates an individual's inner self and the outer social world into a congruent whole (Psychology)

- **-** Traits and characteristics, social relations, roles and social group memberships that define who one is (Oyserman-Elmore - Smith)

- **-** Process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute enabling people to find meaning in what they do in their life (Castells)

Here is a picture showing the complexity of identity formation and the various factors influencing one's identity.

An interesting issue regarding group identity is what constitutes it. Is group identity formed by those factors that are common, meaning that members of a certain group have something in common and on this basis they create an 'imagined community'. Or, quite the contrary, group identity is formed by the sense of difference with regard to other communities, so the basis is given by the differences?

IV.1 Globalization and identity

In the context of globalization, the phenomena of multiplying identities has become a reality, meaning that with the emergence of the 'global village' people get closer to other people, other cultures, other religions, social groups, communities, etc., they get familiar with these groups and as a result might build multiple, parallel identities at the same time. Technological progress, extremely rapid development of communication and social networks all contribute to the phenomena of multiplying identity.

Manuel Castells distinguishes three types of collective identities in the context of globalization. The first type he calls 'legitimising identity, which is constructed from the institutions and in particular from the state. For example, and without wishing to provoke, the French national identity, which is one of the strongest in Europe, is constructed from the French state. It is the French state which constructs the French nation, not the reverse. At the time of the French Revolution less than 13% of the current French territories spoke the language of the Île-de-France. I would say that it is the only European national identity which was efficiently constructed from the state. … In contrast to the French case, the other great revolutionary nation, the American nation, constructed a strong national identity in which there were no traditional identity principles, and it did so based on the state and the Constitution and through the key elements of multiculturality and multiethnicity.

The second type of identity is what I call 'identity of resistance'. It is that identity in which a human collective that feels either culturally rejected or socially or politically marginalised reacts by constructing with the materials of its history forms of self-identification, enabling it to confront what would be its assimilation into a system in which its situation would be structurally subordinated. We can speak of national identity, but to express at that moment the extraordinary emergence of indigenous movements throughout Latin America. It is an identity which was asleep and which had not expressed itself with all the strength with which it is

expressing itself now. And the cause is that it is structured as a resistance to the marginalisation process in which the globalisation of a certain kind places them. Not all globalisation generates resistance, but globalisation does make certain social groups resist, and they resist with what they have because they cannot do so as citizens, because as citizens they are minorities that do not have their rights represented.

The third type of identity that I have observed is what I call "project identity". The project identity is structured based on a self-identification, always with cultural, historical and territorial materials. And although it is always with these materials, there is a project of construction of a collective and at that moment it can be a project of a national, generic, kind; for instance, the feminist or the ecologist movement as a project of construction of a citizenship of the rights of nature.' (Castells, 2010, pp. 95-97)

The last two types (protest- and project) identities are obviously results of globalisation and might connect people with rather different 'original' or national identities. Project identity is in many cases truly transnational, but in the case of reject identities, we can also observe that certain transnational groups protest against some negative consequences of globalisation – such as nationalist or anti-globalisation groups. The Zapatista movement in Mexico, for example, represent marginalised native people in Southern Mexico, but as a protest organisation – with a strong anti-globalisation stance – it has attracted many supporters identifying with their goals outside Mexico.

So-called territorial identities are on type of collective identities and they are attached to a given geographical territory that is in connection with a group of people. Territorial identities are divided into further categories, such as local, regional, national, supranational and global. In this sense, regional identity refers to the regional level below the state level. On the other hand, from the perspective of regional organisations and institutions supranational identity is what matters, such as European or South American identity. Relations between national and supranational identities is rather a debated issue, three models are used to describe and understand the links between them. The first one is the so-called 'zero-sum model' meaning that 'Identification with one social group comes at the expense of identifying with other groups. Europeanness either will or will not gradually replace national, subnational, or other identities relating to territorial spaces.' (Risse, 2002) The second on is the layered cake model, according to which 'people hold multiple identities and it will depend on the social context of interaction which of these multiple identities are invoked and become salient.' (Risse, 2002) It means that the given situation determines which level of someone's identity will be the strongest. A

Hungarian born near Lake Balaton might have a strong identification with the Balaton region, so in Budapest he or she might have a self-definition of belonging to this part of the country, while on a soccer match between Hungary and France, Hungarian identity will come to the front. And when he or she attends China, he or she might feel closer to fellow European tourists. The third model is called the 'marble cake model' and it means that similarly to the previous model, 'identities are invoked in a context-dependent way, but they enmesh and flow into each other in a such a way that one cannot clearly define boundaries between for instance, one's Flemishness, Waloonness, Belgianness and one's Europeanness.' (Risse, 2002)

When regional organisations and regional identity is discussed, the question can be raised: is regional identity necessary for successful regional organisations? Does regional identity support regionalism or regionalism supports regional identity?


Source: https://www.debatingeurope.eu/2013/10/29/do-you-feel-part-of-a-common-european-identity/#infographic

IV.2 The European Union and regional identity

The European Union is a regional institution that builds regional identity consciously and this activity distinguishes it from other regional organisations and basically makes it rather an exception then a model to be followed. European values (such as freedom, respect of human rights, human dignity, democracy, rule of law, equality, etc.) give the core of this identity building and various symbols are used to reinforce these and make all the member societies committed to Europeanness. Symbols include the European flag, Ludwig von Beethoven's Symphony No. 9. (being played on official events of the European Union and the Council of Europe), the day of Europe (9th May), the motto 'United in diversity' has been used since 2000 and the Euro can also be described as a symbol of Europe. On the contrary, even in Europe, statistics prove that national identities are still much stronger than regional (in this case, European) identity.

EUROPEAN IDENTITIES

Legend: ■ Nationality only ■ Nationality and European ■ European and Nationality ■ European only

| Country	Nationality only	Nationality and European	European and Nationality	European only
United Kingdom	64	31	2	1
Cyprus	57	35	5	3
Greece	51	47	1	
Latvia	48	42	7	1
Bulgaria	47	42	8	1
Czechia	44	50	5	1
Lithuania	43	50	5	2
Ireland	43	52	3	2
Austria	43	48	7	2
Poland	42	50	4	1
Romania	41	53	3	2
Portugal	41	55	2	
Finland	40	54	4	1
Slovenia	38	57	3	1
Hungary	37	51	10	2
Slovakia	36	54	7	2
France	36	55	6	2
Estonia	36	55	5	2
Italy	35	55	5	1
Denmark	34	58	5	2
Sweden	31	61	5	1
Belgium	31	56	8	2
Croatia	30	63	5	1
Spain	28	56	5	6
The Netherlands	26	65	6	2
Malta	26	69	3	1
Germany	25	58	12	2
Luxembourg	17	61	14	7

Percent of respondents

SOURCE: European Commission, "Spring 2015 Eurobarometer"

BUSINESS INSIDER

It is rather eye-catching that two islands (the United Kingdom and Cyprus) stand on one of the edges in the above table – with the highest percentage of 'only national identity', basically meaning rejection of European identity, which might be an explaining factor of the Brexit

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process, too. On the other edge, Germany and Luxembourg stand with the highest rate of those who have a primary European and a secondary national identity. It shows that Germans – leaders in the EU and those, who take the highest financial burden in the integration (of course next to important benefits) are rather committed to Europeanness and belonging to Europe form an essential part of their identity. In the case of Luxembourg, probably the low number of total population and the relatively high number of Eurocrats explain the results.

Source: https://slideplayer.com/slide/8531632/

EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Debating Europe

Symbols of EU identity

€

9 May
Europe Day

Ode to Joy
EU Anthem

Unity in diversity
EU motto

What would strengthen your sense of EU identity?
EU27, 2012

- 37% — Common social welfare system (healthcare, education, pensions)
- 24% — Free movement of pension
- 19% — EU emergency response service for natural disasters
- 18% — EU ID cards
- 18% — EU-wide mobile phone network at same price
- 17% — Directly elected President of the EU

Do you feel a citizen of the EU?
Poll EU27, 2013

No 37%   Yes 62%

In the near future, I see myself as...
EU27, 2012

- 3% Only European
- 38% Only my nationality
- 6% European and my nationality
- 49% My nationality and European

Cultural contributions to European unity

DANTE ALIGHIERI
Poet
(1265-1321)
Argued that political unity in Europe was solution to war

DESIDERIUS ERASMUS
Theologian
(1466-1536)
Saw the world as "one common fatherland"

IMMANUEL KANT
Philosopher
(1724-1804)
Thought federalism was only guarantee of "perpetual peace"

VICTOR HUGO
Poet, writer
(1802-1885)
Wanted to see the "Etats-Unis d'Europe"

VACLAV HAVEL
First President of Czech Republic (1993-2003) Pro-EU stance encouraged eastern Europeans to join the EU

WINSTON CHURCHILL
Prime minister of UK (1940-45, 1951-55) Called for a "United States of Europe"

PABLO PICASSO
Painter, sculptor
(1881-1973)
Supporter of the Pan-European Movement

SIGMUND FREUD
Neurologist
(1856-1939)
Attended the first Pan-Europa Congress in 1926

Sources: Eurobarometer, European Commission. September, 2013

Source: https://www.debatingeurope.eu/2013/10/29/do-you-feel-part-of-a-common-european-identity/#infographic

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V Future of regionalism

In the 21st century, regional cooperations/integrations face several challenges. Dynamism of the 1990s brought by the rise of new regionalism has slowed down, several regional structures have lost their relevance, especially in Latin America and Africa, while the Asian Pacific region has become more active in building regional structures.

The role the European Union – as the only real and/or would-be-global-player today (Remarks made by András Inotai, 2019) – is essential till today regarding the future of regionalism. From the 1950s the European integration served as kind of a role model for other regional frameworks outside Europe, especially institutional forms have been copied – typically the Parliament for more democratic operation –, but measures such as gender quota have also been applied in other regions. As it was discussed earlier, success or effectiveness of a regional organisation is always difficult to measure, but if volume of internal trade or FDI, level of institutionalization, involvement of citizens, common law and regulations or identity building is taken into consideration, the European Union is absolutely the No. 1 regional institution. Share of intra-EU exports among total EU exports were 64% in 2017, while 50% in the case of NAFTA and ASEAN is on the third place with 24% (see Annex, p. 93).

On the other hand, evolution of regional frameworks do not follow the European Union in their contents, the example of the highly regulated EU is extremely far from other regional frameworks, it is rather an exception than a model to be copied. The idea that regional integrations go towards the structure and principles of the European integration does not seem to come true; the EU is rather a 'champion' of regionalism without real competitors.

21st-century crisis of the European Union is a visible phenomenon, and this crisis is multi-dimensional in nature. 'The 'age of crisis' for the EU began in 2009-2010 with the onset of what quickly came to be called the euro or eurozone crisis. This crisis, whose severity has ebbed and flowed over the years that have followed, is the most obvious manifestation of the EU in crisis. It has threatened the very existence of one of the EU's main policy achievements: the single currency (…) At various times during the eurozone crisis, membership, governing structure, and operating rules of the single currency system have been fundamentally questioned and challenged.

Apart from the eurozone crisis, the most recognizable feature of the EU in crisis has been the migration crisis, which greatly escalated in 2015 … The migration crisis has put severe strains

on free movement within the EU, and, indeed, has led to a partial breakdown of Schengen. Another dimension of the crisis pertains to EU governance. The handling of the Eurozone and the migration crisis has demonstrated poor EU leadership, often slow and insufficient leadership, hardening national positions, uneven burden-sharing, and fraying solidarity among member states. (…) These features of EU governance have, in turn, fuelled Euroscepticism and put the credibility and democratic legitimacy of the EU system increasingly in question.' (Dinan – Nugent – Paterson, 2017. pp. 1-2)

The EU crisis has strengthened negative perceptions of the EU focusing on its often slow, bureaucratic nature and lack of unity among member states. These developments – together with the unprecedented Brexit process – have questioned the future of the European integration and have made the previous undeniable successes relative.

Regarding the future of regional cooperation, inner coherence is an essential question. An innovation of new regionalism in the 1990s was that countries with different levels of development could join the same regional organisation, but since then negative side effects have become obvious. Regional integrations often produce smaller 'subgroups', a group of member states having similar real or perceived interests and are able to act united to have a word and more influence. These phenomena are often connected to 'multi-speed' integration models.

Typically, smaller and/or poorer countries within the regional bloc form such subgroups in order to prevent/protect against the dominance of regional leaders. Today, Visegrad-4 countries in the EU is a visible and loud example, but there is also a dividedness in Mercosur between Brazil and the smaller economies. In ASEAN, enlargement in the 1990s included less developed countries compared to the original members resulting in serious conflicts, not only in economic but also in political terms. NAFTA had to be renegotiated during the Trump administration because of a deep conflict between developed (US) and developing (Mexico) member of the agreement.

Smaller subgroups within regional organisations might have effective results as they can bring issues unrepresented to the table, might turn attention to inner conflicts and ruptures and altogether might achieve more democratic operation of the given regional cooperation. On the other hand, in practice, these subgroups often represent the disillusionment of poorer or smaller member states as their original objective (to develop and be an equal member of the club) could not be achieved and they perceive their position as subordinate to the 'real' decision makers. Joining a regional cooperation – especially in the case of the European Union – is often

perceived as a chance for smaller countries to close up. If they do not manage to reach the level of development they wanted, frustration might be the result, blaming the given regional cooperation for their relative underdevelopment – and not considering the positive consequences of their membership. These developments might weaken the integration if the subgroups are not able or willing to follow the basic principles of the integration. They might undermine the cooperation by perceiving the given institution as an 'enemy', thus making common thoughts and grounds impossible.

The EU has rather a sophisticated mechanism (the cohesion fund) to limit inherited and/or newly created differences within the integration. But this is also a principle and measure difficult to follow – other regional integrations can hardly introduce similar tools because of lack of resources and the swallow-level of integration. Mercosur attempted to diminish asymmetries by the Fund for Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR (FOCEM) – through an annual contribution of over $100 million dollars, FOCEM funds projects aimed at promoting competitiveness, social cohesion and the reduction of asymmetries among members involved in the process. (Mercosur official site)

The European Union is still a motor regionalism, but it is particularly active in building inter-regional relations to create a net of inter-regional links covering the whole world. These inter-regional forums support stronger and more dynamic cooperation between regional groupings and serve as an essential level of global governance. The EU is an initiator of this process and till today keeps its central position in inter-regionalism.

But it is important to emphasize that the study of regionalism has shifted towards the Pacific region. As the economic importance of China and East Asia is increasing, East Asian regionalism has become an important target of attention. ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are important new forums collecting main actors of world politics and world economy. Probably, in the next decades, these regional and inter-regional forms of cooperation will be strengthened and the East Asian region will be more embedded in the global process of regionalization. It is a question of the future, whether regionalism in Asia will follow the path of Europe in regionalism (probably not) or which could be those norms, values, principles or institutions that could be taken from the experience of the European integration.

South-South cooperation (SSC) will probably be stronger in inter-regional relations of the 21st century, institutionalisation of SSC might develop in the next decades. Forums for regular

cooperation might be established – with the exclusion of developed countries. The role of China and India is essential regarding these future developments, their ideas and attitude towards regionalism and inter-regionalism will determine these new forms of cooperation.

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
Annex

Table 1 Regional integrations in comparison

Region	Population	GDP	GDP/capita
NAFTA	488,899,434	23.4 trillion USD	47,923 USD
Mercosur	295,007,000	3.396 trillion USD	19,569 USD
European Union	512,600,000	19.1 trillion USD	38,370 USD
ASEAN	622,000,000	2.92 trillion USD	4,519 USD
Gulf Cooperation Council	54,000,000	3.464 trillion USD	34,265USD
ECOWAS	349,154,000	0,675 trillion USD	1,985USD

Data collected by the author.

Table 2 Number of existing ROs by region, 1945-2015

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/project/Comparative-Regional-Organizations-Project-CROP/figures

Table 3 Policy Areas of Regional Trade Agreements

Regional Trade Agreements are Becoming More Complex

Regional trade agreements have become deeper, now covering multiple policy areas.

■ More than 20 policy areas ■ Between 10 and 20 policy areas ■ Less than 10 policy areas

Source: World Bank Group · Get the data

Table 4 Areas of competence of ROs (multiple answers possible)

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/project/Comparative-Regional-Organizations-Project-CROP/figures

**Map 1 Organizations grouping almost all the countries in their respective continents**

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_organization#/media/File:Continental_Orgs_Map.png

Map 2 Several smaller regional organizations with non-overlapping memberships

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_organization#/media/File:Regional_Organizations_Map.png

Table 5 Exports of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)

Legend: Rest of the world | Intra-regional Trade [b] | Intra-RTA Trade

[a] Andean Community
[b] Intra-regional trade is calculated as total RTA exports to members of the geographical region (e.g. South America) who are not part of the RTA (e.g. MERCOSUR). The next update, to be released in October 2018, will include 2017 figures.
Note: For composition of regional trade agreements, see Chapter VII.
Source: WTO estimates.

Table 6 RTA'S share in global exports of manufactured goods and in intra-RTA trade

Chart 2.14

RTAs' share in global exports of manufactured goods and in intra-RTA trade,[1] 2016
(Percentage share)

[1] Trade with other members of the RTA.
[2] Andean Community.
Note: For composition of regional trade agreements, see Chapter VII.
Source: WTO estimates.