Pintér, Miklós and Radványi, Anna Ráhel (2019) Upstream responsibility games – the non-tree case. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.
|
PDF
- Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
594kB |
Abstract
In this paper the problem of sharing the cost of emission in supply chains is considered. (Gopalakrishnan et al, 2017) focus on allocation problems that can be described by rooted trees, called cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called upstream responsibility games. This paper generalizes the formal notion of upstream responsibility games to a non-tree model, and provides two (primal and dual) characterizations of the class of these games. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value under both characterizations are also provided. This is a followup paper of Radványi (2018); Pintér and Radványi (2019).
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP |
| Series Number / Identification Number: | 2019/09 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | upstream responsibility games, cost sharing, emission, supply chain, shapley value, axiomatization of the shapley value |
| JEL classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games |
| Subjects: | Economic development |
| References: | |
| ID Code: | 4325 |
| Deposited By: | Veronika Vitéz |
| Deposited On: | 29 Nov 2019 13:40 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Nov 2019 13:40 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page
Download Statistics
Download Statistics