Corvinus
Corvinus

Upstream responsibility games – the non-tree case

Pintér, Miklós and Radványi, Anna Ráhel (2019) Upstream responsibility games – the non-tree case. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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Abstract

In this paper the problem of sharing the cost of emission in supply chains is considered. (Gopalakrishnan et al, 2017) focus on allocation problems that can be described by rooted trees, called cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called upstream responsibility games. This paper generalizes the formal notion of upstream responsibility games to a non-tree model, and provides two (primal and dual) characterizations of the class of these games. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value under both characterizations are also provided. This is a followup paper of Radványi (2018); Pintér and Radványi (2019).

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2019/09
Uncontrolled Keywords:upstream responsibility games, cost sharing, emission, supply chain, shapley value, axiomatization of the shapley value
JEL classification:C71 - Cooperative Games
Subjects:Economic development
ID Code:4325
Deposited By: Veronika Vitéz
Deposited On:29 Nov 2019 13:40
Last Modified:29 Nov 2019 13:40

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