Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?

Tasnádi, Attila and Balogh, Tamás László (2012) Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter? Journal of Economics, 106 (3). pp. 233-249. DOI 10.1007/s00712-011-0252-6

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We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed pricesetting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payo equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves if the most plausible equilibrium is realized in the market. Hence, in this case it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bertrand-Edgeworth, mixed duopoly, timing games
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Funders:Lendület Fiatal Kutatói Program / Momentum Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
ID Code:577
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 13:06
Last Modified:18 Oct 2021 07:56

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