Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

Csóka, Péter, Herings, Jean-Jacques P., Kóczy Á., László and Pintér, Miklós (2011) Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility. European Journal of Operational Research, 209 (1). pp. 57-62. DOI 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004

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We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:NTU games, exact games, convex games, JEL code: C71
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
ID Code:585
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 16:05
Last Modified:30 May 2012 13:50

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