The Limit of the Non-dictatorship Index

Bednay, Dezső and Fleiner, Balázs and Tasnádi, Attila (2020) The Limit of the Non-dictatorship Index. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest.

Preview

PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
329kB

Abstract

In this paper we determine the asymptotic behavior of the Non-dictatorship Index (NDI) introduced in Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasnádi (2019). We show that if m denotes the number of alternatives, then as the number of voters tends to infinity the NDI of any anonymous voting rule tends to (m − 1)/m, which equals the NDI of the constant rule.

Item Type:

Monograph (Working Paper)

Series Name:

Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP

Series Number / Identification Number:

2020/06

Uncontrolled Keywords:

voting rules, dictatorship, non-dictatorship index

JEL classification:

D71 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

Divisions:

Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics

Subjects:

Economics

References:

Arrow, K. (1951), Social choice and individual values, Wiley, New York.

Aleskerov, F. and E. Kurbanov (1999), Degree of Manipulability of Social Choice
Procedures, in: A. Alkan et.al. (eds.), Current Trends in Economics, Springer, Berlin.

Bednay, D., Moskalenko, A. and Tasn´adi, A. (2017), Does avoiding bad voting
rules lead in good ones? Operations Research Letters, 45, 448-451.

Bednay, D., Moskalenko, A. and Tasn´adi, A. (2019), Dictatorship versus manipulability,
Mathematical Social Sciences, 101, 72-76.

Elkind, E., P. Faliszewski and A. Slinko (2015), Distance rationalization of voting
rules, Social Choice and Welfare 45, 345-377.

Farkas, D. and S. Nitzan (1979), The Borda rule and pareto stability: A comment,
Econometrica 47, 1305-1306.

Gibbard, A. (1973), Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica,
41, 587-601.

Kelly, J. (1988), Minimal manipulability and local strategy-proofness, Social Choice
and Welfare, 5, 81-85.

Kelly, J. (1993), Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but few aren’t,
Social Choice and Welfare, 10, 161-175.

Nitzan, S. (1985), The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation
and strategic manipulation, Public Choice, 47, 349-370.

Peleg, B. (1979), A note on manipulability of large voting schemes, Theory and
Decision, 11, 401-412.

Satterthwaite, M. (1975), Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and
correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions, Journal of
Economic Theory, 10, 187-217.

Slinko, A. (2002) On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules. Theory
and Decision 52: 389-398.

ID Code:

6216

Deposited By:

Ádám Hoffmann

Deposited On:

04 Jan 2021 15:29

Last Modified:

28 Apr 2022 10:58

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Download Statistics

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics