Habis, Helga and Herings, Jean-Jacques P. (2011) Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty. Working Paper. Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.
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Abstract
We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | transferable utility games, uncertainty, Weak Sequential Core JEL Codes: C71, C73 |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Economics > Department of Microeconomics |
| Subjects: | Mathematics, Econometrics |
| Funders: | Momemtum Programme (LD-004/2010) |
| References: | |
| ID Code: | 634 |
| Deposited By: | Ádám Hoffmann |
| Deposited On: | 18 May 2012 11:59 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Jun 2012 14:51 |
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