Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty

Habis, Helga and Herings, Jean-Jacques P. (2011) Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 146 (5). pp. 2126-2139. DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.005

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Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053111000895

Abstract

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferableutilitygame with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferableutilitygame. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.

Item Type:

Article

Uncontrolled Keywords:

transferable utility games, uncertainty, Weak Sequential Core JEL Codes: C71, C73

Divisions:

Faculty of Economics > Department of Microeconomics

Subjects:

Mathematics, Econometrics

Funders:

Momemtum Programme (LD-004/2010)

DOI:

10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.005