The Shapley value for shortest path games

Pintér, Miklós and Radványi, Anna (2012) The Shapley value for shortest path games. Working Paper. Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest.

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In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:TU games, Shapley value, shortest path games, axiomatizations of the Shapley value, JEL code: C71
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Funders:János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, OTKA
ID Code:684
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:18 Jun 2012 12:24
Last Modified:18 Oct 2021 07:58

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