Corvinus
Corvinus

How to choose a fair delegation?

Can, Burak ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7262-1728, Csóka, Péter ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1703-5835 and Ergin, Emre (2020) How to choose a fair delegation? Economic Theory . DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01312-x

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01312-x


Abstract

This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek Pareto optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules is characterized by these criteria. The rules do not choose a fixed number of delegates, but instead require different sizes of delegations, depending on the heterogeneity in society. Therefore the resulting delegations are very inclusive, and with t delegates the ratio of individuals whose opinions are not included is always below 0.5. For instance, a delegation of size two should have at least 75% support from the society and therefore only less than 25% of the opinion pool can be neglected.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:aggregation rules, committee selection, conflict management, Kemeny distance, strategy-proofness
JEL classification:C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
D71 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subjects:Economics
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01312-x
ID Code:6910
Deposited By: Veronika Vitéz
Deposited On:05 Oct 2021 12:47
Last Modified:05 Oct 2021 12:47

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