Bednay, Dezső and Fleiner, Balázs and Tasnádi, Attila (2023) Which Social Choice Rule is More Dictatorial? Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest.
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Abstract
Social choice rules (SCRs) aggregate individual preferences to social preferences. By Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem there does not exist a non-dictatorial SCR satisfying three desirable properties. Considering this negative axiomatic result, in this paper we determine distances of SCRs from the dictatorial rules to rank common SCRs. In particular, we apply the Kendall tau, the Spearman rank correlation and the Spearman footrule metrics. We find that from the investigated SCRs the Borda, the Copeland and the Kemény-Young SCRs stand out. Furthermore, we show that anonymous SCRs approach the constant rule when the number of alternatives is fixed and the number of voters tends to infinity.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP |
| Series Number / Identification Number: | 2023/03 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Simulation, Asymptotic behavior, Dictatorship, Kendall tau, Spearman rank correlation, Spearman footrule |
| JEL classification: | D71 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
| Divisions: | Institute of Data Analytics and Information Systems |
| Subjects: | Mathematics, Econometrics |
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| ID Code: | 8100 |
| Deposited By: | Ádám Hoffmann |
| Deposited On: | 27 Mar 2023 14:04 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Mar 2023 14:11 |
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