Tax morale and tax evasion: Social preferences and bounded rationality

Méder Z., Zsombor and Simonovits, András and Vincze, János (2012) Tax morale and tax evasion: Social preferences and bounded rationality. Working Paper. Department of Mathematical Economics and Economic Analysis, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest.

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We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffercurves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Working Papers
Uncontrolled Keywords:tax evasion, tax morale, agent-based simulation, JEL: H26
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematical Economics and Economic Analyses
Subjects:Economic policy
Mathematics, Econometrics
ID Code:910
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:25 Sep 2012 12:07
Last Modified:25 Sep 2012 12:07

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