

# Can NATO Be Considered as an International Regime?

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## Abstract

In the following paper, with the assistance of the international regime theory and hegemonic stability theory, a better understanding of the formation and creation of NATO is provided. The topic is linked to the ongoing debate about its future and to the high tensions currently taking place in Eastern Ukraine. The paper forms the hypothesis that NATO has been created to advocate the interest of the US. Based on qualitative research methodology, the main conclusion is that the current hegemon status of the US is under threat, which is resulting in higher maintenance costs.

**Keywords:** international regime theory, hegemon stability, military interest, NATO

**JEL codes:** F42, F50, F53

## Introduction

Many scholars argue that (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973) military power is not as important anymore as it used to be, and it is getting more expensive and less effective than it was previously. As the devaluation of military power is ongoing, on the other hand, economic power has dominated the field of International Relationships in the last decades. Economic interest plays the most important role in most conflicts, even if it is not that clear. Economic interdependencies are providing new alternatives, opportunities, and directions while using hard power becomes very costly and inefficient. The area of the post-Soviet bloc received special attention during the previous years, as its economic potential was considerably growing and, in parallel, its geopolitical importance was also not neglectable.

The following article analyses the background of security alliances, more specifically the formation and existence of NATO. The main motivation behind it is that, since 2016, an important debate has started about the North-Atlantic military cooperation. With the election of Donald Trump, American-European relations started to decline as the US was demanding a higher contribution from the European states (Mandelbaum, 2017). On the other side, EU countries have also started a discussion about the creation of a common army (Nováková, 2021). The appointment of Ursula von der Leyen as the President of the European Commission, who is a security policy expert, can also have a symbolic meaning that the processes are going this way and that the military-related questions are getting more and more important. The other goal of the paper is to back the assumption that NATO has been formed to advocate US interests in Europe. The currently ongoing Russian-Ukrainian standoff also shows us these signs. Most of the European nations are using a bandwagoning strategy and are not interested in contributing more to the alliance. Their most important goal is economic prosperity and peace on their borders. But based on the level of Russophobia, there is a significant fracture among them that results in further American dominance in the alliance. The main motivation of the article is to find an explanation for these currently ongoing processes with the assistance of international regime theory, hegemonic stability theory and military expenditure analyses.

The paper forms the hypothesis that NATO has been created to advocate the interest of the US on a global scale, and more specifically in Europe. The current hegemon status of the US is under threat, which is resulting in higher maintenance costs for other participants of the alliance as well. However as the EU is only interested in peace and decreasing the level of confrontation with Russia, they are not willing to spend more on the military. For them, the question arises of how to proceed, as they are divided into security questions. Using qualitative research methodology, the research aims to point out how the theoretical approaches of geopolitics and political economy have changed recently towards the existence of NATO. More specifically, the relevance of international regime theory and hegemon stability theory is going to be presented. Then a short quantitative summary will be provided about the change in military spending among the members of the alliance. Eventually, the security concerns and threats are going to be listed as a result of the enlargement policy. The main contribution of the paper is that with the assistance of the above-mentioned theories, a better understanding of the formation and creation of NATO can be reached. On the other hand, the topic is linked to the currently ongoing debate about its future and also to the recent high pressure on Ukraine. Further evaluation of the research topic would be an analysis of the question of the common European army, whether it would be sustainable and if it would serve the common interest of Europe. It would be important to understand how the EU nations can re-activate their efficiency in advocating their interests.

## 1. Literature overview

First of all, the main definition of international regime theory is to be provided. One precise definition is that a regime can be defined as a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and a decision-making mechanism in the particular field of international relations, to which the expectations of the actors are approaching (Kóváriné, 2008). According to Robert Gilpin, a prominent representative of International Political Economics, a distinction can be made between international regimes based on a norm or system of rules or a specific institution. However, this term is often misused in international political economics (Gilpin, 2016).

According to Political Economy theories, regimes can solve the theoretical debate about the prisoner's dilemma. In Keohane's study, it is clearly defined that regimes as institutions can successfully solve this problem in international institutional systems (Keohane, 1984). In his opinion, the most important reason that could lead to such situations is the lack of information. Through the contradictions of the used car market, he presents this problem in his study in a comprehensible way. In Keohane's view, regimes are the fundamental components of the international system and they can promote the effectiveness of the international economy. However, according to the realist approach, these institutions are created by self-interest following states, which are protecting their interests rather than serving the collective interests of the community. Despite that, according to the author, the regime itself begins to live independently after a while, regardless of who originally set it up.

There is a related debate on the topic. Can we have a stable world economic and political system without a hegemon? Based on Ikenberry's and Kupchan's (1990) view, a hegemon is always needed to create order. According to other scholars, it is not the balance of power but hierarchy that creates order (Waltz, 1979). Differentiated economic growth can create dynamic shifts in power. Can the liberal economic order survive with the recent changes happening on the international level? Ikenberry (2011) argues that liberal institutions can survive since they can give some transparency about what is going on exactly. However, it is also important to note, that even these liberal institutions can be influenced. The world is much more complex than creating some new regulations and the big players need to deal with this fact.

What is a related question in balancing power, is whether multipolarity could once return. According to Morgenthau (1985), multipolarity was much more stable, as there were more directions and options and the different power centres could balance each other. In the bipolar world, one always displeased the other country and there was no trust among the players. One always thought the other could not be trusted, which is why every actor was more cautious when it came to difficult decisions. Others say that the unipolar world is the most suitable for our current world (Wohlworth, 2009) and it is even the most stable one as the hegemon power can create its reality due to the lack of significant threat in the system.

There are two key concepts of historical institutionalism also worth mentioning: path dependence and critical junctures. As described by Fioretos (2011, p. 376) „It refers to a process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in time (often a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make alternative institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those that would be more efficient according to a standard expected utility model”. The central idea of the relevant literature is „that once a path is taken, then it can become »locked-in«, as all the relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern” (Thelen, 1999, p. 385).

Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) point out that history is not destiny, and vicious cycles are not unbreakable. Critical junctures offer appropriate opportunities for „breaking the mould” — which may or may not be seized. Critical junctures constitute short breaks in the „normal” historical process during which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period. Critical junctures depend on which one of the opposing forces will succeed, which groups will be able to form effective coalitions, and which leaders will be able to structure events to their advantage.

## 1.1. Theoretical assessment

It is important to note that security and development are related to each other and there are strong connections between them since any kind of societal progress requires reduced insecurity. First of all, there are major economic costs of a conflict. For instance, many people who are fighting in a conflict, many times cannot work productively any longer due to long-term physical and psychological injuries. It could lead to a lack of effective and productive labour, which would result in a lower amount of exports, and that in turn could mean a reduced amount of foreign exchange earnings. This spillover effect can potentially redound higher imports and further constrain the amount of output, which would end in declining employment and growth rates (Stewart, 2004).

On the other hand, conflicts always lead to sectoral shifts in the economy and the industries with higher added value are affected mostly. Even the workforce which is not participating in fights needs to assist in the making of other products, which is also lowering the national income. Most of the time, the overall consumption also falls back, as the population is not willing to purchase non-elemental products. Last, but not least, the share of government expenditure on the military significantly rises in these cases, which takes away most of the resources from further economic development. In a time of peace, that capital could be used for social welfare, education, or for advancing research and development. The role of foreign direct investment shall not even be mentioned, as in the time of a conflict even the working capital flees out of the country.

Concerning the international regime theory, it is worth mentioning that Schimmelfennig focuses on norms and values and provides a synthesis of the rationalist-constructivist debate. It seems that it could be the right interpretation from a European perspective (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002). However, if we assess the enlargement of the EU and NATO from a global and geopolitical perspective, the spread of norms and values to Central and Eastern Europe seems secondary, and the primary reason was simply interest-based, more precisely economic and military interest. The Russian perspective is a very similar one. They see both integrations as international regimes serving directly or indirectly the economic and military interests of the US. The expansion of this cooperation with the post-Soviet bloc appears to be a real threat to Russian security and economic interests. The opportunist approach is the one that explains to us the process in the most efficient way. There was a lack of power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and space has only been fulfilled by Western institutions. In parallel, indeed, the success of a regime may also have a positive effect on the behaviour of self-interest following states, which is why international regimes are necessary and indispensable for the maintenance and stability of international economic order.

The theory of hegemonic stability provides us with a better understanding of the formation and creation of NATO. First of all, we need to state that, in international relations, the behaviour of states is commonly similar, and the pursuit of security is one of the most important determining factors. However, the priorities of each government's security policy are not easy to adapt to the frequent changes in international political relations (Valki, 1999). It is also difficult to align the theoretical issues of security policies with real events. There are also different views regarding the regime theory, for instance, Walker (1993, p. 82) says: „*Security is the responsibility of the Ministry of Uncertain Affairs*”. According to Ken Booth (2007, p. 14), „... *security is what we make of it*”. By Barry Buzen et al. (1998, p. 96) „*security is the possibility of survival among all the threats to human life*”. Based on Egon Bahr's concept, „*security in the past is absolute, in the present relative, in the future unpredictable*” (Bahr, 1998, p. 93). According to Waltz's (1979) suggestion, we can talk about security on three levels: the individual level, the state level, and the international system level. In this paper, the last concept is going to be used to understand the creation and transformation of NATO.

The role of path dependency is also playing an important role in the existence of NATO. Authority established by the „founding” political institutions tends to reproduce itself. Hence, any policy change is impeded or thwarted by the distributional status quo. The functional explanation highlights the „sunk costs”, which render any change difficult. As explained by Thelen (1999, p. 392), „*once a set of institutions is in place, actors adapt their strategies in ways that reflect but also reinforce the »logic« of the system*”. Levi argues that a tree is a better metaphor than a path and explains that although „*from the same trunk, there are many different branches ... the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow*” (Levi, 1997 p. 127). Once the set of rules has been laid down, the participants tend to follow them. Based on Levi's arguments, it can even be accepted

that the European states were following a free rider policy, as they got used to it during the bipolar world. There are plenty of examples from the last 70 years when they were acting according to the American interest (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yom-Kippur war, Arab Spring, etc.). There were critical junctures as well, when the change of rules could have resulted in a different kind of cooperation, and such a juncture was the above-mentioned period of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The new administration of Joe Biden brings another critical juncture from a European perspective. Based on the declining power of the US, if the European states would act and take responsibility, then setting up new protocols could result in a reformed regime that could balance the hegemon status of the American interest.

In the debate surrounding the theory of international regimes and institutions, in my view, the truth can be found somewhere in the middle. I reckon that Keohane states the international political order well, and indeed, a new international regime or organization will be created only if it is in the interest of a hegemonic state and will be maintained until it is in the interest of the creator(s) (for example Bretton Woods). However, I can also agree with Strange's (1982) view that the whole regime theory has been designed to legitimize US interest primarily in international trade, and also in security policy. Other scholars agree with this statement, for instance, Grieco (1999). According to him, the EU is functioning in the way it is, because of US interest (and of course German). On the other hand, ASEAN is not functioning as an international regime because there was a lack of American interest in that region.

If we turn back to our starting point, we can say that Keohane's and Gilpin's (2004) conception seems to be correct, as it has been proved that a current hegemonic power creates the regime with its own rules and norms and maintains it until its interest is met. With the failure of the bipolar system, NATO was supposed to be eliminated, as the biggest threat has also been eliminated. It would have been possible to establish deep and comprehensive security cooperation among the actors, which would have served the interest of European peace and would have tackled the process towards a united Europe. But NATO has been maintained and its border has been constantly approaching Russia. It is a natural reaction that this process appeared as a threat to the Russians, and instead of seeking to establish a common European security and defence policy, they have sought allies in the other direction, so another international regime, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could be established.

## **2. Military spendings overview**

During the last 8 years, there were significant changes in the narratives towards NATO from both the EU and US sides. From the European perspective, the question of forming a common army has been discussed, but so far, no real actions have been taken towards it. Nevertheless, the personality change of the new president of the EU's Commission can symbolize the higher intentions on this topic. In parallel, since 2016 with Donald Trump's rise to presidency, the American commitment

towards NATO has also been challenged (Kaufman, 2017). He started to criticize the existence of the structure, and especially the European states due to their lack of contribution. But this narrative from the Americans was already in place before, for example, the request for spending 2% of the GDP for each member has already been presented in Wales in 2014 (Lasconjarias, 2014).

The hegemon power of the US seems to be declining, but in parallel, their military engagement is mostly unchanged. Despite the fact that they still account approximately for 70% of the total budget of NATO (Mattelaer, 2016), it is clear that the European members are spending more and more on security. In the table below, the most interesting column is the real change in total military expenditure in the period of 2014-2020 for each member state (Appendix 1). There was an increase in every country, but it was the lowest in the US. In some cases, the proportion was extremely high, for example in Latvia, Lithuania or Slovakia, where the spending increased by more than double. It is worth mentioning that by 2021, each member could increase the military spending above 1% of their GDP, but still only one-third of the countries are willing to spend more than 2%. The high rises represent the previous free rider position of many participants of the cooperation. The American claim for spending more turned out to be right, and if the European states are looking forward to maintaining the military alliance with the US, they need to take more responsibility and act accordingly.

Forming a common European army would strengthen this process, not even mention the interest advocating ability of the European nations in the alliance. Nevertheless, in the current status quo, the quantitative measures nicely represent the theoretical assessment of NATO as an international regime. The US is still spending the most on it and is using its existence for foreign policy making and advocacy (Shifrinson, 2020), which is one of the main reasons why they are still maintaining it. It is important to note, that a regime is changed when there are new players on the political stage, and they accept new rules of the game. Whenever there is a change of the players, without a change of the rules, there is no ground to argue that a regime has changed. The fact that rules have to be changed, whether developed or imposed, means that they need to be accepted and followed. In the case of NATO, if the role of the European states will be higher and stronger in the long term, then new rules can also be introduced, which can result in significant changes in the alliance.

### **3. Major concerns towards the existence of the cooperation**

NATO was created by politicians who had experienced the horrors of World War II and decided to create a system that would exclude further war threats among European nations. On the other hand, it has been established to provide effective and sustainable protective actions against any external threat (Matus, 2005). If we consider the special situation in post-war Europe, it can be stated that a real solution could only come from the United States. As a result of that, in 1947, the

triple goal of American foreign policy was formulated: the principle of stopping the Soviet Union's expansion, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan (Hanhimäki, 2004). At that time, it was clear that the Soviet leadership would not give up an inch of its bitterly acquired position, so confrontation between the two sides would soon arise. It could not have been otherwise, so the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established on April 4, 1949, by 10 Western European countries, the United States and Canada (Lindley-French, 2015).

The question about the dissolution of NATO started in the 1990s when the Soviet troops started to leave Central Europe behind. The idea was to create a post-Cold War security architecture for Europe that would establish partner relations with the post-Socialist countries including Russia. NATO's original purpose was to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but as none of these institutions existed anymore, a new path had to be laid down. During the German unification negotiations, the Soviet and Western leaders made several proposals. Eventually, the Gorbachev-led delegation was convinced by US Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dieter Genscher that Germany's place is in NATO, but in exchange, they received assurances that the eastern border of the cooperation would not shift „*one inch eastward from its position*” (Oberdofer, 1998, p. 392). Nevertheless, these proposals or agreements have never been documented nor signed by the actors and therefore cannot be referenced, but at least nobody denies the fact that they took place.

It is also worth mentioning, that in July 1990 at the London Summit of the Alliance, it was stated that NATO had no intention of dissolving itself even if Soviet troops would leave the Central European area (NATO London Summit Declaration, 1990). It was both the interest of the US and Western Europe to have an American military presence in Europe at that time. In parallel, Russia's interest and suggestion was to involve the predecessor of the Soviet Union in the European Security System. They were also not against NATO membership for Russia. Eventually, things evolved in a different way. Despite the fact that Yeltsin, Kozyrev and Primakov repeatedly shared their concerns about further NATO enlargement, Central European countries, namely Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, became members in 1999.

During the '90s, due to Russian concerns, NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace programme, in which every Post-Socialist and Post-Soviet country has been involved. It also meant that full membership for Russia was not discarded at this time. The common Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council has also been established in 1997, which also promised further assurances for Russia. It seemed that the first wave of new members was acceptable to the Russians, but they claimed already at that time that further enlargement would cross the red line (Burns, 1999). Then, as a result of the NATO bombing in Yugoslavia without a UN mandate, which was a non-defensive operation on external territories, Russians became more hostile. That was the breaking point when the level of trust started to decrease again. Later, during the Bush administration, arms control could not be reached between Russia and the US, and in parallel, nuclear defence systems were installed in Poland and the Czech Republic (Hildreth & Ek, 2017).



Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that each of the newly joint countries benefitted from NATO membership. It has helped them integrate into the West, reduced the risk of interstate conflict among them (for example Romania and Hungary), enabled them to spend less on military while modernizing the defence forces, and last, but not least, it has also brought confidence and stability to the Baltic states (Le Jeune, 2010). As the EU expressed its commitment to deepening in 1992 in the Maastricht treaty, the responsibility for integrating and stabilizing the post-Socialist area was up to NATO. Now in 2022, it can be stated that it was a successful process, but at that time, there were major concerns about it. Influential foreign policy experts have warned the Clinton administration that it could lead to the split of Europe and another cold war with Russia (Kennen, 1997; Kupchan 1995; Waltz, 1998). They claimed that NATO expansion would decrease security and unsettle European stability. 22 years after the first wave of the enlargement, it can be stated that these claims were too cautious, and the integration of Central Europe and the Baltic states has not resulted in additional threats from Russia. However, the case of Georgia and Ukraine is already showing us another picture.

2008 was another critical juncture in the NATO-Russia relations. First of all, after Kosovo claimed its independence, most of the European states hurried to acknowledge it, which was another sign to Russia that their interest and influence were not considered in the security of Europe (Radeljic, 2017). Then in April at the Bucharest Summit of NATO, the Bush administration was pressing the members to offer a Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine. France and Germany opposed it, but eventually, they accepted a declaration that proposed future membership for these countries (NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008). Obviously, for Russia, this meant crossing the red line, and they immediately started intensified troop mobilization on the border of Georgia. President Saakashvili took the bait and attacked Russian troops in South Ossetia. It resulted in a decisive defeat for Georgia, and most probably also ended their hope to re-integrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the foreseeable future (Walker, 2015). During the process, it became clear that the American interest was to bring the NATO borders as close to Russia as it is possible, while Europe's interest was peace in its neighbouring territories. France and Germany were opposing the American suggestion and they turned out to be correct. The UK's interest is also a bit different, as they are not part of continental Europe. The first signs of a standoff among the members have shown, which was foreseen by the above-mentioned foreign policy experts.

Then there is the case of Ukraine. The country has been suffering from its own frozen conflict since the 2015 ceasefire (Tankovsky, 2020). After the regime change in Kyiv, an armed uprising broke out in the Eastern part of Ukraine. There were massive fights between the government forces and the rebels who were backed by Russian irregular units. The process of power change resulted in a very similar situation which was noted in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to international law (Goldgeier, 2010), the central governments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia do not have the right to join any military coopera-

tion (such as NATO) until they reach their total territorial integrity, therefore, the current status quo is very much in favour of the Russian government. As during negotiations Russia could not reach an agreement with its Western partners, they decided to introduce frozen conflicts to prevent the accession of these territories to NATO (Grossman, 2018).

It is clear that there is a major difference in the concept of Russia and NATO. Russia represents a geopolitical approach and the West stays liberal-minded. For Russia, the most important values are national sovereignty, security of the homeland and relative power calculations. On the other hand, the West promotes liberal political reform, the respect of human rights and the importance of free markets. Russia claims that the enlargement is highly destabilizing their security, which was also the reason they decided to „act” in the case of Crimea. The West refers to the 1975 Helsinki Charter, which suggests the right of a country to choose its own alliance (Wolff, 2015). Geopolitics suggests the use of buffer zones between two centres of power, which play a very important role in international affairs (Berryman, 2012). By bringing the eastern border of NATO closer to Russia, these buffer zones are almost non-existent anymore, not in the Baltics, not in Belarus and lately, not even in Ukraine, as more and more NATO arms are being installed in the country. Many argue that NATO enlargement indeed needs to stop, and it has to be documented in order to decrease tensions between Russia and the West (Marten, 2020). At the beginning of 2022, massive troop mobilization started on the Russian-Ukrainian border, which is showing us a similar case as it was in Georgia in 2008. The American and European interests are showing different directions. Poland, the Baltic States and the UK are ready to support Ukraine with defensive arms, but all the other member states are against any military support and suggest only humanitarian aid (Quinn, 2022). In the history of NATO, most of the time, the American interest was dominating, which represents their hegemon status. Recently, this started to change, and some European nations are ready to oppose them. The enlargement process of Central Europe and the Baltic States was tolerated by the Russians, and most probably, this will be the case with the Balkans as well. But Georgia and Ukraine are other cases. They represent the „near-abroad” for Russia and the area of their influence. As it seems, Russians are not willing to change their mentality and approach, therefore, the Western countries shall take a more geopolitical approach and re-think their concept regarding European peace. Western European states are not interested in intensifying the tensions with Russia; therefore, the hegemon status of the US is being challenged as a result of the Ukrainian and Georgian case.

## Conclusion

At the beginning of the study, the main theories have been described which can be linked to the existence of NATO. First of all, the theory of international regimes has been presented, then the hegemon stability theory, path dependence, and critical junctures were also mentioned. After that, the assessment of these theories has been provided and linked to the topic, which resulted in a better understanding of the formation and creation of NATO. Based on these results, it can be concluded that NATO indeed can be considered as an international regime and its acts can be further evaluated based on the interest of the hegemon.

After a while, the regime itself reached a status of path dependence, which defined the workaround among the members. Critical junctures have been met, but the real character of the alliance, which is the main defining factor, could not be reformed. Therefore, the cooperation itself can be considered stagnant and stiff, which status can lead to fractures in the long run, especially if the emerging problems are not analysed and solved. The overview of the military expenditures supported the main hypothesis regarding the hegemon status of the US. There was no significant change in their dominant status, the Americans still account for 70% of the total budget and used the alliance for interest advocacy. Nevertheless, the European nations are starting to spend more and more, during the last 7 years, every member state has increased its proportion of spending, especially those who were falling behind. In the meantime, a significant standoff has started among the members regarding the further enlargement of the cooperation. The idea of creating a common European Army is also on the table, but it seems like a utopia based on the current political structure. Their free-rider behaviour will need to come to an end, especially if they want to influence further directions of enlargement. They need to contribute more to the existence of the alliance, as it can strengthen the core relations among the members and out-balance the currently existing Angle-Saxon hegemony.

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## Appendix

Appendix 1: Defense expenditure real change 2014-2021 in million US dollars (Constant 2015 prices and exchange rates)

	2014	2021e	Real change 2014-2021e (%)	Share of real GDP 2014 (%)	Share of real GDP 2021e (%)
Albania	150	188	25.6	1.35	1.44
Belgium	4 400	5 404	22.8	0.97	1.12
Bulgaria	640	901	40.8	1.31	1.56
Canada	15 562	23 576	51.5	1.01	1.39
Croatia	892	1 512	69.5	1.85	2.79
Czech Republic	1 686	2 958	75.7	0.95	1.42
Denmark	3 399	4 758	40.0	1.15	1.41
Estonia	432	624	44.4	1.92	2.28
France	43 931	50 971	16.0	1.82	2.01
Germany	39 222	53 736	36.8	1.19	1.53
Greece	4 355	7 417	70.2	2.20	3.82
Hungary	1 032	2 333	125.3	0.86	1.60
Italy	20 786	25 595	23.1	1.14	1.41
Latvia	245	691	181.8	0.93	2.27
Lithuania	357	1 003	180.8	0.88	2.03
Luxembourg	212	380	79.6	0.38	0.57
Montenegro	59	76	28.3	1.50	1.74
Netherlands	8 649	12 027	39.0	1.15	1.45
North Macedonia	105	177	67.6	1.09	1.61
Norway	5 862	7 715	31.6	1.55	1.85
Poland	8 521	12 047	41.2	1.85	2.10
Portugal	2 562	3 272	27.7	1.31	1.54
Romania	2 309	4 432	90.7	1.35	2.02
Slovak Republic	832	1 700	104.2	0.99	1.73
Slovenia	411	629	53.0	0.97	1.28
Spain	10 607	12 749	20.2	0.92	1.02
Turkey	11 784	16 851	43.0	1.45	1.57
United Kingdom	61 316	69 082	12.6	2.14	2.29
United States	660 062	725 709	9.9	3.73	3.52

Source: Edited by the author based on NATO (2022)