

The Populist Discourse of the Hungarian Prime Minister: The Case Study of Gyöngyöspata and Migration Crisis¹

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Abstract: *The study aims to analyse if the Hungarian prime minister attempted to portray an 'other' image of the Roma ethnic minority group during the segregated primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata. Moreover, the study will explore the Hungarian prime minister's discourse on the migration crisis to understand if Viktor Orbán adopted the same communication strategy as in the Gyöngyöspata conflict. Comparing the two cases will allow us to identify the key similarities and differences in the discourse adopted by the Hungarian prime minister in different events. This research uses the qualitative content analysis methodology to examine the collected data. Besides this, the study concludes that Viktor Orbán attempted to portray an 'other' image of the Roma ethnic minority group during the Gyöngyöspata conflict. This study aims to fill a gap in the literature by analysing the Hungarian prime minister's discourse on the Gyöngyöspata conflict and comparing his discourse on both cases.*

Key words: *populism; discourse; Hungary; Gyöngyöspata; migration crisis.*

I. Introduction

Recently, the European political sphere began to transform for several reasons, including the euro and European migration crises. These changes led to the rise of populist political parties and politicians. However, Mudde (2016) claims that the recent rise of populism in Europe is part of a bigger narrative

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that can be traced back to the post-industrial revolution, which resulted in significant changes in European society in the 1960s. According to Kriesi and Pappas (2015), the economic crisis (the so-called Great Recession) impacted populist movements. Indeed, other scholars argue that the economic crises make populist parties more noticeable and successful (Hernández – Kriesi 2016; Moffitt 2016). Another argument is that political dissatisfaction toward representative institutions intensifies due to the economic crisis, and this factor is strongly linked to populism (Caiani – Graziano 2019). At the same time, economic crises and cultural crises should be considered crucial elements. Ronald and Norris (2016), in their study, suggest that the emergence and rise of populist political parties is a response to a broad range of cultural changes that appear to be weakening Western cultures' fundamental values and traditions. This explanation refers to the issue of migration. It is important to note that anti-immigrant sentiment is linked to support for radical right populists (Norris 2005). This means that radical right populist parties tend to support anti-immigration policies.

The last two crises in the European Union (EU) have played a critical part in the growth of populist movements in Europe. The recent election results showed us that there is a rise in populist parties and politicians in the EU member states. For example, Alternative for Germany in Germany, True Finns in Finland, League or Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Marine Le Pen in France have all gained popularity. At the same time, the populist parties and politicians became decisive in politics among Eastern European countries. For example, the current government of Hungary was labelled populist by many political scientists and scholars. In the last years of his governance, the current prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, tends to use more populist discourse. Kalyvas (2005) argues that after the 2010 election victory, Orbán's government took the first steps to work on a new constitution, fitting into the populist ideology. Mudde (2016), in his work, notes that the situation in Hungary is exceptional because Viktor Orbán's success has inspired other populist right-wing politicians such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland or Marine Le Pen in France.

Moreover, the example of Hungary shows that populism is not only a campaign method or a style of political mobilisation that politicians abandon once they gain political power (*ibid.*). It is important to emphasise that the head of the current government Viktor Orbán has been in office since 2010 (Hutt 2022). In power for a long time, he has managed to impose influence and control over almost every sphere of Hungarian society. As a result, this long-lasting control has impacted some groups positively but others negatively.

Mudde (2004: 544) observed that populism is only a 'thin-centred ideology, exhibiting a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts'. The core concept of populism is the people. A defining feature of populism is the centrality of people (Rooduijn 2014). Populists claim that people should

have an essential role in politics, and their position is at the centre of politics (Kazin 1995; Taggart 2000). On the other hand, it is a tendency of populism to characterise an 'other' (Sahin et al. 2021). Populist movements identify a pure 'people' and an 'other' who is not included in the concept of the people. Also, 'populist movements use the other and the actions of the other in their articulation of existential threats against the people' (ibid: 4). People from different races, ethnic or cultural backgrounds can be labelled as 'other' by populist political leaders. According to Muller (2016), populist movements intentionally present a scenario as an existential threat to legitimise their form of governance. As a result, populist political leaders or movements, in their portrayal of existential threats against the people, use the concept of the 'other' and their actions. Foucault (1980) argues that these movements usually push a certain interpretation of threat, and it helps them to understand and identify who is a 'friend' and a 'foe'. Due to its highly nationalist, chauvinist and xenophobic character, minority groups are particularly vulnerable to extremism and populism (Tabajdi 2008: 94). According to the findings of the Vidra and Fox (2014) study, several political and social factors have contributed to the growing trend of intolerant public discourse in Hungary towards the Roma ethnic minority group, which has extended to practically all political parties.

In our research, we will investigate if the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán attempted to portray an 'other' image of the Roma ethnic minority group during the segregated primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata. The conflict in Gyöngyöspata appeared in the public media when it was found that children belonging to the Roma ethnic minority group are segregated in primary school (Brassoi 2020). The current literature on populism in the case of Hungary mainly focuses on researching anti-migrant and anti-elite populist topics. The literature lacks research that analyses the case of a segregated school in Gyöngyöspata and the discourse of the Hungarian Prime Minister on the conflict.

The theoretical framework of the research will study populism and how populist parties, or leaders, are associated with creating dangerous 'other' concepts. Following that, an example will be given from the migration crisis. The focus is to analyse the discourse of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and whether he created an environment in which newcomers were identified as 'others'. Understanding the migration crisis will help us assess if Viktor Orbán adopted the same discourse strategy and the main similarities between the discourse used in the Gyöngyöspata case.

The questions we posed in this research are:

1. What kind of environment for the Roma ethnic minority group did Hungary's Prime Minister create during the segregated primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata?
2. What kind of environment for newcomers did Hungary's Prime Minister create during the migration crisis?

The qualitative content analysis methodology will be used to answer the research questions. This research methodology will help us better understand the content of the selected materials for analysis and accomplish our research objectives.

II. Populism and the Dangerous 'Other' Concept

The rise of the popularity of populist political parties and politicians in the European political sphere facilitated research on populism in academia. More recently, populist parties successfully managed to move from the political margins to the centre (Berman 2019). Despite this, there is no commonly accepted definition, and scholars debate classifications, labels and boundaries between its many different aspects (Mudde 2004). Because of the long-running debate regarding the essence of populism, some scholars claim that populism cannot be a relevant concept in the social sciences (Mudde – Kaltwasser 2017). On the other hand, other group scholars see it mainly as a normative term in media and politics (ibid.). As a result of the above-mentioned reasons, populism is one of the most common political buzzwords used to describe a wide range of political parties and politicians and still refers to distinct phenomena in different situations. In their work, Mudde and Kaltwasser state that the term populism referred to left-wing presidents in Latin America, right-wing challenger parties in Europe and both left-wing and right-wing presidential candidates in the United States (ibid: 1).

At the same time, three different groups of literature characterise different types of political actors as populists. First, American literature like the People's Party of the nineteenth century, Ross Perot's Progress Party and, more recently, the Tea Party, are described as populist. However, Latin American literature studies authoritarian regimes and portrays their leaders as populists – for example, Peron in Argentina, Chavez in Venezuela and Morales in Bolivia. Third, Western European literature defines political parties such as Le Pen's National Front in France, Berlusconi's Forza Italia in Italy and Haider's Austrian Freedom Party as populist (Rooduijn 2014).

It is essential to mention that how each group of literature classifies political parties or political actors is usually in line with a contextual meaning of populism in each body of literature. That is why populist parties such as National Front in France will not be seen as populist in American literature. In his study, Matthijs Rooduijn argues and demonstrates four common characteristics of populism which exist in all literature. It is an important finding because it indicates that despite the differences in the contextual meaning of populism within each literature group, there are standard features. This can help us clarify the complication, such as no commonly accepted definition, or debates about the essence of populism. Also, we need to select the most suitable and explana-

tive definition of populism. According to Matthijs Rooduijn, four common characteristics are: '(1) populists emphasise the central position of the people; (2) they criticise the elite; (3) they conceive of the people as a homogeneous entity; and (4) they proclaim that there is a serious crisis' (ibid: 573).

Furthermore, populism has been conceptualised from a theoretical viewpoint as: '(1) a political discourse characterised by the unethical manipulation and instrumentalisation of widespread public feelings of concern and dissatisfaction' (Betz 1994: 4). Also, populist parties and leaders question the legitimacy of the existing political establishment and appeal to the power of the people (Abts – Rummens 2007: 407). Moreover, populism has also been defined as (2) an ideology which considers 'society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte generale* of the people' (Mudde 2004: 543). In addition, populism has been outlined (3) as a type of organisation characterised by a charismatic and robust personalistic leader (Taggart 2000). Because of the centralised aspect of the populist organisation, the leader plays an important role.

On the other hand, Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: 4) define populism as follows: 'an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous others who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice'. It is important to note that this study adopts Albertazzi and McDonnell's definition of populism. The main reason is that the current trends of populism, especially in Europe, contain not only anti-elite or anti-establishment but also dangerous 'others'.

Recent examples demonstrate that populist political actors or parties target elites and particular groups who are eventually labelled as 'other' depending on the situation. During the migration crisis, we witnessed a new wave of populism in Europe. In some countries like Hungary, the populist government strengthened its position using the migration crisis. However, Alternative for Germany in Germany, Marine Le Pen in France and Party for Freedom in the Netherlands managed to exceed expectations primarily because of the migration crisis. Most populist parties in Europe used the migration crisis as a political tactic, and asylum seekers and migrants were an easy scapegoat for them to portray 'others' as dangerous. They presented them as the enemy of the European culture or as newcomers attempting to deprive them of their religion, culture and jobs.

Populism can be observed on both sides of the political spectrum. The difference between left and right is included in the inclusionary-exclusionary differentiation (Caiani – Graziano 2019). Left-wing parties are associated with inclusionary populism, whereas right-wing parties are associated with exclusionary populism (March 2011). Left-wing populism had been regarded as a Latin American phenomenon until recently, but lately it has also been seen

in European states. For example, Podemos in Spain and France Insoumise in France. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013: 158) note that most Latin American literature discusses populism's capacity to be inclusive, while the exclusivity of populism is underlined in all European literature. Inclusionary populism predominantly focuses on the socioeconomic dimension of society, but exclusionary has a dominant sociocultural characteristic. Latin literature and politics are driven by inclusionary populism can be partially explained by the region's lack of socioeconomic development compared to Europe. On the other hand, Europe has advanced to the point where post-material politics are nearly as crucial as socioeconomic politics. In this context, the emergence of the populist radical right is a modern phenomenon (ibid.).

Caiani and Graziano studied (2019) the exclusionary and inclusionary populist parties in 30 European countries (all European Union countries, including the United Kingdom, and adding Norway and Switzerland). Their research shows that before 1994 only one inclusionary populist party existed compared to 22 exclusionary populist parties. From 1995 to 2008, there were three inclusionary populist parties and 26 exclusionary populist parties. However, from 2008 to 2017, the number of inclusionary populist parties increased to six, while seven exclusionary populist parties were documented. This data proves that, as mentioned above, the European political sphere started to change after the euro crisis, and it is not surprising that from 2008 to 2017 the number of populist parties more focused on the socioeconomic side of politics increased.

Furthermore, the migration crisis led to the gain of popularity among exclusionary populist parties associated with creating a dangerous 'other' from migrants. Hungary can be an example where the populist Prime Minister exploited the crisis to create an environment where newcomers were classified as dangerous 'others'. The Hungarian government has had a strict political stance on migration since the beginning of the crisis. They used the crisis as a political tool to implement their policies and consolidate their political power. In his communications, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has exploited the concept of multiculturalism and migration as a threat to European identity (Szalai – Góbl 2015). He usually adopted the political communication style of presenting Muslim migrants as invaders in his discourse (Staudenmaier 2018). He portrayed himself as a saviour of Hungary and Christian culture (Browne 2018).

III. The Current Situation of the Roma Ethnic Minority in Hungary

The Roma ethnic minority group is ethnically, linguistically and culturally diverse with a long and rich history. The Roma is one of Europe's most marginalised, socially unaccepted and morally condemned ethnic minority groups, particularly in East-Central European countries (Ladanyi 2001). On an interpersonal, institutional and national level, Roma people are presented as lazy beg-

gars, criminals and profiteers in most countries where they constitute a sizeable ethnic minority group (van Baar 2011). According to several empirical studies, anti-Roma prejudices concentrate on crime, laziness and getting undeserved state benefits (Kende et al. 2017; Villano et al. 2017). This is one of the reasons they are subject to discrimination and violence, as well as marginalisation and social isolation. It is also important to note that the Roma are Europe's largest ethnic minority.

According to the 2011 census, 315,583 people from the Roma ethnic minority group were recorded by Hungarian authorities (Minority Rights Group International 2018). However, unofficial numbers vary between 250,000 and 800,000 Roma people living in Hungary (ibid.). Most of the Roma community members in Hungary have assimilated and speak the Hungarian language. There are at least three main, distinct linguistic groups within the Roma population in Hungary: 'the first group is Hungarian Roma (magyar cigányok), who speaks Hungarian and identify themselves as Hungarian or Musician Roma. The second group is Vlach Roma (oláh cigányok), who speak two languages, Hungarian and Romani (Lovari and Kalderash dialects), and who identify themselves as Roma or Rom. And the last one is the Beás people (beások), who speak two languages, Hungarian and Beás, and who identify themselves as Beás' (Kemény – Janky 2005: 100).

Following the fall of communism, Hungary took the lead in advocating minority rights and bringing the Roma to the EU institutions' agenda (Rostas – Kovacs 2021). In 2011, the Fidesz government adopted Decree 1136, which defined a plan that would last through 2020 and address the issues such as promoting social inclusion of excluded groups like the Roma (Magyar Közlöny 2011: 10935). The adopted programme focused on excluding regional disadvantages and improving social conditions in four main areas: education, employment, housing and health (ibid.). Even after the government's latest actions to promote the effective integration of Roma people into Hungarian society, problems remain (Rostas – Kovacs 2021).

According to a 2017 survey by the Pew Research Center (2017), in Hungary 54% of respondents stated that they are not willing to accept Roma as members of their family, 44% said they would not want them as a neighbour while 27% would not want them as citizens of Hungary. Furthermore, based on the results of another survey conducted by the same research institute in 2019, 61% of Hungarians say they have unfavourable views on the Roma (Pew Research Center 2019).

Additionally, most of the Roma in Hungary are considered to be at a high risk of poverty due to a lack of proper education and a high rate of unemployment (Rostas – Kovacs 2021). According to research published between 2006 and 2012, approximately 10% of non-Roma students and nearly 50% of Roma students failed to complete their education by the summer of 2012. Also, 75% of non-Roma students get bachelor's degrees, whereas Roma students have

a bachelor's degree rate of 24%. Only 5% of Roma young people start college or university studies, compared to 35% of non-Roma young people (European Commission – Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers 2019). Moreover, in 2015, 16% of Roma between 15 and 64 years of age did not graduate from primary school, and 63% did not attend high school, or have a technical or tertiary education (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2016).

On the other hand, there are severe concerns in Hungary about school segregation of Roma children in schools. Research conducted by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences published in 2018 concluded that school segregation in Hungary increased by almost 10% between 2008 and 2016 (United States Department of State 2020). The Sixth Periodic Report of the UN Human Rights Committee voiced concern that based on the 'public Education Act of 2012, segregation remains prevalent in schools, especially church and private schools, and the number of Roma children placed in schools for children with mild disabilities remains disproportionately high' (United Nations 2018).

As the numbers demonstrate, attitudes toward the Roma ethnic minority group are still quite unfavourable. At the same time, Roma people continue to face problems regarding employment, health, school enrolment and segregation.

IV. The Case Study of Primary School in Gyöngyöspata

Gyöngyöspata originally made headlines in 2011 when a far-right paramilitary organisation, Véder, picked the village as the location for their training camp in response to a reported rise in crimes committed by Roma people. Within a short period, another paramilitary group began marching through the town. The main objective of these organisations was to restore public order in town. Gyöngyöspata became a symbol of anti-Roma movements due to these activities by far-right organisations (Hungary Today 2020).

In the same year, Ernő Kállai, the former Minority Ombudsman published a report on the incidents that happened in Gyöngyöspata. According to the report, the Roma kids of Gyöngyöspata Néksei Demeter Primary School were physically separated. It was said that the 'Minority Ombudsman has conducted investigations not only on the issue of patrols and paramilitary marches, which got great press attention, but also on the segregation of Roma pupils in school and the segregation in the field of housing, neither of which can be separated from the events that have occurred in spring 2011 in Gyöngyöspata' (Kállai 2011). The Chance For Children Foundation (CFCF) (2012) filed a lawsuit based on the report. The CFCF claimed that 'Roma children in the primary school are taught separately from non-Roma children, their classrooms are located on different floors. CFCF also claimed that Roma children are unlawfully excluded from swimming classes, which is compulsory for all non-Roma children and receive a lower education level than non-Roma students.'

On 6 December 2012, the Eger Regional Court ruled in favour of CFCF, concluding that the municipality and the school separated Roma students into Roma-only classes and provided them with a substandard education (*ibid.*). After the first victory, the CFCF filed another lawsuit claiming damages. In their final judgment, the Debrecen Court of Appeals ruled that the school must pay 100 million Hungarian forints as compensation to the children because of the violation to their rights (Hungary Today 2020).

V. Methodology

The material collected for the analyses comprises interviews given by Prime Minister Orbán to local and international media. The author selected the materials from the personal website of the Hungarian Prime Minister. Furthermore, thanks to the availability of the English language records by the other EU prime ministers or presidents, this research can open the way to comparative studies. The main advantage of using the official website as a source of the material collection is that there is a high level of accuracy in the translation process from Hungarian to English.

The data collection for the research was divided into several steps. To answer RQ 1, all the available materials from the official website of the Hungarian Prime Minister which talked about the Gyöngyöspata case were collected for analysis. In the six interviews, Hungary's Prime Minister discussed the segregated primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata from January 2020 to May 2020. In the case of RQ 2, twelve interviews with Hungary's Prime Minister were collected in 2015, in which he discussed the migration issue. The main reason to focus on 2015 is that Hungary, along with other EU member states, witnessed the migration crisis's peak during that year. At the same time, it was the leading subject in the discourse of the Hungarian Prime Minister. According to Eurostat (2022), the responsible Hungarian authorities received 177,135 applications for asylum in 2015. However, in 2014 the number of asylum applicants was 42,775 and 29,430 in 2016 (*ibid.*).

As mentioned earlier, qualitative content analysis was performed to analyse the interviews. According to Krippendorff (2003: 18), 'content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.' Content analysis is also considered an effective tool for document analysis. Furthermore, this research methodology helps to understand the data better and enables the researcher to evaluate theoretical hypotheses (Elo – Kyngäs 2008).

On the other hand, one of the main limitations of qualitative content analysis is that it is less standardised and formulaic compared to quantitative analysis (Polit – Beck 2004). Also, Elo and Kyngäs (2008) mention that there is no right way to do qualitative content analysis. In this study, the coding frame structure

combines a concept-driven (a deductive approach) and a data-driven strategy (an inductive approach). After building the coding frame (main categories and subcategories), the material was divided into coding units, and the coding frame was checked by double-coding. This process helps us evaluate the coding frame in terms of coding consistency and validity. After this pilot study, the main categories and subcategories were identified, and the material was coded with a revised version of the coding frame. The five main categories were identified: 1) Portrayal of blame, 2) Elements of exclusionary, 3) Focus on negativity, 4) Support and 5) Integration Perspective. The main categories and category descriptions are summarised in Table 1.

VI. Results

Migration Crisis

With the beginning of the migration crisis at the end of 2014, we witnessed the polarisation of European politics. One group of politics were in favour of accepting newcomers to the territory of the EU as a humanitarian gesture, but another group was totally against it, seeing it as a securitisation issue. The Prime Minister of Hungary belongs to the group which considered the migration crisis a security threat to the EU and Hungary. That is why his political discourse on migration was sharp. For example, our analysis demonstrates that in his interviews the Hungarian Prime Minister constantly blamed the EU and its member states for not being decisive enough and being unable to protect its external borders.

It is even worse news that we cannot expect help from the West either, but then again this was also true back in the time of János Hunyadi. But the situation is what it is, and instead of helping us – or, as I asked them when I was last in Brussels, at least leaving us to our work without further attacks, because we are the only ones observing the Schengen Agreement, which we strongly intend to and will observe – the voices from the West criticising our actions are not diminishing in volume (Viktor Orbán, 08/09/2015).

On the other hand, he was critical towards Greece for not fulfilling its obligation to protect its southern borders. Another interesting point is that Viktor Orbán blamed George Soros in his interviews for demanding an open border policy and for accepting migrants.

The European Union comes into the equation when one has a country such as Greece, which signs an agreement – the Schengen Agreement – and agrees to protect its southern border, but fails to honour its obligation. Then it must be excluded (Viktor Orbán, 16/11/2020).

People today are setting out – assisted by human traffickers and political activists, particularly with the support of activists from the Soros network –

because they know that Germany awaits them, and events confirm this (Viktor Orbán, 16/11/2020).

Our results suggest that in the discourse of the Hungarian Prime Minister elements of exclusion towards the migrants are easily detected. He mainly focused on cultural differences between the newcomers and Europeans or Hungarians. He repeatedly emphasised that the culture of Hungary or Europe was being forced to change and was under invasion. It is also important to mention that he focused on ethnicity and religious differences a few times.

It is difficult to explain to a Hungarian what is happening: that the cultural identity of our continent and our own country is being changed from the outside, against our will, using an invasion. What good is there in this? We do not understand it, but there are people who make their living from concocting theories, writing books, training activists, keeping them stationed all over the world and employing them in this spirit. This is part of the modern world today (Viktor Orbán, 30/10/2015).

At the same time, in his discourse, while talking about the migration crisis, the Prime Minister constantly focused on negativity towards newcomers. He described them as a group of people who are unwilling to observe Hungary's laws and who refuse to cooperate with the responsible authorities. Additionally, he mentioned that wherever there are immigrants in large numbers, the facts show that crime rates increase and he emphasised that terrorists are arriving in Europe via migration.

We need new rules if we do not want immigration to continuously undermine public security – because wherever there are immigrants in large numbers, the facts show that crime rates increase (Viktor Orbán, 20/11/2015).

While analysing the discourse of Viktor Orbán on the migration crisis, another notable finding is that only in two cases we were able to find support elements. These support elements were towards asylum seekers and refugees. While answering the questions, he mentioned that Hungarian authorities conducted the necessary procedures, and women and children received favourable treatment. The Prime Minister told an interviewer that they care for every asylum seeker in Hungary.

Furthermore, our study indicates that during the discussion of the migration crisis, the integration aspect of the migrants was the hot topic. The Prime Minister of Hungary identified problems with integration. Results show that, according to Viktor Orbán, not integrating into European or Hungarian societies is the problem of migrants. In several instances, the Prime Minister said that migrants do not want to live as we do because they hold different views on the world or have a different mentality. Also, he added that most of them are entirely uneducated, and many only speak Arabic, making the integration process harder.

We cannot only take their manpower into consideration, because it is the whole human being we get – together with their own cultural identities, the prob-

lems they have living with them, and with the fact that they do not at all consider European attitudes to life as a philosophy to be followed. They consider their own cultures to be more valuable, so they do not want to integrate, but organise their own parallel lives. This is what has happened everywhere; this is the phenomenon of parallel societies, experienced recently in Europe, in countries where there are a large number of people who have arrived from elsewhere. Central Europe has not experienced this problem so far (Viktor Orbán, 19/12/2015).

Gyöngyöspata conflict

The qualitative content analysis of the selected materials in the case of the segregated primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata shows that Prime Minister Orbán highlighted a different aspect of the conflict. Analysed interviews with Viktor Orbán demonstrate an augmented emphasis on placing blame while presenting the Gyöngyöspata conflict. Results indicated that he, to the same degree, blamed George Soros or his organisations and the Roma ethnic minority group in Gyöngyöspata. In the case of George Soros, he blamed his organisations for provoking the issue, resulting in a court case. In one of his interviews, he said:

Furthermore, and this is what we always come back to, if we look at the people who started the lawsuit, we find Soros organisations everywhere. I think the whole thing is a provocation (Viktor Orbán, 17/01/2020).

However, the Hungarian Prime Minister mainly blamed the Roma ethnic minority group in Gyöngyöspata for causing trouble in school in a different way and for not attending school. At the same time, while discussing this issue, he accused the Roma people in Gyöngyöspata preventing native Hungarians from having normal education conditions:

We stand by the 80 per cent of decent Hungarians who work and demand a normal education for their children, who in Gyöngyöspata now are on the back foot and are being made to look as if they've done something wrong. So, I told the Member of Parliament to take urgent action to turn this situation around. It is absurd that people have to take their children out of their own settlement, where they're in a majority, to a school in a neighbouring settlement because a minority is preventing normal conditions for education where they live (Viktor Orbán, 31/01/2020).

Also, it is significant to mention that he blamed the previous government for the dispute in Gyöngyöspata, though to a lesser degree compared to George Soros or his organisations and the Roma ethnic minority group in Gyöngyöspata.

Naturally, I don't want to point the finger, but this didn't start under our government. This is a practice that started during the term of a left-liberal government (Viktor Orbán, 17/01/2020).

When the exclusionary elements examined in the Hungarian Prime Minister's discourse, we noticed that he highlighted that he disagreed with the final

judgment of the court and refused to accept that the government should pay compensation. On the other hand, only in one case did the Hungarian Prime Minister focus on the ethnicity aspect of the Roma minority group.

Well, I'm also someone with a law degree, and I have to say that, as it stands, this court verdict is an unjust one. It has been made in the service of legality, but not in the service of justice. And I can see that justice in Gyöngyöspata is not visible from the Supreme Court in Budapest's 5th district. But we shall seek out that justice (Viktor Orbán, 15/05/2020).

Let me repeat: we are ready to provide anything, but we cannot just give money (Viktor Orbán, 17/01/2020).

In different interviews, the Prime Minister mentioned the negative actions of the Roma people in Gyöngyöspata. The general context of these comments was mainly about the negative behaviour of Roma children in the school. While answering the questions, he listed negative behaviour such as physical assaults by parents or children on teachers, causing havoc and behaving in a way that makes teaching impossible when they are in school. In one of the interviews he gave to Kossuth Radio programme, he even accused Roma parents for not sending children to school.

In Gyöngyöspata an 80-per cent non-Roma population lives with a 20-per cent Roma population. In recent years an alarming situation has developed in the school there. Many families didn't send their children to school, and there was one child who missed five hundred hours of schooling. Children who did attend didn't follow the rules, sometimes parents or children threatened teachers, occasionally there were instances of physical assault, and when teachers tried to restore normality they were accused of racism (Viktor Orbán, 31/01/2020).

In the case of if the particular side was supported in the discourse of the Prime Minister while presenting the Gyöngyöspata conflict, our results show that Viktor Orbán totally support the predominant native Hungarians in Gyöngyöspata. During the analysis, Orbán's support of the Roma population in Gyöngyöspata was not detected. At the same time, he, in many cases, mentioned that Hungarians are in the majority position in Gyöngyöspata. It is significant to mention that this kind of discourse can create disbalance between two groups in a small town such as Gyöngyöspata.

They feel that they're in a hostile environment in their own country: that the legal system, the courts and the government in their own country aren't standing by them, but are instead somehow working against them. And they are expected to tolerate all this. And to this my answer is no (Viktor Orbán, 31/01/2020).

One interesting observation is that in several interviews, after blaming the Roma minority group or showing support to native Hungarians, the Prime Minister sought to discuss the issue. He did not criticise or talk about the Roma ethnic minority group in Gyöngyöspata not being integrated into the host society. Instead, he focused on the Hungarian government's integration opportunities

for the Roma people. Moreover, the emphasis was on the government's commitment to integrating Roma people into Hungarian society through different government programmes.

This is happening at a time when Roma families – or many of them, at least – are embarking on a change in their way of life. We cannot speak dispassionately about the great change represented by the fact that tens of thousands of Roma families have taken up offers of work, and that after working in public works schemes tens of thousands of them are making headway in the private sector. They are living off the proceeds of their work instead of welfare benefits, they are raising their children properly, and they have thus earned recognition from all of us. Their children are attending kindergarten from the age of three, something which prepares them for school and gives them the chance of keeping up with their peers from more advantageous backgrounds. It is well known that the government has openly committed itself – and I also see this as my personal responsibility – to eradicating poverty in Hungary. We have therefore also committed ourselves to the advancement of Roma families. Indeed, we have also succeeded in establishing consensus across society on this point (Viktor Orbán 16/02/2020).

VII. Discussion

To the author's knowledge, this qualitative study is the first to explore Prime Minister Orbán's discourse on the primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata. Furthermore, this study advances its essence by studying Viktor Orbán's discourse on the migration crisis. It is followed by examining similarities in the Hungarian prime minister's discourse on both selected cases.

This research confirms that, in the case of the 'portrayal of blame' category, we can identify the most similarities between the two case studies. At the same time, this category in both cases received the highest percentage. This means that the Hungarian prime minister mostly used blame elements while discussing the migration crisis and the Gyöngyöspata conflict. In the case of the migration crisis, he mainly blamed the EU and its member states, particularly Greece. However, in the case of the Gyöngyöspata conflict, he blamed the Roma ethnic minority group in Gyöngyöspata. In both case studies, the negativity and blame were high towards George Soros or his organisations. Relatively low similarities were identified in the 'elements of exclusionary' category compared to the 'portrayal of blame' category. Viktor Orbán highlighted the court's compensation decision in the Gyöngyöspata case to use it to exclude the Roma ethnic minority group. He exploited the court's decision to portray the Roma ethnic minority group in a way that they were getting unfair compensation from the government. On the hand, cultural, ethnic and religious exclusionary elements were identified in the case of the migration crisis.


Table 1: Main categories and category descriptions

Main Category	Category Description
Portrayal of blame	This category aims to determine whom Hungarian Prime Minister blamed while presenting the Gyöngyöspata conflict and migration crisis
Elements of exclusionary	This category aims to determine if any exclusionary elements appeared in the Hungarian Prime Minister's discourse while presenting the Gyöngyöspata conflict and migration crisis
Focus on negativity	This category aims to determine if the Hungarian Prime Minister focused on a specific type of negativity in his discourse toward the Roma ethnic minority group and migrants while presenting the Gyöngyöspata conflict and migration crisis
Support	This category aims to determine if the Hungarian Prime Minister supported a particular side in his discourse while presenting the Gyöngyöspata conflict and migration crisis
Integration	This category aims to determine if the Hungarian Prime Minister focused on a specific type of integration issue in his discourse while presenting the Gyöngyöspata conflict and migration crisis

The third similarity between the case studies was discovered in the ‘integration’ category. However, the intriguing conclusion in this category was that Viktor Orbán, while speaking about the integration of the Roma ethnic minority group, tends to talk about more positive examples, such as how the government provides an opportunity for them or how the situation is improved compared to previous years. Nevertheless, the opposite was observable in the case of the migration crisis, in which migrants were blamed for not integrating into Hungarian or European societies.

Based on our analysis, Figure 1 shows that the most striking difference between the selected cases is found in the ‘support’ category. This concludes that in the discourse of the Hungarian prime minister, support elements on the migration crisis were significantly lower compared to the Gyöngyöspata conflict. Nevertheless, it is significant to mention that Viktor Orbán, in his interviews, largely supported native Hungarians in Gyöngyöspata. However, while talking about the migration crisis, he mentioned support in a few cases, especially for women and children refugees. The ‘focus on negativity’ category also illustrates significant differences between the cases. However, contrary to the ‘support’ category, there was more negative discourse towards the migrants compared to the Roma ethnic minority group.

Figure 1: The overall results of the study of the Gyöngyöspata conflict and the migration crisis



VIII. Conclusion

This study using qualitative content analysis focused on the discourse of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán in the segregated primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata and migration. This research can confirm that populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán attempted to portray an ‘other’ image of the Roma ethnic minority group during the segregated primary school conflict in Gyöngyöspata. The findings in this study indicate that elements of blame, exclusionary, negativity towards the Roma ethnic minority group and support for the native Hungarians in the Gyöngyöspata conflict were evident in the discourse of the Hungarian prime minister. Moreover, it was found that there are general similarities in the discourse of Viktor Orbán while talking about both examined cases. The blame and exclusionary communication style were noticeable in both case studies. At the same time and as mentioned above, this research adopted Albertazzi and McDonnell’s definition of populism. Moreover, the results of our study can confirm that Albertazzi and McDonnell’s definition of populism is relevant for this research because contemporary populism in the discourse of Hungarian prime minister does not contain only anti-elite or anti-establishment but also dangerous ‘other’ elements.

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