



## RESEARCH ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS

# Towards a Conceptual Integration of Collective Victimization Beliefs and Their Variation Within and Across Contexts: A Q Methodology Study in Five Communities

Johanna Ray Vollhardt<sup>1</sup>  | Helin Ūnal<sup>2</sup> | Zsolt P. Szabó<sup>3,4</sup> | Hu Young Jeong<sup>5</sup>  | J. Christopher Cohrs<sup>6</sup> | Danielle Black<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, USA | <sup>2</sup>Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, USA | <sup>3</sup>Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary | <sup>4</sup>ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary | <sup>5</sup>University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA | <sup>6</sup>Phillips-Universität Marburg, Marburg, Germany | <sup>7</sup>University of Maryland Baltimore County, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

**Correspondence:** Johanna Ray Vollhardt ([jvollhardt@clarku.edu](mailto:jvollhardt@clarku.edu))

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## ABSTRACT

Although social psychological research on how people understand collective victimization often examines comparisons between groups' suffering, studies on related concepts (e.g., collective trauma) suggest numerous other relevant beliefs. The present article aimed to integrate diverse collective victimization beliefs and contribute to their conceptual analysis. Utilizing Q methodology, we examined how 60 collective victimization beliefs statements combine into holistic belief patterns. We analysed variation and commonalities in shared beliefs between and within groups, examining five contexts with different historical or ongoing collective victimization experiences and present-day group positions. Our study included purposively sampled Kurdish American immigrants (Study 1,  $N = 51$ ), Black Americans (Study 2,  $N = 47$ ), Jewish Americans (Study 3,  $N = 48$ ), Hungarians (Study 4,  $N = 68$ ) and Koreans (Study 5,  $N = 50$ ). The analysis revealed between two and five viewpoints per context, varying across the following theoretical dimensions: temporality (past or present suffering), power (ingroup strength or vulnerability), group focus (implications for intergroup or intragroup dynamics), locus of strategies (symbolic or material) for addressing ingroup victimization, and perceived importance of ingroup victimization (centrality or decentering victimization). A second-order analysis identified commonalities in viewpoints across contexts, suggesting partial generalization. Overall, this research makes theoretical contributions to the literature on collective victimization beliefs, provides insights into their ecological validity, and demonstrates that collective victimization beliefs are nuanced, complex and contextualized.

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## 1 | Introduction

A hallmark of trauma is people's need to make sense of it and integrate it into assumptions about the world (Frankl 1946; Janoff-Bulman 1992). A growing body of work examines meaning-making of collective trauma, including direct and vicarious transmitted experiences. For example, clinical and counselling psychologists have examined the impact of historical and racial trauma on well-being (Comas-Díaz et al. 2019; Gone et al. 2019), community psychologists have studied how transmitted experiences of oppression and survival affect community dynamics (Quayle and Sonn 2019; Whitbeck et al. 2004) and social psychologists have investigated the effects of different beliefs about the ingroup's collective victimization on intergroup relations and conflict attitudes (Hirschberger 2018; Li et al. 2023; Noor et al. 2012; Vollhardt 2015).

These literatures use different terminologies, examining different aspects of ingroup victimization and distinct ways of thinking about it. We use the overarching term 'collective victimization beliefs' for all cognitions concerning the ingroup's past or present victimization.<sup>1</sup> Social psychology has focused on collective victimization beliefs involving intergroup comparisons and outgroup threats, which omits many other aspects of collective victimization that may be more relevant in certain historical and sociopolitical contexts (Szabó 2020; Vollhardt, Szabó et al. 2021). Additionally, intragroup differences in collective victimization beliefs and their contestation are rarely the focus of research (Klar et al. 2013). Moreover, different collective victimization beliefs are usually studied separately, and studies focus on a few constructs rather than examining complex belief systems. This may not capture the richness in how people make sense of their group's victimization or that the meaning of some beliefs changes depending on which other beliefs are endorsed (Cohrs, McNeill et al. 2015).

Accordingly, the present article has three goals: First, we *integrate* a wide range of concepts reflecting different collective victimization beliefs from different bodies of literature (beyond social psychology, including clinical and counselling psychology and community psychology). This allows us to examine which conceptualizations reflect people's lay theories best and are ecologically valid. Second, we examine how these collective victimization beliefs relate to each other and form socially shared *patterns of beliefs*. This allows us to capture the complexity of people's viewpoints on their group's collective victimization and how they understand it, as well as the different meanings that beliefs may have depending on their relation to other beliefs. Third, we examine how these patterns of collective victimization beliefs *vary between and within groups*: by examining five different contexts (that are mostly underrepresented in the psychological literature in English; Rad et al. 2018) with distinct collective victimization experiences and current group positions and by exploring potential intragroup variation (Buchanan et al. 2021) based on intersecting social positions and ideologies.

To achieve these goals, we use an under-utilized methodology in social psychology: Q methodology (Stephenson 1953; Watts and Stenner 2012), which allows researchers to capture the complexity of a given phenomenon in context-sensitive ways (often associated with qualitative research) while also providing

systematic, quantitative comparisons. Specifically, and mapping on to our three research goals, this method allows for integrating a broad range of ideas about a given phenomenon rather than selectively focusing on a few—examining how together they form patterns of beliefs and which of these viewpoints are shared in a given context as well as which variation exists. The present research thereby contributes to a conceptual analysis of collective victimization beliefs by clarifying their meaning and relations as well as assumptions in the literature (Machado and Silva 2007), offering theoretical contributions to the literature on how people understand collective victimization.

### 1.1 | Theoretical Dimensions Characterizing the Literature on Collective Victimization Beliefs

On the basis of a literature review of research on how people make sense of their ingroup's victimization, including literature from different subdisciplines (see Section 2), we identified several clusters of collective victimization beliefs, which broadly fall into different ways of *describing and explaining* the ingroup's collective victimization and addressing its *significance and consequences*.

#### 1.1.1 | Describing and Explaining Collective Victimization

**1.1.1.1 | Adverse Experiences.** Many collective victimization beliefs capture adverse experiences associated with collective violence, such as losses (of land, language, culture etc.; Brave Heart 1998), lack of power (Nadler and Shnabel 2015) and control (Bilewicz 2022), perceived (existential) threat (Wohl et al. 2010), or a sense of abandonment from outgroups (Abu-Ras et al. 2013).

**1.1.1.2 | Strength in the Face of Adversity.** Conversely, critical traditions within psychology (e.g., critical community psychology, liberation psychology) and qualitative studies also highlight ingroup strength despite collective victimization, including a focus on survival (Quayle and Sonn 2019) and resistance (Selvanathan et al. 2023), collective resilience (Atallah 2017; Vollhardt and Nair 2018), or pride born of suffering (Szabó 2020).

**1.1.1.3 | Time and Place.** Collective victimization beliefs focusing on the temporal dimension emphasize its historical nature (Bouchat et al. 2017) and historical closure (Hanke et al. 2013)—or conversely ongoing experiences of victimization (Hartmann and Gone 2014). Additionally, 'perpetual victimhood' (Schori-Eyal et al. 2017) links historical with present-day victimization and future threat, emphasizing the continuity of ingroup victimization. Some measures capture consequences of the group's historical victimization that impact the ingroup today (Banfield et al. 2014) or assess perceived pervasiveness of the group's victimization in different places and through different perpetrators (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992).

**1.1.1.4 | Attributions of Ingroup Victimization.** Another fundamental question is why the ingroup's victimization happened and who is responsible (Leach 2020). Researchers have examined how much people blame the perpetrator group (Bilali et al. 2012) or third parties, or perceive heterogeneity within the perpetrator group (Čehajić-Clancy and Bilewicz 2021). Relatedly,

internal, essentialist attributions to the perpetrator group's evil nature or culture as a cause of violence are distinguished from situational or structural attributions (Imhoff et al. 2017).

**1.1.1.5 | Comparative Victim Beliefs.** Social comparisons between the ingroup's and other groups' experiences of victimization (i.e., comparative victim beliefs) have been a central focus of social psychological research on collective victimization (Szabó 2020)—above all competitive victimhood (believing the ingroup suffered more than the other conflict party, Noor et al. 2012) and other exclusive victim beliefs such as perceived uniqueness of the ingroup's suffering (Vollhardt 2012), in contrast to perceived similarities between the ingroup's and other groups' suffering (inclusive victim beliefs, Vollhardt 2015). Qualitative work shows that downward comparisons (believing others suffered more) are sometimes also relevant (Nair and Vollhardt 2019).

## 1.1.2 | Significance and Consequences of Collective Victimization

**1.1.2.1 | Centrality of Versus Decentring Collective Victimization.** Social psychological literature on collective victimization often assumes that these experiences are central to group identities (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Leach 2020; Volkan 2001). Measures of perceived centrality of ingroup victimization (Jeong et al. 2023; Vollhardt et al. 2016) assess this, along with perceived importance of sharing knowledge about the ingroup's victimization, or how often people think or talk about the group's victimization. Conversely, qualitative studies showed that many participants decentered ingroup victimization because it lacked personal relevance or was seen as harmful or as less important than other aspects of the ingroup's history (Vollhardt, Szabó et al. 2021). Decentering the ingroup's victimization also involves acknowledging the group's dual role as victims and perpetrators, where relevant (SimanTov-Nachlieli and Shnabel 2014).

**1.1.2.2 | Lessons and Needs.** In response to collective victimization, people often want to protect the ingroup from future victimization (Hirschberger 2018; Klar et al. 2013). Resulting *ingroup-focused* lessons and needs can include strengthening ingroup culture and identity, helping affected ingroup members, or increased ingroup unity and cohesion (Vollhardt and Nair 2018; Wohl et al. 2010). These intragroup dynamics are studied less in the social psychological literature, which has focused more on *intergroup lessons* such as the perceived need for vigilance and outgroup distrust (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992) or moral entitlement to violent self-defence (Schori-Eyal et al. 2014). Conversely, inclusive intergroup lessons emphasize coalitions and solidarity with other oppressed minority groups (Craig and Richeson 2016; Warner et al. 2014) or to 'never be a perpetrator' or treat outgroups like the ingroup was (Klar et al. 2013).

**1.1.2.3 | Redress.** Finally, beliefs about the significance and consequences of the ingroup's victimization also include lack of redress by the perpetrator group or broader society, through denial or lack of acknowledgement (de Guissmé and Licata 2017; Vollhardt et al. 2014), justice (Li et al. 2018) or reparations (Jeong and Vollhardt 2021).

## 1.1.3 | Examining Complexity and Intragroup Variation in Collective Victimization Beliefs Through Q Methodology

As this brief review shows, there is considerable complexity in how people understand their ingroup's victimization. Moreover, different beliefs may form holistic patterns that go beyond the meaning of each individual construct—as highlighted in research on political belief systems (Brandt 2022). For example, the effects of inclusive victimization beliefs change depending on whether people also perceive prosocial obligations towards other victim groups or are concerned with the ingroup's conflict position (Cohrs, McNeill et al. 2015). Additionally, despite dominant societal narratives about the ingroup's victimization (Bar-Tal 2000), there are often alternative views, divergent collective memories and distinct lessons that are contested within the ingroup (Cohrs, Uluğ et al. 2015; Elcheroth et al. 2019; Klar et al. 2013; Vollhardt et al. 2023). These intragroup differences are expected due to intersecting social positions and experiences of oppression (Nair and Vollhardt 2019) or different political ideologies (Szabó et al. 2020).

Common methods in social psychology run into limitations in examining this complexity. For example, although interviews can capture complex belief patterns, a systematic comparison of responses is difficult, and although surveys and experiments can systematically compare within and across groups, examining this great number of collective victimization beliefs as isolated predictors creates statistical issues and loses important information. To address these issues, we use Q methodology, which is ideal for systematically examining (a) the wide range of collective victimization beliefs rather than a few selected constructs; (b) how they form socially shared, complex patterns of beliefs and take on different meanings depending on their relation to other collective victimization beliefs; and (c) comparisons within and across groups.

Q methodology (Stephenson 1953) explores the range and diversity of socially shared perspectives on a given issue. Belief patterns are examined holistically by asking participants to rank order an extensive range of positions on the issue. The methodology assumes and captures heterogeneity in these beliefs within and sometimes also between communities (Watts and Stenner 2012). Like qualitative research, Q methodology examines individual responses and can uncover rare perspectives that might be overlooked in quantitative studies or chalked up as random error or outliers; like quantitative research, it allows for formal comparisons within or between groups. Q methodology, though underutilized in social psychology, has occasionally been used for research questions relevant to the present study (e.g., Selvanathan et al. 2023; Uluğ and Cohrs 2016, 2017a; Ünal et al. 2022).

## 1.2 | Overview of Study and Research Questions

The present studies employ Q methodology to integrate the broad range of collective victimization beliefs identified in the literature in different subdisciplines in psychology. We examine which nuanced patterns of beliefs about ingroup victimization they form, among five different communities with distinct histories of

collective victimization and different present-day group positions (i.e., perceived differences in where the ingroup stands in their societal status in relation to other groups, Bobo 1999): two racial/ethnic minority groups in the United States with historical and ongoing collective victimization experiences (Black Americans and Kurdish American immigrants from Turkey/Northern Kurdistan), one religious/ethnic minority group (but mostly also belonging to the racial majority group) in the United States with historical experiences of genocide and persecution and present-day experiences of hate crimes (Jewish Americans, mostly identifying as White), and two national/ethnic majority groups that experienced historical victimization (Hungarians residing in Hungary and South Koreans in South Korea). We examine three research questions, contributing to a conceptual analysis of collective victimization beliefs to aid theory development: First, which collective victimization beliefs are relevant to participants, and thereby ecologically valid? Second, which distinct patterns of beliefs about the ingroup's victimization exist within communities? Third, how similar or different are patterns of collective victimization beliefs in different contexts?

## 2 | Method

### 2.1 | Sample and Contexts for Studies 1–5

Following recommended practices for Q-methodological studies (Watts and Stenner 2012), we aimed to recruit a sample of approximately 50 participants per context to meet the suggested sample size. To increase the likelihood of identifying distinct and less common viewpoints, we used purposive sampling to recruit diverse samples (regarding gender, social class, immigration background, religiosity and political orientation) as much as feasible.

#### 2.1.1 | Study 1: Kurdish American Immigrants From Turkey/Northern Kurdistan

**2.1.1.1 | Context.** Kurds are one of the largest stateless groups. Most live in Turkey; others live in Iran, Iraq and Syria as a minority facing oppression (Mayer and Tran 2022). Kurdish victimization in Turkey includes decades of political repression and genocidal violence, forced assimilation, including banning the Kurdish language, routine imprisonment, and displacement of millions of Kurds (Gunes 2012). The latter adds another layer of discrimination and racism experienced as refugees and immigrants (Ünal et al. 2022), including in the United States, along with general hostility against people from the Middle East (Awad et al. 2019).

**2.1.1.2 | Participants.** We recruited 51 participants (21 women, 30 men) from Turkey/Northern Kurdistan, 24–61 years old ( $M = 37.53$ ,  $SD = 8.77$ ), who had been in the United States between 5 months and 29 years ( $M = 11.32$ ,  $SD = 7.40$ ). Although their occupations were diverse, participants were mostly highly educated. The sample was politically left-leaning, and most identified as not religious (see Table 1 for detailed sample characteristics).

### 2.1.2 | Study 2: Black/African Americans

**2.1.2.1 | Context.** The United States is shaped by centuries of White supremacy and anti-Black racism, beginning in the 1600s with the transatlantic slave trade (Hannah-Jones et al. 2021). After slavery legally ended in 1865, violent backlash to any subsequent progress towards equality followed (Anderson 2016), including lynchings and segregation in the South. Police killings and other forms of police brutality disproportionately target and harm Black Americans (Haile et al. 2023; Mapping Police Violence 2023), and structural racism creates ongoing racial disparities, such as in the criminal legal system (Rucker and Richeson 2021), health (Bailey et al. 2017) and economic outcomes (Kraus et al. 2017). In addition to these general experiences as a disadvantaged racial minority group in the United States, the Black American population also includes recent immigrants or refugees from African or Caribbean countries who may have experienced discrimination due to citizenship status.

**2.1.2.2 | Participants.** We recruited 47 Black American participants (28 women, 17 men, 1 identified as non-binary, and 1 as genderfluid), 19–72 years old ( $M = 35$ ,  $SD = 16.5$ ). Most ( $n = 33$ ) were born in the United States. Participants reported a range of different ethnicities, occupations and religious affiliations. The sample was highly educated and politically liberal (see Table 2 for detailed sample characteristics).

### 2.1.3 | Study 3: Jewish Americans

**2.1.3.1 | Context.** Jewish history includes centuries of discrimination and violent persecution. The Holocaust is the most known of these events and is central to most Jewish Americans' identity (Pew Research Center 2021). Jewish Americans' concerns about present-day antisemitism have increased over the past years (Pew Research Center 2021), mostly due to right-wing extremism and White supremacist hate crimes in the United States, such as the Tree of Life synagogue shooting (Burley 2024; U.S. Department of Justice 2022).<sup>2</sup> Most Jewish Americans (92%) identify as White, thereby holding an advantaged societal status in terms of race in the United States (Pew Research Center 2021). The Jewish community also includes many recent immigrants with experiences of context-specific antisemitism, such as from the former Soviet Union.

**2.1.3.2 | Participants.** We recruited 48 Jewish American participants (24 women, 24 men), 19–81 years old ( $M = 46.2$ ,  $SD = 20.5$ ). About half of the sample identified as culturally Jewish, whereas others identified with different Jewish religious denominations. Most ( $n = 38$ ) were born in the United States. Participants were mostly highly educated, and the sample was politically liberal-leaning with few conservatives or moderates (see Table 3 for detailed sample characteristics).

### 2.1.4 | Study 4: Hungarians

**2.1.4.1 | Context.** Hungary was occupied or invaded by the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. After World War I, Hungary signed the Trianon

**TABLE 1** | Kurdish participants' factor loadings and demographics.

ID	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Place of birth
1	0.10	-0.04	-0.33	0.01	0.07	F	49	Somewhat leftist	Asc	Teacher	Dersim
2	0.49	0.18	0.43	0.09	0.26	M	40	Moderately leftist	BA	Operations manager	Turkey
3	<b>0.59*</b>	0.37	0.21	0.27	0.07	M	35	Moderately leftist	PhD	Process engineer	Mardin
4	0.21	0.20	0.21	<b>0.72*</b>	0.16	M	42	Moderately leftist	PhD	Scientist	Diyarbakır
5	0.21	<b>0.50*</b>	0.28	0.09	-0.17	F	41	Moderately leftist	MA	Architect	Diyarbakır
6	<b>0.64*</b>	0.08	0.12	0.02	0.30	M	37	Somewhat leftist	PhD	N/A	Mardin
7	<b>0.83*</b>	-0.06	0.07	-0.09	0.07	F	37	N/A	MA	N/A	Van
8	-0.06	-0.20	-0.05	0.25	<b>0.71*</b>	M	51	Very leftist	MA	Social worker	Kurdistan
9	0.36	0.24	-0.03	<b>0.56*</b>	0.02	M	33	Moderately leftist	MA	Self-employed	Şırnak
10	0.23	-0.11	0.24	0.15	<b>0.74*</b>	M	25	Moderately leftist	BA	Student	İstanbul
11	0.39	0.21	0.05	-0.20	<b>0.61*</b>	M	44	Other	High	N/A	Konya
12	0.49	0.07	0.58	0.14	0.51	M	46	None	MA	Technician	Muş
13	0.54	0.21	0.32	-0.04	0.52	F	60	Moderately leftist	BA	Teacher	İzmir
14	0.13	-0.08	0.28	0.03	<b>0.72*</b>	M	33	Very leftist	MA	Trade	Dersim
15	0.34	0.34	0.10	0.10	<b>0.54*</b>	M	37	Somewhat leftist	MA	Senior software developer	Muş
16	0.04	0.18	<b>0.45*</b>	0.06	0.12	F	51	Moderately leftist	BA	Lawyer	Turkey
17	0.55	0.22	0.30	0.26	0.44	F	28	Very leftist	Law School	Computer scientist/consultant	Turkey
18	0.06	0.58	0.48	0.22	0.17	F	35	Very leftist	MA	N/A	Ankara
19	0.33	-0.08	<b>0.63*</b>	0.10	0.24	M	36	None	BA	Pharmacist	Mardin
20	0.28	0.39	0.21	0.20	<b>0.58*</b>	F	33	Somewhat leftist	BA/BS	Professor	İzmir
21	<b>0.57*</b>	0.25	0.10	0.31	0.26	M	30	Moderately leftist	BA	Registered nurse	Turkey
22	0.23	0.10	0.32	0.06	<b>0.72*</b>	M	29	Other	MA	Business owner	Kurdistan
23	-0.07	0.12	-0.09	<b>0.64*</b>	0.04	F	42	Moderately leftist	BA	Artist	Diyarbakır
24	<b>0.45*</b>	0.22	0.08	0.04	-0.13	M	46	Other	Asc	PhD student	Kurdistan
25	0.32	0.26	0.20	-0.14	0.27	F	61	Very leftist	BA	Businesswomen	Ankara
26	<b>0.64*</b>	0.26	0.11	0.23	0.26	M	29	Moderately leftist	PhD	Researcher	Van
27	0.36	-0.14	0.35	<b>0.52*</b>	0.18	F	33	Somewhat leftist	Asc	Teacher	Diyarbakır
28	<b>0.59*</b>	0.22	0.20	0.21	0.22	F	38	Very leftist	PhD	Scientist/educator	Urfa

(Continues)

TABLE 1 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Place of birth
29	<b>0.65*</b>	0.30	-0.17	0.02	0.32	F	32	Very leftist	MA	Business owner, YouTube creator	Kocaeli
30	0.37	0.08	-0.02	0.31	0.42	M	55	Somewhat leftist	PhD	Self-employed	Mardin
31	<b>0.52*</b>	0.37	0.08	0.13	0.07	M	34	Other	BA	Not working	Şirnak
32	0.35	<b>0.72*</b>	0.02	0.22	0.10	M	36	Very leftist	Asc	Cytotechnologist	Ankara
33	-0.08	0.56	-0.07	0.49	0.18	F	35	Very leftist	BA	Procurement manager (aerospace)	Ankara
34	0.05	0.05	<b>0.70*</b>	0.04	0.21	F	24	Moderately leftist	BA	Student	Erzurum
35	<b>0.61*</b>	0.14	0.18	0.07	-0.14	F	39	Somewhat leftist	BA	Graduate student/teaching assistant	France
36	0.44	0.20	0.49	-0.10	0.34	M	30	Other	MA	Unemployed	Mardin
37	<b>0.77*</b>	0.02	0.27	0.05	0.26	M	35	Very leftist	PhD	N/A	Ağrı
38	<b>0.67*</b>	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.31	M	32	Other	MA	Graduate assistant (political science)	Siirt
39	0.22	<b>0.61*</b>	0.13	-0.04	0.04	M	29	Somewhat right-wing	BA	Artist	Mardin
40	0.34	0.44	-0.30	-0.38	0.25	M	32	Somewhat right-wing	PhD	Research scientist (faculty)	Van
41	0.37	0.42	0.32	0.04	0.12	F	30	Moderately leftist	BA	Medical doctor	Turkey
42	<b>0.58*</b>	0.29	0.23	-0.08	0.39	M	33	Moderately leftist	PhD	PhD student	Siirt
43	0.06	0.31	-0.08	0.24	0.26	M	44	Moderately leftist	PhD	Self-employed	Diyarbakır
44	<b>0.64*</b>	0.47	-0.21	0.11	0.15	F	28	Very leftist	MA	N/A	Diyarbakır
45	0.11	0.37	0.16	0.11	-0.09	M	45	Moderately leftist	Other	Marketing manager	Erzurum
46	0.14	0.36	0.15	0.30	-0.03	F	39	Moderately leftist	BA	Engineer	Bingöl
47	0.18	0.32	0.40	-0.09	0.36	M	28	Moderately leftist	MA	Scientist	Kars
48	0.38	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.20	M	54	Other	MA	Human resources expert	Ağrı
49	<b>0.56*</b>	0.36	-0.12	0.04	0.24	M	40	Somewhat leftist	PhD	Lecturer/researcher	Dersim
50	0.34	0.20	<b>0.60*</b>	0.29	0.21	F	29	Somewhat leftist	BA	N/A	Diyarbakır
51	<b>0.56*</b>	0.12	0.06	0.31	0.16	F	30	Moderately leftist	MA	N/A	Dersim

Note: V1–V5 = Each participant's loadings on Viewpoints 1–5; loadings in bold with asterisks indicate that the sort was a defining sort. Total explained variance was 52%; Viewpoint 1 explained 18% of the variance, Viewpoint 2 explained 9%, Viewpoint 3 explained 8%, Viewpoint 4 explained 6% and Viewpoint 5 explained 11%.

Abbreviations: Asc, associate degree; BA, bachelor's degree; Col, some college education/currently in college; F, female; High, high school diploma; M, male; MA, master's degree; N/A, no information/declined to answer; PhD, doctorate degree; Pro, professional degree.

TABLE 2 | Black American participants' factor loadings and demographics.

ID	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Religion	Ethnicity	Birthplace
1	0.25	0.36	0.07	-0.01	<b>0.57*</b>	F	21	Somewhat liberal	Col	Student	Christian	African-American	The United States
2	-0.12	0.19	<b>0.61*</b>	0.21	0.27	M	67	Moderate	Asc	Entrepreneur	Christian	Jamaican	Jamaica
3	0.39	0.31	0.49	0.27	0.40	F	62	Very liberal	MA	Nurse practitioner	N/A	Jamaican	Jamaica
4	0.27	0.08	0.16	<b>0.52*</b>	0.15	F	30	Independent	MA	Care coordinator	N/A	Jamaican	The United States
5	0.33	<b>0.58*</b>	0.31	-0.02	0.00	F	39	Moderate	BA	Registered nurse	Catholic	Nigerian	Nigeria
6	0.43	0.21	0.30	0.15	0.47	F	49	Very liberal	MA	Speech pathologist	7th Day Adventist	Jamaican	Jamaica
7	0.19	0.12	<b>0.58*</b>	0.33	0.02	M	27	Moderate	BA	Athlete, business owner	Christian	African-American	The United States
8	-0.01	0.08	0.20	<b>0.62*</b>	0.15	F	43	Moderate	BA	Registered nurse	N/A	Haitian	Haiti
9	0.31	0.27	0.31	0.31	0.29	M	21	Leftist-anarchist	Col	Student	Muslim	African-American, Malian-Mandika	The United States
10	0.57	0.16	0.44	0.28	-0.07	F	22	Anarchist	BA	Unemployed	N/A	Dominican <sup>a</sup> , Puerto Rican	The United States
11	0.08	0.02	0.18	0.19	<b>0.58*</b>	F	25	Somewhat liberal	BA	Advertising, media-buyer	N/A	Afro Caribbean	The United States
12	<b>0.55*</b>	0.26	0.07	0.24	0.33	F	31	Moderate	PhD	PhD Student	Christian	American	The United States
13	0.03	0.48	0.29	0.37	0.22	F	50	Moderate	PhD	College professor	Christian	Jamaican	Jamaica
14	0.24	0.12	0.70	-0.02	0.23	M	29	Moderate	MA	Life insurance broker	Christian	African-American	The United States
15	-0.26	<b>0.67*</b>	0.26	0.08	0.26	F	44	Somewhat liberal	BA	Registered nurse	Catholic	Haitian	Haiti
16	<b>0.56*</b>	-0.12	0.15	0.15	0.41	M	22	Very liberal	Col	Student	Christian	Black-American	The United States
17	0.43	0.24	0.37	0.24	0.05	M	22	Very liberal	BA	Registered behaviour technician	Christian-Agnostic	Jamaican	The United States
18	0.25	0.39	<b>0.57*</b>	0.14	0.02	M	20	Somewhat liberal	Col	Student, multimedia creator	Spiritual	African-American, European, Jewish	The United States
19	<b>0.55*</b>	0.20	-0.03	0.17	0.35	F	31	Somewhat liberal	BA	Social worker	N/A	Haitian-American	The United States
20	0.21	<b>0.67*</b>	-0.12	-0.05	-0.03	M	69	Somewhat liberal	Asc	Retired	N/A	Jamaican	Jamaica

(Continues)

TABLE 2 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education			Religion	Ethnicity	Birthplace
									Level	Occupation	Religion			
21	0.32	-0.03	0.19	0.48	0.35	F	21	Somewhat liberal	Col	Student	Christian	Dominican <sup>a</sup>	The United States	
22	0.50	0.26	0.21	0.19	0.51	F	21	Very liberal	Col	Student	Christian	Zambian, Armenian, Norwegian	The United States	
23	0.31	0.08	0.26	0.31	<b>0.50*</b>	F	60	Somewhat liberal	PhD	Associate professor	Protestant	African-American (Nigerian, European genealogy)	The United States	
24	0.40	0.14	0.44	0.21	0.25	F	66	N/A	PhD	Clergy	Methodist	African-American	N/A	
25	<b>0.53*</b>	0.13	0.19	-0.15	0.38	M	72	Moderate	Pro	Retired librarian	Methodist	African-American	The United States	
26	0.25	0.03	<b>0.59*</b>	0.16	0.25	M	27	Moderate	BA	Personal trainer	Christian	N/A	Haiti	
27	<b>0.61*</b>	-0.30	-0.06	0.00	-0.17	M	24	N/A	Col	N/A	N/A	Black	The United States	
28	0.12	-0.01	-0.07	<b>0.46*</b>	-0.01	M	56	Very liberal	MA	Enterprise architect	N/A	Jamaican	Jamaica	
29	0.23	0.05	<b>0.74*</b>	-0.07	0.19	M	54	Independent	BA	Retired veteran	Baptist	African-American	The United States	
30	0.13	<b>0.64*</b>	0.29	0.35	0.01	F	50s	Moderate	MA	Teacher	N/A	Dominican <sup>b</sup>	Caribbean	
31	0.03	0.29	0.36	<b>0.63*</b>	0.13	F	28	N/A	MA	Basketball coach	Spiritual	Black-American	The United States	
32	0.17	0.02	0.18	-0.02	<b>0.69*</b>	M	21	Somewhat liberal	Col	Student	N/A	Nicaraguan, Trinidadian	The United States	
33	0.44	0.35	0.22	0.05	0.32	M	21	Very liberal	Col	Student	N/A	Vincentian	The United States	
34	0.45	0.18	0.23	0.30	0.57	M	22	Very liberal	Col	Student	N/A	Ethiopian, Eritrean	The United States	
35	<b>0.58*</b>	0.35	0.04	0.19	0.21	F	21	Very liberal	Col	Student	Christian	African-American	The United States	
36	<b>0.51*</b>	0.20	0.18	0.23	0.28	F	37	Somewhat liberal	MA	Business owner, student	Christian-Apostolic	Black-American	The United States	
37	0.47	-0.16	0.45	0.29	0.28	GF	21	N/A	Col	Unemployed	N/A	N/A	N/A	
38	0.11	<b>0.53*</b>	-0.02	0.32	0.36	F	52	Moderate	MA	Nurse practitioner	Christian-Episcopal	Nigerian	Nigeria	
39	0.13	-0.25	0.43	0.17	0.45	F	52	Somewhat liberal	Col	Homemaker	Christian	African-American	The United States	
40	<b>0.52*</b>	0.19	0.26	0.35	0.08	F	19	Very liberal	Col	Student	Christian-Episcopal	N/A	The United States	
41	<b>0.64*</b>	0.17	0.22	0.03	0.44	F	22	Very liberal	Col	EMT, certified nursing assistant	Christian	Jamaican	The United States	

(Continues)

TABLE 2 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Religion	Ethnicity	Birthplace
42	0.25	0.25	0.12	<b>0.62*</b>	0.40	F	22	Moderate	Col	Student	Islam	Black, African-American	The United States
43	0.48	0.35	0.41	0.14	0.45	F	22	Very liberal	Col	Distributed organizer	Spiritual	White	The United States
44	<b>0.67*</b>	-0.07	0.23	0.42	0.07	NB	23	Leftist, eco-anarchist, socialist	BA	Unemployed, incoming student	N/A	Bajan/Nigerian/American	The United States
45	0.37	0.06	<b>0.54*</b>	0.27	0.25	F	38	Somewhat liberal	MA	Associate director of ethics and compliance	Christian	Panamanian/West Indian	The United States
46	0.57	0.15	0.53	0.17	0.29	M	20	Very liberal	Col	Intern	Christian	N/A	The United States
47	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.33	<b>0.50*</b>	F	21	Moderate	Col	Student	Spiritual	Unknown	The United States

Note: V1–V5 = Each participant's loadings on Viewpoints 1–5; loadings in bold with asterisks indicate that the sort was a defining sort. Total explained variance was 55%; Viewpoint 1 explained 37% of the variance, Viewpoint 2 explained 6%, Viewpoint 3 explained 5%, Viewpoint 4 explained 4% and Viewpoint 5 explained 4%.

Abbreviations: Asc, associate degree; BA, bachelor's degree; Col, some college education/currently in college; F, female; High, high school diploma; M, male; MA, master's degree; N/A, no information/declined to answer; NB, nonbinary; PhD, doctorate degree; Pro, professional degree.

<sup>a</sup>Dominican Republic.

<sup>b</sup>Dominica.

TABLE 3 | Jewish American participants' factor loadings and demographics.

ID	Education			Age	Gender	V3	V2	V1	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Immigrated	Denomination	Ethnicity
1	<b>0.82*</b>	0.21	0.14	20	F				Very liberal	Col	Student	No	Reform	Ashkenazi
2	<b>0.76*</b>	0.01	0.32	70	M				Liberal	MA	Electrical writer	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi
3	<b>0.71*</b>	0.27	0.29	48	F				Very liberal	BA	Artist	One parent immigrated	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi
4	0.41	0.46	0.42	48	M				Moderate	MA	Rabbi	From Israel, 1995	Conservative	Mizrahi (Yemen)
5	0.51	0.23	0.49	65	M				Somewhat liberal	PhD	Physician, retired	No	Conservative	Ashkenazi
6	0.38	0.42	<b>0.59*</b>	44	F				Somewhat conservative	JD	Attorney	From USSR	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi
7	0.38	0.25	<b>0.57*</b>	62	F				Liberal	MA	Local government	No	Humanist Jewish	Other
8	<b>0.74*</b>	0.35	0.21	20	F				Liberal	Col	Student	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi
9	0.26	<b>0.58*</b>	0.36	20	F				Liberal	Col	Student	No	Secular	Ashkenazi
10	<b>0.79*</b>	0.26	0.17	40	F				Somewhat liberal	PhD	Scientific editor	From Odessa, 1992	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi
11	<b>0.59*</b>	0.18	0.18	64	M				Liberal	PhD	Rabbi	No	Reform	Ashkenazi
12	0.41	0.40	0.23	75	M				Liberal	MA	Retired teacher	No	Reconstructionist	Ashkenazi
13	<b>0.70*</b>	0.47	0.05	53	F				Very liberal	MA	Chef/business owner	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenaz and Sephardi
14	<b>0.91*</b>	0.04	0.01	29	F				Very liberal	MA	Communal Organizer	Parents born in Israel	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi
15	0.35	0.41	<b>0.57*</b>	21	F				Liberal	Col	Student	No	Culturally Jewish	No answer
16	0.45	0.51	0.19	20	M				Liberal	Col	Student	No	Reform	Ashkenazi
17	0.24	<b>0.58*</b>	0.30	21	M				Moderate	Col	Student	No	Secular	Ashkenazi
18	<b>0.65*</b>	0.14	0.10	81	M				Very liberal	MA	Retired	No	Atheist, culturally Jewish	Other
19	0.15	0.25	<b>0.68*</b>	64	M				Somewhat liberal	BA	Retired	No	Reform	Ashkenazi
20	-0.23	<b>0.82*</b>	0.10	20	M				Conservative	Col	Student	No	Modern Orthodox	Ashkenazi
21	0.13	0.39	<b>0.61*</b>	26	M				Somewhat liberal	BA	MBA student	From France, 2003	Secular	Ashkenazi & Sephardic
22	<b>0.84*</b>	0.18	0.28	40	F				Liberal	MA	Monitoring and evaluation specialist	From Ukraine, 1991	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi
23	0.20	<b>0.62*</b>	0.36	66	F				Liberal	BA	Retired	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi

(Continues)

TABLE 3 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	V3	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education			Occupation	Immigrated	Denomination	Ethnicity
							level	level	level				
24	<b>0.77*</b>	-0.18	0.19	F	69	Somewhat liberal	PhD	Retired	No	Secular	Ashkenazi		
25	0.20	0.52	0.49	M	32	Moderate	MA	Data Scientist	From Odessa as a child	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
26	0.19	0.31	<b>0.46*</b>	F	69	Moderate	PhD	Attorney	No	Reform	Ashkenazi		
27	0.39	0.36	0.40	F	69	Somewhat liberal	MA	Freelance writer	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
28	-0.15	0.49	0.64	F	52	Somewhat liberal	Col	Customer service	No	Reform	Sephardic		
29	<b>0.78*</b>	0.21	0.37	M	52	Liberal	JD	Lawyer	One parent from Israel	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
30	<b>0.71*</b>	0.40	0.19	M	32	Very liberal	MA	Unemployed	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
31	<b>0.86*</b>	-0.17	0.25	M	28	Other	BA	Union organizer	No	Secular	Ashkenazi		
32	<b>0.74*</b>	0.07	0.35	M	66	Somewhat liberal	PhD	Retired	One parent from Germany	Conservative	Ashkenazi		
33	0.51	0.07	0.43	F	66	Liberal	BA	Professional textile artist	No	Conservative	Ashkenazi		
34	<b>0.71*</b>	0.36	0.11	F	26	Very liberal	BA	Mental health program mentor	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
35	0.16	-0.09	<b>0.71*</b>	M	22	Conservative	Col	Personal trainer	No	Conservative	Ashkenazi		
36	<b>0.67*</b>	0.18	0.23	M	33	Very liberal	JD	Attorney	From Canada, 2011	Conservative	Ashkenazi		
37	<b>0.71*</b>	0.13	0.32	M	73	Liberal	Pro	Retired	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
38	<b>0.75*</b>	0.12	0.12	F	40	Very liberal	MA	Yoga teacher	No	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
39	0.41	0.24	0.51	F	75	Liberal	MA	Retired	From Soviet Union, 1989	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
40	0.01	<b>0.61*</b>	0.33	M	77	Liberal	MA	Writer and editor	No	Reform	Ashkenazi		
41	0.29	0.40	0.43	M	78	Liberal	BA	Retired	No	Conservative	Ashkenazi		
42	<b>0.66*</b>	0.30	0.29	M	57	Liberal	MA	Consultant	From UK, 1989	Modern Orthodox	Ashkenazi		
43	0.30	<b>0.49*</b>	0.23	M	41	Moderate	Pro	Rabbi	No	Modern Orthodox	Ashkenazi		
44	<b>0.66*</b>	0.19	0.03	F	39	Very liberal	MA	Designer/artist	From Ukraine, 1988	Culturally Jewish	Ashkenazi		
45	0.21	<b>0.80*</b>	-0.01	F	22	Somewhat Liberal	BA	Surgical coordination assistant	US	Modern Orthodox	Ashkenazi		
46	<b>0.80*</b>	0.13	0.29	F	22	Other	BA	Teacher	US	Conservative	Ashkenazi		

(Continues)

TABLE 3 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	V3	Gender	Age	Education			Occupation	Immigrated	Denomination	Ethnicity
						Political orientation	Level					
47	0.26	0.19	<b>0.74*</b>	M	42	Moderate	Pro	Rabbi	US	Modern Orthodox	Ashkenazi	
48	<b>0.62*</b>	0.45	0.38	F	19	Liberal	Col	Student	One parent from Sweden	Conservative	Ashkenazi	

Note: V1–V3 = Each participant's loadings on Viewpoints 1–3; loadings in bold with asterisks indicate that the sort was a defining sort. Total explained variance was 59%; Viewpoint 1 explained 45% of the variance, Viewpoint 2 explained 10% and Viewpoint 3 explained 4%.

Abbreviations: Asc, associate degree; BA, bachelor's degree; Col, some college education/currently in college; F, female; High, high school diploma; JD, Juris Doctor degree; M, male; MA, master's degree; N/A, no information/declined to answer; PhD, doctorate degree; Pro, professional degree.

Treaty, losing two-thirds of its territory and one-third of its ethnic Hungarian population. This and Hungary's historical victimization more generally are central in Hungarian discourse (Szabó et al. 2020). It includes memories of Hungary's defeat in World War II, over 1,600,000 deaths during the two world wars, the failed 1956 revolution against the Soviet Union's control of Hungary, and many Hungarian refugees after the wars and the 1956 revolution (Gyáni 2022). In present-day Europe, Hungary is one of the less economically advantaged countries and on the periphery, which may shape perceptions of ongoing disadvantage compared to wealthier and politically more powerful European countries (Bilewicz and Liu 2020; Bod 2015).

**2.1.4.2 | Participants.** We recruited 68<sup>3</sup> Hungarian participants (32 women, 33 men, 3 did not disclose gender), 20–76 years old ( $M = 39.46$ ,  $SD = 15.91$ ). Most were born in Hungary ( $n = 52$ ). Participants had a range of different occupations but were relatively highly educated. More participants identified as liberal than as conservative (see Table 4 for detailed sample characteristics).

## 2.1.5 | Study 5: Koreans

**2.1.5.1 | Context.** The Korean peninsula became a colony of Japan in 1910, gaining independence in 1945 with a subsequent civil war that resulted in the North and South division. Under Japanese colonial rule, Korean workers were ordered into forced labour for Japan, Korean language and cultural expression were significantly limited and Korea's historical records were distorted. During the Pacific War, Japan forced Korean women to serve in military brothels as sexual slaves. Today, Japanese politicians' ambiguous stance concerning acknowledgement and reparations contributes to diplomatic conflicts (Gries et al. 2009). In addition, South Koreans' perceptions of the past and present may have been shaped by the country's experience of decades of poverty and economic hardship followed by rapid economic development and increased wealth since the 1980s, as well as the increasing influence of China and the United States (Phillips et al. 2020; Sakaki and Nishino 2018).

**2.1.5.2 | Participants.** We recruited 50 Korean participants (23 women, 27 men), 18–62 years old ( $M = 35.01$ ,  $SD = 11.79$ ), all of whom were born in South Korea. Although participants' occupations were diverse, most were highly educated. About half of the participants identified as liberal and half as moderate or conservative (see Table 5 for detailed sample characteristics).

## 2.2 | Materials

The statements for the Q study (the 'Q set') were identified through several steps to comprehensively capture possible beliefs about ingroup victimization. A PsycInfo search (using the keywords 'collective victim beliefs', 'cultural trauma', 'collective trauma', 'racial trauma', 'historical trauma', 'collective victimization', 'historical victimization', 'national victimization', 'historical victimhood', 'collective victimhood' and 'national victimhood') yielded 120 empirical publications. Teams of two authors reviewed each article, extracting all items and qualitative findings (e.g., themes) with collective victimization beliefs. We

TABLE 4 | Hungarian participants' factor loadings and demographics.

ID	Education			Age	Gender	V3	V2	V1	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Denomination	From		Born in
	level	Budapest	Hungary/Diaspora												
1	0.59	0.47	0.11	24	F	0.11	0.47	0.59	Liberal	BA	Student	Catholic	Yes		Diaspora
2	-0.36	0.27	0.29	76	M	0.29	0.27	-0.36	Slightly conservative	Voc	Retired	Catholic	Yes		In Hungary
3	-0.15	0.37	0.33	73	F	0.33	0.37	-0.15	Very conservative	Voc	Retired	Evangelical	No		In Hungary
4	0.14	0.42	0.34	63	F	0.34	0.42	0.14	Moderate	High	Doorkeeper	Catholic	No		In Hungary
5	<b>0.86*</b>	0.17	0.14	24	M	0.14	0.17	<b>0.86*</b>	Moderate	High	Student	Not religious	No		In Hungary
6	0.35	0.31	-0.01	54	M	-0.01	0.31	0.35	Slightly conservative	Voc	Manager	Other	No		In Hungary
7	0.47	0.47	0.41	53	F	0.41	0.47	0.47	Slightly conservative	BA	Manager	Not religious	No		In Hungary
8	<b>0.64*</b>	0.21	0.11	49	F	0.11	0.21	<b>0.64*</b>	Slightly liberal	Voc	Nurse	Catholic	No		In Hungary
9	<b>0.57*</b>	0.36	0.32	20	F	0.32	0.36	<b>0.57*</b>	Liberal	High	Student	Catholic	No		Diaspora
10	-0.18	<b>0.68*</b>	0.03	49	M	0.03	<b>0.68*</b>	-0.18	Moderate	Voc	Mechanic	Catholic	No		Diaspora
11	0.34	<b>0.59*</b>	0.30	29	M	0.30	<b>0.59*</b>	0.34	Slightly conservative	MA	Musician	Catholic	No		Diaspora
12	0.49	0.51	0.30	42	M	0.30	0.51	0.49	Slightly conservative	MA	Teacher	Reformed	No		In Hungary
13	-0.17	<b>0.80*</b>	0.17	26	F	0.17	<b>0.80*</b>	-0.17	Conservative	MA	Engineer	Catholic	No		In Hungary
14	0.63	0.01	0.51	44	F	0.51	0.01	0.63	Liberal	BA	Entrepreneur	Not religious	No		In Hungary
15	-0.68	0.32	0.22	51	M	0.22	0.32	-0.68	Conservative	BA	Storekeeper	Catholic	No		In Hungary
16	0.14	<b>0.73*</b>	0.01	48	F	0.01	<b>0.73*</b>	0.14	Conservative	MA	Teacher	Catholic	No		In Hungary
17	0.35	0.26	0.34	28	M	0.34	0.26	0.35	Liberal	MA	Engineer	Not religious	No		In Hungary
18	<b>0.74*</b>	0.16	0.23	28	M	0.23	0.16	<b>0.74*</b>	Slightly liberal	BA	Finance	Not religious	No		In Hungary
19	0.45	-0.09	0.59	33	F	0.59	-0.09	0.45	Liberal	MA	Finance	Not religious	Yes		In Hungary
20	<b>0.57*</b>	0.17	0.22	25	F	0.22	0.17	<b>0.57*</b>	Liberal	BA	Student	Not religious	No		In Hungary
21	0.29	0.42	0.35	43	F	0.35	0.42	0.29	Moderate	BA	Teacher	Catholic	No		Diaspora
22	0.54	0.44	0.03	30	F	0.03	0.44	0.54	Moderate	MA	Lawyer	Reformed	Yes		Diaspora
23	<b>0.71*</b>	0.14	0.24	24	F	0.24	0.14	<b>0.71*</b>	Moderate	BA	Student	Catholic	No		Diaspora
24	<b>0.52*</b>	0.36	0.17	24	M	0.17	0.36	<b>0.52*</b>	Slightly conservative	High	Consultant	Catholic	No		In Hungary
25	0.12	<b>0.63*</b>	0.13	N/A	N/A	0.13	<b>0.63*</b>	0.12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A
26	-0.06	-0.10	<b>0.69*</b>	48	M	<b>0.69*</b>	-0.10	-0.06	Moderate	Voc	Driver	Not religious	No		In Hungary
27	<b>0.74*</b>	0.35	0.02	24	M	0.02	0.35	<b>0.74*</b>	Slightly liberal	High	Student	Not religious	No		In Hungary
28	<b>0.58*</b>	0.24	0.25	24	F	0.25	0.24	<b>0.58*</b>	Liberal	High	Student	Catholic	No		In Hungary
29	0.33	<b>0.73*</b>	-0.12	55	F	-0.12	<b>0.73*</b>	0.33	Slightly conservative	MA	Teacher	Catholic	No		In Hungary

(Continues)

TABLE 4 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	V3	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education			From		Born in Hungary/Diaspora
							level	Occupation	Denomination	Budapest	Hungary	
30	<b>0.82*</b>	-0.22	0.23	F	26	Liberal	High	Student	Not religious	No	No	In Hungary
31	0.35	-0.24	<b>0.57*</b>	M	26	Other	BA	Engineer	Orthodox	No	No	In Hungary
32	0.36	<b>0.56*</b>	0.35	F	54	Liberal	BA	Teacher	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
33	0.45	0.45	0.08	M	59	Slightly conservative	BA	Engineer	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
34	<b>0.71*</b>	-0.09	0.42	F	26	Liberal	MA	Consultant	Not religious	Yes	Yes	In Hungary
35	<b>0.42*</b>	0.01	0.01	M	41	Slightly liberal	PhD	Lecturer	Not religious	Yes	Yes	In Hungary
36	<b>0.62*</b>	0.24	0.05	F	30	Moderate	MA	Teacher	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
37	0.37	<b>0.62*</b>	0.19	F	64	Other	MA	Teacher	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
38	<b>0.73*</b>	0.32	-0.09	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
39	<b>0.76*</b>	0.33	-0.21	M	32	Very liberal	PhD	Lecturer	Not religious	No	No	In Hungary
40	-0.21	<b>0.68*</b>	-0.13	M	32	Conservative	PhD	Psychologist	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
41	0.38	<b>0.60*</b>	0.22	M	20	Moderate	High	Student	Not religious	No	No	In Hungary
42	<b>0.66*</b>	0.04	0.21	M	21	Liberal	High	Student	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
43	<b>0.68*</b>	0.36	0.39	M	39	Moderate	MA	Entrepreneur	Not religious	Yes	Yes	In Hungary
44	<b>0.71*</b>	0.39	-0.30	M	30	Slightly liberal	MA	Engineer	Not religious	Yes	Yes	In Hungary
45	0.38	0.34	<b>0.56*</b>	M	35	Liberal	MA	Psychologist	Not religious	No	No	In Hungary
46	0.21	<b>0.50*</b>	0.09	M	22	Conservative	Voc	Soldier	Not religious	No	No	In Hungary
47	0.58	0.22	0.50	F	29	Slightly liberal	BA	Manager	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
48	0.37	<b>0.57*</b>	0.18	F	25	Slightly liberal	High	Student	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
49	<b>0.63*</b>	0.40	0.28	M	48	Liberal	MA	CEO	Not religious	Yes	Yes	In Hungary
50	<b>0.85*</b>	0.23	-0.15	F	32	Moderate	MA	Psychologist	Evangelical	Yes	Yes	In Hungary
51	<b>0.72*</b>	0.32	0.25	M	31	Slightly liberal	MA	Psychologist	Not religious	Yes	Yes	In Hungary
52	0.16	0.33	0.13	M	65	Slightly conservative	Voc	Agriculture	Reformed	No	No	In Hungary
53	<b>0.81*</b>	0.00	0.06	M	34	Liberal	MA	Entrepreneur	Not religious	Yes	Yes	Diaspora
54	-0.11	0.29	0.28	F	66	Slightly liberal	High	Retired	Reformed	No	No	In Hungary
55	-0.49	0.48	0.11	M	58	Conservative	Voc	Driver	Catholic	No	No	In Hungary
56	0.40	<b>0.57*</b>	0.40	F	26	Other	High	Student	Catholic	No	No	Diaspora
57	0.21	<b>0.61*</b>	0.05	F	20	Moderate	High	Student	Catholic	No	No	Diaspora
58	0.19	<b>0.62*</b>	0.33	M	27	Other	Other	IT	Other	No	No	In Hungary

(Continues)

TABLE 4 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	V3	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education			From		Born in Hungary/Diaspora
							level	Occupation	Denomination	Budapest	Hungary/Diaspora	
59	0.04	0.39	-0.05	M	70	Moderate	High	Retired	Reformed	No	In Hungary	
60	0.52	0.48	0.14	F	33	Slightly liberal	BA	Teacher	Catholic	No	Diaspora	
61	0.11	<b>0.73*</b>	-0.27	M	30	Slightly conservative	BA	Technician	Catholic	No	In Hungary	
62	<b>0.73*</b>	-0.22	0.03	F	74	Liberal	BA	Retired	Not religious	No	In Hungary	
63	<b>0.76*</b>	0.02	0.22	M	36	Liberal	MA	Journalist	Not religious	Yes	In Hungary	
64	0.43	<b>0.60*</b>	0.09	M	30	Liberal	BA	Engineer	Catholic	No	Diaspora	
65	-0.14	-0.32	-0.01	F	68	Other	Ele	Cook	Catholic	No	Diaspora	
66	0.07	<b>0.73*</b>	-0.04	F	47	Other	MA	Teacher	Catholic	No	In Hungary	
67	0.16	0.47	<b>0.63*</b>	F	48	Slightly liberal	High	Administrator	Not religious	No	In Hungary	
68	<b>0.77*</b>	-0.08	0.24	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

Note: V1-V3 = Each participant's loadings on Viewpoints 1-3; loadings in bold with asterisks indicate that the sort was a defining sort. Total explained variance was 52%; Viewpoint 1 explained 35% of the variance, Viewpoint 2 explained 12% and Viewpoint 3 explained 5%.

Abbreviations: BA, bachelor's degree; Col, some college education/currently in college; Ele, elementary school diploma; F, female; High, high school diploma; JD, Juris Doctor degree; M, male; MA, master's degree; N/A, no information/declined to answer; PhD, doctorate degree; Pro, professional degree; Voc, vocational school degree.

added collective victimization beliefs from unpublished studies in the contexts included in our study and drew on public discourse to expand the Q-set with context-specific beliefs. The author team included one member of each context examined in these studies, and authors brought their insider context knowledge into the selection and adaptation of statements.

These items and qualitative findings were grouped into similar constructs along broader theoretical clusters. This resulted in 96 distinct collective victimization beliefs, which we narrowed down to a more feasible number of statements based on guidelines (40-80; Watts and Stenner 2012). In deciding which collective victimization beliefs to include, we considered which were found across different studies, which were most relevant for the contexts in the present studies, and which statements best represented their theoretical construct. This resulted in a final Q-set of 60 statements (see Appendix A), representing the broader categories of collective victimization beliefs reviewed in Section 1, with several statements within each to address theoretical nuances. The statements were adapted to each context (see Tables 7-11), including translating the statements from English into Korean and Hungarian, respectively, and naming relevant historical events at the core of the group's collective victimization (e.g., 'Japanese colonization' for the Korean sample).

### 2.3 | Procedure

Participants were recruited, and study sessions were conducted by researchers belonging to the respective group (including three of the authors and research assistants). Participants were recruited through social media, personal contacts, snowball sampling, and community organizations across the country.

Sessions were conducted in the local language, on Zoom or Skype, using software for Q methodology studies (Q Method Software; Lutfallah and Buchanan 2019) for the sorting procedure. Participants were first asked to pre-sort the 60 statements into three categories: 'agree', 'disagree' and 'neutral', based on how they evaluated each statement regarding relevance and match with their own views. Next, participants sorted these statements into a (forced) quasi-normal distribution (see Figure 1), with 13 categories from 'most agree' (+6) to 'most disagree' (-6) and a neutral midpoint (0). Participants had to place two statements they agree with most in the +6 category, continuing with the next category until all statements in the 'agree' pile were placed. The same procedure was then used for the disagree pile (starting at -6). Finally, participants placed the remaining statements into the neutral category. Participants were able to rearrange their rankings and change their sorting pattern until they were satisfied with it. Because of the fixed number of slots for the agree and disagree statements, it is possible that some statements participants agree with may end up being sorted into the 'disagree' half of the forced distribution and vice versa; thus, in line with standard Q-methodological procedures (e.g., Watts and Stenner 2012), the rankings need to be interpreted in relative rather than absolute terms. The detailed instructions for the procedure (see Appendix B) were presented at the beginning of the study, right after participants signed the consent form. Investigators read the instructions out loud and answered participants' questions. The instructions for each segment of the study were then repeated

TABLE 5 | Korean participants' factor loadings and participant demographics.

ID	V1	V2	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Place of residence
1	0.11	<b>0.76*</b>	F	31	Slightly liberal	MA	PhD student	Seongbuk-gu, Seoul
2	0.33	0.33	M	29	Moderate	BA	Software developer	Songpa-gu, Seoul
3	0.59	0.58	M	32	Moderately liberal	BA	Office worker	Incheon
4	0.38	<b>0.56*</b>	F	32	Moderately liberal	BA	Nurse	Incheon
5	0.38	0.35	F	29	Moderately liberal	MA	Elementary school teacher	Siheung
6	<b>0.64*</b>	0.40	M	27	Slightly liberal	BA	Unemployed	Incheon
7	<b>0.69*</b>	0.18	M	25	Moderate	BA	Master's student	Nowon-gu, Seoul
8	0.35	<b>0.69*</b>	M	27	Moderately conservative	Col	Student	Gyeongsan
9	0.59	0.46	F	29	Moderately liberal	MA	PhD student	Suwon
10	0.29	<b>0.58*</b>	M	27	Moderately liberal	BA	Unemployed	Sacheon
11	0.56	0.42	M	30	Slightly conservative	MA	PhD student	State College, Pennsylvania, US
12	0.27	<b>0.71*</b>	M	26	Moderate	Col	Student	Gwangju, Gyeonggi-do
13	0.24	<b>0.48*</b>	M	25	Very conservative	Col	Student	Gyeongsan
14	<b>0.58*</b>	-0.05	F	22	Moderate	BA	Master's student	Jinju
15	0.47	<b>0.71*</b>	M	30	Moderately liberal	MA	Researcher	Gwanak-gu, Seoul
16	0.46	0.48	F	30	Moderate	MA	PhD student	Orlando, Florida, US
17	0.50	0.60	F	27	Slightly liberal	MA	Private instructor	Yangcheon-gu, Seoul
18	<b>0.67*</b>	0.19	F	23	Moderately liberal	BA	Master's student	Yangju
19	0.48	0.53	M	24	Moderate	Col	College student	Gwangju, Gyeonggi-do
20	0.45	0.48	F	34	Moderately conservative	MA	Office worker	Mapo-gu, Seoul
21	0.10	<b>0.61*</b>	F	48	Moderate	High	Small business owner	Yangsan
22	<b>0.66*</b>	0.06	M	33	Slightly liberal	JD	Lawyer	Guro-gu, Seoul
23	<b>0.77*</b>	0.25	F	58	Slightly liberal	MA	Middle school teacher	Gwangjin-gu, Seoul
24	0.29	<b>0.64*</b>	F	22	Slightly liberal	Col	Student	Jinju
25	<b>0.69*</b>	0.33	M	49	Moderate	Asc	Cargo company owner	Yangsan
26	-0.03	<b>0.74*</b>	M	30	Moderately liberal	Asc	Personal trainer/gym manager	Gangnam-gu, Seoul
27	0.40	<b>0.54*</b>	M	60	Moderately conservative	MA	Retired	Gwangjin-gu, Seoul
28	0.30	<b>0.65*</b>	F	60	Very conservative	Col	Business owner	Jakarta, Indonesia
29	0.40	<b>0.62*</b>	M	32	Slightly conservative	MA	IT operator	Goyang
30	<b>0.52*</b>	0.13	M	44	Slightly conservative	BA	Hospital electrician, tour guide	Busan
31	<b>0.68*</b>	0.41	F	49	Moderately conservative	BA	Housewife	Seocho-gu, Seoul
32	0.52	0.62	M	31	Slightly liberal	BA	Unemployed	Gwangju
33	0.24	0.19	M	30	Slightly liberal	BA	Travel agency operator/tour guide	Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul
34	<b>0.61*</b>	0.36	F	28	Slightly conservative	MA	Education researcher	Cheongju

(Continues)

TABLE 5 | (Continued)

ID	V1	V2	Gender	Age	Political orientation	Education level	Occupation	Place of residence
35	0.03	<b>0.69*</b>	M	31	Moderately liberal	MA	Barista	Seongbuk-gu, Seoul
36	<b>0.63*</b>	0.35	M	37	Very liberal	BA	Tour guide	Daejeon
37	<b>0.71*</b>	0.18	F	27	Moderately liberal	BA	Office worker	Yangsan
38	0.44	0.54	F	34	Moderately liberal	MA	Pastor	Seongbuk-gu, Seoul
39	0.33	0.19	F	62	Moderately conservative	Col	Housewife	Yongsan-gu, Seoul
40	0.06	0.10	M	21	Moderate	Col	Student	Seongnam
41	<b>0.65*</b>	0.45	F	49	Slightly liberal	BA	Tour guide	Eunpyeong-gu, Seoul
42	<b>0.81*</b>	0.14	F	46	Slightly liberal	BA	Housewife	Yongin
43	<b>0.68*</b>	0.26	M	26	Moderately conservative	BA	Part-time worker, job searching	Gwangju, Gyeonggi-do
44	-0.24	<b>0.67*</b>	M	30	Moderate	Asc	Office worker	Gwangju, Gyeonggi-do
45	<b>0.63*</b>	0.35	F	55	Very conservative	High	Small business owner	Gwangju, Gyeonggi-do
46	<b>0.71*</b>	0.17	F	18	Moderately liberal	Col	Student	Cheongju
47	0.51	0.57	F	57	Moderately liberal	Mid	Kitchen staff	Naju
48	0.43	0.54	M	52	Very liberal	High	Taxi driver	Dongjak-gu, Seoul
49	<b>0.65*</b>	0.38	M	38	Moderately conservative	MA	Financial analyst	Seocho-gu, Seoul
50	<b>0.72*</b>	0.11	M	37	Moderately liberal	High	Heavy equipment operator	Gimhae

Note: V1 and V2 = Each participant's loadings on Viewpoint 1 and 2; loadings in bold with asterisks indicate that the sort was a defining sort. Total explained variance was 49%; Viewpoint 1 explained 41% of the variance and Viewpoint 2 explained 8%.

Abbreviations: Asc, associate degree; BA, bachelor's degree; MA, master's degree; Col, some college education/currently in college; F, female; High, high school diploma; JD, Juris Doctor degree; M, male; Mid, middle school diploma; N/A, no information/declined to answer; PhD, doctorate degree; Pro, professional degree.

when participants were completing the respective tasks. After the sorting, task participants completed demographic questions, and the researcher answered any questions participants had and paid them electronically (except Hungarian participants, who were not paid). Although researchers answered questions during the session and took some notes on participants' comments, participants were not interviewed systematically about their sorting patterns, and due to the differences in information obtained across contexts, we did not include these informal notes in the analysis.

## 2.4 | Analytic Procedure

Data analysis in Q methodology involves computing correlations and a factor analysis across participants rather than across items (Shemings 2006). Thus, unlike in factor analyses of scales, in Q methodology, the *person's* overall sorting pattern of statements is the unit of analysis, determining if there are commonalities in how individuals considered the statements together (as holistic viewpoints). Correlations between two Q-sorts indicate the sorting patterns' similarity. Each factor represents an idealized viewpoint on the issue (that a fictitious participant with a factor loading of 1 would produce), summarizing the views shared by participants whose Q-sorts load on the factor. Correlations

between factors (reported in the Tables S1–S4) indicate the two idealized viewpoints' similarity.<sup>4</sup>

We conducted principal component analyses, exploring and comparing different factor solutions to decide on the optimal number of factors (Watts and Stenner 2012). In addition to Q methodology's criterion of the factors' theoretical interpretability, we used quantitative criteria: The solution should maximize the number of participants loading clearly on one factor (with at least 0.40, no other factor loading higher than 75% of the primary loading; Field 2013), each factor should have at least three defining participants, and the correlations between factors should not exceed the median of the given factor loadings.

In describing the viewpoints, we use terms such as 'strongly endorsed', 'strongly emphasized' and 'strongly rejected' to indicate statements that participants selected as those they agreed with most (i.e., placed at +6 or +5) or least (i.e., placed at -6, -5). Where present, we note demographic differences between viewpoints to aid interpretation, following recommendations by Watts and Stenner (2012). We report descriptive statistics for these differences and do not test their statistical significance, as meaningful testing was not feasible given the small number of participants per viewpoint and non-probability sampling. To aid comprehension of these complex findings, we provide

an overview and summary of the gist of all viewpoints in Table 6.

### 3 | Results

#### 3.1 | Study 1: Kurdish American Immigrants From Turkey/Northern Kurdistan

A five-factor solution was deemed most appropriate (see Table 7), with 34 participants' Q sorts loading on one of the factors (and nine cross-loaders and eight participants with insufficient loadings; see Table 1).

##### 3.1.1 | Viewpoint 1: Concerns With Ongoing Oppression and Structural Solutions While Rejecting Negative Intergroup Attitudes

Viewpoint 1 ( $n = 16$ ) had more men ( $n = 10$ ) than women ( $n = 6$ ) and even more highly educated participants than other viewpoints.

Viewpoint 1 highlighted the ongoing violence against Kurds (#10–#12) and strongly emphasized the need to preserve Kurdish identity and culture (#22). However, the ingroup's victimization was not seen as particularly central to group identity (#36) or important to transmit as collective memories (#35; #44).

Participants endorsed structural, political solutions to their group's victimization through redress, emphasizing the need for justice, acknowledgement and reparations (#58; #55; #59; #60). Conversely, they focused less on intergroup relations or intragroup strategies. Accordingly, structural attributions for the violence against Kurds were emphasized (#33), and essentialist attributions of the perpetrator group as violent were strongly rejected (#32). Likewise, participants rejected statements linked to negative intergroup relations, such as exclusive victimization beliefs (#28; #27; #31) and outgroup distrust (#46). However, statements associated with positive intergroup relations, such as inclusive victimization beliefs (#30; #26) and outgroup solidarity and coalitions (#51; #52), were not emphasized. Ingroup-focused solutions to ingroup victimization, such as ingroup unity and strength (#21; #50; #54), were not highlighted either.

##### 3.1.2 | Viewpoint 2: Strengthening the Ingroup Symbolically and Materially in Light of Ongoing Oppression

Viewpoint 2 ( $n = 3$ , two men, one woman) included two left-wing participants and one right-wing participant.

Viewpoint 2 focused on the ingroup and its communal actions to strengthen the ingroup symbolically and materially given the ongoing, long-term violence against Kurds (#11–#13). Like Viewpoint 1, the need to preserve the victimized ingroup's culture and identity (#22) was one of the most endorsed statements. However, unlike Viewpoint 1, participants also emphasized transmission and commemoration of collective memories of ingroup

victimization (#44; #45; #35), in addition to the ingroup's material well-being (#54). Additionally, the ingroup was not seen as powerless (#2; #3).

This ingroup focus was not accompanied by negative intergroup attitudes. Like Viewpoint 1, participants rejected ideas linked to negative intergroup relations, such as exclusive victimization beliefs (#28; #27) or essentialist views of the perpetrator group (#32), while not emphasizing inclusive victimization beliefs either (#26; #30). Furthermore, participants rejected justifications for violent self-defence (#48) and that the ingroup had perpetrated harm (#23). Unlike Viewpoint 1, societal redress was not prioritized (#56; #58; #59), and participants did not think that Turks do not acknowledge violence against Kurds (#55).

##### 3.1.3 | Viewpoint 3: Ingroup Strength in the Face of Threatening Outgroups: Self-Defence, Survival and Resilience

Viewpoint 3 ( $n = 4$ ) included mostly women ( $n = 3$ , one man) and non-religious participants (except one).

Unlike Viewpoints 1 and 2, participants strongly emphasized that Kurds are morally entitled to do anything to survive (#49), while attributing their victimization to the perpetrator group's violent nature (#32). Accordingly, participants endorsed the need for vigilance (#47) and right to violent self-defence (#48), which other viewpoints rejected. Alongside this strong emphasis on confrontational intergroup solutions to the group's oppression, intergroup solidarity and coalitions were rejected (#51; #52), and societal redress through justice, reparations (#58; #59) and acknowledgement (#55; #57; #60) were not emphasized as much as in Viewpoint 1.

Related to self-defence, participants strongly emphasized ingroup strength through keeping the nation strong and united (#21; #50), supporting Kurdish businesses (#54) and the ingroup's history of survival and resilience (#15; #18; #19). Like Viewpoints 1 and 2, participants refuted that the ingroup lacked control or power (#2; #7; #3). In contrast to the emphasis on material strength, participants did not emphasize symbolic means of strengthening the ingroup through culture and identity (#22) or transmitting collective memories of ingroup victimization (#35). However, learning about Kurds' historical oppression was valued (#34), and the ingroup's victimization was seen as somewhat central to ingroup identity (#36; #42) and worldviews (#37).

##### 3.1.4 | Viewpoint 4: Centring Grievances and the Ingroup's Unique Victimization Without Empowering Strategies to Address It

Viewpoint 4 ( $n = 4$ , two men, two women) only included participants from major Kurdish cities (Diyarbakır and Şırnak).

This viewpoint focused on ingroup grievances, including feelings of injustice (#58), loss of culture and identity (#1) and

**TABLE 6** | Overview of viewpoints, Studies 1–5 and second-order analysis.

<b>Sample and viewpoint</b>	<b>Title and main content of viewpoint</b>	<b>Second order factor</b>
Kurdish Viewpoint 1	Concerns with ongoing oppression and structural solutions while rejecting negative intergroup attitudes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing oppression, need to preserve Kurdish culture and identity</li> <li>• Ingroup victimization not particularly central to ingroup identity</li> <li>• Structural and political solutions to ingroup victimization—redress (justice, acknowledgement, reparations); less focus on ingroup solutions</li> <li>• Structural rather than essentialist intergroup attributions for violence</li> <li>• Negative intergroup attitudes and exclusive victimization beliefs rejected; positive intergroup relations not particularly emphasized either</li> </ul>	Factor 6
Kurdish Viewpoint 2	Strengthening the ingroup symbolically and materially in light of ongoing oppression <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthening the ingroup materially and symbolically (identity, culture)</li> <li>• Transmitting and commemorating collective memories of ingroup victimization</li> <li>• Ingroup is not powerless</li> <li>• Rejecting negative intergroup attitudes and right to self-defence</li> </ul>	Factor 1
Kurdish Viewpoint 3	Ingroup strength in the face of threatening outgroups: self-defence, survival and resilience <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moral entitlement to violent self-defence; need for vigilance</li> <li>• Negative intergroup attitudes: essentialist attributions of ingroup victimization to perpetrator's violent nature; rejecting intergroup solidarity and coalitions</li> <li>• Focus on (further) material strength and power of the ingroup</li> <li>• Resilience and survival</li> </ul>	Factor 4
Kurdish Viewpoint 4	Centring grievances and the ingroup's unique victimization without empowering strategies to address it <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ingroup grievances: injustice, loss of culture and identity, no acknowledgement, long and ongoing nature of ingroup's victimization, constant threat</li> <li>• Exclusive victim beliefs (including competitive victimhood) and victim identity</li> <li>• Lack of empowering solutions to ingroup victimization; powerlessness</li> </ul>	N/A
Kurdish Viewpoint 5	The need for redress and preserving collective memories of collective victimization while emphasizing solidarity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for redress: acknowledgement, justice, reparations</li> <li>• Preserving and transmitting collective memories of ingroup victimization, not moving on</li> <li>• Ingroup solidarity and unity; supporting more affected ingroup members</li> <li>• Outgroup solidarity and coalitions; don't treat others like the ingroup was</li> </ul>	Factor 4
Black American Viewpoint 1	Awareness of long, ongoing oppression while rejecting negative intergroup attitudes and highlighting structural solutions and solidarity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Centrality of long-lasting historical and ongoing ingroup victimization and importance of remembering and teaching about it</li> <li>• Structural attributions for ingroup victimization and solutions to it—redress (justice, acknowledgement, reparations)</li> <li>• Inclusive victimization beliefs and intergroup coalitions</li> <li>• Rejecting negative intergroup attitudes and competitive victimhood</li> </ul>	Factor 6

(Continues)

TABLE 6 | (Continued)

Sample and viewpoint	Title and main content of viewpoint	Second order factor
Black American Viewpoint 2	Communal strategies for strengthening the ingroup symbolically and materially while rejecting negative intergroup relations and violence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Centrality of ingroup struggles for identity</li> <li>• Ingroup strategies to strengthen the ingroup symbolically (collective memories, culture and unity) and materially</li> <li>• Ingroup power, resilience and survival</li> <li>• Rejection of negative intergroup attitudes and violent resistance or self-defence; never treat others like we were treated</li> </ul>	N/A
Black American Viewpoint 3	Strengthening the ingroup in light of long-lasting, ongoing oppression and preserving collective memories of ingroup victimization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long-lasting and ongoing nature of the ingroup's victimization; duty to keep memories of ingroup victimization alive and not move on</li> <li>• Strengthening ingroup culture, identity and unity in addition to material support</li> <li>• Rejecting negative intergroup attitudes and competitive victimhood</li> <li>• No emphasis on structural or political solutions</li> </ul>	Factor 1
Black American Viewpoint 4	Rejecting victimhood, powerlessness and a focus on the past while emphasizing present-day threats and the need for material support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rejecting victimhood and powerlessness</li> <li>• Focus on present-day threats rather than on past, rejecting lessons of history</li> <li>• Need for material ingroup support and redress</li> <li>• Emphasis on ingroup unity while rejecting outgroup coalitions</li> </ul>	Factor 5
Black American Viewpoint 5	The ingroup's long, ongoing and unique experience of oppression and survival <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long-lasting, ongoing ingroup victimization and its consequences; grievances</li> <li>• Exclusive victimization beliefs and centrality of ingroup victimization for identity</li> <li>• Emphasis on survival and the need to preserve culture and identity</li> <li>• Strategies to address ingroup victimization not emphasized much</li> </ul>	N/A
Jewish American Viewpoint 1	Intergroup focus on inclusive lessons of the ingroup's historical victimization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusive victimization beliefs and lessons of ingroup victimization; rejecting competitive victimhood</li> <li>• Acknowledgement of ingroup power, privilege and perpetration of ingroup violence</li> <li>• Rejecting negative intergroup attitudes and right to self-defence; present threats not emphasized</li> <li>• Importance of commemorating historical ingroup victimization</li> </ul>	Factor 2
Jewish American Viewpoint 2	Ingroup unity and strength as responses to long-lasting, ongoing and unique experiences of victimization and survival <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ingroup's long and ongoing history of victimization; including present-day threats and perceived lack of acknowledgement</li> <li>• Importance of remembering and transmitting collective memories of ingroup victimization and not decentering victimhood; exclusive victimization beliefs</li> <li>• Need for ingroup unity and material and symbolic ingroup support</li> <li>• Survival, resilience, resistance and power</li> </ul>	Factor 1

(Continues)

TABLE 6 | (Continued)

Sample and viewpoint	Title and main content of viewpoint	Second order factor
Jewish American Viewpoint 3	Vigilance and entitlement to violent self-defence while keeping the ingroup strong and united <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for ingroup strength and unity; material and symbolic ingroup support</li> <li>• Rejecting distancing from ingroup victimhood or victim identity</li> <li>• Ingroup power and strength; entitlement to violent self-defence and need for vigilance</li> <li>• Inclusive victimization beliefs without outgroup solidarity or acknowledgement of ingroup privilege</li> </ul>	Factor 4
Hungarian Viewpoint 1	Intergroup focus on inclusive lessons of the ingroup's historical victimization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusive victimization beliefs and lessons of ingroup victimization; rejecting exclusive victimization beliefs</li> <li>• Acknowledging ingroup harmdoing and rejecting negative intergroup attitudes and violent self-defence</li> <li>• Historical closure, commemoration of past violence not particularly emphasized, rejecting entitlement to reparation and present-day ingroup threat</li> </ul>	Factor 2
Hungarian Viewpoint 2	Strengthening the ingroup and preserving collective memories of victimization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uniting and strengthening the ingroup materially and symbolically</li> <li>• Commemoration and transmission of historical ingroup victimization but no perception of present-day threat</li> <li>• Grievances concerning perceived lack of redress (justice and acknowledgement)</li> <li>• Rejecting negative intergroup attitudes, hostility and exclusive victimization beliefs</li> </ul>	Factor 4
Hungarian Viewpoint 3	Centring grievances without solutions to address the ingroup's victimization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ingroup grievances: Abandonment by outgroups, long-lasting and ongoing victimization, lack of justice, acknowledgement and power</li> <li>• Rejecting exclusive victimization beliefs or victim identity and centrality</li> <li>• Ingroup and intergroup solutions to ingroup victimization and empowerment rejected or not emphasized</li> </ul>	Factor 3
Korean Viewpoint 1	Preserving collective memories of ingroup victimization, strengthening the ingroup and demanding redress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remembering and transmitting collective memories of historical ingroup victimization; centrality of ingroup victimization to identity</li> <li>• Strengthening the ingroup materially and symbolically; preserving ingroup culture, identity and unity</li> <li>• Ingroup power, resistance, resilience and survival; no perceived present threat</li> <li>• Need for redress (acknowledgement, justice, reparations)</li> </ul>	Factor 4
Korean Viewpoint 2	Intergroup focus on inclusive lessons of historical victimization and moving forward <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusive victimization beliefs and prosocial lessons of ingroup victimization</li> <li>• Rejecting negative intergroup attitudes, exclusive victimization beliefs and right to violent self-defence while acknowledging ingroup harmdoing</li> <li>• Historical closure and moving on; present-day power rather than ongoing threat</li> </ul>	Factor 2

a lack of acknowledgement of the ingroup's suffering (#56). Like Viewpoints 1 and 2, it also emphasized the group's long history and the ongoing nature of these grievances (#11; #13; #9; #24). However, this perspective did not highlight empowerment or solutions to address the group's victimization. Addi-

tionally, unlike other viewpoints, participants believed that the ingroup is under constant threat (#6) and had suffered more than other groups and in unique ways (#26–#28; #30), also claiming the victim label (#43) and refusing to move on (#38).

**TABLE 7** | Z-scores of the statements for each viewpoint, Kurdish American sample.

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5
1	We lost our culture—such as language and our traditional Kurdish way of life—because of how we were persecuted and oppressed	0.69	0.92	0.46	1.34	−0.97
2	Due to how we were persecuted and oppressed, we do not have the power we used to have	−0.91	−1.20	−1.72	0.48	−0.75
3	We never had much power	−0.93	−0.93	−0.65	−0.24	−1.19
4	We have much more power now than we did in the past	−0.97	−0.15	0.50	−0.78	−1.19
5	Because of how we were persecuted and oppressed, we have lost the sense of community we used to have	−0.96	−0.49	−1.23	0.70	−0.98
6	Kurds are constantly under threat	0.37	−0.57	−0.61	0.97	−0.74
7	Kurds have very little control over our future	−0.66	−0.41	−1.43	0.25	−1.19
8	We are on our own because no other nations or groups care about us	−0.95	0.32	−0.50	−0.09	−1.41
9	The Kurdish people have a long history of being persecuted, targeted and oppressed	0.69	0.86	0.05	0.81	−0.58
10	Even today, Kurds are still suffering in several ways as a result of the violence against us in the past	1.21	0.96	0.19	0.83	−0.62
11	What happened to us in the past is not over yet—we are still being persecuted and oppressed today	1.34	1.11	0.43	1.27	−0.70
12	Anti-Kurdish violence still exists; it has just taken on a different form than in the past	1.04	2.15	0.07	0.67	−0.56
13	We have suffered throughout history and still do to this day	0.92	1.59	−0.43	1.24	−0.53
14	We have been oppressed and persecuted by different groups in different places	0.91	1.27	0.80	0.79	−0.29
15	We survived, and we are still here	0.43	−0.67	1.13	0.44	−0.43
16	Kurds have always fought back against our oppressors, and we will continue to resist	−0.06	−0.41	0.50	−0.51	−0.43
17	All that we had to go through shows that we are a strong community	0.00	0.01	0.38	−1.19	−0.46
18	We are a resilient people—despite all we suffer through, we still thrive	0.66	0.65	1.10	−0.10	−0.80
19	We have a proud history of struggle and survival	0.25	0.18	1.12	−0.34	−0.49
20	We need to do what we can as a community to give emotional and financial support to the Kurdish people who were arrested or tortured by the state	0.71	0.44	0.02	−0.75	0.07
21	We need to do what we can to keep our Kurdish nation strong and stick together	0.49	0.36	1.45	−0.20	0.19
22	It's important to keep our culture and identity alive and preserve it for future generations	1.50	1.92	0.13	1.76	0.56
23	Kurds have also harmed others, and not just been harmed	0.23	−1.10	−1.95	−1.47	−0.21
24	In the past we were persecuted and oppressed much more than we are today	−0.93	0.47	−1.02	−1.76	−0.63
25	There are some groups within the Kurdish nation that suffer(ed) and were oppressed much more than others	0.63	0.29	−0.75	0.39	1.02
26	There are other groups in the world that experience persecution and oppression similar to Kurds	0.41	−0.17	−0.27	−1.52	0.46
27	The suffering of Kurds is unique in world history	−1.36	−0.93	0.65	0.86	0.68
28	No other nation in the world has been persecuted and oppressed as much as Kurds	−2.09	−2.33	−0.89	1.54	−0.34

(Continues)

TABLE 7 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5
29	There are other groups in the Middle East that have suffered more than us	-0.73	-1.08	-1.95	-1.82	-1.27
30	There are other groups in the Middle East that experience persecution and oppression similar to Kurds	0.70	0.22	-0.48	-1.24	0.11
31	Kurds have been oppressed or treated unfairly to a greater extent than other groups in the Middle East	-1.21	0.00	0.01	0.59	0.39
32	Turks have oppressed us because they are violent by nature	-2.07	-0.75	1.42	-0.48	-0.63
33	The Turkish violence against Kurds can be explained by broader historical, social and systemic influences	1.28	-0.78	0.94	0.07	0.91
34	It is very important to me to know and learn more about the Kurdish history of oppression and persecution	0.77	-1.26	1.03	0.46	0.96
35	It is important to remember and pass on stories of our history of oppression and the violence committed against us	0.45	1.33	0.24	1.28	1.21
36	Our people's struggles have shaped who we are today	0.50	0.50	1.05	-0.15	0.86
37	Knowing about how Kurds have been oppressed and persecuted shapes how I understand social and political issues today	0.57	0.90	0.62	0.61	1.20
38	We (Kurds) need to leave our painful past behind us and move on	-0.76	0.68	-1.44	-1.71	-1.72
39	Many Kurds who were imprisoned or experienced other violence don't want to talk about it	-0.25	-0.69	-1.36	-0.80	0.19
40	I am not very interested in learning more about the suffering of the Kurdish people	-2.29	-2.01	-2.11	-1.74	-2.23
41	I don't think a lot about the Kurdish history of violence and oppression, because it is not very relevant to my daily life	-2.31	-1.86	-2.12	-1.89	-1.89
42	Our experiences of oppression do not define us	0.13	-0.34	-0.76	-0.68	-0.31
43	We are not victims; we are victors	-0.84	-0.38	-0.50	-0.86	-0.68
44	It is our duty to keep the memory of Kurdish oppression and persecution alive for the sake of future generations	0.19	1.67	0.35	0.51	1.49
45	It is important to commemorate and educate the public about Kurdish history, including the history of our oppression, persecution and our resistance	0.99	1.50	0.49	0.84	1.71
46	History teaches us that we can only trust our own people	-1.59	-0.42	-0.53	-0.37	-0.88
47	Kurdish history teaches us that we need to be vigilant	0.24	0.68	0.81	0.30	0.66
48	A central lesson of our history is that we need to protect and defend ourselves, which sometimes means using violence against those who want to harm us	0.40	-1.66	0.90	-1.34	0.30
49	A central lesson from our history is that we are morally entitled to do whatever is necessary to survive	-0.18	-0.17	2.09	-0.43	0.94
50	Our history has taught us that we need to be united and keep the Kurdish nation together	0.51	-0.16	1.32	0.14	1.60
51	Kurds will be more successful in achieving our goals if we form coalitions with other oppressed groups	-0.28	0.96	-0.94	-1.41	1.27
52	A central lesson of our history is that Kurds should support oppressed peoples around the world	0.29	0.20	-0.77	0.06	0.45
53	A central lesson of our history is that Kurds should never treat other groups in the same way as we were treated	0.67	-0.59	0.00	0.06	1.81
54	Whenever possible, Kurds should support Kurdish businesses to help our community	-0.01	1.19	1.28	0.20	1.50

(Continues)

TABLE 7 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5
55	Turks do not acknowledge violence and oppression against Kurds enough	1.17	-1.13	0.68	0.94	1.59
56	Most nations in the world do not know much about the violence committed against Kurds by the Turkish government	0.19	0.69	0.48	1.21	0.02
57	The suffering my group experienced is often overlooked or forgotten because all the attention is devoted to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict	-1.25	-0.30	-0.36	0.53	-0.12
58	The perpetrators of violence against Kurds have not been brought to justice	1.95	0.54	0.87	2.20	1.89
59	Kurds deserve reparations from Turkey	1.17	-0.50	0.77	0.47	0.82
60	Overall, many people in the world know about the violence committed against Kurds	-1.03	-1.16	0.43	-0.92	0.37




FIGURE 1 | The Q-sort distribution (above) and an example of a Q-sort session (below). Source: The screenshots above are adapted from Q-method software (Lutfallah and Buchanan 2019), with permission to share.

Although participants focused on some symbolic issues (similar to Viewpoint 2), such as preserving ingroup identity and culture (#22) and transmitting collective memories of ingroup victimization (#35), they did not emphasize other solutions. They did not believe the ingroup was strong (#17) or powerful (#2; #7; #3). Like Viewpoints 1 and 2, participants rejected violent self-defence (#48), and unlike other viewpoints, they did not emphasize resistance or resilience (#16; #18).

### 3.1.5 | Viewpoint 5: The Need for Redress and Preserving Collective Memories of Collective Victimization While Emphasizing Solidarity

Viewpoint 5 ( $n = 7$ ) included mostly ( $n = 6$ ) men. Unlike other viewpoints, most were religious.

This viewpoint entailed three emphases. The first was the need for redress through the perpetrator group's acknowledgement (#55), justice (#58) and reparations (#59), similar to Viewpoint 1. The second was on preserving and transmitting collective memories of ingroup victimization (#45; #35; #44), similar to Viewpoint 2. Accordingly, like Viewpoints 3 and 4, participants strongly rejected moving on (#38).

The third focus was on ingroup and outgroup solidarity. Intra-group solidarity included emphasizing the ingroup's community and culture (#1; #5), the need for ingroup unity and supporting ingroup members materially (#50; #54) and recognizing more affected ingroup members (#25). Outgroup solidarity as a response to the ingroup's victimization distinguished Viewpoint 5 from other viewpoints and included valuing coalitions with other oppressed groups (#51) and strongly endorsing the perceived lesson of Kurdish victimization to refrain from treating others like the ingroup was treated (#53). Additionally, participants disagreed that nobody cares about Kurds (#8), which may indicate awareness of outgroup solidarity.

## 3.2 | Study 2: Black Americans

Five factors best captured the nuances of viewpoints in this sample (see Table 8),<sup>5</sup> including Q sorts from 32 participants (1 participant had insufficient loadings, and 14 had cross-loadings; see Table 2).

### 3.2.1 | Viewpoint 1: Awareness of Long, Ongoing Oppression While Rejecting Negative Intergroup Attitudes and Highlighting Structural Solutions and Solidarity

Viewpoint 1 ( $n = 10$ ) included mostly women ( $n = 6$ ), liberal or leftist ( $n = 7$ ) and young (19–24) participants (except one 72-year-old), all born in the United States.

This viewpoint strongly emphasized the centrality and ongoing nature of the ingroup's historical victimization. The highest ranked statements included that the ingroup's oppression had shaped participants' views (#37) and that racism continues in new forms (#12). Participants emphasized remembering and

teaching their history of oppression and resistance (#45; #36; #34) and strongly rejected distancing oneself from the ingroup's victimization (#38; #40; #41).

Participants strongly endorsed structural attributions for ingroup victimization (#33) while rejecting essentialist attributions of the perpetrator's violence (#32). Accordingly, they emphasized structural and political solutions to the ingroup's victimization, such as redress through justice (#58), reparations (#59) and acknowledgement (#55; #56; #60). To achieve societal change, participants highlighted coalitions with other oppressed groups (#51), along with inclusive victimization beliefs (#30), which were both ranked higher than in other viewpoints. The potential for outgroup coalitions was reinforced by rejecting negative intergroup attitudes (#46; #8) and competitive victimhood (#28; #57). Ingroup solidarity and unity were also endorsed (#20; #21; #50), though not as much as in Viewpoint 2.

### 3.2.2 | Viewpoint 2: Communal Strategies for Strengthening the Ingroup Symbolically and Materially, While Rejecting Negative Intergroup Relations and Violence

Five participants (mostly women,  $n = 4$ ), all middle-aged ( $M = 50.8$ ,  $SD = 11.39$ ), and immigrants, shared this viewpoint. They were less liberal than in Viewpoint 1 (three moderate, two somewhat liberal).

Viewpoint 2 included two foci: on the ingroup's strengths and strategies to address the ingroup's victimization, and on (positive) intergroup relations. One of the highest ranked statements that distinguished Viewpoint 2 from other viewpoints was how the ingroup's struggles shaped their identity (#36). Accordingly, preserving the ingroup's collective memories and culture was strongly emphasized (#22; #45). In addition to this symbolic focus, participants endorsed strengthening the ingroup through material support, unity and solidarity (#21; #20; #50; #54). They also highlighted the ingroup's strength, resilience and survival (#17; #18; #19) as well as power (#2; #4), while rejecting ingroup vulnerability (#1; #5; #6; #10).

This ingroup focus was not accompanied by negative intergroup attitudes, which were strongly rejected like in Viewpoint 1 (#8; #32; #57; #46). The lesson to never treat outgroups how the ingroup was treated was highly ranked (#53), unlike other viewpoints. Further emphasizing nonviolent responses to ingroup victimization, participants rejected violent self-defence (#48), ranking this and another statement about resistance (#16) lower than other viewpoints. However, participants also did not endorse other structural and political solutions to the ingroup's oppression, such as outgroup coalitions (#51; #52) or redress (#60; #58; #59; #55).

### 3.2.3 | Viewpoint 3: Strengthening the Ingroup in Light of Long-Lasting, Ongoing Oppression and Preserving Collective Memories of Ingroup Victimization

Viewpoint 3 ( $n = 7$ ) mostly included men ( $n = 6$ ) with moderate political views ( $n = 4$ ). The age range varied, and all but one were born in the United States.

**TABLE 8** | Z-scores of the statements for each viewpoint, Black American sample.

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5
1	We lost our culture—such as language and our traditional way of life—because of how we were oppressed	0.46	−0.98	−0.74	0.05	−1.03
2	Due to how we were oppressed, we do not have the power we used to have	−0.94	−1.41	−1.27	−1.84	−0.93
3	We never had much power	−1.31	0.73	−0.59	−1.72	−1.77
4	We have much more power now than we did in the past	−0.70	0.88	0.05	0.89	0.05
5	Because of how we were oppressed, we have lost the sense of community we used to have	0.03	−0.35	−0.51	0.03	−0.60
6	Black Americans are constantly under threat	0.40	−0.87	1.13	1.18	0.83
7	We have very little control over our future	−1.69	−1.83	−0.90	−2.48	−1.42
8	We are on our own because no other communities care about us	−1.15	−1.99	−1.06	−1.65	0.88
9	We have a long history of being targeted and oppressed	1.02	0.48	1.73	0.18	2.32
10	Even today, Black Americans are still suffering in several ways as a result of the violence against us in the past	0.75	−0.82	0.83	0.55	1.48
11	What happened to us in the past is not over yet—we are still being targeted and oppressed today	0.83	1.12	1.52	0.80	1.36
12	Racism still exists; it has just taken on a different form than in the past	1.35	0.84	2.06	1.28	0.58
13	We have suffered throughout history and still do to this day	0.52	0.37	1.39	−0.10	0.93
14	We have been oppressed by different groups in different places	0.11	−0.31	0.55	−0.14	0.37
15	We survived, and we are still here	0.22	0.46	0.66	0.33	1.41
16	Black Americans have always fought back against our oppressors and we will continue to resist	0.19	−0.58	0.59	0.64	0.47
17	All we have endured shows that we are a strong community	−0.57	1.20	0.10	0.01	−0.12
18	We are a resilient people—despite all we suffer through, we still thrive	0.89	1.08	0.96	0.22	0.46
19	We have a proud history of struggle and survival	−0.40	1.22	−0.72	0.58	0.97
20	We need to do what we can as a community to give emotional and financial support to Black Americans who are targeted by racist violence such as police brutality	0.72	1.21	1.32	1.67	−0.12
21	We need to do what we can to keep our Black community strong and sticking together	0.74	1.30	1.05	0.77	1.33
22	It's important to keep our culture and identity alive and preserve it for future generations	0.98	1.41	1.52	0.86	1.56
23	We have also oppressed others, and not just been oppressed	−0.84	−0.41	−2.06	−0.58	−1.82
24	In the past we were oppressed much more than we are today	−0.41	−0.30	−0.09	0.84	0.33
25	There are some groups within the Black community that suffered much more than others	0.94	0.60	0.29	0.11	0.38
26	There are other groups in the world that experience injustice and oppression similar to Black Americans	−0.44	0.14	−0.81	0.63	−0.53
27	The suffering of Black Americans is unique in world history	0.30	0.04	−0.54	0.32	0.92
28	No other group in the world has been oppressed as much as Black Americans	−1.41	−0.91	−0.11	0.40	−0.06

(Continues)

TABLE 8 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5
29	There are other groups in the United States that have suffered more than us	-0.92	-0.56	-0.18	-1.61	-1.08
30	There are other groups in the United States that experience injustice and oppression similar to Black Americans	0.60	-0.58	0.02	-0.38	-0.24
31	Black Americans have been oppressed or treated unfairly to a greater extent than other groups in the United States	0.05	0.10	-0.37	0.40	1.35
32	White people have oppressed us because they are violent by nature	-0.85	-2.13	-0.93	-0.79	-1.31
33	White supremacy against Black Americans can be explained by broader historical, social and systemic influences	1.17	0.33	-1.56	0.04	1.00
34	It is very important to me to know and learn more about Black Americans' history of oppression	0.40	0.31	0.91	0.96	0.51
35	It is important to remember and pass on stories of our history of oppression and the violence committed against us	0.19	0.42	0.58	-0.91	0.15
36	Our people's struggles have shaped who we are today	0.66	1.44	-1.17	0.37	-0.04
37	Knowing about how Black Americans have been oppressed shapes how I understand social and political issues today	1.82	1.28	0.19	1.23	1.18
38	We need to leave our painful past behind us and move on	-1.89	-0.66	-2.36	0.13	-1.45
39	Black Americans who experienced racist violence don't want to talk about it	-0.76	-0.73	-1.31	-1.52	-0.76
40	I am not very interested in learning more about the suffering of Black people	-2.29	-0.83	-1.57	-1.79	0.07
41	I don't think a lot about Black people's history of oppression, because it is not very relevant to my daily life	-2.44	-0.19	-1.94	-1.82	-0.75
42	Our experiences of oppression do not define us	-0.43	-0.28	0.32	1.32	-1.46
43	We are not victims; we are victors	-0.68	1.10	0.59	1.32	-0.74
44	It is our duty to keep the memory of Black oppression alive for the sake of future generations	0.24	-0.61	1.50	-0.83	0.15
45	It is important to commemorate and educate the public about Black history, including the history of our oppression and our resistance	1.03	1.35	0.79	-0.06	1.01
46	History teaches us that we can only trust our own people	-1.68	-1.14	-1.02	-0.45	-1.08
47	Black history teaches us that we need to be vigilant	0.15	0.37	0.15	-0.55	-0.55
48	A central lesson of our history is that we need to protect and defend ourselves, which sometimes means using violence against those who want to harm us	0.03	-1.66	-0.38	-0.03	-1.04
49	A central lesson from our history is that we are morally entitled to do whatever is necessary to survive	-0.64	0.83	0.21	-0.05	-0.63
50	Our history has taught us that we need to be united and keep the Black community together	0.68	1.06	0.82	1.26	0.26
51	Black Americans will be more successful in achieving our goals if we form coalitions with other oppressed groups	0.84	-1.45	0.34	-1.08	-1.33
52	A central lesson of our history is that Black Americans should support oppressed peoples around the world	0.26	-0.56	0.01	0.49	-1.01
53	A central lesson of our history is that Black Americans should never treat other groups in the same way as we were treated	0.63	1.87	0.15	-1.16	-1.03

(Continues)

TABLE 8 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5
54	Whenever possible, Black Americans should support Black businesses to help our community	-0.04	0.70	1.42	1.26	0.50
55	White Americans do not acknowledge slavery and racism enough	1.11	-1.07	0.12	0.12	0.10
56	Most nations in the world do not know much about the violence committed against Black people in the United States through slavery and racism	0.67	0.49	-0.47	-0.51	-1.08
57	The suffering Black Americans experienced is often overlooked or forgotten because all the attention is devoted to the Holocaust	-0.21	-1.67	-0.65	-1.70	0.01
58	The perpetrators of violence against Black Americans have not been brought to justice	1.77	0.31	-0.29	0.87	1.56
59	Black Americans deserve reparations from the United States	1.58	-0.80	-0.10	1.34	0.71
60	Overall, many people in the world know about the violence committed against Black Americans	-1.65	0.62	-0.17	0.27	-1.10

This viewpoint strongly emphasized the long-lasting, ongoing nature of the ingroup's victimization (#9; #11-#13; #6). The perceived duty to keep memories of this history alive was ranked higher than in other viewpoints (#44); preserving collective memories of the ingroup's victimization was endorsed (#34; #35; #45), whereas moving on was rejected (#38; #40; #41). The need to strengthen the ingroup's culture and identity (#22) was ranked higher than in other viewpoints. In addition to these symbolic ways of addressing ingroup victimization, including through ingroup unity (#21; #50), participants highlighted the need for material ingroup support (#20; #54). However, unlike Viewpoint 2, participants did not emphasize ingroup strength (#4; #17) or resilience (#18).

Like other viewpoints, negative intergroup attitudes were mostly rejected (#8; #32; #46). Competitive victimhood was ranked lower than in other viewpoints (#27; #28; #31). However, unlike other viewpoints, participants also strongly rejected structural attributions for their oppression (#33). Accordingly, structural and political solutions, including redress (#55-#60) and coalitions with other minority groups (#51), were not emphasized.

### 3.2.4 | Viewpoint 4: Rejecting Victimhood, Powerlessness and a Focus on the Past While Emphasizing Present-Day Threats and Need for Material Support

Viewpoint 4 ( $n = 5$ ) was mostly shared by women ( $n = 4$ ) of different ages and born in the United States.

Participants emphasized, more strongly than in other viewpoints, that they were not victims or defined by oppression (#42; #43). However, although they disagreed that the ingroup lacked power (#2-#4; #7), they did not emphasize ingroup resilience (#17; #18), survival (#15; #19) or resistance (#16). Perhaps related to rejecting victimhood, unlike other viewpoints, the long-lasting nature of the ingroup's victimization (#9; #13) or preserving collective

memories of the ingroup's history of oppression and resistance were not emphasized (#35; #44; #45). Participants also rejected drawing lessons from this history (#46-#49; #53). However, they agreed that the ingroup suffered from present-day racism and threats (#10-#12; #6) and that the ingroup's oppression was personally relevant (#34; #37).

Another focus in this viewpoint was the need for material support. The need for reparations (#59) and communal support for victims of racist violence (#20) were ranked higher than in other viewpoints. Participants also emphasized ingroup solidarity and unity (#21; #50; #54), while rejecting coalitions with other oppressed groups (#51). Symbolic redress through acknowledging the ingroup's suffering was not prioritized (#55-#57; #60; #8).

### 3.2.5 | Viewpoint 5: The Ingroup's Long, Ongoing and Unique Experience of Oppression and Survival

Viewpoint 5 ( $n = 5$ ; four women, one man) was shared by participants in their early 20s (except for one 60-year-old), born in the United States. Most identified as somewhat liberal ( $n = 4$ ).

This viewpoint focused on characteristics of the ingroup's victimization, and less on solutions to address it. Participants emphasized the long-lasting, ongoing nature of ingroup victimization and its consequences (#9-#11; #13), along with other grievances such as lacking justice (#58) and abandonment by outgroups (#8). Unlike other viewpoints, participants endorsed exclusive victimization beliefs (#31; #27; #29) while rejecting statements decentering victimhood (#23; #38; #42; #43). The ingroup's victimization was seen as an important part of collective and personal identity and consciousness (#37; #45; #34). However, like other viewpoints, participants strongly refuted that the ingroup lacked power (#3; #7; #2) and stressed the ingroup's survival (#15; #19) more than in other viewpoints.

Like in several other viewpoints, participants strongly emphasized the need to preserve the ingroup's culture and identity (#22). Other strategies to address ingroup victimization were emphasized less than in other viewpoints, including the need for reparations (#59), ingroup solidarity and unity (#21; #54; #50; #20) and preserving the ingroup's collective memories (#35; #40; #44). Intergroup strategies were rejected, including negative intergroup attitudes (#32; #46), like in most other viewpoints, but also solidarity and coalitions with other oppressed groups (#51; #53).

### 3.3 | Study 3: Jewish Americans

The three-factor solution was deemed most appropriate (see Table 9), with 38 participants' Q sorts loading clearly on a factor (four participants had cross-loadings and six did not load sufficiently on any factor; see Table 3).

#### 3.3.1 | Viewpoint 1: Intergroup Focus on Inclusive Lessons of the Ingroup's Historical Victimization

Viewpoint 1 ( $n = 23$ ) was shared by an approximately equal number of men and women and participants who were politically more left-leaning than in other viewpoints (none identified as moderate or conservative) and less religious.

This viewpoint focused on positive intergroup relations. All the highest ranked statements were inclusive comparisons with other groups' suffering and inclusive lessons of the ingroup's victimization (#51–#53; #26, #30). Accordingly, competitive victimhood was strongly rejected (#31; #28; #57), more than in other viewpoints. Moreover, participants acknowledged their group's power (#3; #2) and present-day privilege, strongly agreeing that other groups in the United States suffered more (#29) and that the ingroup had also perpetrated violence, which was endorsed more than in other viewpoints (#23). Likewise, the perceived right to violent self-defence was rejected (#48; #49) more than in other viewpoints. Negative intergroup attitudes were strongly rejected (#32; #46), and redress was ranked lower than in other viewpoints (#56; #58).

Conversely, the intragroup level—such as ingroup unity and strength—was not particularly emphasized (#20–#22; #50; #54). However, participants believed it was important to commemorate and educate about the ingroup's historical victimization (#45; #35; #44), which was seen as relevant to personal and collective identities (#37; #36) and not decentered (#38; #40; #41). Yet, unlike Viewpoint 3, ongoing consequences of historical victimization, or present-day threat and suffering, were not emphasized (#9–#11; #24; #13; #6).

#### 3.3.2 | Viewpoint 2: Ingroup Unity and Strength as Responses to Long-Lasting, Ongoing and Unique Experiences of Victimization and Survival

Participants sharing Viewpoint 2 ( $n = 7$ ; four men, three women) were somewhat younger than participants in Viewpoint 1, less left-leaning, and more religious.

In contrast to the intergroup focus of Viewpoint 1, participants focused on characteristics of the ingroup's victimization and intragroup strategies addressing it. The ingroup's long history of victimization was strongly highlighted (#9), and (unlike Viewpoint 1) ongoing consequences and present-day threats were also emphasized (#6; #10–#13). Participants strongly rejected decentering the ingroup's victimization (#38; #40; #41) and, like Viewpoint 1, believed the ingroup's history of victimization should be commemorated and transmitted (#35; #34; #44; #45). Additionally, they strongly emphasized the need for ingroup unity as a lesson of this history (#50), including supporting the ingroup materially and symbolically (#20–#22; #54). Participants also highlighted ingroup strength, including survival (#15; #19), resistance and resilience (#16; #18), and did not believe the ingroup is powerless (#2–#4; #7).

Conversely, intergroup relations were not emphasized as much, and like Viewpoint 1, negative attitudes towards the perpetrator group (#32; #59) and entitlement to violent self-defence (#48; #49) were rejected. However, unlike Viewpoint 1, participants believed the Holocaust is not sufficiently acknowledged (#56; #57; #60) and perceived the ingroup's victimization as unique (#27), rejecting inclusive victimization beliefs (#26; #30; #51; #52).

#### 3.3.3 | Viewpoint 3: Vigilance and Entitlement to Violent Self-Defence While Keeping the Ingroup Strong and United

Viewpoint 3 ( $n = 8$ , four men, four women) was shared by less left-leaning and more religiously observant participants than Viewpoint 1. Almost all ( $n = 6$ ) had family in Israel.

Similar to Viewpoint 2, participants strongly emphasized many intragroup aspects of the ingroup's victimization, such as the need to keep the ingroup strong and united (#21; #50), which was endorsed more than in other viewpoints; and both material support for ingroup members (#30) and symbolic issues such as preserving the ingroup's culture (#22) and collective memories of victimization (#45; #35–#37; #44). Accordingly, like in Viewpoint 2, distancing oneself from the ingroup's victimization was strongly rejected (#38; #40; #41), as were statements about lack of power and control (#7; #2–#4).

Unlike other viewpoints, this emphasis on ingroup strength included the ingroup's perceived right to (violent) self-defence (#48; #49). Relatedly, vigilance as a lesson of ingroup victimization (#47) was strongly emphasized. However, ongoing threat and victimization were not highlighted as much as in Viewpoint 2 and even somewhat rejected (#6; #9–#13). Additionally, unlike Viewpoint 2, participants did not endorse competitive victimhood (#27; #28; #31) while strongly endorsing global inclusive victimization beliefs (#26) and some similarity with oppressed groups in the United States (#30). Unlike Viewpoint 1, though, this was not accompanied by acknowledging present-day privilege (#29), ingroup harmdoing (#23), or solidarity with other minority groups (#52; #51), suggesting the inclusive victimization beliefs were strategic and not driven by a prosocial intergroup orientation.

**TABLE 9** | Z-scores of the statements for each viewpoint, Jewish American sample.

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3
1	We lost our culture—such as language and our traditional Jewish way of life—because of how we were persecuted	−0.74	−1.19	−1.05
2	Due to how we were persecuted, we do not have the power we used to have	−0.92	−0.67	−1.35
3	Jewish Americans never had much power	−0.99	−0.36	−1.48
4	Jewish Americans have much more power now than we did in the past	0.11	−0.66	−0.37
5	Because of how Jews were persecuted, we have lost the sense of community we used to have	−0.82	−1.27	−1.36
6	The Jewish people are constantly under threat	−0.45	1.10	−1.05
7	We (Jewish Americans) have very little control over our future	−0.99	−1.31	−1.80
8	We are on our own because no other groups care about Jews	−1.34	0.39	−1.36
9	The Jewish people have a long history of being persecuted	0.52	1.60	0.12
10	Even today, Jews are still suffering in several ways as a result of the violence against us in the past	0.06	0.39	−0.79
11	What happened to us in the past is not over yet—Jews are still being targeted today	0.35	1.50	−0.18
12	Antisemitism still exists; it has just taken on a different form than in the past	0.79	1.02	0.36
13	The Jewish people have suffered throughout history and we still do to this day	−0.12	0.50	−0.30
14	The Jewish people have been persecuted by different groups in different places	0.95	0.50	0.47
15	We survived, and we are still here	0.77	1.17	0.43
16	Jews have always fought back against our oppressors, and we will continue to resist	0.15	0.69	−0.28
17	All that the Jewish people were able to endure shows that we are a strong community	0.25	0.35	0.62
18	Jews are a resilient people—despite all we suffer through, we still thrive	0.59	0.90	0.56
19	The Jewish people have a proud history of struggle and survival	0.64	0.86	0.69
20	We need to do what we can as a community to give emotional and financial support to Jewish Holocaust survivors and others who were targeted by antisemitic violence	0.51	0.94	0.88
21	We need to do what we can to keep our Jewish community strong and together	0.03	0.66	1.64
22	It's important to keep our Jewish culture and identity alive and preserve it for future generations	0.76	0.88	1.41
23	Jews have also harmed others, and not just been harmed	1.16	−0.03	−0.03
24	In the past, the Jewish people were targeted much more than we are today	0.38	−0.94	0.22
25	There are some groups within the Jewish community that suffer(ed) much more than others	0.64	−0.11	0.25
26	There are other groups in the world that have experienced genocide and persecution similar to Jews	1.51	−1.26	1.55
27	The suffering of the Jewish people is unique in world history	−1.07	1.03	−0.82

(Continues)

TABLE 9 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3
28	No other group in the world has been persecuted as much as the Jewish people	-1.64	-0.14	-0.80
29	There are other groups in the United States that have suffered more than Jews	1.71	0.01	-0.99
30	There are other groups in the United States that experience injustice and discrimination similar to Jewish Americans	1.42	-1.06	0.70
31	Jews have been oppressed or treated unfairly to a greater extent than other groups in the United States	-1.78	-0.10	-0.38
32	Germans have persecuted and killed us during the Holocaust because they are violent by nature	-1.94	-1.74	-1.70
33	The Holocaust can be explained by broader historical, social and systemic influences	0.95	-0.42	0.30
34	It is very important to me to know and learn more about the Jewish peoples' history of persecution	0.28	0.68	0.26
35	It is important to remember and pass on stories about the history of violence committed against the Jewish people	0.82	1.41	1.17
36	The Jewish peoples' struggles have shaped who we are today	0.92	0.31	1.37
37	Knowing about how Jews have been persecuted shapes how I understand social and political issues today	1.06	0.30	1.15
38	We (Jews) need to leave our painful past behind us and move on	-1.04	-2.28	-1.76
39	Many Jewish Holocaust survivors who were imprisoned or experienced other violence don't want to talk about it	0.06	-0.33	0.83
40	I am not very interested in learning more about the suffering of the Jewish people	-1.07	-1.78	-1.65
41	I don't think a lot about the history of violence and persecution against the Jews, because it is not very relevant to my daily life	-0.96	-1.96	-1.24
42	Our experiences of victimization do not define us	0.30	-0.42	0.66
43	We are not victims; we are victors	-0.32	-0.39	-0.49
44	It is our duty to keep the memory of Jewish suffering alive for the sake of future generations	0.30	0.67	0.93
45	It is important to commemorate and educate the public about Jewish history, including the history of our persecution and resistance	1.03	0.77	1.48
46	Jewish history teaches us that we can only trust our own people	-1.61	-0.97	-0.73
47	Jewish history teaches us that we need to be vigilant	0.65	0.73	1.82
48	A central lesson of Jewish history is that we need to protect and defend ourselves, which sometimes means using violence against those who want to harm us	-0.41	0.33	1.20
49	A central lesson from Jewish history is that we are morally entitled to do whatever is necessary to survive	-1.60	-1.33	0.85
50	Our history has taught us that we need to be united and keep the Jewish community together	-0.32	1.76	1.18
51	We (Jewish Americans) will be more successful in achieving our goals if we form coalitions with other victimized groups	1.43	-1.15	-0.54
52	A central lesson of our history is that Jews should support oppressed peoples around the world	2.02	0.16	0.15
53	A central lesson of our history is that Jews should never treat other groups in the same way as we were treated	1.94	0.83	0.99

(Continues)

TABLE 9 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3
54	Whenever possible, Jews should support Jewish businesses to help our community	-0.54	0.64	0.19
55	Germans do not acknowledge the Holocaust enough	-1.25	-0.28	-1.22
56	Most nations in the world do not know much about the violence committed against Jews during the Holocaust	-0.36	1.17	0.56
57	The suffering the Jewish people experienced is often overlooked or forgotten because all the attention is devoted to racism in the United States	-1.18	0.67	0.48
58	The perpetrators of violence against Jews have not been brought to justice	-0.70	0.22	0.18
59	Jewish people deserve more reparations from Germany	-1.00	-1.19	-1.27
60	Overall, many people in the world know about the violence committed against Jews during the Holocaust	0.12	-1.82	-0.68

### 3.4 | Study 4: Hungarians

A three-factor solution was deemed most appropriate (see Table 10), with 47 participants' Q sorts loading on a factor (12 had cross-loadings, 8 did not load sufficiently on any factor and 1 participant had a negative loading; see Table 4).

#### 3.4.1 | Viewpoint 1: Intergroup Focus on Inclusive Lessons of the Ingroup's Historical Victimization

Viewpoint 1 ( $n = 25$ ; 10 women, 13 men, 2 did not report gender) was mostly shared by politically liberal ( $n = 17$ ) and educated people. Eight had family directly affected by the Trianon Treaty.

Viewpoint 1 focused on (positive) intergroup implications of the ingroup's historical victimization. Most of the highest-ranked statements were inclusive (#30; #26) and downward comparisons (#29) with other groups' suffering, while strongly rejecting exclusive victimization beliefs (#28; #27; #31). Similarly, inclusive and prosocial lessons of ingroup victimization (#53; #52) were endorsed, whereas exclusive lessons such as entitlement to violent self-defence (#48; #49) and negative intergroup attitudes (#32; #46) were rejected, and ingroup harmdoing was acknowledged (#23). Although structural attributions for the ingroup's victimization were endorsed (#33), redress through acknowledgement and justice was not particularly emphasized (#55; #58), and entitlement to reparations from perpetrator groups was strongly rejected (#59).

Participants indicated historical closure (#38) and did not think the ingroup was currently facing victimization (#6; #11; #12; #24). Similarly, they did not perceive the ingroup's victimization as central (#40–#42) or prioritize commemorating the ingroup's collective memories of victimization very much (#22; #36; #45). Likewise, compared to this viewpoint's strong intergroup focus, ingroup unity and material ingroup support were prioritized less (#50; #54; #20; #21).

#### 3.4.2 | Viewpoint 2: Strengthening the Ingroup and Preserving Collective Memories of Victimization

Viewpoint 2 ( $n = 18$ ; nine women, eight men, one did not report gender) included many politically conservative participants ( $n = 10$ ). Nearly half ( $n = 8$ ) had relatives who were affected by the Trianon Treaty.

Viewpoint 2 focused on intragroup aspects of the ingroup's victimization, especially uniting and strengthening the ingroup materially (#54) or symbolically (#22; #21; #50), including by commemorating and transmitting collective memories of ingroup suffering (#45; #35; #44). Accordingly, decentering the ingroup's collective victimization was strongly rejected (#40–#42; #38). However, like in Viewpoint 1, participants also expressed historical closure, not believing that Hungarians experience threat or violence today (#6; #11; #13).

Nevertheless, participants indicated grievances concerning the lacking redress of the ingroup's historical victimization, specifically, justice and acknowledgement (#55; #56; #58; #60), but less so reparations (#59). Yet, similar to Viewpoint 1, participants rejected negative intergroup attitudes and views linked to intergroup hostility (#8; #48; #32), including exclusive victimization beliefs (#27; #28). Conversely, inclusive victimization beliefs (#26; #30) and lessons (#51–#53) were mostly endorsed, though less than in Viewpoint 1. Overall, intergroup strategies for addressing the ingroup's victimization were not central in this viewpoint.

#### 3.4.3 | Viewpoint 3: Centring Grievances Without Solutions to Address the Ingroup's Victimization

Viewpoint 3 ( $n = 4$ ; three men, one woman) only included participants who were born in Hungary and did not have relatives affected by the Trianon Treaty.

Participants focused on the ingroup's grievances, strongly emphasizing the lack of justice and acknowledgement of the ingroup's

**TABLE 10** | Z-scores of the statements for each viewpoint, Hungarian sample.

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3
1	We lost our culture—such as language and our traditional way of life—because of how we were persecuted throughout our history	−0.23	−0.29	−0.57
2	Due to how we were oppressed, we do not have the power we used to have	−0.09	−0.38	1.37
3	We never had much power	−0.34	−1.47	−0.97
4	We have much more power now than we did in the past	−0.23	−1.10	−1.56
5	Because of how Hungarians were persecuted throughout history, we have lost the sense of community we used to have	−0.07	−0.83	−0.02
6	The Hungarian people are constantly under threat	−0.92	−1.07	−0.49
7	We have very little control over our future	−0.06	−1.24	0.33
8	We are on our own because no other communities care about us	−0.61	−1.07	1.13
9	We have a long history of being targeted and oppressed	0.23	0.05	1.35
10	Even today, Hungarians are still suffering in several ways as a result of the violence against us in the past	0.09	−0.43	0.88
11	What happened to us in the past is not over yet—we are still being targeted and oppressed today	−1.24	−0.73	0.27
12	Anti-Hungarism still exists; it has just taken on a different form than in the past	−0.81	0.22	0.73
13	We have suffered throughout our history and still do to this day	−0.38	−0.84	0.67
14	We have been oppressed by different groups in different places	0.01	−0.28	0.58
15	We survived, and we are still here	0.87	0.22	0.92
16	Hungarians have always fought back against our oppressors, and we will continue to resist	−0.45	0.19	−0.18
17	All we have endured shows that we are a strong community	0.05	0.24	−1.26
18	We are a resilient people—despite all we suffer through, we still thrive	0.29	−0.49	−0.81
19	We have a proud history of struggle and survival	0.69	0.84	−0.15
20	We need to do what we can as a community to give emotional and financial support to Hungarians outside the border	0.25	0.60	−1.32
21	We need to do what we can to keep our Hungarian community strong and sticking together	0.27	1.50	−0.71
22	It is important to keep our culture and identity alive and preserve it for future generations	1.17	2.06	0.23
23	Hungarians have also harmed others, and not just been harmed	1.56	0.26	1.32
24	In the past we were oppressed much more than we are today	1.18	0.36	1.58
25	There are some groups within the Hungarian community that suffered much more than others	1.38	0.54	0.55
26	There are other groups in the world that have experienced oppression and injustice similar to Hungarians	1.60	0.91	1.64
27	The suffering of the Hungarians is unique in world history	−1.74	−1.28	−1.60
28	No other group in the world has been harmed as much as the Hungarian people	−2.03	−1.44	−1.64
29	There are other groups in the world that have suffered more than the Hungarians	1.72	0.07	0.25
30	There are other groups in CEE that experience injustice and oppression similar to Hungarians	1.84	0.33	1.03

(Continues)

TABLE 10 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3
31	Hungarians have been oppressed or treated unfairly to a greater extent than other groups in CEE	-1.54	-0.50	-1.04
32	Our oppressors have oppressed us because they are violent by nature	-1.45	-0.80	-1.32
33	The Trianon Treaty can be explained by broader historical, social and systemic influences	1.19	-0.23	-0.22
34	It is very important to me to know and learn more about Hungarians' history of oppression	-0.10	0.95	0.00
35	It is important to remember and pass on stories of our history of oppression and the violence committed against us	-0.30	1.19	-0.46
36	Hungarians' struggles have shaped who we are today	0.53	1.23	0.25
37	Knowing about how Hungarians have been oppressed shapes how I understand social and political issues today	-0.36	0.35	-0.86
38	We need to leave our painful past behind us and move on	1.10	-1.26	0.80
39	Many Hungarians who have experienced the violence against Hungarians directly (e.g., Hungarians outside the border) do not want to talk about it	0.10	-0.51	-0.95
40	I am not very interested in learning more about the suffering of Hungarian people	-0.16	-2.12	0.08
41	I do not think a lot about Hungarian people's history of oppression, because it is not very relevant to my daily life	0.73	-1.75	0.88
42	Our experiences of oppression do not define us	-0.14	-1.42	-1.51
43	We are not victims; we are victors	-0.27	-0.99	-1.38
44	It is our duty to keep the memory of Hungarian oppression alive for the sake of future generations	-0.70	1.08	-1.05
45	It is important to commemorate Hungarian history, including the history of our oppression and our resistance	0.63	1.57	-0.12
46	History teaches us that we can only trust our own people	-1.14	-0.10	0.48
47	Hungarian history teaches us that we need to be vigilant	-0.38	0.52	0.89
48	A central lesson of our history is that we need to protect and defend ourselves, which sometimes means using violence against those want to harm us	-1.93	-1.09	-1.51
49	A central lesson from our history is that we are morally entitled to do whatever is necessary to survive	-1.70	-0.34	0.28
50	Our history has taught us that we need to be united and keep the Hungarian community together	0.88	1.79	0.13
51	Hungarians will be more successful in achieving our goals if we form coalitions with other oppressed groups	1.14	0.23	-0.47
52	A central lesson of our history is that Hungarians should support oppressed peoples around the world	1.23	0.41	-1.76
53	A central lesson of our history is that Hungarians should never treat other groups in the same way as we were treated	1.63	1.33	1.29
54	Whenever possible, Hungarians should support Hungarian businesses to help our community	1.04	2.07	0.94
55	Groups who oppressed Hungary in history do not acknowledge the negative consequences of the oppression and violence enough	-0.32	0.94	0.90
56	Most nations in the world do not know much about the historical violence and oppression committed against Hungarian people	0.33	1.24	1.71

(Continues)

TABLE 10 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2	V3
57	The suffering Hungarians experienced is often overlooked or forgotten because all the attention is devoted to the Holocaust	-1.27	0.44	0.95
58	The perpetrators of violence against Hungarians have not been brought to justice	-0.58	0.91	1.15
59	Hungarians deserve reparations from Slovaks and Romanians	-1.88	0.29	-0.20
60	Overall, many people in the world know about the violence committed against the Hungarians	-0.25	-0.86	-1.43

victimization (#56; #55; #58; #60), lack of power (#2–#4) and abandonment by outgroups (#8). Unlike other viewpoints, participants emphasized not only their ingroup's long history of victimization (#9) but also that the ingroup is still suffering today (#10; #12; #13), though less than in the past (#24).

This strong focus on ingroup grievances was not accompanied by strategies to address the ingroup's situation. Unlike Viewpoint 2, ingroup unity and solidarity (#20; #21; #50) or preserving the group's culture (#22) were rejected or not emphasized. Participants also disagreed with other statements about ingroup empowerment in the context of victimization, such as resistance, survival and resilience (#16–#19), or intergroup strategies such as outgroup coalitions (#51; #52)—even though inclusive victimization beliefs were endorsed (#26) and exclusive victimization beliefs strongly rejected (#27; #28). Like other viewpoints, participants did not express entitlement to violent self-defence (#48; #49) either.

Despite the focus on grievances, participants did not perceive their group's victimization as central to their identity (#41; #36; #37; #42) and did not emphasize learning about and preserving collective memories of ingroup suffering (#40; #34; #45; #35; #44).

### 3.5 | Study 5: South Koreans

A two-factor solution was most appropriate for this sample (see Table 11), with 29 participants' Q-sorts loading on one of the two factors (16 had cross-loadings, and 5 had low loadings; see Table 5). The correlation between the two factors was  $r = 0.60$ .

#### 3.5.1 | Viewpoint 1: Preserving Collective Memories of Ingroup Victimization, Strengthening the Ingroup and Demanding Redress

Viewpoint 1 ( $n = 19$ ; 10 women, 9 men) included more left-leaning/liberal participants ( $n = 13$ ) than Viewpoint 2.

Participants strongly emphasized remembering and transmitting the ingroup's memories of historical victimization (#35; #44; #45). Accordingly, ingroup victimization was viewed as central to their identity (#34), and decentering ingroup victimization was strongly rejected (#40–#42). Other ways of strengthening the

ingroup materially (#20; #54) and symbolically, such as through ingroup unity (#21; #50) and preserving Korean cultural identity (#22), were also emphasized; and participants endorsed a sense of community (#5) and ingroup culture (#1) despite historical victimization. They also did not believe the ingroup lacked power or control (#2–#4; #7) and highlighted ingroup resilience, resistance and survival (#16–#19).

In addition to this ingroup focus, political and intergroup solutions to the ingroup's historical victimization through redress were emphasized: specifically, the lack of justice (#58), acknowledgement (#55) and reparations (#59). Perhaps because of these unresolved issues, participants believed that Japanese imperialism continues in new forms (#12) and rejected moving on (#38). However, participants did not perceive ongoing threat (#13; #6) or suffering (#10), perhaps due to the ingroup's perceived strength and resilience.

Participants generally rejected exclusive victimization beliefs (#28; #27; #31), though less than Viewpoint 2. Inclusive victimization beliefs were also not endorsed as much (#30; #26; #29).

#### 3.5.2 | Viewpoint 2: Intergroup Focus on Inclusive Lessons of Historical Victimization and Moving Forward

Viewpoint 2 ( $n = 15$ ) was held by more men ( $n = 10$ ) than women ( $n = 5$ ). Participants' political views were more varied than in Viewpoint 1.

This viewpoint had a strong focus on (positive) intergroup relations. Participants highlighted comparisons, strongly emphasizing that other groups suffered similarly (#26; #30) or more than the ingroup (#29), in addition to highlighting that some ingroup members suffered more than others (#25) and rejecting exclusive victimization beliefs (#28; #27; #31). Similarly, participants endorsed inclusive lessons of ingroup victimization (#52; #53), rejected the right to violent self-defence (#48; #49) and outgroup distrust (#46) and acknowledged ingroup harmdoing (#23).

Essentialist attributions of the perpetrator group as violent (#32) were strongly rejected, whereas structural attributions for their group's victimization (#33) were endorsed. However, although similar to Viewpoint 1, lack of justice (#58) was emphasized, other aspects of redress, such as reparations (#59) and

**TABLE 11** | Z-scores of the statements for each viewpoint, Korean sample.

No.	Statements	V1	V2
1	We lost our culture—such as language and our traditional way of life—because of Japanese colonization	−0.46	0.04
2	Due to how we were persecuted/oppressed, we do not have the power we used to have	−0.59	−0.59
3	We never had much power	−1.86	−0.62
4	We have much more power now than we did in the past	0.81	1.09
5	Because of how we were oppressed, we have lost the sense of community we used to have	−1.50	−1.04
6	Koreans are constantly under threat	−0.29	−1.03
7	We have very little control over our future	−1.94	−1.60
8	We are on our own because no other nations and peoples care about us	−0.08	0.37
9	We Koreans have a long history of being oppressed	0.16	−0.18
10	Even today, Koreans are still suffering in several ways as a result of the violence against us in the past	−0.05	−0.11
11	What happened to us in the past is not over yet—we are still being targeted/persecuted/oppressed today	−0.84	−0.65
12	Japanese imperialism still exists; it has just taken on a different form than in the past	0.33	0.11
13	We have suffered throughout history and still do to this day	−0.44	−1.05
14	We have been oppressed by different groups in different places	−0.14	0.45
15	We survived, and we are still here	0.27	0.81
16	Koreans have always fought back against our oppressors, and we will continue to resist	1.19	0.34
17	All we were able to endure shows that we are a strong community	0.76	0.54
18	We are a resilient people—despite all we suffer through, we still thrive	0.65	0.04
19	We have a proud history of struggle and survival	0.75	0.83
20	We need to do what we can as a community to give emotional and financial support to comfort women and survivors of forced labour	1.74	0.99
21	We need to do what we can to keep our Korean nation strong and stick together	1.26	0.24
22	It's important to keep our culture and identity alive and preserve it for future generations	1.70	0.97
23	We have also harmed oppressed others and not just been oppressed	−1.36	1.14
24	In the past we were oppressed much more than we are today	−0.17	0.85
25	There are some groups within the Korean nation that are or were oppressed much more than others	0.29	1.41
26	There are other groups in the world that have experienced colonization and imperialism and oppression similar to Koreans	0.05	1.39
27	The suffering of Koreans is unique in world history	−1.11	−1.89
28	No other group/nation in the world has been oppressed as much as Koreans	−1.14	−2.13
29	There are other groups in Asia that have suffered more than us	−0.44	0.66
30	There are other groups in Asia that experience injustice and oppression similar to Koreans	0.21	1.10

(Continues)

TABLE 11 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2
31	Koreans have been oppressed or treated unfairly to a greater extent than other groups in Asia	-0.29	-1.32
32	The Japanese have oppressed us because they are violent by nature	-1.02	-2.19
33	Japanese colonization can be explained by broader historical, social and systemic influences	-0.14	1.04
34	It is very important to me to know and learn more about Koreans' history of oppression	1.37	0.25
35	It is important to remember and pass on stories of our history of oppression against us	1.92	1.22
36	Our people's struggles have shaped who we are today	-0.11	-0.09
37	Knowing about how Koreans have been oppressed shapes how I understand social and political issues today	0.29	0.40
38	We need to leave our painful past behind us and move on	-0.46	1.44
39	Many Korean survivors of comfort women and forced labour don't want to talk about it	-1.32	-1.06
40	I am not very interested in learning more about the suffering of the Korean people	-1.94	-1.39
41	I don't think a lot about the Korean history of violence and oppression, because it is not very relevant to my daily life	-1.78	-0.87
42	Our experiences of oppression do not define us	-0.81	0.22
43	We are not victims; we are victors	-0.07	-1.02
44	It is our duty to keep the memory of Korean oppression alive for the sake of future generations	1.82	0.77
45	It is important to commemorate and educate the public about Korean history, including the history of our colonization and our resistance	1.61	1.27
46	History teaches us that we can only trust our own people	-0.70	-1.30
47	Korean history teaches us that we need to be vigilant	0.54	-0.27
48	A central lesson of our history is that we need to protect and defend ourselves, which sometimes means using violence against those who want to harm us	-0.62	-0.61
49	A central lesson from our history is that we are morally entitled to do whatever is necessary to survive	-0.03	-0.82
50	Our history has taught us that we need to be united and keep the Korean nation together	0.92	0.02
51	Koreans will be more successful in achieving our goals if we form coalitions with other oppressed groups	-0.46	0.04
52	A central lesson of our history is that Koreans should support oppressed peoples around the world	-0.59	-0.59
53	A central lesson of our history is that Koreans should never treat other groups in the same way as we were treated	-1.86	-0.62
54	Whenever possible, Koreans should support Korean businesses to help our community	0.81	1.09
55	Japanese do not acknowledge the violence of Japanese colonization enough	-1.50	-1.04
56	Most nations in the world do not know much about the violence committed against Koreans through Japanese colonization	-0.29	-1.03

(Continues)

TABLE 11 | (Continued)

No.	Statements	V1	V2
57	The suffering my group experienced is often overlooked or forgotten because all the attention is devoted to the Holocaust	-1.94	-1.60
58	The perpetrators of violence against Koreans have not been brought to justice	-0.08	0.37
59	Koreans deserve more reparations from Japan	0.16	-0.18
60	Overall, many people in the world know about the violence committed against Koreans	-0.05	-0.11

acknowledgement (#55), were not. Additionally, unlike Viewpoint 1, participants strongly emphasized moving on (#38), implied a sense of historical closure, and disagreed that the ingroup still suffered or experienced threats and lack of control (#13; #7; #6), instead emphasizing the ingroup's power and strength like Viewpoint 1 (#4; #17). Nevertheless, participants believed it was important to remember and educate about the ingroup's collective memories of victimization (#35; #45; #44; #40).

### 3.6 | Second-Order Analysis

These findings suggest several parallels in some patterns we identified across the five contexts. To statistically compare the viewpoints in each context and more systematically answer our research question about whether or not the viewpoints are comparable across contexts, we conducted a second-order analysis where the factors from each sample rather than individual Q-sorts were the unit of analysis (for a similar procedure from a Q-methodological analysis of conflict understandings across samples, see Ulug and Cohrs 2017a). The factor arrays (statement ranks for each factor) from the five separate analyses were used as input data, and a Q analysis was conducted following the procedures described earlier. The correlation matrix (see Table S5) suggests that some viewpoints were highly similar across contexts, most notably the first Kurdish and first Black American factors and the first Korean and second Hungarian factors.

A six-factor solution was deemed most appropriate based on interpretability, with five being the minimum number of factors to expect (because this was the highest number of factors identified for any of the individual samples). The solutions with more than six factors included factors without clearly defining sorts. The solution was Varimax-rotated and then further adjusted via manual rotation to render the loading pattern even clearer. Table S6 shows the final loading matrix.

Factor 1 of this second-order analysis includes Factor 2 from the Jewish American sample and Factor 3 from the Black American sample, as well as (with a somewhat lower loading) Factor 2 from the Kurdish sample. The viewpoints included in this shared factor all focus on the temporal dimension of the ingroup's victimization that entails both historical and enduring, ongoing victimization. This factor is predominantly ingroup-focused, expressing concerns with what the ingroup can do to

preserve collective memories of ingroup suffering and to support and strengthen the ingroup materially and not just symbolically. All three contexts across which this viewpoint generalizes (i.e., Black Americans, Jewish Americans, Kurdish Americans) involve minority groups that experienced historical violence as well as (albeit to varying degrees) continued disadvantage and/or violence and discrimination today.


Factor 2 of the second-order analysis combines Factor 1 from the Hungarian and Jewish American samples and Factor 2 from the Korean sample. Thus, it represents a viewpoint generalized across contexts with primarily historical experiences of victimization and present-day advantage as either a national/ethnic majority group or (in the case of 92% of Jewish Americans, Pew Research Center 2021) intersecting racial privilege as White in the United States in addition to being an ethnic and religious minority group. This viewpoint is characterized by a focus on intergroup relations and consequences of the group's historical victimization, with a particular emphasis on inclusive victimization beliefs and lessons learned from this history.

Factor 3 of the second-order analysis is uniquely defined by Factor 3 of the Hungarian sample, showing only small correlations with any of the factors from other contexts (see Table S5). This viewpoint is characterized by a focus on the ingroup's historical grievances without any empowerment or solutions to address them.

Factor 4 of the second-order analysis includes factors from all contexts except the Black American sample: Factor 2 from the Hungarian sample, Factor 5 from the Kurdish sample, Factor 1 from the Korean sample and Factor 3 from both the Jewish American and Kurdish<sup>6</sup> samples. This factor focuses on ingroup strength and power. It also emphasizes the importance of preserving collective memories of the ingroup's victimization as well as the need for redress.

Factor 5 of the second-order analysis is uniquely defined by Factor 4 from the Black American sample. This viewpoint decenters historical victimization and symbolic responses like commemoration, instead emphasizing material strategies to address present-day ingroup disadvantage.

Factor 6 of the second-order analysis includes Factor 1 from both the Kurdish and Black American samples. It includes a concern with historical, long-lasting oppression and ongoing injustice, as



**FIGURE 2** | Overarching, varying theoretical dimensions in collective victimization beliefs.

well as a desire for structural change through acknowledgement and redress while also rejecting negative intergroup attitudes. This perspective generalizes across the two contexts involving historically marginalized minority groups with continued, present-day experiences of victimization and structural disadvantage as well as lacking justice and reparations.

## 4 | Discussion

This article reports five studies in different historical and sociopolitical contexts of collective victimization, providing the first empirical investigation of a comprehensive set of collective victimization beliefs. Rather than limiting the collective victimization beliefs and examining them in isolation, Q methodology enabled us to include the full range of potentially relevant beliefs to identify more complex, holistic viewpoints regarding the ingroup's victimization and examine intragroup variation within each community that goes beyond master narratives about collective victimhood (Bar-Tal 2000). Our findings show that beliefs about the ingroup's collective victimization are not homogeneous: Instead, there are multiple, coexisting shared viewpoints within each group (two to five in each sample). Shedding more light on this diversity and complexity in collective victimization beliefs (building on and extending previous, related findings such as Vollhardt, Cohrs et al. 2021; Vollhardt, Szabó et al. 2021) is a key contribution of this article.

### 4.1 | Theoretical Dimensions of Collective Victimization Beliefs

On a more general level, the viewpoints on collective victimization we identified varied along several theoretical dimensions that we discerned and summarize in Figure 2. Specifically, (1) some focus on the *past* (i.e., historical victimization and collective memories) and others on the *present* (i.e., ongoing victimization and the ingroup's current situation). (2) Some viewpoints emphasize ingroup *power* and strength, including through resilience and resistance, whereas others focus on the victimized ingroup's *powerlessness* and vulnerability. (3) Some viewpoints emphasize *intergroup* relations, such as outgroup-focused lessons and intergroup consequences of the ingroup's victimization, whereas other viewpoints focus on the *intragroup*, communal level and how the victimized ingroup can support each other. (4) Some prefer strategies for addressing the ingroup's victimization through *material* means (e.g., tangible support for ingroup members, structural or political solutions), whereas others focus on *symbolic* aspects such as culture, identity and collective memory. (5) Finally, the viewpoints vary regarding

the perceived *centrality* of the ingroup's victimization versus *decentering* this aspect of the group's history and/or current situation.

These dimensions differ from and extend the initial categories we discussed in Section 1 that informed the statements we selected for the Q set, providing an important contribution to theory development on collective victimization beliefs. Specifically, they provide overarching theoretical dimensions that span across several of the more domain-specific and concrete categories identified in the literature review, suggesting theoretical connections between them and a more parsimonious representation of relevant dimensions of collective victimization that people may emphasize to different degrees. For example, the dimension 'symbolic versus material' aspects integrated beliefs about the nature of the group's victimization and different categories of ways to address it. Notably, these dimensions are dialectical and not mutually exclusive; sometimes both seemingly opposite poles were endorsed (in line with Jeong and Vollhardt 2021; Vollhardt and Nair 2018). Moreover, Q methodology allowed us to examine how these dimensions combine in different ways, creating different meanings when considered together.

### 4.2 | Contributions to Social Psychological Research on Collective Victimization Beliefs

Additionally, we observed some correspondence with and some deviation from commonly studied collective victimization beliefs and assumptions in the social psychological literature.

First, although *comparative victimization beliefs* (competitive victimhood, inclusive victimization beliefs) are commonly studied (Szabó 2020), these beliefs were only prominent in the contexts of historical victimization but not endorsed by all; some viewpoints focused on the intragroup dimension instead. Moreover, contrary to the assumption that competitive victimhood is most common (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Hirschberger 2018), inclusive victimization beliefs were actually more endorsed and part of several viewpoints, whereas exclusive victimization beliefs were rejected in most viewpoints across samples. This may be because our samples were more left-leaning, and viewpoints characterized by inclusive victimization beliefs were shared more by left-leaning participants. Future research should replicate these findings with more representative samples and examine the role of political ideology in predicting different collective victimization beliefs. That said, other studies also observed less endorsement of exclusive compared to inclusive victimization beliefs, or absence or rejection of comparative victimization beliefs (Jeong and Vollhardt 2021; Vollhardt, Szabo et al. 2021; Vollhardt et al. 2023).

Social psychological research should therefore move away from the assumption that comparative victim beliefs are the default of how people think about collective victimization and instead examine under which conditions comparative victimization beliefs become relevant—for example, when groups experience intergroup threat (Hirschberger 2018) or receive unequal societal recognition (de Guissemé and Licata 2017; Politi et al. 2025; Twali et al. 2025).

Similarly, *centrality of ingroup victimization* was rejected in several viewpoints, and various ways of distancing oneself from ingroup victimization were expressed instead. For example, several viewpoints endorsed moving on from the ingroup's history of victimization, and one viewpoint rejected the victim label and the idea that these experiences defined the ingroup's identity. Conversely, several viewpoints among groups with primarily historical experiences of victimization strongly rejected decentering the ingroup's victimization. This resonates with Perez and Salter's (2020) argument that victimhood claims have different consequences for different racial groups and may backlash for marginalized groups while benefiting currently advantaged groups. Notably, although conflation of victimhood and group identity may be rejected (Leach 2020), this does not necessarily mean denying the importance of acknowledging and commemorating this history, which was deemed important across groups and even when the victim label was rejected. Future research on perceived centrality of victimization should therefore avoid conflating these distinct aspects and consider which terms (e.g., 'collective victimhood', 'suffering', 'oppression') are preferred.

Relatedly, perceived *ingroup power* and strength was common across contexts and part of many viewpoints, whereas perceived powerlessness was rare. This counters the common assumption of social psychological research on collective victimization that victim groups lack a sense of power and agency (Nadler and Shnabel 2015; for discussions, see Coşkan and Şen 2023; Jeong et al. 2024; Twali et al. 2023) and corresponds with scholarship from a liberation psychology tradition that emphasizes both strength and vulnerability as aspects of collective victimization experiences (Mosley et al. 2020; Quayle and Sonn 2019), findings on perceived power among oppressed groups (Coşkan and Şen 2023; Jeong et al. 2024; Twali et al. 2023), and work on collective memories of resistance, resilience and survival (Jeong and Vollhardt 2021; Selvanathan et al. 2023; Vollhardt and Nair 2018). Thus, studies on collective victimization should routinely include domains of power, instead of assuming powerlessness.

Although social psychological literature on collective victimization has primarily emphasized intergroup relations (Noor et al. 2017; Szabó 2020), the present findings demonstrate that this is not the primary concern for all group members. Some focus on *ingroup*, communal dynamics and outcomes instead, in line with some scarce work in social and political psychology (e.g., Hirschberger 2018; Vollhardt and Nair 2018; Volkan 2001; Wohl et al. 2010). In each context we examined, at least one viewpoint did not highlight intergroup relations—instead focusing on what the ingroup can do on its own to address the ingroup's victimization. Additionally, negative intergroup attitudes were often rejected, and positive intergroup relations were stressed instead. These findings have two important implications for research and theorizing on collective victimization: First, negative intergroup

relations should not be assumed to be an inevitable outcome of salient ingroup victimization (see also Vollhardt 2012). Second, more research should examine intragroup dynamics and ingroup-focused actions linked to collective victimization, and not assume that all coping strategies involve outgroups.

By including five distinct communities, we were able to observe similarities and differences across contexts and interpret them in light of different group positions (Bobo 1999). The interpretation and second-order analysis revealed that groups with similar social positions shared some viewpoints about their group's victimization. For example, inclusive lessons of the ingroup's victimization were shared by historical victim groups with temporal distance to these events (see Factor 2 of the second-order analysis) that may facilitate more abstract construals (Trope and Liberman 2003). Conversely, unmet needs for redress and structural change were highlighted in a viewpoint shared by Kurdish Americans and Black Americans, two disadvantaged minority groups with ongoing experiences of violence (see Factor 6 of second-order analysis). This shows the importance of considering historical context, present-day group positions and group power in work on collective victimization beliefs (Vollhardt 2020). However, some viewpoints were shared across groups with different group positions and varying temporal distances to the events, such as an emphasis on ingroup strength and the importance of preserving collective memories (see Factor 4 of second-order analysis). Therefore, group position should not be understood as a deterministic influence on collective victimization beliefs, and future research should continue to examine their generalizability versus context-specificity.

### 4.3 | Theoretical Links to the Coping Literature

The present findings also support the proposed integration of research on collective victimization beliefs with an appraisal-coping theoretical framework (Leach 2020). Collective victimization beliefs are about making sense of the ingroup's victimization, and meaning-making attempts are one of the coping strategies proposed by Folkman and Moskowitz (2004). Although we did not use this framework to conceptualize the studies, the different collective victimization beliefs in our Q-set could also be organized along the different categories in Leach's (2020) model: the perceived relevance of collective victimization (centrality) and which concerns and goals are at stake (e.g., justice and redress; losing culture and identity) are part of the primary appraisal, and the interpretation of the events (e.g., attributions) and the ingroup's perceived coping potential in light of demands they are facing (e.g., ongoing oppression) as well as their resources (e.g., solidarity, ingroup power, and resilience) form the secondary appraisal. Finally, some collective victimization beliefs relate to different coping efforts (e.g., outgroup coalitions to address injustice, vigilance and self-defence). Like our Q methodology approach, the appraisal-coping framework of collective victimization suggests that these perceptions need to be considered together because they happen simultaneously as part of a holistic appraisal process. Future research could therefore use the coping-appraisal approach to collective victimization (Leach 2020) as a theoretical framework to examine which appraisals of the ingroup's victimization are linked to which coping efforts, including different emotional responses to the cognitive appraisals.

Affect is part of the appraisal-coping model but was not included in the present study since we did not conceptualize it with this framework in mind and focused on collective victimization beliefs (i.e., cognition).

Future research from an appraisal-coping perspective should also integrate the model of Li et al. (2023) of different responses to collective victimization depending on whether the ingroup's victimization is appraised as a threat versus a challenge. In our findings, Viewpoint 3 in the Hungarian sample and Viewpoint 4 in the Kurdish sample captured perceived grievance without empowerment. This could indicate being overwhelmed with demands that the ingroup does not have the resources to meet, giving rise to a threat response. Conversely, several viewpoints suggest a challenge appraisal because they include solutions to the ingroup's victimization and ingroup resources to achieve them. On the basis of this theoretical framework and research on the effects of threat versus challenge appraisals on well-being (Blascovich 2008), future research should examine the links between the different viewpoints on collective victimization and physical or psychological well-being.

#### 4.4 | Strengths and Limitations

The present studies have several strengths. Our materials were developed on the basis of an extensive literature review of qualitative and quantitative studies, including work from several disciplines, to include a broad range of collective victimization beliefs. Participants' sorting patterns revealed which of these different beliefs were relevant in the given context, increasing the findings' ecological validity. Additionally, we included five groups with different historical and present-day sociopolitical statuses and group positions, increasing the findings' generalizability. The samples were diverse (e.g., in terms of age, occupation, immigration backgrounds and geographic locations), with community members recruited through different types of organizations. Finally, the samples included contexts that are underrepresented in social psychological research (Buchanan et al. 2021; Rad et al. 2018; Szabó 2020).

We also note several limitations. Despite purposive sampling efforts to recruit diverse samples, participants were mostly highly educated and skewed towards leftist and liberal political ideologies (especially among all three US minority groups). This was the case although we tried to reach more conservative or right-wing participants by contacting relevant organizations such as those affiliated with the Republican Party. This is not surprising, however, given the relatively low number of people in these populations identifying as politically conservative or right-wing (e.g., in 2020, 71% of Jewish Americans identified as Democrats: Pew Research Center 2021; and only 12% of Black Americans voted for Trump in the 2020 presidential election shortly before the data in the present study were collected: CBS News 2020). Additionally, some language we used in the recruitment script (e.g., the term 'oppression' in the Black American context) may have been perceived as aligned with a more leftist perspective (Paul 2024), potentially creating a self-selection bias of participants regarding political ideology. Therefore, future research should find ways to increase the sample diversity in terms of education, social class and political ideology, which may

uncover new viewpoints. That said, the national majority group samples (Korean and Hungarian) did include some participants with less formal education and more conservative participants. Moreover, Q methodology does not require many participants from a given background to identify its influence on potentially shared viewpoints as reflected in shared factor loadings (with as few as three participants).

Another limitation of the present studies is that they were conducted online due to the Covid-19 pandemic and to expand the geographic reach of recruitment. However, this limits recruitment to people with a stable internet connection who take the initiative to sign up for sessions (as opposed to recruiting at community events). This procedure also does not allow the researcher to observe and engage more with the participant while they sort the statements (Ünal et al. 2022). This might have led to a more superficial sorting process and could explain why many participants were not included in the viewpoints. Future research should therefore replicate this study with face-to-face sessions. Additionally, participatory follow-up research would be informative, such as focus group discussions to determine whether other statements should be added to the Q-set. This might increase the number of participants represented in one of the viewpoints and shed light on participants whose sorts loaded on more than one factor and thus represented mixed viewpoints.

Other limitations involve questions about adapting the Q-set to each context and language. Although we considered this in our development of the materials, a more in-depth and contextualized examination of the preferred language to describe collective victimization is necessary. Additionally, the current research did not assess the perceived relevance of each statement in the given context. Although the statements we used were based on reviews of relevant literature that included qualitative studies conducted in these contexts, and they were adapted to each context by researchers who are from or are familiar with the given context, it is possible certain collective victimization beliefs were presumably considered less applicable in certain contexts than others. The standardization of the Q-set allowed the group comparisons of viewpoints in the current research and is one of its strengths. However, future research could develop more nuanced, context-specific Q-sets that are tailored to the ingroup's specific concerns. For example, Armenians are concerned with the use of the specific term 'genocide' to describe their ingroup's victimization, and for the Palestinian diaspora, the denial of the right to return is a central aspect of the ingroup's victimization (Twali et al. 2025). These examples would not be relevant to many other contexts, and therefore these types of statements that may be key aspects of how people think about the ingroup's victimization were not included in the present study to keep the statements consistent across contexts. Additionally, replication in additional contexts is needed—including less asymmetrical violence and more symmetrical conflicts than the ones included in the present study as an additional dimension that may go along with different collective victimization beliefs (Penić et al. 2021)—to continue examining which collective victimization beliefs are specific to a historical and sociopolitical context and which are generalizable.

Another limitation is that although the Q-statements were carefully selected according to theoretical and empirical considerations because they were developed on the basis of the

available literature, they reflect some beliefs in more nuance than others. For example, the final Q-set contained more statements emphasizing ingroup-focused solutions than structural or political solutions. Future research should therefore create a more balanced Q-set that does not overrepresent certain theoretical dimensions. Finally, the systematic literature review used to develop the Q-set may have yielded slightly different results depending on the selected keywords. For example, we did not include the term 'chosen trauma' from the more psychodynamically oriented literature (Volkan 2001), which could have introduced additional perspectives.

Finally, although a strength of Q methodology is that it provides a rich, in-depth description of the phenomenon, which is an important aspect of theory building (Pettigrew 1996), it is limited in its ability to test hypotheses. Future research using a different methodology (e.g., vignettes capturing the viewpoints from the present study, similar to Ulug and Cohrs 2017b) could examine whether these viewpoints predict different policy preferences, resistance strategies, inter- and intragroup attitudes and psychological well-being, which was beyond the scope of the present study. Additionally, future research should triangulate the present findings with findings from other methodologies, such as complex belief networks (Brandt 2022) or narratives (Ben Hagai et al. 2013) about collective victimization; and use survey methodology and representative samples to determine how common and pervasive each of the identified viewpoints are. Larger samples in survey studies will also allow for testing which of the potential demographic and ideological background characteristics we identified in our descriptive interpretation of the findings reliably predict differences in which viewpoints are endorsed.

## 5 | Conclusion

This article shows that collective victimization beliefs should be conceptualized as complex, holistic patterns of beliefs that vary within and across contexts. Instead of one dominant master narrative, there are several shared viewpoints within each community that convey distinct and sometimes seemingly incompatible ways of making sense of the ingroup's victimization. These different collective victimization beliefs vary along different theoretical dimensions—including whether they focus on the past or present, the group's power or powerlessness, the degree to which intragroup or intergroup strategies are favoured, or symbolic versus material solutions, and how central the ingroup's victimization is perceived to be. Ignoring any of these dimensions or selectively focusing on one without assessing its relevance and heterogeneity in the given context risks oversimplifying the psychology of collective victimization.

### Author Contributions

All authors contributed equally to this manuscript and are listed in reverse alphabetical order. **Johanna Ray Vollhardt**: conceptualization, formal analysis, funding acquisition, methodology, project administration, supervision, writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. **Helin Ünal**: conceptualization, formal analysis, funding acquisition, investigation, methodology, writing – original draft, writing – review

and editing. **Zsolt P. Szabó**: conceptualization, formal analysis, funding acquisition, project administration, supervision, writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. **Hu Young Jeong**: conceptualization, formal analysis, funding acquisition, investigation, methodology, writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. **J. Christopher Cohrs**: conceptualization, formal analysis, supervision, methodology, writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. **Danielle Black**: formal analysis, funding acquisition, investigation, writing – original draft, writing – review and editing.

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### Disclosure

This study was not preregistered and due to the nature of the analysis and software used there is no code or codebook. All materials are provided in the manuscript and [Supporting Information](#) section.

### Ethics Statement

The study received ethics approval from the Institutional Review Board at Clark University.

### Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

### Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> We use the term 'victimization' instead of 'victim' beliefs that were previously used (e.g., Vollhardt 2012; Vollhardt, Cohrs et al. 2021) to emphasize the process of victimization rather than imply a deterministic subject position (see Leach 2020); and based on some participants' feedback who reject the term 'victim' (e.g., Vollhardt, Szabo et al. 2021) and instead emphasize their group's power and strength, or surviving and overcoming adversity (Twali et al. 2023; Vollhardt and Nair 2008). Additionally, there is considerable variation among group members regarding the centrality and relevance of their group's victimization for their ingroup's identity (e.g., Jeong et al. 2023; Skrodzka and Vollhardt 2024), such that the term 'victim' would not reflect some participants' group identity content (Vollhardt, Szabo et al. 2021).

<sup>2</sup> Fears about antisemitism have also further increased since 7 October 2023 (see American Jewish Committee 2024), but we do not mention this event here as relevant context influencing the study findings because the data were collected prior to 2023.

<sup>3</sup> This number is slightly higher than our target and than in other studies due to different research assistants' parallel recruitment efforts.

<sup>4</sup> Although we also report the explained variance of the factors in Tables 1–5, we caution against interpreting these values because explained variance holds less significance in Q methodology compared to regular

factor analysis. As Cuppen et al. (2010, 584) explain: 'In Q methodology however, variance explained is not considered a relevant measure, since one is not interested in the question what the percentage of a perspective in the population is, but Q methodology is developed to show that various factors exist, and what the similarities and differences between these factors are. If the variance explained of factor A is higher than that of factor B, it only means that there are more people of factor A in the sample. Contrary to R methodology, the sample is not randomly selected'.

<sup>5</sup>Although the median of the factor loadings was slightly lower than the correlations between two of the factors (1 and 3) for the five-factor solution, this difference was very small, and the solutions were theoretically plausible and interpretable, such that we decided to use this solution over the alternative two-factor solution that did not reflect the complexity in different sorting patterns.

<sup>6</sup>Notably, although in the separate analysis of data from the Kurdish sample factors 3 and 5 were distinguished, when considered in the broader context of the other samples via the second-order analysis, these two factors show family resemblance.

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### Supporting Information

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section.

**Supporting File 1:** ejsp70026-sup-0001-SuppMat.docx