Nudging tax compliance : evidence from a laboratory experiment

Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5016-8483, Fedeli, Silvia and Papa, Stefano ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6778-8494 (2026) Nudging tax compliance : evidence from a laboratory experiment. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 124 . DOI 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102624

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2026.102624

Abstract

We test whether minimal, non-informative messages can nudge tax compliance beyond standard deterrence. In a within-subjects lab experiment, we randomize exposure to either a “reminder” that leaves audit probability unchanged or an informative “warning” tied to higher audit probability, and estimate effects on both the probability of evasion and the share of income evaded. A short non-informative reminder, holding incentives fixed, lowers the probability of evasion by about 16 percentage points, with no detectable effect on the evaded share among evaders; informative messages add at most marginal effects once audit probability is controlled for.

Item Type:

Article

Uncontrolled Keywords:

Audit; Laboratory experiment; nudge; Tax compliance; Deterrence;

JEL classification:

C91 - Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
H26 - Tax Evasion

Divisions:

Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS)

Subjects:

Finance

Funders:

Italian Ministry of University and Research