Between plurality and proportionality: an analysis of vote transfer systems

Csató, László (2015) Between plurality and proportionality: an analysis of vote transfer systems. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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The paper considers a general model of electoral systems combining district-based elections with a compensatory mechanism in order to implement any outcome between strictly majoritarian and purely proportional seat allocation. It contains vote transfer and allows for the application of three different correction formulas. Analysis in a two-party system shows that a trade-off exists for the dominant party between the expected seat share and the chance of obtaining majority. Vote transfer rules are also investigated by focusing on the possibility of manipulation. The model is applied to the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary election. Hypothetical results reveal that the vote transfer rule cannot be evaluated in itself, only together with the share of constituency seats. With an appropriate choice of the latter, the three mechanisms can be made functionally equivalent.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2015/06
Uncontrolled Keywords:electoral systems, mixed-member systems, vote transfer, two-party system, Hungary
JEL classification:D72 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Projects:OTKA K 111797
ID Code:1870
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:24 Mar 2015 10:03
Last Modified:24 Mar 2015 10:03

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