Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof

Pintér, Miklós (2015) Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics.

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We give a new proof of Young's characterization of the Shapley value. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value is valid on various well-known subclasses of TU games.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2015/07
Uncontrolled Keywords:TU games, Shapley value, Young's axiomatization
JEL classification:C71 - Cooperative Games
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Funders:János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Projects:OTKA, MTA-BCE "Lendület" Strategic Interactions Research Group
ID Code:1891
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:10 Apr 2015 13:47
Last Modified:10 Apr 2015 13:47

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