Forgó, Ferenc (2015) A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence. Mathematica Pannonica, 25 (1). pp. 147155.

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Abstract
A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for nperson games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of nonemptiness, weak oneperson rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite nperson game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent.
Item Type:  Article 

Uncontrolled Keywords:  Nash equilibrium, axiomatization, independence of irrelevant strategies 
JEL classification:  C72  Noncooperative Games 
Divisions:  Faculty of Economics > Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences 
Subjects:  Mathematics, Econometrics 
Projects:  OTKA 101224 
ID Code:  2186 
Deposited By:  Ádám Hoffmann 
Deposited On:  06 Jan 2016 07:58 
Last Modified:  06 Jan 2016 07:58 
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