A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence

Forgó, Ferenc (2015) A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence. Mathematica Pannonica, 25 (1). pp. 147-155.

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A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Nash equilibrium, axiomatization, independence of irrelevant strategies
JEL classification:C72 - Noncooperative Games
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Projects:OTKA 101224
ID Code:2186
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:06 Jan 2016 07:58
Last Modified:06 Jan 2016 07:58

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