Axiomatic Districting

Puppe, Clemens and Tasnádi, Attila (2010) Axiomatic Districting. Working Paper. .

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Abstract

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the \optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

Item Type:

Monograph (Working Paper)

Uncontrolled Keywords:

districting, gerrymandering.

Divisions:

Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics

Subjects:

Mathematics, Econometrics

References:

ID Code:

239

Deposited By: