Csató, László ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8705-5036 (2020) The UEFA Champions League seeding is not strategy-proof since the 2015/16 season. Annals of Operations Research, 292 . pp. 161-169. DOI 10.1007/s10479-020-03637-1
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03637-1
Abstract
Fairness has several interpretations in sports, one of them being that the rules should guarantee incentive compatibility, namely, a team cannot beworse off due to better results in any feasible scenario. The current seeding regime of the most prestigious annual European club football tournament, the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) Champions League, is shown to violate this requirement since the 2015/16 season. In particular, if the titleholder qualifies for the first pot by being a champion in a high-ranked league, its slot is given to a team from a lower-ranked association, which can harm a top club from the domestic championship of the titleholder. However, filling all vacancies through the national leagues excludes the presence of perverse incentives. UEFA is encouraged to introduce this policy from the 2021-24 cycle onwards.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | OR in sports, Football, Incentive compatibility, Seeding, UEFA Champions League |
Subjects: | Culture, sport Mathematics, Econometrics |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10479-020-03637-1 |
ID Code: | 6640 |
Deposited By: | Ádám Hoffmann |
Deposited On: | 08 Jul 2021 11:08 |
Last Modified: | 08 Jul 2021 11:08 |
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