

How did we get here, and where does this road lead?

Review of three books on economic policy

Epigraph:

*Arguments and debates in vain,
One thing is certain: the world
Is not moving forward,
But is being built from the back.*

(JÁNOS SZÉKELY: THE RIVER)

László Muraközy (ed.)
Válságban és válság nélkül. A gazdaságpolitika rétegei (In crisis and without crisis. Layers of economic policy)
(AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ, 2010)

László Andor: *Eltévedt éllovas. Siker és kudarc a rendszerváltó gazdaságpolitikában (The lost leader. Success and failure in the economic policy of the regime change)*
(NAPVILÁG KIADÓ, 2010)

Károly Tardos: *Felzárkózás vagy lemaradás. Beszélgetés a magyar gazdaságpolitika elmúlt húsz évéről (Catching up or lagging behind. Conversations on the last twenty years of Hungarian economic policy)*
(GONDOLAT KIADÓ, 2010)

It should be a task of primary importance for the Hungarian literature on economics and economic policy to conduct a deep analysis of the relative relapse of the Hungarian economy by international comparison. Well, it cannot be denied that numerous essays, articles or thematic volumes have been written about the economic and political developments of the beginning of the twenty-first century. As far as the developments in the area of finance are concerned, this quarterly has also published several important professional articles in previous issues. The number of publications on economic theory is nothing to be scoffed at either. Thorough studies and monographs have analysed the international financial crisis; there have been debates on the economics and policy conclusions that can be drawn from the latest developments, and the scientific and professional circles of each country have reacted to the new reality. However, in the case of Hungary, two major ranges of subjects have become overlapped and intertwined.

Namely, the country has truly been affected by the international financial turbulences, and even more seriously than our environment. On the other hand, the lost momentum of the Hungarian economy and the accumulation of a number of equilibrium problems had been felt well before the financial troubles started to evolve from 2007 onwards. Accordingly, we have *a crisis of our own*, which would have evolved even if there had not been any change in the outside world. But such a changed did indeed occur. Therefore, economic policy analysts simultaneously have to give account of the crisis that is attributable to the two different groups of reasons, while, of course, the two matters that represent different qualities in terms of their roots and driving forces converge from the aspect of consequences. However, not many works with such complex understanding and high ambition have been written until now.

Indeed, it is not easy to process and present this duality in a comprehensible manner.

Ideally, a group of experts who continuously cooperate with one another and constitute a professional workshop is able to explain the twin crisis, or an essayist who is tuned into to both the internal developments in Hungary and the global trends. In addition, we may be too close to the problem time wise, and this may be the reason we perceive the reaction of the profession as insufficient. Moreover, in the meantime, since the summer of 2010 there have been changes in Hungarian economic policy that are not easy to interpret, while global crisis developments have not subsided enough to allow a truly prudential analyst to offer an analysis meeting the criteria of a summary.

Nevertheless, even in this transitory state it might be interesting how representative economic authors and workshops evaluate the events that have taken place in Hungary in recent years and the external processes that affect these events. In the following, I will review works that will provide us insight into how important representatives of Hungarian science and public life experienced the period behind us, and what lessons they drew bearing the future in mind.

Under our present circumstances, evaluation of the past is a much more significant issue than in quieter times. We could already see that broad public opinion as well as party and government policies that react to and shape it tend to *experience* the two decades that have elapsed since the political transformation *as a failure* on the whole, blending the various realities of the many types of phases. However, economic analyses must not be subject to the decisive effect of collective sentiment. Nevertheless, it is not surprising if a strong critical attitude is typical of the majority of the authors of trade publications as well, since the developments in Hungary have obviously deviated from the trends of the countries that serve as benchmarks for us. By 2010, our relative gap has become a fact that can be well supported by figures, which, of course, necessitates raising the

question *when and how was the momentum lost and when and how did the deviation take place*, leading to another obvious question: *what should we do to regain our position?*

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The first work reviewed is the volume entitled *In crisis and without crisis. Layers of Economic Policy* by László Muraközy (ed.). In addition to the editor, Dóra Gyórfy, Ádám Török and László Csaba each wrote a study in it. The next one is *The lost leader. Success and failure in the economic policy of the regime change* by László Andor. It is rather a collection of political essays, but, as its title suggests, it is about the problem of losing direction. The last one in the row is a collection of interviews entitled *Catching up or lagging behind. Conversations on the last twenty years of Hungarian economic policy* by Károly Tardos. Ten well-known economists (analyst, tutor, former or practising economic politicians) speak mostly precisely about the two subjects discussed in this analysis.

Obviously, more papers should be processed to allow us to safely talk about the position of “Hungarian economists”, but, as we will see, the variety of ideas, notions, arguments and conclusions appears in a clearly visible manner in this small sample as well, since the authors truly represent many kinds of political and economic policy schools and scales of values.



The work edited by László Muraközy and entitled *In crisis and without crisis* is the third volume of the series called “Economic policy round table”. From the aspect of our subject, volume two, which was published in 2009, is of particular importance. It has a somewhat poetical title: *Járatlan utak – járt úttalanságok* (*Present, the*

past of the future. Untrodden roads – trodden roadlessness). Its authors chose the double crisis examined here as the subject of their analysis in 2008. Péter Halmai wrote a thorough (and appreciative) review of the book in the columns of this periodical (*Public Finance Quarterly*, 2010/First Issue).

The volume reviewed here was compiled from the materials of the round table held in the spring of 2009. The book starts with the editor's precise and detailed abstract; László Muraközy summarises Dóra Györffy's, Ádám Török's, László Csaba's and his own chapters so well that it makes the work of reviewers easy. It is worth quoting two passages from the summarising-evaluating first chapter of the book (Is unsustainable "development" sustainable?) because of its succinctness: "...a weakened Hungary convalescing after the symptomatic treatment of the adjustment in 2006, which was enforced from outside by the sensible rules of the European Union but which was not well-structured, was debilitated by the international financial crisis in October 2008". Elsewhere, the situation is summarised as follows: "In the beginning of the twenty-first century, as a result of the missed structural reforms, the fundamental weaknesses of the labour market, the populist economic policy, the divided elite and innumerable other reasons, Hungary gradually fell behind not only the leading economies, but also behind its former peers, i.e. the other Central and East European ex socialist countries". Indeed, this is the situation our country has slipped into, from where we have to find a way out.

► The chapter by Dóra Györffy compares the fiscal policies of four euro area Member States starting from the fact that in the area of the single European currency – where no monetary instruments remain within the sphere of national competence – fiscal policy is the strongest instrument of economic policy, i.e. exactly the field with which Hungary had most

of its problems in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Two of the four countries (Ireland and Finland) were successful, at least until the crisis, while two (Italy and Portugal) are less successful. Her analysis points out that, contrary to the simplistic economic approach, the significant weight of the state (which is typical of Finland) by itself does not contradict international competitiveness and ability to grow, whereas low state redistribution, which is rather typical of Southern Europe, is not a guarantee of competitiveness.

It is hardly surprising that robust statistical correlation between the size of the state and ability to grow cannot be found, as a number of related factors play a demonstrably significant role. They include the structure of public expenditures, the structure of contributions (taxes) paid to the state, the efficiency of tax administration and the efficiency of the government institutional system in general. The educational level of the population and the existence or lack of corruption have a serious impact on the ability to grow. The author separately dwelt on the structure of the Portuguese budget, which is the most relevant case from the perspective of Hungary in the comparison of the examined four euro area Member States. She came to rather pessimistic conclusions from the analysis, at least compared to the optimistic views according to which the adjustment of the fiscal balance and a restructuring of taxes (which was done out of necessity in 2009 by the government at the time) are perhaps able to break the vicious circle that evolved from the trio of society-level distrust, unpredictability of economic policy and slow growth. The lesson from the chapter rather is that successful adjustments became truly successful as a result of hard work over a long period, and especially that the improvement of the quality of the institutional system requires a lot of time. In other words, no matter how radical an adjustment is, the vicious circles cannot be dissolved with one rapid series of actions.

▶ The next study is the work of László Muraközy. Compared to the subject of the book as a whole, he deals with an issue that seems to be a departure: the sphere of thought of evolution. Apparently, he was strongly influenced by *Hayek*, or it was the situation that made him rethink Hayek. However, he is on to something, as now it is especially timely for us to deeply consider the interdependence of *market, freedom, law, order* and *knowledge* as rudiments, since their validity is surrounded by debates and uncertainties.

This is the paper where it is felt the most that after the two previous volumes about the dead end of Hungarian economic policy, in the spring of 2009, one year before the inevitable political change, the analyst cannot provide much new information about the situation itself. Not because he would not have a critical message regarding economic policy matters, but because in this specific situation he should basically explain the same thing as one year earlier: none of the fundamental problems have been solved in a year. Moreover, there have been no signs of a solution either. Therefore, repeated criticism could even be considered as kicking a dead lion. What may have restrained the author is that in the given situation, understandably, there was no chance for any element of criticism to be included in decision-makers' concepts because 2009 was the period of *forced governance*; the government was confined within narrow content and time limits by creditors' demands and political circumstances. Indeed, in a situation like this, it is appropriate if the analyst takes one or two steps back from daily matters and chooses a more abstract subject (to some extent, this is true for the previous study as well, regarding the comparison between Portugal and Hungary and also for the subsequent studies of the book).

Considering, however, that it is the latest professional opinions on economic policy that constitute the subject of this analysis, here I can only point to the values of the Hayek study.

Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from citing a passage from Hayek, which Muraközy also thought to be worth quoting word for word, when he mentions the weak or missing control of modern democracies over the government. As Hayek puts it: "In most respects the members of the majority know barely more than that they vested a factor with poorly determined authority to attain a wrongly determined target. The majority of voters do not have any reason for supporting or opposing most of the measures, apart from the fact that they know that in exchange for supporting those who insist on these measures they receive promises that some of their wishes will also be satisfied. The outcomes of this bargaining process are honoured with the designation "the will of the majority." (quoted by Muraközy, p. 126)

▶ Due to the objective of this work, I am not going to go into the details of the merits of the next chapter of the book, although Ádám Török writes about the contradictions accumulating in the main schools of present-day economics in the usual demanding manner. It is especially interesting what he writes about the surfaces of contact between economics and law in connection with competition policy. Nevertheless, Ádám Török's views on economic policy will be mentioned in connection with another book, where we will have an opportunity to gain insight into his evaluation of the situation.

▶ The next essay, by László Csaba, also analyses the state of economics. In several of his works, the author examined the frequently asked question whether the undoubtedly and surprisingly deep financial crisis, which was unexpected in many respects, invalidates the determining schools of economics and, if so, what will replace them. Well, the news about the death of the main directions in economic theory have proven to be somewhat exaggerated, and the sudden resurrection of *Keynes* is also a myth. In his analysis, I mostly underline what is important for us from the aspect of our

double crisis, i.e. his conclusion regarding *state activity*. During the international crisis, the state became more active almost everywhere, and since the book was published, the undertakings of the state and the government have been especially radical. Therefore, it is interesting to cite László Csaba's conclusion from 2009: "one of the most frequent dangers of pursuing an economic policy in parallel with democratic politics is that – often as a result of pressure from the media, often out of impudence – they would assign tasks to decision-makers for the performance of which the government is not equipped, or if it received these mandates it would be harmful for free society and for economic development." (p. 226)

His warnings are augmented by the public spirit (on a continental scale as well, but especially in Hungary) that demands strong regulation by the state as a response to the insufficient degree of regulation before the crisis. In contrast to that, László Csaba declares: "those influential public actors who are trying to find a way out through the ardour of order makers sent out by the executive power instead of the horizontal autoregulation of individual professions are on the wrong track." (p. 231) Then he recalls the principle of German ordoliberals and of the American constitutional political economy, according to which "it can never be the objective of regulation to improve the relative situation of some of the stakeholders, but it is always worth following some kind of public interest or general objective." (p. 234)



Proceeding to the book by László Andor is a big jump in terms of approach and level of abstraction. It is a collection of papers about politics and political science by an author

who, as the editor of the leftist periodical *Eszmélet*, admits his political commitment. Therefore, it may particularly be interesting to hear from him how he sees the experience of the eight years of governance, which was unsuccessful and led to political failure even in the opinion of those who believe in leftist values. As he spent many years at an international financial institution in London and now is a commissioner of the European Commission, his international background increases the weight of what he may have to say about the halt of the economic and social development of Hungary.

However, the first sentences of the preface written in April 2010 reveal a contradiction, the unresolved nature of which casts its shadow on the book as a whole. "Had the great recession (which started as a financial crisis in the English-speaking world as early as in mid-2007) not occurred in 2008, and if the East European region where the democratic transformation took place had not become one of the most seriously affected zones of the global crisis, the works that analyse the twenty years of transition from an economic point of view could have documented a great success story. It is basically in this spirit in which the western mainstream – press and science – wrote about the changing region in the middle of the first decade of the new century." (p. 9)

Although this last sentence is built on fact, as observed from the West, the transition in progress in the region proved to be a joyfully quiet process in most of the countries, and what is written in the first sentence can also be confirmed by quotes from analysts who observe our region from a certain distance, there is a serious problem with its relevance from a Central East European or, especially, Russian standpoint.

As far as Hungary is concerned, the thesis in the initial sentence in no way holds water. Not only because of what is unveiled by the opinion

polls by *Eurobarometer* or the value examinations conducted by *Pew Research Center*: by the middle of the second decade following the democratic transformation (prior to the manifestation of the financial crisis) the greater part of Hungarian society had lost confidence in the new regime. Subsequently, the opposition to the socialist-free democrat government channelled and amplified this feeling towards life in line with its own views. When this opposition force formed a government in 2010, it incarnated criticism projected to the entire period of two decades. Accordingly, the experience of the majority in the region, including Hungary, has been much different from what can be perceived by an outside observer.

But this is only the experience; there are serious social facts as well. A number of factors related to the structure of society (which are also mentioned by László Andor in the third part of the book) show that, due to deeply rooted reasons and serious distortions, only a very weak mark in history could be given to Hungary and a few other countries in the region. This is true even if the first half of the 1990s can indeed be presented as an objective success for Hungary. However, if the first phase of the Hungarian transformation is considered a success on the whole, the question is even more interesting: where, when, and in what was a blunder or mistake occur or – as the title of the book has it – *how* in fact *did the leader get lost*?

In terms of our subject, the most relevant of the articles selected for the book are the ones that deal with the nature of the “*Hungarian model*”. In the opinion of Hungarian mainstream economics a Hungarian model does not exist, or at most it only evolves if politics messes something up. Andor, as a critic of the neoliberal mainstream, is more tolerant of Hungary’s own ways. For that matter, recent leftist political traditions strongly comprise the appreciation of the peculiar socialism

(“mechanism reform”) that existed in Hungary before the democratic transformation, although that detour is not called the Hungarian way or, in particular, the third way (albeit both could be appropriate based on its content). Nevertheless, despite all its nostalgic attraction and the then good external press coverage, the “new mechanism” still cannot be considered a success. As he also writes, the reforms did not make Hungary more stable or dynamic, but the enormous external indebtedness created at the time encoded a considerable competitive handicap in the future of the country vis-à-vis the other countries that were in a similar situation.

This is undoubtedly so, but the book fails to give an answer to the question hidden in the title, as despite the reform socialist past with its questionable merits and the debts that were indisputably left behind, in the first couple of years external analysts ranked the Hungarian transformation as one of the successful cases in the region on the basis of hard figures. This was not the time at all when the deviation took place and the gap emerged. Compared to several countries, the first decade of the Hungarian economic transformation prompted sincere recognition on the part of external analysts, although the society that lives here felt, subjectively, more of the suffering than of the successes they toiled for. The author does not refrain from criticising the Antall government, but is rather tolerant with the operation of the Horn government, then strongly critical again vis-à-vis the first Orbán government (the rule of “civilian nationalist forces”); of course all this may be attributable to the author’s political commitment. However, approaching the matters of the socialist-free democrat government that ruled prior to 2010, with honest curiosity we would expect some insight into how in 2002 the populist change of course that pushed our country onto the path of indebtedness could

again take place. Or, as the author puts it: “it is still to be found out how and why the socialist-liberal coalition, which was so proud of the Bokros package, launched an ultra-Keynesian economic turn in the summer of 2002” (p. 130) What happened to the creation of the 400 thousand jobs proclaimed for a long time by MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party)?

Obviously, László Andor’s current international position does not allow him to dig very deep in the issue of the responsibilities of individuals and interest groups. Nevertheless, it would be essential to receive answers to numerous important questions from the circles of experts who know and understand the economic policy and direct political decisions of the leftist governance of 12 years out of the two decades of the process of the change of regime, and to learn about the motives and hypotheses underlying the decisions. Neither as a demand for doing justice subsequently, nor as a need for acquittal out of indulgence, but because most of the problems have not elapsed. Moreover, new problems have developed, and if we do not have a clear picture of the mistakes that were made in decision-making and that caused or added to the troubles, it entails a high risk that the political class will make the same mistakes again.



But let us return to the reactions regarding economic policy and economics. In his book entitled *Catching up or lagging behind*, Károly Tardos asks his interviewees with a high degree of empathy how they saw things at the beginning of the democratic transformation and how they evaluate the distance covered since then. He does not push his own liberal

world view into the spotlight, and lets the colleagues, whom he knows well and who have pursued different careers over the past two decades, elaborate on their views in an undisturbed manner. The reader can also feel that his conversation partners are truly honest, although there are some ex government members among them, who had to learn to restrain themselves in their wording; nevertheless, one can almost hear their spoken voice. Indeed, the list covers a wide range of views: *Julius Horváth, Béla Greskovits, László Csaba, Ádám Török, László Lengyel, Lajos Bokros, György Matolcsy, Gábor Oblath, Ákos Péter Bod and György Surányi*. As this reviewer is also concerned and does not feel an ability to produce an expert summary similar to the one compiled by the editor of the book reviewed first, he prefers to select among the opinions, paying special attention to those personalities who rarely let the general public know their respective opinions.

► One of them is Julius Horváth, who has an excellent knowledge of our language and situation, but, due to his background, brings an aspect into our current debates that is otherwise regrettably lacking, a fair regional comparison. Perhaps his retrospection is the most interesting, especially when he expounds that the Czech and Slovak attitudes towards the state budget are traditionally conservative, whereas the Hungarians tended to ease the domestic economic tension with inflation on several occasions. He was surprised why Hungary had not made more efforts to adopt the euro, albeit it is known that “monetary policy and exchange rate policy are usually not conservative here”. Moreover, in Hungary it is not the case that politics deliberately sacrificed the cause of adopting the euro for the sake of higher growth, as “they managed to decelerate the growth of the Hungarian economy and add to the fiscal deficit even without Hungary entering the euro area”. This is an important

observation because even today many say that in order to achieve rapid growth we should not force the adoption of the single European currency. Well, we do not even have a remote chance of switching currencies, which would reduce the exchange rate risk, and our growth conditions are also worse than those of our fellow sufferers.

▶ The name of Béla Greskovits is also not one that is often mentioned in everyday debates about economic policy, although he has an interesting opinion, which does not match the prevailing atmosphere. He does not at all consider the transnational, export-driven development of the Hungarian economy to be the wrong path, as his data suggest that foreigners have invested in relatively human capital intensive industries in Hungary. He also believes that the shortage of internationally competitive small and medium-sized companies is a problem, but he still trusts in small-scale modern capitalism growing out of the supplier network.

▶ Academician László Csaba, in turn, is strongly present in our economic policy debates; therefore, there is no need to unfold his views in detail here. Nevertheless, it is still worth highlighting from his interview that he attributes the loss of momentum of the Hungarian economy after 2006 more to the exhaustion of growth factors than to the convergence programme. Consequently, he is sceptical about the success of experiments that promise a rapid acceleration of economic growth. Of his recommendations for the new government the adoption of the euro deserves attention, as “successful economic policy cannot exist without a fixed point”. (p. 97)

▶ From Ádám Török’s chapter, the section about the factors of economic growth is worth highlighting; he expressly states that the views on the competitiveness and good quality of Hungarian labour are unfounded. The quality

of labour in some counties in Hungary is the same as in Slovenia or the Czech Republic, but in Hungary there are masses that lag behind and are unable to find employment. As far as the developments until 2010 are concerned, his verdict is very critical, because, on the one hand, he saw a fading (socialist) reform policy and, on the other hand, an opposition, which believed that “bankrupting reform policy is the same as bankrupting the government”; the opposition, while it wants to knock its political rivals out, cannot see that “in the meantime the country is going bankrupt”.

▶ The next chapter of the book includes interviews with László Lengyel, then Lajos Bokros; their names are well-known and appear often. Interested readers may frequently encounter their views elsewhere as well. The editor chose György Matolcsy’s chapter as the next one; the parts about the Bokros package or the chances of social market economy in Hungary are illuminating and interesting. The answer to the last question of the interview recorded in April 2009 (“And what will be your first step if Fidesz takes office again?”) is informative. The answer: “Tax and contribution reform. In any case, no matter what situation we will be in. Because we seriously believe in the correlation and logic that a reduction of taxes and contributions, i.e. tax reform is needed, which also entails an increase in employment and investment, resulting in additional GDP and from that equilibrium as well.” (p. 208)

“*In any case*” – this means a strong, almost ideological commitment, the tax implications of which have become known to the whole country. The correlation of employment and equilibrium arouses doubt not only from an economic theory aspect, but several of the cited economists referred to the deeply rooted territorial and social structure factors that explain low employment and to the long time required for the adjustment work.

▶ Gábor Oblath's essay is especially rich in thoughts. Looking back to the initial period of the democratic transformation, regarding the decisions made at the time it is remarkable how he discusses the rapid market opening in the early 1990s. The sudden liberalisation carried out by the ministry led by *Béla Kádár* and *László Bogár* crushed many industries abruptly. However, the hands of the decision-makers were tied because in the 1980s the regime before the democratic transformation made the GATT and the International Monetary Fund believe that Hungary no longer had any non-tariff barriers. Consequently, in the process of Hungary's integration into the Western system after 1990 it was not possible to offer the reduction of non-existent quantity-based barriers, so what remained was the reduction of tariffs. Albeit as it was possible to admit the fact of falsification of data in the case of external debt, the fact of informal import regulation could also have been admitted, and in parallel with its actual termination it would have been possible to *raise* tariffs. But, in the given situation, the tariffs had to be reduced, with all the relevant consequences. His words about the subsequent mistakes in economic policy are also circumspect and careful, pointing out the false or inaccurate assumptions that served as a basis for decisions that entailed serious consequences, such as the significant increase of the minimum wages or the various government programmes for the financing of housing.

▶ I myself can often take a stand on economic policy matters, including the issue of the relative gap. György Surányi is also one of those who often express their views; therefore, from his opinion given here I only highlight what is related to the external models of Hungarian economic policy. Namely, especially prior to the crisis, many cited the *Baltic* states by way of example, while others recommended the *Slovak* model on the basis of the

impressive growth figures of the past decade, but obviously there are followers of the specific – a little bit corporative – *Slovenian* way as well. György Surányi prefers to highlight *Czech* development, without primarily examining in which countries more or fewer reforms took place. Financial discipline and income policy discipline were incomparably better in the Czech Republic; “economic policy as a whole was much more responsible than in Hungary”. (p. 288)

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What conclusions can be drawn from this truly broad tableau with regard to the lessons from and the future of Hungarian monetary policy and economic policy? Those who are ready to consider the facts, and do not lock themselves in their own ideology, can perceive the great slip of economic policy in 2002, right at the time directly preceding EU accession, when it was also decided in an implicit manner that our country would become a member amongst much more unstable fiscal conditions than what would have been possible. However, the analyses did not clarify in a satisfying manner whether it was an individual, and thus theoretically avoidable, mistake that led to a series of decisions that resulted in a deterioration of fiscal positions, or, as time passed, changes took place in the Hungarian societal and economic structure that turned politics in the direction of spending and populism.

Nevertheless, the consequences are dramatic. Employment rates, which had already been weak, continued to deteriorate, and Hungary's lag increased in this area. Consequently, in the case of any fiscal problem, economic policy either had to resort to the dubious means of raising taxes or, if it did not have the courage to do so, it resulted in an increase in government deficit, then in government debt. Overconsumption evolving in the private economy (households' indebtedness, the dissipa-

tion of households' savings) contributed to the deficit of the general government, suddenly adding to the external financial exposure of the country as a whole. All this led to the crisis in the autumn of 2008.

International borrowing put off the direct hazards accompanying the financial crisis, but the social structure problems did not diminish. The structural and qualitative weakness of labour became even more pronounced. As not

one of the quoted experts conclude, it is not possible to ease employment troubles in a rapid and painless manner. This is one of the reasons the experiment of increasing supply through a one-off tax reduction is surrounded by so much scepticism. However, this is already a matter of a period to come; we will see how it will be processed by Hungarian economics literature.

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