Corvinus
Corvinus

Mixed duopolies with advance production

Balogh, Tamás László and Tasnádi, Attila (2013) Mixed duopolies with advance production. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Production to order and production in advance has been compared in many frameworks. In this paper we investigate a mixed production in advance version of the capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game and determine the solution of the respective timing game. We show that a pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash-equilibrium point exists for all possible orderings of moves. It is pointed out that unlike the production-to-order case, the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves. An analysis of the public firm's impact on social welfare is also carried out. All the results are compared to those of the production-to order version of the respective game.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bertrand-Edgeworth, mixed duopoly, timing games
Subjects:Economics
Funders:OTKA K-101224
Projects:MTA-BCE "Lendület" Stratégiai Interakciók Kutatócsoport
ID Code:1280
Deposited By: Attila Tasnádi
Deposited On:01 Jul 2013 13:20
Last Modified:01 Jul 2013 13:20

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