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A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game

Tasnádi, Attila (2005) A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game. Labour Economics, 12 (2). pp. 191-203.

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Official URL: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0927537103001325


Abstract

We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the rms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the rms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with dierent reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We show that equilibrium unem- ployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the efficient allocation of workers would result in full employment.

Item Type:Article
Series Number / Identification Number:10.1016/j.labeco.2003.10.003
Uncontrolled Keywords:unemployment, Bertrand-Edgeworth, wage-setting games
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Labour economics
ID Code:217
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:04 Feb 2011 09:32
Last Modified:03 Jul 2012 00:24

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