Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

Barbie, Martin, Puppe, Clemens and Tasnádi, Attila (2006) Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count. Economic Theory, 27 (2). pp. 411-430.

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We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satises Arrow's "independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by xing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations ("Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.

Item Type:Article
Series Number / Identification Number:10.1007/s00199-004-0603-4
Uncontrolled Keywords:voting, Borda count, strategy-proofness, restricted domains
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
ID Code:218
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:04 Feb 2011 11:19
Last Modified:18 Mar 2014 16:27

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