Corvinus
Corvinus

Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions

Solymosi, Tamás (2016) Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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Abstract

We consider linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigate the reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita (pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with polynomial many dually esential coalitions.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2016/12
Uncontrolled Keywords:per-capita (pre)nucleolus, least core, computation
JEL classification:C71 - Cooperative Games
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Projects:MTA-BCE "Lendület" Strategic Interactions Research Group, OTKA K-101224
ID Code:2480
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:11 Oct 2016 15:04
Last Modified:11 Oct 2016 15:04

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