Corvinus
Corvinus

Organising collective reputation: An Ostromian perspective

Megyesi, Boldizsár and Mike, Károly (2016) Organising collective reputation: An Ostromian perspective. International Journal of the Commons, 10 (2). pp. 1082-1099. DOI http://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.657

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
134kB

Official URL: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.657


Abstract

What do collective reputation and communal pastures have in common? Collective reputation is an important type of collective good produced by many business networks. We argue that it has the structure of a common-pool resource, which points to the relevance of Elinor Ostrom’s theory about the community governance of natural common-pool resources. After adapting the Ostromian framework to the phenomenon of collective reputation, we explore the experience of two groups of winemaking enterprises in Hungary who set up systems of quality assurance in order to protect and improve their joint reputation. We examine if the conditions identified by Ostrom as favourable for the self-governance of commons are also conducive to the governance of collective reputation. Our findings validate our conjecture that research on goal-oriented business networks may use insights from the mature theory of ‘governing the commons’. Potential pathways for further research are outlined.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:collective reputation, common pool resources, Hungary, institution building, self-governance, wineries
Divisions:Faculty of Economics > Department of Public Policy and Management
Subjects:Economics
Funders:Bolyai Postdoctoral Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Projects:OTKA PD 113072
DOI:http://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.657
ID Code:3356
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:19 Feb 2018 11:34
Last Modified:19 Feb 2018 11:34

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics