Forgó, Ferenc (2019) Necessary conditions on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in concave games and Cournot oligopoly games. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.
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Abstract
Necessary conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria introduced by Joó (A note on minimax theorems, Annales Univ. Sci. Budapest, 39(1996) 175-179) for concave non-cooperative games are generalized and then applied to Cournot oligopoly games. If for a specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then cost functions of the firms must be convex. Analogously, if for another specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then revenue functions of the firms must be concave in their respective variables.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Series Name: | Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP |
| Series Number / Identification Number: | 2019/08 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Nash equilibrium, Cournot oligopoly |
| JEL classification: | L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Economics > Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences |
| Subjects: | Economics Mathematics, Econometrics |
| References: | |
| ID Code: | 4287 |
| Deposited By: | Veronika Vitéz |
| Deposited On: | 05 Nov 2019 12:04 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2019 10:09 |
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