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Corvinus

Necessary conditions on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in concave games and Cournot oligopoly games

Forgó, Ferenc (2019) Necessary conditions on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in concave games and Cournot oligopoly games. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

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Abstract

Necessary conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria introduced by Joó (A note on minimax theorems, Annales Univ. Sci. Budapest, 39(1996) 175-179) for concave non-cooperative games are generalized and then applied to Cournot oligopoly games. If for a specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then cost functions of the firms must be convex. Analogously, if for another specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then revenue functions of the firms must be concave in their respective variables.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Series Name:Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP
Series Number / Identification Number:2019/08
Uncontrolled Keywords:Nash equilibrium, Cournot oligopoly
JEL classification:L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subjects:Economics
Mathematics, Econometrics
ID Code:4287
Deposited By: Veronika Vitéz
Deposited On:05 Nov 2019 12:04
Last Modified:07 Nov 2019 10:09

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