Corvinus
Corvinus

Regression games

Pintér, Miklós (2011) Regression games. Annals of Operations Research, 186 (1). pp. 263-274. DOI 10.1007/s10479-011-0897-0

[img] PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
249kB

Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/9204h4g048p24268/


Abstract

The solution of a TU cooperative game can be a distribution of the value of the grand coalition, i.e. it can be a distribution of the payo (utility) all the players together achieve. In a regression model, the evaluation of the explanatory variables can be a distribution of the overall t, i.e. the t of the model every regressor variable is involved. Furthermore, we can take regression models as TU cooperative games where the explanatory (regressor) variables are the players. In this paper we introduce the class of regression games, characterize it and apply the Shapley value to evaluating the explanatory variables in regression models. In order to support our approach we consider Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value, and conclude that the Shapley value is a reasonable tool to evaluate the explanatory variables of regression models.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:TU game, Shapley value, Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value, Linear regression model
Subjects:Mathematics, Econometrics
Funders:János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Projects:OTKA
DOI:10.1007/s10479-011-0897-0
ID Code:559
Deposited By: Ádám Hoffmann
Deposited On:13 Mar 2012 15:54
Last Modified:16 Aug 2012 23:21

Repository Staff Only: item control page