Rational autocrats? Drivers of corruption patterns in competitive authoritarian regimes: towards an explanatory framework with empirical applications from Hungary

Abstract

Competitive authoritarianism, a specific type of hybrid regime, is gaining ground globally. Corruption is particularly prevalent in these contexts as regimes utilise it to consolidate their power. However, some competitive authoritarian regimes also take significant measures to curb certain types of corruption. The present article posits that competitive authoritarian regimes, acting as rational utility-maximising actors, curb or enhance corruption types based on the net costs and benefits—that is, net gains—they yield for the regime. To elucidate the factors influencing net gains, an explanatory framework is presented. Its three constituent elements are accountability costs, transaction costs, and political benefits. The applicability of the framework is demonstrated with case studies of two corruption types in Hungary, namely, informal payments in healthcare and clientelism in awarding tobacco retail concessions.