The Role of Smallness and Responsibility in the Strategic Narratives of British Elites Regarding the Withdrawal from the Gulf Region (1968–1971)

Abstract

One of the most important attributes of the modern Gulf sub-system of the Middle East and North Africa is the unique distribution of material resources. The region is dominated by three large powers, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which (according to the latest data of the World Bank)1 collectively possess approx. 91% of the territory, 87% of the population, and 78% of the economic capacities in the Gulf.2 The rest is divided between five smaller states, which are squeezed between the three giants, which constantly represent a threat to their political, economic, military, and societal security. This scattered configuration can at least partly be attributed to British policies in the region and the practical consequences of the British withdrawal. Between the 19th and 20th centuries, Great Britain was the dominant power in the Gulf through the so-called trucial system. Nevertheless, because of the review process concerning foreign policy initiated in the 1950s, the British government decided in 1968 to withdraw all armed forces from the region by the end of 1971. This process resulted in a flawed negotiation process between local rulers to form a union, which did not manage to integrate Bahrain and Qatar into the emerging United Arab Emirates. The outcome was the quite unstable situation which reproduced international and transnational tensions and strengthened the identity of smallness and weakness of local rulers, all of which manifested in several border tensions, smaller and larger armed conflicts (e.g., the conquest of Abu Musa and Tunb islands by Iran, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the constant intervention of Iran in Bahrain, and the tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia).