Kobayashi, Katsuya and Tasnádi, Attila (2014) The Multiple Hierarchical Legislatures in a Representative Democracy: Districting for Policy Implementation. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.
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Abstract
We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases because of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters gives a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy. We also show that the range of implementable policies increases with the depth of the hierarchical system. Consequently, districting by a candidate in a hierarchical legislative system can be viewed as a type of policy implementation device.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Series Name: | Corvinus Economics Working Papers - CEWP |
Series Number / Identification Number: | 2014/19 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | electoral systems, median voter, gerrymandering, council democracies. |
JEL classification: | D72 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
Divisions: | Faculty of Economics > Department of Mathematics |
Subjects: | Economics |
Projects: | MTA-BCE "Lendület" Strategic Interactions Research Group |
References: | |
ID Code: | 1774 |
Deposited By: | Ádám Hoffmann |
Deposited On: | 19 Dec 2014 12:51 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jan 2015 08:39 |
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